[Cite as Champion Waterproofing, Inc. v. RWC Rentals, 2026-Ohio-2259.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
CHAMPION WATERPROOFING, CASE NO. 2025-T-0067 INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas - vs -
RWC RENTALS, et al., Trial Court No. 2023 CV 00336
Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: June 15, 2026 Judgment: Reversed; remanded
Thomas E. Lyden, James E. Lanzo, L.L.C., 4126 Youngstown-Poland Road, Youngstown, OH 44514 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
James J. Crisan, Martin F. White Co., L.P.A., 156 Park Avenue, N.E., P.O. Box 1150, Warren, OH 44482 (For Defendants-Appellants).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellants, RWC Rentals and its owner, Robert Cregar, (collectively
“RWC”), appeal the judgment granting the motion of appellee, Champion Waterproofing,
Inc. (“Champion”), to enforce a settlement agreement. We reverse the judgment and
remand this matter to the trial court to enter judgment denying Champion’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement.
{¶2} In 2022, Champion commenced the underlying action by filing a complaint
in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, seeking payment for work it had
performed on RWC’s rental property. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas (“the trial court”) on Champion’s motion, and the matter
was set for mediation. During mediation, the parties reached an agreement.
{¶3} On December 15, 2023, the parties executed a written settlement
agreement requiring RWC to pay $10,000 to Champion Waterproofing, with $5,000 due
immediately upon signing, and $5,000 to be held in trust. The parties agreed that
Champion would perform certain work, including attaching window wells, remedying
electrical work, trenching and burying a drainpipe, and running pipes to a basin. The
agreement specifically provided that the work would not be warrantied upon completion
due to Champion’s belief that the buried drainpipe would fail and the basement would
flood.
{¶4} On August 1, 2024, the case was dismissed with prejudice, subject to the
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to enforce the settlement agreement.
{¶5} On October 28, 2024, Champion filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement, arguing that it had completed the work as agreed, but RWC failed to pay the
remaining $5,000 due.
{¶6} On August 25, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion. Thereafter, the court issued an entry stating that, although the drain pipe was not
buried to the depth that RWC had wanted, the settlement agreement contained no terms
as to the depth of the pipe. The court granted Champion’s motion to enforce the
agreement and ordered RWC to remit payment of the remaining $5,000 to Champion
within seven days.
{¶7} On October 1, 2025, RWC noticed this appeal and now raises one assigned
error for our review. In the sole assigned error, RWC argues:
PAGE 2 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 {¶8} “The trial court committed reversible error by granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement.”
{¶9} The standard of review applied to a ruling on a motion to enforce a
settlement agreement depends upon the issue being raised. Thirion v. Neumann, 2005-
Ohio-4486, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.). Where the issue pertains to interpretation of the agreement
or other issues of contract law, we review the trial court’s judgment de novo. See N.E.
Cable Television Sys. v. Pantalone, 2011-Ohio-6840, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.); Continental W.
Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 1996-Ohio-158, ¶ 6;
Savoy Hosp., L.L.C. v. 5839 Monroe St. Assocs., L.L.C., 2015-Ohio-4879, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.).
{¶10} Here, RWC does not challenge the trial court’s interpretation of the
agreement, but, instead, maintains that the evidence did not support judgment in favor of
Champion. Civil judgments may be challenged as lacking sufficient evidence or as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence under the same standards used in criminal
cases. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, paragraph two of the syllabus. “In a civil
case, in which the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each element
(sufficiency) and the evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of persuasion
(weight).” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶11} “Sufficiency” of the evidence is “‘a term of art meaning that legal standard
which is applied to determine . . . whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
. . . verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 23, quoting Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). The reviewing court determines, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, “whether a rational trier of fact could have found
PAGE 3 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 the essential elements proven to the requisite degree.” Riley v. Kavanaugh, 2024-Ohio-
5765, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).
