Champagne v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance

85 So. 2d 106, 1955 La. App. LEXIS 1095
CourtLouisiana Court of Appeal
DecidedDecember 30, 1955
DocketNo. 4112
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 85 So. 2d 106 (Champagne v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Louisiana Court of Appeal primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Champagne v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance, 85 So. 2d 106, 1955 La. App. LEXIS 1095 (La. Ct. App. 1955).

Opinion

ELLIS, Judge. -

Defendant has appealed from a judgment in favor of the plaintiff in which the latter was awarded compensation for total and permanent disability at the rate of $30 per week during the period of plaintiff’s disability not to exceed 400 weeks, less the number of weeks previously paid, and judgment in favor of defendant deny[107]*107ing plaintiff’s claim for attorney fees and damages. The defendant is seeking a reversal of the judgment of the District Court on the following grounds as stated in its brief:

“As was pointed out by the District Judge in his reasons for judgment, the transcript had not been completed, and the note of evidence had not been transcribed at the time that he rendered his decision (Transcript page 156). It is respectfully submitted that a careful consideration of the entire record which has been made up in this case, including the entire note of evidence, shows that there is no substantial conflict in the medical testimony, which greatly preponderates to the effect that the plaintiff is suffering no disability as a result of any accident which may have occurred in the course of employment. We respectfully direct the attention of this Court to the testimony of the doctors who testified as we believe that a careful consideration thereof will demonstrate the error-of the District Judge in the conclusions which he reached. In the second place, we believe that there is serious question as to whether any accident occurred in the course of employment, and that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof which was imposed upon him in that regard.
“The' jurisprudence is apparently well settled to the effect that where an analysis of the medical testimony indicates that ‘there is no irreconcilable conflict in the medical testimony’, the testimony of lay witnesses shall not be considered, and if that testimony is contrary to the plaintiff’s case, he cannot recover.
“Carter v. Consolidated Underwriters [La.App.], 62 So.2d 682 [684] (Second Circuit 1953) :
“ ‘We next come to the question of the duration of plaintiff’s disability. Analysis of the medical testimony indicates that there is no substantial degree of conflict in the testimony of the medical experts. It is well established that where there is no irreconcilable conflict in medical testimony the testimony of lay witnesses will not be considered. Sellers v. T. J. Moss Tie Co., La.App., 56 So.2d 878 (writs refused April 28, 1952); Maricelli v. Standard Accident Insurance Co., La.App., 57 So.2d 926.’
“Waldrup v. Consolidated Underwriters [La.App.], 64 So.2d 468 [469]:
“ ‘To establish injury and continuing disability plaintiff called several lay witnesses whose testimony disclosed only subjective conditions observed by them in plaintiff’s conduct. However, inasmuch as there is no conflict in the medical testimony, we are not justified in accepting lay testimony in' a case of this kind. See: Maricelli v. Standard Accident Insurance Company, La.App., 1952, 57 So.2d 926; Sellers v. T. J. Moss Tie Company, La.App., 1952, 56 So.2d 878; Fee v. Travelers Insurance Co., La.App., 1940, 193 So. 381.
“ ‘We are of the opinion that plaintiff has failed to present adequate proof of a compensable disability under the act which prescribes that our findings of fact be based upon competent evidence, and a compensation award made only for such injuries as are proven by competent evidence.’ ”

The District Judge in his written reasons stated that the transcript had not yet been transcribed, however, the testimony of Dr. Karr, who could be termed the main medical witness of the defendant, and that of Dr. Schneider, who was the main medical witness for the plaintiff, was in the record and their testimony is quoted and referred to in the opinion of the able District Judge.

We have carefully read and considered the record and briefs filed in this case and cannot agree with counsel for the defendant in his statement that there is no substantial conflict in the medical testimony, for Dr. Karr, who operated upon the plaintiff for [108]*108his herniated disc positively testified that the operation was successful and that plaintiff was no longer disabled and could return to work, whereas Dr. Schneider was of the positive opinion that the plaintiff showed “definite indications of nerve-root irritations- involving the right lower extremity and this is undoubtedly due to the residual adhesion .about the lower lumbar roots, plus the further extrusion of the pulposus at the level of the previous surgery performed” and further testified, “I feel that there is a definite possibility that a segment of the nucleus pulposus, which might possibly have been retained at the time of the surgery, may have worked loose and- extruded at the site of the previous herniation.” Dr. Meuleman agreed with Dr. Karr, however, there is a definite conflict in the medical testimony as found by the District Court. We do not mean by this necessarily to indicate approval of the proposition of- law advanced by defendants, for there might be instances where credible lay testimony may prove preponderantly what medical opinion testimony indicates to be a mere possibility.

As to the second contention that there is a serious question as to whether any accident occurred in the course of employment and that the plaintiff has failed to sustain the burden of proof which was imposed upon him in that regard, we find that the Lower Court has correctly evaluated the testimony even though the transcript on this point was not complete, and he correctly held that the .plaintiff had proven an accident within the contemplation o-f the .compensation law. In view of the fact that the able District Judge has written an extensive opinion and correctly interpreted the facts and the law applicable thereto, we herewith adopt his opinion in this case.

“This action is brought by Cyrus Champagne to recover workmen’s compensation for total and permanent 'disability as a result of- an injury he claims to have sustained on December 23,-1953 in the course of his employment with the Abshier Construction Company. He- claims to have suffered the rupture of -a vertebral disc while-lifting four-inch pipes to load them onto a truck.

“On the day of the alleged injury Champagne reported for work at the Anse La Butte oil field- in St. Martin Parish at about 7:30 o’clock in the morning. At about 10:00 o’clock, while lifting one of the pipes with several of his fellow employees he claims to have felt a warm sensation in the lower portion of his back. He did not mention it to his fellow workers as he thought that the sensation would soon disappear. At noon he drove his employer’s truck to Breaux Bridge, a distance of four or five miles, where he and his coworkers live. He brought each of them to their respective homes and then went to his own. On his way in the truck he claims to have begun suffering pain and that by the time he reached home the pain was severe. It was so severe that he did not eat his noonday meal, but promptly visited Dr. Ernest Yongue and notified his foreman of his injury.

“Dr. Yongue, with the assistance of X-rays diagnosed Champagne’s injury as a ruptured disc. He prescribed the customary treatment and when the patient failed to respond to it, Dr. Yongue referred Champagne to Dr. William L. Meuleman of Lafayette, an orthopedist. Dr. Meuleman attempted further conservative treatment without success and on April 1, 1954 the doctor referred Champagne to Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
85 So. 2d 106, 1955 La. App. LEXIS 1095, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/champagne-v-houston-fire-casualty-insurance-lactapp-1955.