RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0270P (6th Cir.) Nashville, Inc. et al. File Name: 04a0270p.06 _________________ UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS COUNSEL FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT ARGUED: Francis H. Young, METROPOLITAN _________________ DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Trent A. McCain, COCHRAN, CHERRY, CALVIN B. CHAMPION et al., X GIVENS, SMITH & MONTGOMERY, Chicago, Illinois, for Plaintiffs-Appellees, - Appellees. ON BRIEF: Francis H. Young, - METROPOLITAN DEPARTMENT OF LAW, Nashville, - No. 03-5068 Tennessee, for Appellants. Trent A. McCain, James D. v. - Montgomery, Thomas C. Marszewski, COCHRAN, > CHERRY, GIVENS, SMITH & MONTGOMERY, Chicago, , OUTLOOK NASHVILLE , INC. et - Illinois, for Appellees. al., - Defendants, - _________________ - OPINION DEBBIE MILLER et al., - _________________ Defendants-Appellants. - - KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. The death of N Calvin D. Champion (“Champion”) shortly after being Appeal from the United States District Court detained, restrained, and subdued by Nashville Police Officers for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville. presents us with a difficult issue of whether the Officers are No. 00-00568—Todd J. Campbell, District Judge. entitled to qualified immunity such that we should reverse a jury verdict rendered against them. On April 30, 1999, Argued: April 21, 2004 Champion overwhelmed the facilities of his caregiver, promoting a response by the Nasvhille Police. Three Decided and Filed: August 19, 2004 Nashville Police Officers, Defendants-Appellants Debbie Miller (“Miller”), Richard Woodside (“Woodside”), and Before: BATCHELDER and MOORE, Circuit Judges; Craig Dickhaus (“Dickhaus”) (collectively “Defendants” or CALDWELL, District Judge.* “Officers”), subdued Champion with pepper spray and physical restraints. At trial, five different witnesses testified that after Champion was handcuffed and his feet were bound, the Officers continued to pepper spray Champion and to apply pressure to Champion’s back as he lay on his stomach. * Champion died en route to the hospital shortly after this The Honorable Karen K. Caldwell, United States District Judge for incident. Champion’s father, Calvin B. Champion, and the Eastern District of Kentucky, sitting by designation.
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Champion’s sister, Jetonne Champion-Collins, (together Delelys had taken Champion and her three-year-old son “Plaintiffs”),1 brought an action against the Officers pursuant Devin, Champion began to have a “behavior.” Delelys had to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A jury awarded the Plaintiffs $900,000 neglected to seatbelt Champion, and Champion began to in damages for Champion’s physical and mental pain and move around Delelys’s minivan, hitting himself in the face suffering. Following the return of the verdict, the district and biting his hand, which was a type of “behavior” court denied the Officers’ motion for a judgment as a matter Champion frequently exhibited. Delelys stated that of law or a new trial or remittitur, in which they argued that Champion was very agitated, “slapping his own head harder they were entitled to qualified immunity and that the verdict than usual, biting his own hand harder than usual, slapping was excessive. the top of [Devin]’s head, shaking [Devin]’s hand.” Joint Appendix (“J.A.”) at 165. While the Officers undoubtedly faced unenviable choices in their interactions with Champion, they are not entitled to Delelys stopped the van, fearing that Champion’s behavior qualified immunity. Based upon the testimony presented at would further escalate. Delelys and Champion both exited trial, the Officers’ actions in this particular situation violated the van. Champion grabbed Delelys’s right hand and started Champion’s clearly established rights. Consequently, we to rub her hand all over his head, a response which, AFFIRM the judgment of the district court, which upheld the unbeknownst to Delelys, had helped Champion to calm down jury’s verdict. in the past. Delelys became frightened. She broke away from Champion and locked herself in the van, realizing she had lost I. FACTS AND PROCEDURE control. Delelys tried to get help. She failed in her repeated attempts to call the Outlook emergency number. Finally, A. Factual Background Delelys called 911. Right after she finished her phone call, Officer Debbie Miller appeared at the driver-side window, The parties mostly agree on the anguishing series of events having been alerted to the developing problem by other that culminated in Champion’s death, but they differ with Babies ‘R’ Us customers who had phoned 911. Delelys regards to the most crucial moments of the incident. informed Miller that Champion was mentally ill, but Delelys Champion, who was 32 years old at the time of his death, did not tell Miller that Champion was nonverbal and completely lacked the ability to care for himself on account nonresponsive. of his autism. He was nonresponsive and unable to speak. Outlook Nashville, Inc. (“Outlook”), which provided care for Miller approached Champion, asking him for his name and developmentally disabled individuals, was responsible for his to explain the reason for his agitation. Champion was hitting well-being. On April 30, 2000, Jolene Delelys (“Delelys”), and biting himself as he began to approach Miller. Miller told an Outlook employee, watched over Champion. Upon Champion to stop, but Champion kept advancing towards departing from a Nashville Babies ‘R’ Us store, where Miller. Miller had walked backwards about fifty feet through the parking lot, retreating from Champion, when Champion grabbed Miller’s shirt. Miller pushed Champion’s hand away 1 and delivered a short burst of pepper spray to Champion’s Champio n’s father brought the action individually and as the personal representative of Champion’s estate. Champ ion’s sister was a face. plaintiff in her individ ual cap acity only. No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 5 6 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