{¶12} The “[w]eight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount
of credible evidence . . . to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis
added in Thompkins.) Thompkins at ¶ 24, quoting Black’s. When considering challenges
to the weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews “‘the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶13} Here, Champion, as the party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement,
bore “the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the elements of a
claim for breach of a settlement agreement.” (Citations omitted.) Rondy, Inc. v. Goodyear
Tire Rubber Co., 2004-Ohio-835, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). “‘Those elements include the existence
of a [settlement agreement], performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and
damage or loss to the plaintiff.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d 597,
600 (2d Dist. 1994).
{¶14} Applying these principles to the present case, there is no dispute that the
parties entered into a settlement agreement. There is also no dispute that the terms of
the agreement included that Champion was “to attach window wells, remedy electrical
wire in area of prior work, [and] trench [and] bury drain line.” Instead, RWC maintains that
Champion failed to prove that it performed its responsibilities under the agreement. In
PAGE 4 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 support, RWC first argues that Champion failed to put forth any proof that it completed
the electrical work.
{¶15} At the evidentiary hearing, on the issue of the electrical work, counsel for
Champion asked Champion’s president, Howard Alexander, “Did we remedy the electric
wire in the area of prior work?” Alexander responded, “That I can’t recall. It’s been a year
and a half since we’ve done that.” Alexander repeated during cross-examination and
redirect examination that he could not recall if the electrical work had been completed.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
[Cite as Champion Waterproofing, Inc. v. RWC Rentals, 2026-Ohio-2259.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT TRUMBULL COUNTY
CHAMPION WATERPROOFING, CASE NO. 2025-T-0067 INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellee, Civil Appeal from the Court of Common Pleas - vs -
RWC RENTALS, et al., Trial Court No. 2023 CV 00336
Defendants-Appellants.
OPINION AND JUDGMENT ENTRY
Decided: June 15, 2026 Judgment: Reversed; remanded
Thomas E. Lyden, James E. Lanzo, L.L.C., 4126 Youngstown-Poland Road, Youngstown, OH 44514 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).
James J. Crisan, Martin F. White Co., L.P.A., 156 Park Avenue, N.E., P.O. Box 1150, Warren, OH 44482 (For Defendants-Appellants).
EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.
{¶1} Appellants, RWC Rentals and its owner, Robert Cregar, (collectively
“RWC”), appeal the judgment granting the motion of appellee, Champion Waterproofing,
Inc. (“Champion”), to enforce a settlement agreement. We reverse the judgment and
remand this matter to the trial court to enter judgment denying Champion’s motion to
enforce the settlement agreement.
{¶2} In 2022, Champion commenced the underlying action by filing a complaint
in the Mahoning County Court of Common Pleas, seeking payment for work it had
performed on RWC’s rental property. Thereafter, the case was transferred to the Trumbull County Court of Common Pleas (“the trial court”) on Champion’s motion, and the matter
was set for mediation. During mediation, the parties reached an agreement.
{¶3} On December 15, 2023, the parties executed a written settlement
agreement requiring RWC to pay $10,000 to Champion Waterproofing, with $5,000 due
immediately upon signing, and $5,000 to be held in trust. The parties agreed that
Champion would perform certain work, including attaching window wells, remedying
electrical work, trenching and burying a drainpipe, and running pipes to a basin. The
agreement specifically provided that the work would not be warrantied upon completion
due to Champion’s belief that the buried drainpipe would fail and the basement would
flood.
{¶4} On August 1, 2024, the case was dismissed with prejudice, subject to the
continuing jurisdiction of the trial court to enforce the settlement agreement.
{¶5} On October 28, 2024, Champion filed a motion to enforce the settlement
agreement, arguing that it had completed the work as agreed, but RWC failed to pay the
remaining $5,000 due.
{¶6} On August 25, 2025, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on the
motion. Thereafter, the court issued an entry stating that, although the drain pipe was not
buried to the depth that RWC had wanted, the settlement agreement contained no terms
as to the depth of the pipe. The court granted Champion’s motion to enforce the
agreement and ordered RWC to remit payment of the remaining $5,000 to Champion
within seven days.
