Chamlee v. Morrissey (Child Custody)

Nevada Supreme Court

Chamlee v. Morrissey (Child Custody)

DecidedAugust 12, 2013

Docket60677

StatusUnpublished

This text of Chamlee v. Morrissey (Child Custody) (Chamlee v. Morrissey (Child Custody)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Nevada Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Chamlee v. Morrissey (Child Custody), (Neb. 2013).

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jurisdiction when appellant filed an appeal in Docket No. 59872." See NRAP 3A(b); Gumm v. Mai nor, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002); Burton v. Burton, 99 Nev. 698, 669 P.2d 703 (1983). Appellant has timely responded to our show cause order, and respondent has filed a reply. In her response, appellant contends that she is not appealing from the district court's refusal to rule on her motion for stay, but rather, she is challenging the district court's refusal to enter an order denying or certifying its intent to modify the divorce decree or set aside portions of the decree as to reunification and visitation of the children with respondent. Huneycutt v. Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). Appellant contends that the district court's refusal to rule on her motion to modify the decree or set aside portions of the divorce decree was essentially the denial of her motions, which she insists is an appealable decision. Based on the documents before this court, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The order that appellant seeks to challenge on appeal is not substantively appealable because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order refusing to rule on a motion to modify custody, for a stay, or for a Huneycutt remand. Taylor Constr. Co., 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152, and we decline to construe the district court's order as an effective denial, as appellant suggests. Moreover, even if the district court denied the relief sought, such an order is not substantively appealable because it does not affect the rights of either

'Docket No. 59872 was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on October 8, 2012.

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 2 (0) 1947A party stemming from the divorce decree. Gumm, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220; Burton, 99 Nev. 698, 669 P.2d 703. As we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal, we ORDER this appeal DISMISSED.

knkL Gibbons

Douglas

cc: Hon. Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, Family Court Division Stovall & Associates Hanratty Law Group Eighth District Court Clerk

SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA 3 (0) 1947A

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jurisdiction when appellant filed an appeal in Docket No. 59872." See NRAP 3A(b); Gumm v. Mai nor, 118 Nev. 912, 59 P.3d 1220 (2002); Burton v. Burton, 99 Nev. 698, 669 P.2d 703 (1983). Appellant has timely responded to our show cause order, and respondent has filed a reply. In her response, appellant contends that she is not appealing from the district court's refusal to rule on her motion for stay, but rather, she is challenging the district court's refusal to enter an order denying or certifying its intent to modify the divorce decree or set aside portions of the decree as to reunification and visitation of the children with respondent. Huneycutt v. Huneycutt, 94 Nev. 79, 575 P.2d 585 (1978). Appellant contends that the district court's refusal to rule on her motion to modify the decree or set aside portions of the divorce decree was essentially the denial of her motions, which she insists is an appealable decision. Based on the documents before this court, we conclude that we lack jurisdiction to consider this appeal. The order that appellant seeks to challenge on appeal is not substantively appealable because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order refusing to rule on a motion to modify custody, for a stay, or for a Huneycutt remand. Taylor Constr. Co., 100 Nev. 207, 678 P.2d 1152, and we decline to construe the district court's order as an effective denial, as appellant suggests. Moreover, even if the district court denied the relief sought, such an order is not substantively appealable because it does not affect the rights of either