Chandler v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ.

528 So. 2d 309, 1988 WL 74957
CourtSupreme Court of Alabama
DecidedJune 24, 1988
Docket86-333
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 528 So. 2d 309 (Chandler v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chandler v. Lamar County Bd. of Educ., 528 So. 2d 309, 1988 WL 74957 (Ala. 1988).

Opinion

The plaintiff, Almus Chandler, appeals from a summary judgment for the defendants, Lamar County Board of Education ("the Board") and Don Coker, Superintendent of the Lamar County Board of Education. The circuit court held that the contract Chandler sued upon was void as being against public policy, and thus that Chandler's claim for a portion of certain gas and oil severance tax monies and his claim for the "burned-out school money" was invalid. Additionally, the summary judgment also related to a claim based on allegations of fraudulent inducement to enter into the contract. We reverse and remand.

The facts are as follows:

On March 11, 1983, Chandler and the Board, by its superintendent Coker, entered into an employment contract. Pursuant to the agreement, the Board hired Chandler as a consultant to "seek additional revenue for the Lamar County Board of Education." According to the agreement he was to seek revenue from "any and all sources," including grants, loans, and new and additional sources of revenue, e.g., the "burned-out school fund" and a portion, or at least a more favorable portion, "of Gas and Oil Severance Tax [money] that [was to become] due Lamar County, Alabama." As compensation, the Board agreed to pay Chandler a portion of those monies, based on a graduated rate.

After Chandler secured additional revenues for the Board from various sources, a dispute arose between the parties regarding Chandler's compensation. Chandler and the Board entered into an addendum to the agreement, as a proposed settlement of the dispute. The addendum purported to clarify and make a final settlement of any disputes arising out of the contract.

Furthermore, while the promise is not expressly stated in the addendum, Chandler claims that the Board orally promised to pay him $11,000.00 "plus all other monies owed to him in exchange for his relinquishment of his claim for oil and gas severance tax money." Chandler says that the Board failed to perform its oral promise under the addendum and refused to pay him all of the monies he claims is owing to him under the initial contract. The Board paid Chandler on his first claim for compensation but it refused to pay him on his subsequent claims. It reasoned that the contract was void because it violated public policy. Chandler sued the Board and Coker for damages, alleging that they had breached the contract. He also claimed that they had fraudulently induced him to enter into a contract that they did not intend to perform. The court granted the Board's and Coker's summary judgment motions on these claims. Chandler appeals.

I.
Chandler maintains that the trial court erred in holding that the contract was void as being against public policy. The trial court does not state in its order why it reached this conclusion. After examining the record, we conclude that the considerations *Page 311 central to the trial court's findings were:

1. the contract was contingent in nature, and

2. it was a lobbying1 contract under which the compensation was contingent upon the passage of certain measures.2

While there is some authority holding that contingent contracts in general are void as against public policy, this is not the law in Alabama. Jurisdictions prohibiting contingency contracts have done so in a variety of cases and tend to strike contingency agreements where the compensation is tied to, or predicated upon, the passage of legislation.

In 1913, this Court considered and set forth the proper way to view contingent contracts. That wisdom still rings true today. In Alabama:

We are not disposed to attach controlling importance to the presence or absence of this fact, for the reason that, while the fact that his compensation is contingent will naturally stimulate the efforts of a broker or other agent and so hold out inducement to the use of improper means, and such contracts ought therefore perhaps to be subjected to the more careful scrutiny, yet the temptation to wrong in such cases is not different in kind from the seduction of self-interest which inheres in all business transactions, and, if the parties in truth contemplate no impropriety and the contract is irreproachable in other respects, our judgment is that it cannot be condemned because there is a stipulation for a contingent compensation. The contract is good or bad without regard to that circumstance. [Citation omitted.]

Bush v. Russell, 180 Ala. 590, 595-96, 61 So. 373, 375 (1913). Our approach to analyzing contingent contracts has been to look first at the face of the contract to determine if there is an "appearance of secrecy or deception to be practiced, . . . [or if] fraud or corruption [is] contemplated — [anything] to justify a judicial declaration that it is against fair dealing, good morals, or public policy." Bush,180 Ala. at 599, 61 So. at 376 (1913) (citation omitted). InHunt v. Test, 8 Ala. 713 (1845), this Court upheld a contract where one party contracted to "do all in his power to prevent the confirmation" of a land claim by the decedent's heirs and to obtain the passage of an act favoring other parties. This Court said, "The contract on its face does not import that any unfair, or improper means were to be resorted to." We prohibit contracts that are contingent in nature only where the "agreements [are] to do acts [that are] in themselves contrary to public policy, or agreements the performance of *Page 312 which, by necessary inference, require or contemplate the resort to methods having a corrupting tendency." Bush,180 Ala. at 598, 61 So. at 376, quoting Houlton v.Nichol, 93 Wis. 393, 67 N.W. 715 (1896). See also,Stanton v. Embrey, 93 U.S. (3 Otto) 548, 23 L.Ed. 983 (1876). We give the following caution, however:

It may be made to appear in proof that, notwithstanding the fair form of the contract, the parties intended or contemplated that some additional element of improper personal solicitation, secret and discreditable influence, or other unlawful means, should be used in effecting a sale of defendant's property. If so, the jury will, on issues properly framed, declare the contract to be void and unenforceable.

Bush, 180 Ala. at 599, 600, 61 So. at 376.

The Board argues that Hunt and its progeny are distinguishable from the present case. Here, they argue, Chandler's agreement required him to exert influence over governmental appropriations via the legislature. Along these lines, the Board argues that the public's interest is insuring that legislative decisions be made openly and absent from improper influences. We agree and observe that the merits of legislation should override private interests.

The terms of the contract provided that Chandler would "seek additional revenue . . . from any and all sources." Had the terms concerned monies that were within the exclusive control of the legislature and thereby required Chandler to lobby the legislature for the passage of the Oil and Gas Severance Act, our holding might have been otherwise.

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Bluebook (online)
528 So. 2d 309, 1988 WL 74957, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chandler-v-lamar-county-bd-of-educ-ala-1988.