Champion walked dazedly into the Babies ‘R’ Us. Miller Plaintiffs have not suggested that the Officers acted followed him into the store, and after a few minutes she improperly before Champion was handcuffed and hobbled. touched him on the arm and ordered him to leave. Champion Indeed, the Plaintiffs’ entire § 1983 claim is premised on the responded to this command, giving Miller the false Officers’ alleged use of pepper spray and application of impression that Champion actually understood her. Just as asphyxiating pressure after Champion’s incapacitation. The the two exited the store, Officer Richard Woodside arrived. parties disagreed during trial, and continue to diverge, in their Miller informed Woodside that Champion was “10-35” — respective understandings of how much force the Officers police code for “mentally ill individual” — and that she had used after Champion was incapacitated on the ground. previously sprayed Champion with pepper spray. Miller and Woodside attempted to arrest Champion outside the store, but After several minutes of being on the ground, Champion the Officers struggled with Champion until Officer Craig began to vomit. Woodside immediately called for an Dickhaus arrived. The Officers decided to take Champion to ambulance. Between Champion’s first regurgitation and the the ground in the entrance foyer of the store, an area with arrival of the EMTs, Champion vomited two more times. carpeting. As Miller described it, “Woodside bends or squats Each time, according to the officers, Dickhaus and Miller down to where he has his arms wrapped around, a bear hug pulled Champion back by the arms so that he would not be position if you will, of Champion’s lower legs. And as lying in his own vomit. They also checked Champion’s Officer Dickhaus and myself step forward, we bring mouth and nose to ensure that he was still breathing. The Champion down to his knees, and then from his knees we Officers reported that after vomiting, Champion was alert, gently lay him from his knees, his knees to his stomach, and blinking, breathing, and moving his head from side-to-side. down on his chest to the ground.” J.A. at 248. The EMTs entered the store shortly after Champion Once on the ground Champion struggled. The Officers vomited for a third time. The first EMT to view Champion handcuffed Champion using two sets of handcuffs so as to was Douglas Baggett (“Baggett”). Baggett testified that as he allow Champion more movement. Champion continued to stepped over Champion, he noticed that Champion’s legs squirm and move around. Because Woodside had difficulty moved a couple of inches, which gave Baggett the impression controlling Champion’s feet, which were kicking high into that Champion was alive. Then, Champion’s “belly rose, his the air, Miller and Dickhaus decided to restrain Champion back rose up, and then he vomited,” J.A. at 153 (Baggett further through the use of a “hobble device,” which Test.), such that Baggett thought he was watching Champion essentially binds an individual’s ankles together. The “take his last breath.” J.A. at 154. Baggett failed to find a Officers had difficulty putting on the hobble device because pulse on Champion and asked the Officers to remove the Champion was still kicking violently, but they eventually handcuffs, which they promptly did. Champion went into “hobbled” him. cardiac arrest; despite effort to resuscitate him, he was pronounced dead on arrival at the hospital. The parties’ divergent recounting of what occurred in the seventeen minutes between the application of the hobbling All three Officers claim that none of them put pressure on device and the arrival of the emergency medical technicians Champion’s back or pressed Champion’s face into the floor (“EMT”) was one of the most significant factual issues at trial such that he could not breathe during this entire time period. and is the axis around which this appeal revolves. The See J.A. at 181, 185 (Dickhaus Test.); J.A. at 255-56 (Miller No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 7 8 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
Test.) (“Not only did I not [lie across Champion’s back, lie All of these witnesses stated that they did not see Champion across his legs, or kick him], I took extra care myself to make struggle during this time. There were some inconsistencies, sure that Champion did not receive any injuries from the however, in the witnesses’ stories, particularly with regard to ground . . . . [W]e knew he had a mental problem.”); J.A. at the length of time that various activities regarding Champion 298 (Woodside Test.). Additionally, the Officers claimed that went on and the number of Officers who were lying on him Champion was not sprayed again with chemicals after he was after they brought him to the ground. on the ground. J.A. at 185 (Dickhaus Test.); J.A. at 298 (Woodside Test.). Paramedic Douglas Sleighter, who is B. Procedural History extremely sensitive to pepper spray such that he feels its effects if it is sprayed near him or on another individual near Plaintiffs filed their action on June 15, 2000. The him, testified that he did not detect any pepper spray on complaint featured several different claims against an array of Champion during the course of the ambulance ride. defendants, but most of the claims were dismissed, leaving only: 1) negligence claims against Outlook and Delelys; and However, five different lay witnesses testified that the 2) § 1983 claims against the three Officers premised upon Officers continued to sit or otherwise put pressure on violations of Champion’s rights under the Fourth Amendment Champion’s back while he was prone on the ground with his (excessive force) and Fourteenth Amendment (failure to face towards the carpet. J.A. at 156 (Ballenger Test.) render medical assistance). Following discovery, the (recalling that the Officers were lying on top of Champion); government defendants filed a motion for summary judgment, J.A. at 158 (Buford Test.) (“They were laying on him, like alleging for the first time that qualified immunity insulated how wrestlers do in the ring, they were just all — upper body the Officers from liability. The district court ruled that the was on him, all their strength was on him.”); J.A. at 228 Officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and denied (Jamerson Test.); (“I saw three officers on top of him.”); J.A. the Officers’ motion for summary judgment. The Officers did at 230-31 (Martinez Test.) (“They were holding him down, not appeal this ruling. laying on top of him after he was already down . . . . [T]hey are on top of him and with their elbows, and basically laying The parties prepared for trial. On July 31, 2002, the on top of him.”); J.A. at 265 (Simpson Test.) (“I believe there Officers filed a motion in limine objecting to the inclusion of was another officer with his knee in the middle of his back the testimony of the Plaintiffs’ three experts, Michael F. . . . .”). Additionally, these witnesses testified that the Dorsey (“Dorsey”), Kris Sperry (“Sperry”), and Geoffrey Officers continued to use pepper spray on Champion after he Alpert (“Alpert”). The district court denied the motion in was subdued on the ground and had stopped resisting. J.A. at part, permitting Sperry and Alpert to testify. 156 (Ballenger Test.) (“[Champion] turned his head to move and breathe . . . and the female officer maced him.”); J.A. at The trial began on August 20, 2002. The jury heard 229 (Jamerson Test.) (testifying that Miller sprayed contradictory testimony from the Officers, the witnesses, and Champion twice and that Champion subsequently turned several experts regarding the amount of force exerted against white); J.A. at 231-32 (Martinez Test.) (“Well, he was on the Champion, Champion’s cause of death, and the level of pain ground already and [Miller] maced him again after he was and suffering Champion might have endured. Before the jury already handcuffed.”); J.A. at 265 (Simpson Test.) (“He retired, the Officers filed a motion for a judgment as a matter turned his face to breathe and then he got sprayed again.”). of law, which was denied. The jury returned a verdict on No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 9 10 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
