Chambliss-Partee v. Knapp

Second Circuit

Chambliss-Partee v. Knapp

667 F. App'x 316

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedJune 30, 2016

Docket15-2842

StatusUnpublished

This text of 667 F. App'x 316 (Chambliss-Partee v. Knapp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Chambliss-Partee v. Knapp, 667 F. App'x 316 (2d Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Tina Chambliss-Partee, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint for her failure to timely file an amended complaint and from a subsequent order denying her motion to vacate that judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the denial of a motion to vacate a judgment for abuse of discretion. See Grace v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 443 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2006). The district court’s refusal to vacate the judgment was not an abuse of discretion. Chambliss-Partee’s assertion that she did not receive the district court’s order directing her to file an amended complaint is belied by the record, which shows that the clerk mailed a copy of the order to Chambliss-Partee in June 2015. Chambliss-Partee’s argument that the district court should have considered the first proposed amended complaint is meritless; it was identical to the second proposed amended complaint, which the district court did review. Finally, even assuming that Chambliss-Partee has adequately challenged the district court’s standing ruling on this appeal, see Little *317 john v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that claim not sufficiently argued. in pro se appellate brief is deemed forfeited), and that standing were to be decided in her favor, she would not be entitled to relief from judgment because her complaint, even liberally construed, fails to state, a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 794 F.3d 272, 273 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We may affirm on any ground the record supports, and are not limited to the reasons expressed by the district court”).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and order of the district court are hereby AFFIRMED.

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SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Tina Chambliss-Partee, pro se, appeals from the district court’s judgment dismissing her complaint for her failure to timely file an amended complaint and from a subsequent order denying her motion to vacate that judgment. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review the denial of a motion to vacate a judgment for abuse of discretion. See Grace v. Bank Leumi Tr. Co. of N.Y., 443 F.3d 180, 187 (2d Cir. 2006). The district court’s refusal to vacate the judgment was not an abuse of discretion. Chambliss-Partee’s assertion that she did not receive the district court’s order directing her to file an amended complaint is belied by the record, which shows that the clerk mailed a copy of the order to Chambliss-Partee in June 2015. Chambliss-Partee’s argument that the district court should have considered the first proposed amended complaint is meritless; it was identical to the second proposed amended complaint, which the district court did review. Finally, even assuming that Chambliss-Partee has adequately challenged the district court’s standing ruling on this appeal, see Little *317 john v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 313 n.12 (2d Cir. 2015) (recognizing that claim not sufficiently argued. in pro se appellate brief is deemed forfeited), and that standing were to be decided in her favor, she would not be entitled to relief from judgment because her complaint, even liberally construed, fails to state, a plausible claim for relief. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009); see also Laurent v. PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 794 F.3d 272, 273 n.1 (2d Cir. 2015) (“We may affirm on any ground the record supports, and are not limited to the reasons expressed by the district court”).

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment and order of the district court are hereby AFFIRMED.

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667 F. App'x 316, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chambliss-partee-v-knapp-ca2-2016.

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