{¶7} On October 1, 2025, RWC noticed this appeal and now raises one assigned
error for our review. In the sole assigned error, RWC argues:
PAGE 2 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 {¶8} “The trial court committed reversible error by granting Plaintiff's Motion to
Enforce Settlement Agreement.”
{¶9} The standard of review applied to a ruling on a motion to enforce a
settlement agreement depends upon the issue being raised. Thirion v. Neumann, 2005-
Ohio-4486, ¶ 14 (11th Dist.). Where the issue pertains to interpretation of the agreement
or other issues of contract law, we review the trial court’s judgment de novo. See N.E.
Cable Television Sys. v. Pantalone, 2011-Ohio-6840, ¶ 8 (11th Dist.); Continental W.
Condominium Unit Owners Assn. v. Howard E. Ferguson, Inc., 1996-Ohio-158, ¶ 6;
Savoy Hosp., L.L.C. v. 5839 Monroe St. Assocs., L.L.C., 2015-Ohio-4879, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.).
{¶10} Here, RWC does not challenge the trial court’s interpretation of the
agreement, but, instead, maintains that the evidence did not support judgment in favor of
Champion. Civil judgments may be challenged as lacking sufficient evidence or as being
against the manifest weight of the evidence under the same standards used in criminal
cases. Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, paragraph two of the syllabus. “In a civil
case, in which the burden of persuasion is only by a preponderance of the evidence,
rather than beyond a reasonable doubt, evidence must still exist on each element
(sufficiency) and the evidence on each element must satisfy the burden of persuasion
(weight).” Id. at ¶ 19.
{¶11} “Sufficiency” of the evidence is “‘a term of art meaning that legal standard
which is applied to determine . . . whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
. . . verdict as a matter of law.’” State v. Thompkins, 1997-Ohio-52, ¶ 23, quoting Black’s
Law Dictionary (6th Ed. 1990). The reviewing court determines, after viewing the evidence
in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, “whether a rational trier of fact could have found
PAGE 3 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 the essential elements proven to the requisite degree.” Riley v. Kavanaugh, 2024-Ohio-
5765, ¶ 21 (11th Dist.).
{¶12} The “[w]eight of the evidence concerns ‘the inclination of the greater amount
of credible evidence . . . to support one side of the issue rather than the other.’” (Emphasis
added in Thompkins.) Thompkins at ¶ 24, quoting Black’s. When considering challenges
to the weight of the evidence, an appellate court reviews “‘the entire record, weighs the
evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses and
determines whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [finder of fact] clearly lost
its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the [judgment] must be
reversed and a new trial ordered.’” Thompkins at ¶ 25, quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio
App.3d 172, 175 (1st Dist. 1983).
{¶13} Here, Champion, as the party seeking to enforce the settlement agreement,
bore “the burden to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, all of the elements of a
claim for breach of a settlement agreement.” (Citations omitted.) Rondy, Inc. v. Goodyear
Tire Rubber Co., 2004-Ohio-835, ¶ 7 (9th Dist.). “‘Those elements include the existence
of a [settlement agreement], performance by the plaintiff, breach by the defendant, and
damage or loss to the plaintiff.’” Id. at ¶ 7, quoting Doner v. Snapp, 98 Ohio App.3d 597,
600 (2d Dist. 1994).
{¶14} Applying these principles to the present case, there is no dispute that the
parties entered into a settlement agreement. There is also no dispute that the terms of
the agreement included that Champion was “to attach window wells, remedy electrical
wire in area of prior work, [and] trench [and] bury drain line.” Instead, RWC maintains that
Champion failed to prove that it performed its responsibilities under the agreement. In
PAGE 4 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 support, RWC first argues that Champion failed to put forth any proof that it completed
the electrical work.
{¶15} At the evidentiary hearing, on the issue of the electrical work, counsel for
Champion asked Champion’s president, Howard Alexander, “Did we remedy the electric
wire in the area of prior work?” Alexander responded, “That I can’t recall. It’s been a year
and a half since we’ve done that.” Alexander repeated during cross-examination and
redirect examination that he could not recall if the electrical work had been completed.