August 29, 2002. It found Outlook and Delelys liable in the Officers’ alleged qualified immunity from liability. “[I]n amount of $3.5 million for their negligence. The jury also cases where an appellant made a Rule 56 motion for summary found each police officer liable to the Plaintiffs in the amount judgment that was denied, makes those same arguments in a of $300,000 each. Rule 50(a) motion at the close of evidence that was also denied, lost in front of a jury, then renewed its arguments in The Officers filed a combined post-verdict motion, a rejected Rule 50(b) motion after the entry of judgment, we renewing their motion for a judgment as a matter of law, or in will review only the denial of the Rule 50(b) motion.” K & the alternative, seeking a new trial or remittitur. The Officers T Enters., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co., 97 F.3d 171, 174 (6th Cir. based their renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law 1996). “[R]eviewing a Rule 50 determination is preferable to on qualified immunity. J.A. at 123. The district court denied reviewing a summary judgment decision because the Rule 50 the Officers’ motion on November 21, 2002, ruling that decision is based on the complete trial record and not the “[b]ased on the facts at trial, taken in the light most favorable incomplete pretrial record available at summary judgment.” to the Plaintiff, the officers’ conduct violated the Plaintiff’s Id. (quotation omitted). constitutional right not to be subjected to excessive force and that right was clearly established at the time of the officers’ Thus, we review de novo the denial of the Rule 50(b) conduct.” J.A. at 127-28 (Dist. Ct. Or. 11/21/02). The motion, but our de novo review is narrowed by the test for district court also ruled that the $300,000 verdicts against the evaluating a renewed Rule 50(b) motion. Garrison v. Officers were not excessive. Cassens Transp. Co., 334 F.3d 528, 537 (6th Cir. 2003); Monday v. Oullette, 118 F.3d 1099, 1101 (6th Cir. 1997). The Officers timely appealed several of the district court’s The Supreme Court has held, rulings, including: 1) the order denying in part the motion for summary judgment; 2) the district court’s ruling on Alpert’s [I]n entertaining a motion for judgment as a matter of testimony; and 3) the denial of the Officers’ motion for law, the court should review all of the evidence in the judgment as a matter of law, or in the alternative a new trial record. and/or remittitur. In doing so, however, the court must draw all II. ANALYSIS reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations or weigh A. Standards of Review the evidence. . . . [A]lthough the court should review the record as a whole, it must disregard all evidence We evaluate the decisions of the district court through favorable to the moving party that the jury is not required several different lenses. The Officers ask us to review both to believe. That is, the court should give credence to the the denial of their motion for summary judgment and the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that evidence denial of their motion for a judgment as a matter of law, supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and which was initially filed before the jury retired pursuant to unimpeached, at least to the extent that that evidence Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50(a) and was renewed after comes from disinterested witnesses. the return of the jury’s verdict pursuant to Rule 50(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a)-(b). All of these motions concerned the No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 11 12 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, B. Qualified Immunity 150-51 (2000) (citations and quotations omitted). “The motion should be granted, and the district court reversed, only In actions involving the alleged abuse of government if reasonable minds could not come to a conclusion other than power, the defense of qualified immunity accommodates the one favoring the movant.” Garrison, 334 F.3d at 537-38 tension between permitting litigants to recover damages, (quotation omitted). which is often “the only realistic avenue for vindication of constitutional guarantees,” Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. Our review is further complicated by the underlying 800, 814 (1982), and the “social costs” of such suits, qualified immunity question. The issue of “whether qualified including “the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official immunity is applicable to an official’s actions is a question of energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able law.” Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1157 (6th Cir. citizens from acceptance of public office.” Id. Qualified 1996). “However, where the legal question of qualified immunity provides “that government officials performing immunity turns upon which version of the facts one accepts, discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability the jury, not the judge, must determine liability.” Pouillon v. for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate City of Owosso, 206 F.3d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 2000) (quotation clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which and ellipses omitted). Thus, to the extent that there is a reasonable person would have known.” Id. at 818. We disagreement about the facts, such as whether the Officers put employ a three-step inquiry for determining whether qualified their body weight on Champion and pepper-sprayed him after immunity is proper: he was handcuffed and hobbled, we must review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, taking all First, we determine whether, based upon the applicable inferences in their favor. We cannot weigh the evidence or law, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the make credibility assessments, and we are acutely aware that plaintiffs show that a constitutional violation has a jury, faced directly with the tasks we cannot undertake, occurred. Second, we consider whether the violation believed the evidence presented by the Plaintiffs. involved a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable person would have known. Third, we We employ a different method of review for the two other determine whether the plaintiff has offered sufficient issues raised on appeal by the Officers. We review for an evidence to indicate that what the official allegedly did abuse of discretion the district court’s denial of the Officers’ was objectively unreasonable in light of the clearly post-trial motion for a new trial and/or remittitur filed established constitutional rights. pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59. Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir. 2000). We also Feathers v. Aey, 319 F.3d 843, 848 (6th Cir. 2003) (emphasis review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s decision added) (quotation omitted). If the answer to all three to allow Geoffrey Alpert’s expert testimony. Pride v. BIC questions is “yes,” qualified immunity is not proper. Corp., 218 F.3d 566, 575 (6th Cir. 2000). 1. The Occurrence of a Constitutional Violation First, we consider whether the facts, when taken in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, demonstrate the occurrence No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 13 14 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
of a constitutional violation. See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be 194, 201 (2001) (“Taken in the light most favorable to the sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the that what he is doing violates that right.” Anderson v. officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). Officials do not enjoy the initial inquiry.”). This is a threshold question that often qualified immunity simply because the exact action in requires the setting forth of legal principles “which will question has not previously been held unlawful by a court, but become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly “in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be established.” Id. “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers apparent.” Id. In the excess-force context, it is not enough have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course of for a plaintiff to demonstrate that an officer’s use of force an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen exceeded the objective standard of reasonableness articulated should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its in Graham. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201-202 (2001). Rather, ‘reasonableness’ standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. qualified immunity is proper unless “it would be clear to a 386, 395 (1989). The test’s “proper application requires reasonable officer” that his use of excessive force “was careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each unlawful in the situation he confronted.” Id. at 202. particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of The Supreme Court has refused to require that a plaintiff the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting demonstrate the existence of a “fundamentally similar” or arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. To “materially similar” case. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 741 take the facts in a light most favorable to Plaintiffs is to (2002). There can be “notable factual distinctions between assume that the Officers lay on top of Champion, a mentally the precedents relied on . . . so long as the prior decisions retarded individual who had stopped resisting arrest and g[i]ve reasonable warning that the conduct then at issue posed no flight risk, and sprayed him with pepper spray even violated constitutional rights.” Id. at 740 (quotation omitted). after he was immobilized by handcuffs and a hobbling device. “[O]fficials can still be on notice that their conduct violates The use of such force is not objectively reasonable, as the established law even in novel factual circumstances.” Id. at Officers conceded at oral argument for the purposes of 741. Moreover, the fact that various courts have “not agreed focusing on the question of whether Champion’s right to be on one verbal formulation of the controlling standard” does free from this particular type of force was clearly established. not by itself entitle an officer to qualified immunity. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 203. 2. A “Clearly Established” Right? To demonstrate that the Officers unreasonably violated a The first Feathers inquiry bleeds into the second question clearly established right, the Plaintiffs must therefore show of whether the constitutional right was clearly established, the prior articulation of a prohibition against the type of which is the focus of the parties on appeal. “If the law at that excess force exerted here. “In inquiring whether a time was not clearly established, an official could not . . . constitutional right is clearly established, we must look first fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not to decisions of the Supreme Court, then to decisions of this previously identified as unlawful.” Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818. court and other courts within our circuit, and finally to “[T]he right the official is alleged to have violated must have decisions of other circuits.” Higgason v. Stephens, 288 F.3d been ‘clearly established’ in a more particularized, and hence 868, 876 (6th Cir. 2002). “[A]n action’s unlawfulness can be No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 15 16 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
