Chandler v. Dejoy

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 15, 2025
• Docket: 24-1265
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 15 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JOHN W. CHANDLER, No. 24-1265 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:20-cv-00924-DWL v. MEMORANDUM* LOUIS DEJOY, Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service,

Defendant - Appellee,

and

MEGAN J. BRENNAN, Former Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service,

Defendant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Dominic Lanza, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 13, 2025** Phoenix, Arizona

Before: RAWLINSON, BUMATAY, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Plaintiff-Appellant John Chandler (“Chandler”) was employed as a City

Letter Carrier for Defendant-Appellee, the United States Postal Service

(“Defendant”). Defendant terminated Chandler’s employment in May 2016

following over two dozen unscheduled absences between November 2015 and

March 2016 related to Chandler’s mental and physical health problems. We

review the district court’s dismissal of Chandler’s claims of age and disability

discrimination, retaliation, and hostile work environment, and its entry of summary

judgment on Chandler’s Rehabilitation Act claim. We have jurisdiction under 28

U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

1. The district court properly granted summary judgment for Defendant on

Chandler’s claim under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 794. To state a claim,

a plaintiff who is disabled must prove that he is “qualified” for his position. Cripe

v. City of San Jose, 261 F.3d 877, 884 (9th Cir. 2001). “If a disabled person cannot

perform a job’s ‘essential functions’ (even with a reasonable accommodation),”

then the person is not a “qualified individual” and “the ADA’s [and Rehabilitation

Act’s] employment protections do not apply.”1 Id. Here, the descriptions in the

record for Chandler’s job clearly establish that regular physical attendance is an

essential function. It is undisputed that Chandler’s disability prevented him

1 The standards used to determine a violation of the Rehabilitation Act are the same as those set forth under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). 29 U.S.C. § 794(d).

2 24-1265 performing this essential function without a reasonable accommodation.

Chandler argues that “intermittent leave and leave for a period of time [i]s a

reasonable accommodation.” He is mistaken. Where an essential job function is

“on-site regular attendance,” allowing a plaintiff to “simply miss work whenever

she felt she needed to and apparently for so long as she felt she needed to as a

matter of law is not reasonable on its face.” Samper v. Providence St. Vincent

Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233, 1238, 1240 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). Because

Chandler fails to establish a reasonable accommodation, he is not a qualified

individual, and his Rehabilitation Act claim is foreclosed.

2. The district court properly dismissed Chandler’s other claims arising

before February 19, 2016, for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, 29 C.F.R.

§ 1614.105(a)(1). As for claims arising after February 19, 2016, the district court

properly dismissed his age discrimination claim for failure to adequately allege that

younger employees received favorable treatment and his hostile working

environment and retaliation claims for exceeding the scope of the district court’s

grant of leave to amend.

Chandler contends that the district court erred by dismissing the claims

arising before February 19, 2016, because Defendant’s discrimination was a

“continuing violation,” a “pattern and practice,” and because “equitable tolling [is]

applicable here.” We disagree. The continuing violation doctrine is limited to

3 24-1265 hostile work environment claims, not claims premised on “discrete discriminatory

acts,” as is the case here. Cherosky v. Henderson, 330 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir.

2003) (citation omitted). We have also “consistently refused to apply the [pattern

and practice theory] to rescue individualized claims that are otherwise time-barred”

unless a plaintiff brings a class-wide claim. Bird v. Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 935 F.3d

738, 748 (9th Cir. 2019). Chandler does not. Lastly, Chandler fails to set forth any

facts to support equitable tolling. See Leong v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1117, 1123 (9th

Cir. 2003).

AFFIRMED.

4 24-1265