Alexander indicated that RWC has never called Champion for service or to complain since
entering into the settlement agreement.
{¶16} Further, at the hearing, in support of RWC, Cregar testified that Champion
had not performed the work required of it under the settlement agreement. Specifically,
with regard to the electrical repair, on cross-examination, Cregar stated that he did not
believe that the electrical work had been completed.
{¶17} In its ruling on the motion to enforce the settlement agreement, the trial court
did not address the provision of the settlement agreement requiring Champion to “remedy
electrical wire in area of prior work. . . .” RWC maintains that, as no evidence was
presented on this material term of the agreement, the trial court erred in granting the
motion to enforce.
{¶18} Champion responds that, although Alexander could not recall whether the
electrical work was done, the trial court could reasonably infer it was completed because
the evidence demonstrated that Champion had performed work pursuant to the
settlement agreement, and RWC did not contact Champion to demand the electrical work
be completed.
PAGE 5 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 {¶19} It is well settled that circumstantial and direct evidence hold the same
probative value. State v. Jenks, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991); State v. Seymour, 2026-Ohio-
1249, ¶ 18. Circumstantial evidence may be defined as “‘“proof of facts by direct evidence
from which the trier of fact may infer or derive by reasoning other facts in accordance with
the common experience of mankind. . . .”’” Seymour at ¶ 18, quoting State v. Roberts,
2025-Ohio-5120, ¶ 140, quoting State v. Griffin, 13 Ohio App.3d 376, 377 (1st Dist. 1979).
{¶20} Thus, Champion was not required to put forth direct evidence of completion
of the electrical work. However, if Champion intended to rely on circumstantial evidence
to meet its burden of proving that it performed this aspect of the agreement, the trial court
must have been able to infer from this evidence, in accordance with common experience,
that the electrical work had been completed.
{¶21} However, the only evidence on which Champion relies that was presented
at the hearing consists of evidence that (1) certain work involving the drain had been
performed at the property following the settlement agreement, and (2) RWC did not
contact Champion to complain about the work being incomplete. It cannot be rationally
inferred from this evidence that Champion completed the electrical work in accordance
with the agreement. Common human experience does not indicate that all required work
under an agreement will be performed at the same time, nor does common experience
suggest that a party will likely contact another to complain of incomplete performance
under an agreement where, as here, RWC was not required to release the remaining
$5,000 prior to completion of the work. To reach a conclusion that the electrical work had
been completed in this case would require the court to stack inferences or engage in
PAGE 6 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 speculation. Compare Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hamilton Twp. Trustees, 28 Ohio St.3d
13, 17 (1986).
{¶22} As no evidence was presented on this aspect of the agreement, Champion
failed to meet its burden of production on the element of its claim that it had performed its
duties under the settlement agreement. Therefore, the trial court’s ruling on the motion to
enforce the settlement agreement lacked sufficient evidence, and thus it erred as a matter
of law. As RWC is entitled to judgment on this basis, we need not reach any further issues
raised by RWC, as they have been rendered moot. See App.R. 12(B).
{¶23} Based on the foregoing, RWC’s sole assigned error has merit.
{¶24} The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and this matter is remanded to
the trial court to enter judgment denying Champion’s motion to enforce the settlement
agreement.
MATT LYNCH, P.J.,
SCOTT LYNCH, J.,
concur.
PAGE 7 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067 JUDGMENT ENTRY
For the reasons stated in the opinion of this court, appellant’s sole assignment of
error has merit. It is the judgment and order of this court that the judgment of the Trumbull
County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Costs to be taxed against appellee.
JUDGE EUGENE A. LUCCI
PRESIDING JUDGE MATT LYNCH, concurs
JUDGE SCOTT LYNCH, concurs
THIS DOCUMENT CONSTITUTES A FINAL JUDGMENT ENTRY
A certified copy of this opinion and judgment entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Ohio Rules of Appellate Procedure.
PAGE 8 OF 8
Case No. 2025-T-0067