apparent from direct holdings, from specific examples against Champion after he was handcuffed and hobbled was described as prohibited, or from the general reasoning that a excessive. In Adams v. Metiva, 31 F.3d 375 (6th Cir. 1994), court employs.” Feathers, 319 F.3d at 848. Other sources a plaintiff was sprayed with mace by authorities. Id. at 378. can also demonstrate the existence of a clearly established The police then handcuffed the plaintiff, placed him in his constitutional right; in Hope, the Supreme Court considered car, and according to the plaintiff and two witnesses, Alabama state regulations and communications between the continued to spray mace in the plaintiff’s face even though he U.S. Department of Justice and the Alabama Department of was already blinded and incapacitated. Id. We held that this Corrections as evidence that the corporal punishment at issue use of force was excessive, and we denied the officers in Hope was clearly proscribed. Hope, 536 U.S. at 744-45. qualified immunity because “[a] reasonable person would know that spraying mace on a blinded and incapacitated Our caselaw and the evidence presented at trial about the person . . . would violate the right to be free from excessive training that the Officers received demonstrate that the force force.” Id. at 387; see also Vinyard v. Wilson, 311 F.3d 1340, exerted against Champion violated his clearly established 1348 (11th Cir. 2002) (“Courts have consistently concluded Fourth Amendment rights. We have repeatedly stated that that using pepper spray is excessive force in cases where . . . “the right to be free from excessive force is a clearly the arrestee surrenders, is secured, and is not acting violently, established Fourth Amendment right.” Neague v. Cynkar, and there is no threat to the officers or anyone else.”). 258 F.3d 504, 507 (6th Cir. 2001) (decided after Saucier). For example, we have articulated a clearly established right to In addition to prior precedent, the Officers’ training be free from specific types of non-deadly excessive force, demonstrates that they were aware of Champion’s clearly such as handcuffing an individual too tightly. See Walton v. established right to be free from this type of excessive force. City of Southfield, 995 F.2d 1331, 1342 (6th Cir. 1993). We The Officers were taught that pepper spraying a suspect after have also consistently held that various types of force applied the individual was incapacitated constitutes excessive force. after the subduing of a suspect are unreasonable and a Sergeant Robert Allen, who testified about the training the violation of a clearly established right. See, e.g., Phelps v. Nashville Police Officers received, agreed that if Champion Coy, 286 F.3d 295, 301 (6th Cir. 2002) (“[T]here was simply were handcuffed and hobbled, spraying him with pepper no governmental interest in continuing to beat Phelps after he spray would be excessive. had been neutralized, nor could a reasonable officer have thought there was.”); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, Second, it also clearly established that putting substantial 1307 (6th Cir. 1988) (“[A] totally gratuitous blow with a or significant pressure on a suspect’s back while that suspect policeman’s nightstick may cross the constitutional line.”); is in a face-down prone position after being subdued and/or Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711, 715 (6th Cir. 1985) (“The incapacitated constitutes excessive force. This appeal gives unprovoked and unnecessary striking of a handcuffed citizen us no cause to consider whether leaving a bound suspect on in the mouth with a nightstick is clearly excessive.”). his or her stomach without more constitutes excessive force that violates a suspect’s clearly established Fourth The particular type of physical force exerted against Amendment rights. This is neither a “positional asphyxia” Champion was unreasonable, and the Officers should have case nor a case in which the officers lightly touched or placed been aware that they were violating Champion’s rights. First, incidental pressure on Champion’s back while he was face it is clearly established that the Officers’ use of pepper spray down. The asphyxia was caused by the combination of the No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 17 18 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
Officers placing their weight upon Champion’s body by lying cause asphyxiation. All three Officers admitted that they across his back and simultaneously pepper spraying him.2 were aware of the potential danger of putting pressure on an Creating asphyxiating conditions by putting substantial or individual’s back or diaphragm. J.A. at 187 (Dickhaus Test.) significant pressure, such as body weight, on the back of an (“I believe our training was once he is under control we are to incapacitated and bound suspect constitutes objectively sit him up physically . . . .”); J.A. at 262 (Miller Test.). J.A. unreasonable excessive force. For example, in Simpson v. at 305 (Woodside Test.). Additionally, Sergeant Allen Hines, 903 F.2d 400 (5th Cir. 1990), several police officers testified that he taught his officers that lying across an entered an inmate’s cell, placed the inmate in a neckhold, and individual’s back when that person is on his or her stomach put strong pressure upon his chest. Id. at 403. The inmate increases the possibility of asphyxia. Just as the Supreme died as a result, and a physician’s report suggested that the Court determined that the Alabama Department of inmate may have died as a result of the pressure placed upon Corrections Regulations and the communications between the his chest. Id. The Fifth Circuit denied qualified immunity to U.S. Department of Justice and the State of Alabama put the the officers, ruling that any reasonable officer would have state on notice about what constituted cruel and unusual known that the force exerted was excessive and thus punishment, so too here the training these Officers received constitutionally deficient. Id. Other district courts in our alerted them to the potential danger of this particular type of circuit have highlighted the dangers of putting pressure on a excessive force. See Hope, 536 U.S. at 744-45. prone, bound, and agitated detainee. Swans v. City of Lansing, 65 F. Supp. 2d 625, 633-34 (W.D. Mich. 1998) (jury It cannot be forgotten that the police were confronting an awarded verdict to a mentally ill arrestee who was hog-tied); individual whom they knew to be mentally ill or retarded, Johnson v. City of Cincinnati, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1019-20 even though the Officers may not have known the full extent (S.D. Ohio 1999) (finding that information existed in the law of Champion’s autism and his unresponsiveness. The enforcement community, which put officers on notice of the diminished capacity of an unarmed detainee must be taken dangers of positional asphyxiation). into account when assessing the amount of force exerted. See Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272, 1283 (9th Cir. 2001) Additionally, the Officers’ training outlined the boundaries (“[W]here it is or should be apparent to the officers that the of excessive force and made clear that lying on a suspect can individual involved is emotionally disturbed, that is a factor that must be considered in determining . . . the reasonableness of the force employed.”). For example, in Drummond v. City 2 of Anaheim, 343 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2003), officers The Officers cite several cases that purportedly show that the handcuffed a mentally ill individual and leaned their body app lication o f pressure