Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota

876 F. Supp. 209, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2140
CourtDistrict Court, D. South Dakota
DecidedFebruary 21, 1995
DocketCiv. 94-3002
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 876 F. Supp. 209 (Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. South Dakota primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota, 876 F. Supp. 209, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2140 (D.S.D. 1995).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

JOHN B. JONES, Senior District Judge.

Plaintiff Chance Management, Inc. (Chance) is a South Dakota corporation whose majority stock ownership is held by plaintiff William A. Sanders (Sanders), a Wyoming resident. SDCL § 42-7A-43 restricts licenses for video lottery machine operators (machine operators) to South Dakota residents, or partnerships or corporations whose majority ownership is held by South Dakota residents. After Chance was denied a video lottery machine operator’s license, the plaintiffs brought this suit to challenge the constitutionality of the residency requirement.

Both sides moved for summary judgment. For the reasons set out below, summary judgment will be granted to the defendants.

Background

The South Dakota Lottery commenced operation in 1989. 1989 S.L., ch. 374. It is regulated in considerable detail by the South Dakota Lottery Commission. SDCL Ch. 42-7A. The lottery business is broken down by statute into four divisions, each of which is separately licensed. SDCL § 42-7A-41.

The video lottery machine manufacturers and video lottery machine distributors are separately licensed, and their roles in the business are self-explanatory. The video lottery establishment or retailer operates the premises where the machines are available to the public for play.

The machine operator purchases the video lottery terminals (machine) from the distributor and owns, maintains and places the machines in the retail establishments.

The State of South Dakota dictates to manufacturers the electronic circuitry required and owns the programs in the logic boards and the Erasable, Programmable Read Only Memory (EPROM) chips in the machines. The state’s central computer is connected to each machine and controls payouts and maintains a record of the machine’s usage.

The state’s share of the net machine revenue generated by each machine started at 22 per cent, is now at 37 per cent, and legislation is pending to raise it to 50 per cent. The state’s share is collected every two weeks from the machine operator by means of electronic “sweeps” of the operator’s bank account.

Discussion

Chance and Sanders challenge the video lottery operator license residency requirement on the basis that it violates the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States Constitution. These issues will be addressed in that order.

*211 I. Commerce Clause.

The Commerce Clause reserves to Congress the power to “regulate Commerce ... among the several States.” U.S. Const, art. I, § 8, cl. 3. The state argues that the residency requirement is not subject to Commerce Clause scrutiny because the state is acting as a market participant.

The market participant exception has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court in three instances: Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 96 S.Ct. 2488, 49 L.Ed.2d 220 (1976), (holding that the state of Maryland was a participant in the market of purchasing junk car hulks through a bounty system); Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 100 S.Ct. 2271, 65 L.Ed.2d 244 (1980), (holding that the South Dakota State Cement Plant was a market participant as a seller of cement products); and White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 103 S.Ct. 1042, 75 L.Ed.2d 1 (1983), (holding that the city of Boston was acting as a market participant when it contracted for public works construction).

It has also been the subject of law review articles, including Dan T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 Mich. L.Rev. 395 (1989) and Barton B. Clark, Comment, Give ’Em Enough Rope: States, Subdivisions and the Market Participant Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 60 U.Chi.L.Rev. 615 (1993).

The Supreme Court eases “make clear that if a State is acting as a market participant, rather than a market regulator, the dormant Commerce Clause places no limitation on its activities.” South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93, 104 S.Ct. 2237, 2243, 81 L.Ed.2d 71 (1983) (citations omitted). The rationale for this exception is that the state, having entered a market, should be allowed to operate freely as any other business would in that market. “[T]he Commerce Clause responds principally to state tax and regulatory measures impeding free private trade in the national marketplace. There is no indication of a constitutional plan to limit the ability of States themselves to operate freely in the free market.” Reeves, 447 U.S. at 436-37, 100 S.Ct. at 2277 (citations omitted). “[T]he competing considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis.” Id. at 439, 100 S.Ct. at 2279. These considerations favor leaving the states unfettered when acting as a market participant.

This case is a perfect example of that mix of concerns. The record convinces me that the State of South Dakota is a market participant with the machine operators in the operation of the South Dakota State Lottery for a number of reasons.

First, the enterprise has always been known as the “State Lottery”, SDCL Ch. 42-7A, which at least implies that the state has a controlling interest in its operation and management.

Second, the state dictates the makeup of the electronic programs and chips built into the machines.

Third, the state requires that all machines be connected with and controlled by the state’s central computer system, including controlling the payouts of the machines.

Fourth, the state requires that each machine be given an ID number which is programmed into its logic board and EPROM chip, to permit the state to track the machine and its key internal components.

Fifth, the substantial investment in the state’s central computer system, software, personnel and equipment to allow the operation of the video lottery is clearly a proprietary interest.

Sixth, the state takes a share of the net take of the machines, now 37%, which far exceeds any reasonable regulatory license fee, and being a very substantial portion of the gross profit generated by the machines, makes this proprietary interest even stronger.

And, finally, the state controls the lottery business in great detail through its statutes, SDCL Ch.

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Related

C.S. McCrossan Construction, Inc. v. Rahn
96 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (D. New Mexico, 2000)
Chance Management, Inc. v. South Dakota
97 F.3d 1107 (Eighth Circuit, 1996)
Chance Management, Inc. v. State Of South Dakota
97 F.3d 1107 (Eighth Circuit, 1996)

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Bluebook (online)
876 F. Supp. 209, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2140, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chance-management-inc-v-south-dakota-sdd-1995.