to a suspect’s back while he or she is lying prone weight onto his upper torso. Id. at 1054. The officers then is not a clearly established co nstitutional violation. See Wagner v. Bay City, 227 F.3d 316 , 323 -24 (5 th Cir. 2000); Estate of Phillips v. City of applied a hobble device. Drummond fell into respiratory Milwaukee, 123 F.3d 586, 594 (7th Cir. 1997); Cottrell v. Ca ldwe ll, 85 distress and eventually a coma. Id. at 1055. The court held F.3d 1480, 1488, 14 91, 1492 (11th Cir. 1996). However, all three cases that the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the are inappo site because they involve an arrestee who se positional asphyxia basis of qualified immunity was not proper because the was caused solely as a result of the officers leaving the arrestee on his or officers had violated Drummond’s clearly established rights. her stomach, but without applying pressure to the back. Because we are not confronted with such a situation, we need not decide whether such Id. at 1062. It stated, “Any reasonable officer should have behavior violates a clearly established righ t. known that such conduct constituted the use of excessive No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 19 20 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
force.” Id. at 1061. Drummond postdated the events that led Champion’s injuries were inconsistent with a death caused by to Champion’s death, but it relies on cases decided before Officers lying across Champion’s back. J.A. at 284-86 (Wetli April 30, 2000 (including the Swans case) and notes that Test.). This evidence is unavailing for two reasons. First, the when officers receive training explaining the dangers of Plaintiffs presented contradictory evidence, and the jury asphyxia, they are on notice that applying pressure to an believed the Plaintiffs’ experts (and the witnesses who viewed arrestee’s back is objectively unreasonable. the Officers lying on Champion’s back) more than the Defendants’ witnesses. Second, the Officers’ argument Consequently, the right to be free from the two types of sidesteps the point: even if Champion had not died, but had excessive force exerted against Champion was clearly only been injured, his clearly established rights were no less established by the law of this circuit and by the training of the violated. Officers. Either action by itself violated a clearly established right, and the combination of the actions bolsters the 3. Sufficiency of Evidence conclusion that no reasonable officer could believe that excessive force was not being used. We recognize that the Finally, the panel must determine “whether the plaintiff Officers perhaps did not intend to harm Champion; indeed, offered sufficient evidence to indicate that what the official they may have believed they were helping him. Such a allegedly did was objectively unreasonable in light of the consideration is immaterial, however, because the qualified clearly established constitutional rights.” Feathers, 319 F.3d immunity doctrine is an objective one; motive is irrelevant. at 848. As described in detail above, the Plaintiffs presented The evidence presented in the light most favorable to such evidence at trial. The fact that a jury found in his favor Champion, and in the light accepted by the jury, demonstrates further underscores the sufficiency of the evidence. that the Officers unreasonably applied excessive force to Champion after he had been incapacitated in violation of 4. Conclusion Champion’s clearly established rights. No reasonable officer would have continued to spray a chemical agent in the face of In sum, all three Feathers inquiries have been answered in a handcuffed and hobbled mentally retarded arrestee, who the affirmative. We therefore affirm the district court’s denial was moving his or her head from side to side in an attempt to of qualified immunity to the Officers. breathe, after the arrestee vomited several times. No reasonable officer would continue to put pressure on that C. The Verdict Amount arrestee’s back after the arrestee was subdued by handcuffs, The Officers contend that they are entitled to a new trial, or an ankle restraint, and a police officer holding the arrestee’s at least a remittitur, because the jury award of $900,000 legs. ($300,000 per Officer), which only compensates for The Officers concentrate their efforts on the evidence Champion’s physical and mental pain and suffering, is presented at trial that Champion may have died from a excessive. In essence, the Officers suggest that “a cumulative preexisting medical condition unrelated to his treatment by verdict of $900,000 against the Officers for at most a 17- the police and that the pepper spray was unlikely to contribute minute period of physical and mental pain and suffering is to Champion’s vomiting or his death. In particular, the excessive.” Def. Br. at 38. Because the Officers ask us to Defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Wetli, testified that undertake a Sissiphyean task of comparing Champion’s pain No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 21 22 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
and suffering to other forms of pain and suffering and because However, other testimony averred that Champion may have the award does not shock the conscience, we hold that the suffered physical pain. First, Plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Gerber district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the located a contusion on Champion’s lung that may have Officers’ motion. resulted from pressure applied by the Officers. Second, the autopsy revealed evidence of “extensive aspiration of gastric We undertake a highly deferential review of the district contents,” J.A. at 270 (Sperry Test.), which may have court, which itself is sharply limited in its ability to remit a signaled that Champion was choking on his own vomit. jury verdict. “[A] jury verdict should not be remitted by a Third, Dr. Gerber agreed that “someone suffering from court unless it is beyond the maximum damages that the jury positional asphyxia would be gasping for breath,” which reasonably could find to be compensatory for a party’s loss.” generates psychic pain stemming from anxiety and fear. J.A. Gregory v. Shelby County, 220 F.3d 433, 443 (6th Cir. 2000) at 221 (Gerber Test.). (quotation omitted). Our remittitur standard favors maintaining the award, “[u]nless the award is (1) beyond the The jury heard inconsistent evidence attesting to the level range supportable by proof or (2) so excessive as to shock the of Champion’s pain. We do not attempt to measure it anew. conscience, . . . or (3) the result of a mistake.” Bickel v. No one but Champion can ever know the full amount of Korean Air Lines Co., 96 F.3d 151, 156 (6th Cir. 1996) physical and mental pain and suffering experienced during his (quotation omitted) “A trial court is within its discretion in seventeen-minute ordeal, but the jury heard various and remitting a verdict only when, after reviewing all evidence in conflicting pieces of evidence and believed that Champion the light most favorable to the awardee, it is convinced that suffered. Their verdict does not lack an evidentiary basis, the verdict is clearly excessive, resulted from passion, bias or particularly given that the verdict encompassed not only prejudice; or is so excessive or inadequate as to shock the physical pain, but also mental pain and suffering. The panic judicial conscience of the court.” Gregory, 220 F.3d at 443. of being unable to breathe and the pressure limiting one’s breath cannot be discounted. See J.A. at 224-25 (Gerber The Officers attempt to prove that the award shocked the Test.) (stating that from a physiological standpoint, an conscience in two ways. First, they suggest that the medical individual during asphyxiation would feel “fear, agitation and evidence is insufficient to support a $900,000 award. Citing struggle; air hunger is something that causes fear”). Simply the testimony of both sides’ medical experts, the Officers put, there is evidence sufficient to support the jury’s award charge that Champion suffered only superficial abrasions and such that the district court did not err in denying the motion hemorrhaging, which would not have caused severe pain. to remit the judgment. Additionally, the experts portray Champion’s death as being relatively peaceful by showing that any of the three potential, Second, the Officers cite to several cases in which and possibly cumulative, causes of Champion’s death — decedents received smaller awards for what the Officers positional asphyxia, asphyxia resulting from gastric construe as greater pain and suffering than that endured by aspiration, or cardiac arrest prompted by Champion’s Champion. Endeavoring to compare awards is difficult and angulated right coronary artery — would not have been often unfruitful, because the factual circumstances of each particularly painful. case differ so widely and because it places reviewing courts in the position of making awkward assessments of pain and suffering better left to a jury. Layne v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 23 24 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
No. 00-5607, 2001 WL1480736, at * 4 (6th Cir. Nov. 19, pain and suffering. In Bickel, we wrote: “It is impossible to 2001) (“[C]omparable decisions are ‘instructive’ but ‘not determine the exact value of the pain and suffering which the controlling’ when we review for abuses of discretion.”); decedents may have endured. . . . One simply cannot quantify Thompson v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 621 F.2d 814, 827 the mental and physical pain and suffering such an experience (6th Cir. 1980) (“[C]ases involving similar injuries are in no would cause, and thus we cannot conclude that the evidence sense controlling.”). The Defendants cite several cases that does not support the awards.” Id. at 156. The award granted they believe demonstrate the unconscionability of the award here by the jury, which was capable of judging credibility and given the relatively brief period of his pain and suffering. actually heard live testimony regarding the incident as Compare Gregory, 220 F.3d at 433-44 ($778,000 award not opposed to the written record before us, is not unreasonable, remitted when decedent was beaten horribly by a fellow excessive, or conscience-shocking. We therefore hold that the prisoner and lay in his cell for ten hours before being district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the discovered); Tatum v. Land, No. 95-6378, 1997 WL 85144, Officers’ motion for remittitur. at *5 (6th Cir. Feb. 26, 1997) ($600,000 award not remitted when decedent suffered severe injuries to shoulder, pelvis, D. Alpert’s Testimony and face as a result of a car accident and who survived for five hours after the accident); with Sharpe v. City of Finally, we evaluate the Officers’ claim that the district Lewisburg, 677 F. Supp. 1362, 1365 (M.D. Tenn. 1988) court erred in permitting Alpert’s expert testimony. The ($100,000 award for pain and suffering reduced after Supreme Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, decedent was shot eight times and died within minutes of the Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), established the standard for shooting.). The plaintiffs respond by citing our decision in admissibility of scientific expert testimony under Federal Bickel, when we affirmed the district court’s denial of Rule of Evidence 702. The requirement that “any and all remittitur for several pain and suffering awards exceeding $1 scientific testimony or evidence admitted [be] not only million when the decedents, passengers on a Korea-bound relevant, but reliable,” Id. at 589, “entails a preliminary plane attacked by the Soviet Union, “remained conscious assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology during the twelve minute descent into the Sea of Japan, underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether suffering the physical effects of decompression and that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the recompression along the way, as well as the horror of facts in issue.” Id. at 592-93. This test has also been applied knowing that death was imminent.” Bickel, 96 F.3d at 155. to non-scientific expert testimony, such as Alpert’s. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 149 (1999). The Officers ask us to make an impossible comparison between Champion’s pain and the pain of others. We cannot The Officers argue that Alpert did not present any ascertain whether Champion’s mental and physical pain and specialized knowledge that was reliable or of any assistance suffering, magnified by his likely inability to comprehend to the jury. The Officers rely principally on Berry v. City of what was happening, equaled the pain and suffering of the Detroit, 25 F.3d 1342 (6th Cir. 1994), in which we held that airplane passengers plummeting out of the sky for twelve the plaintiff’s expert, a so-called specialist in the field of minutes in Bickel or the ten hours of slow death endured by “police policies and practices” was not qualified to speak the decedent in Gregory. Such comparisons are impossible about the city government’s policy of disciplining officers for and improper, because one cannot so mechanistically measure alleged uses of excessive force. Id. at 1348-54. In Berry, we No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 25 26 Champion et al. v. Outlook No. 03-5068 Nashville, Inc. et al. Nashville, Inc. et al.
stated that “there is no such ‘field’ as ‘police policies and criminologist, but excluding expert’s affidavit as useless practices,’” mainly because we believed that the concept of because it was too general). such a field as presented by that “expert” was far too broad. Id. at 1352. We analogized to the legal profession, stating By contrast, the Plaintiffs’ expert, Alpert, testified about a that labeling the individual in Berry as an expert when he did discrete aspect of police practices, namely use of excessive not demonstrate that he had experience in any particular force, based upon his particularized knowledge about the area. aspect of studying the police was “like declaring an attorney In contrast to the expert in Berry, Alpert’s credentials are an expert in the ‘law.’” Id. However, by reasoning that a much more extensive and substantial. Alpert has a PhD in divorce lawyer was no more an expert on patent law than sociology from Washington State University, is employed by anyone else, we implicitly recognized that individuals with the University of South Carolina’s Department of specialized knowledge could most certainly serve as experts, Criminology, teaches classes on police procedures and i.e., patent lawyers can serve as experts in patent law. We did practices, has been involved with federal research funded by not hold that an individual cannot ever testify as an expert the Department of Justice that evaluates the use of force by about some aspect of police affairs. Rather, the holding in officers, trains officers in the use of force, works with police Berry reasoned that unqualified individuals could not broadly departments to create use-of-force policies, has testified testify about an area in which they possessed no specialized before Congress and state legislatures about police policies, knowledge. While “police practices” in the broadest sense of and has authored forty to fifty articles on the subject of police the phrase may not be a field, surely criminology is. procedures, many of which have appeared in peer-reviewed journals. Alpert Test., Transcript Vol III at 428-32 (Attached Indeed, the chief reason for our decision in Berry was that to Motion to Take Judicial Notice). Unlike the expert in the expert’s credentials demonstrated that he had no specific Berry, Alpert testified about much more specific issues: the expertise about police activities. He had limited experience, continuum of force employed by officers generally, the given that he was appointed as a deputy sheriff, a post that specific training the Officers received, and Alpert’s opinion required almost no qualifications, and he had been fired twice that if the witnesses’ testimony is credited, the Officers’ from the position. Furthermore, he lacked any formal training actions violated nationally recognized police standards or experience on the subject of criminology or police actions. governing excessive force. The critical difference between Compounding the problem was his ungrounded and testifying about the impact of police policies upon a large methodologically flawed testimony regarding what effect the group of officers and testifying about the proper actions of City of Detroit’s procedural shortcomings would have upon individual officers in one discrete situation highlights the the future conduct of 5,000 police officers who would be inapplicability of Berry. Courts have permitted experts to confronted with a diverse and unpredictable array of testify about discrete police-practice issues when those situations in which force would be used. See Dickerson, 101 experts are properly credentialed and their testimony assists F.3d at 1163-64 (relying on the affidavit of a criminology the trier of fact. See Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1163-64; Kladis professor, which opined that an officer used excessive force, v. Brezek, 823 F.2d 1014, 1019 (7th Cir. 1987). Because in deciding that material fact issues remained regarding Alpert had considerable experience in the field of criminology qualified immunity); Estate of Boncher v. Brown County, 272 and because he was testifying concerning a discrete area of F.3d 484, 486 (7th Cir. 2001) (recognizing implicitly the field police practices about which he had specialized knowledge, of criminology by labeling the expert a reputable No. 03-5068 Champion et al. v. Outlook 27 Nashville, Inc. et al.
we hold that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in admitting Alpert’s testimony. III. CONCLUSION We AFFIRM the rulings and judgment of the district court. First, the district court properly denied the Officers’ Rule 50(b) motion for qualified immunity, because on a view of the facts in the light most favorable to the Plaintiffs, the Officers violated Champion’s clearly established right to be free from the specific types of forces administered after Champion was subdued and restrained. Second, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Officers’ motion to remit the size of the pain-and-suffering award because the award was supported by evidence and it did not shock the conscience. Third, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Alpert’s testimony. We AFFIRM.