Chambersburg Borough v. Chambersburg Gas Co.

38 Pa. Super. 311, 1909 Pa. Super. LEXIS 132
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 26, 1909
DocketAppeal, No. 75
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 38 Pa. Super. 311 (Chambersburg Borough v. Chambersburg Gas Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chambersburg Borough v. Chambersburg Gas Co., 38 Pa. Super. 311, 1909 Pa. Super. LEXIS 132 (Pa. Ct. App. 1909).

Opinion

Opinion by

Porter, J.,

The borough brought this action of assumpsit to recover of [316]*316the defendant the charges imposed upon persons or corporations, who made openings in the highways or the streets of the borough, under the provisions of an ordinance approved June 24, 1905. The ordinance required all persons who desire to make openings within the limits of any highway of the borough to first obtain from the chairman of the street committee of the borough a permit authorizing the same. The charges imposed for such permit, so far as they are relevant to this case, are as follows: “For a permit to open a highway for ... . the introduction of a service pipe the sum of fifty cents; for a permit to open a highway for the extension of a gas or other main, five dollars ($5.00) per hundred feet, or fractional part thereof on highways that are macadamized; and for a permit to open a highway for any other purpose the sum of fifty cents.” The second section of the ordinance required all openings made in macadamized highways, between the curb lines, for the extension of gas or other mains, or for the introduction of service pipes, to be closed under the direction and supervision and to the satisfaction of the chairman of the street committee of the borough. The defendant company declined to take out the permits and the borough, waiving the penalty imposed by the ordinance, brought this action of assumpsit to recover the amount which the defendant company would have been required to pay for the permits. No objection was made to the form of the action and the only question raised in the court below was as to the power of the borough to impose the charges. The defendant company did not deny that it had made in the streets openings for the introduction of 314 service pipes, the charges for which imposed by the ordinance would amount to $157, and it admitted that it had made extensions of its mains in the macadamized streets of the borough amounting in the aggregate to a trifle over 6400 feet, the charges for which under the ordinance would be $322.70.

The right and duty of the borough, in the exercise of the police power, to regulate, inspect and supervise the introduction and maintenance under its street of the pipe lines of a duly incorporated gas company and to impose a reasonable charge to reimburse it for the probable expense of such inspection and super[317]*317vision, cannot be questioned: Borough of Kittanning v. Kittanning Consolidated Natural Gas Company, 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 355; Borough of Kittanning v. Consolidated Natural Gas Company, 219 Pa. 250. The only question to be determined at the trial in the court below was whether the borough in the enactment of this ordinance had exceeded the power with which it was by law invested. The defendant company contended that the charges imposed by the ordinance were excessive and unreasonable. The primary presumption is that borough officers act in good faith, exercise their best judgment and have regard only to the purpose for which an ordinance may lawfully be enacted, in fixing the amount; for that is their duty. Their power is not, however, absolute, their action being reviewable by the courts. The borough is not, in actions of this character, required to show the cost of such supervision and inspection in the presentation of its case in chief, for there was nothing upon the face of this ordinance which would have justified the court in holding that it had been enacted by the borough for revenue purposes in the guise of a police regulation. The burden was upon the defendant to establish by evidence that the charges were clearly unreasonable and the ordinance for that reason invalid. The character of the inspection and supervision and the period during which they are to be exercised, in order to protect the public interests, must necessarily vary with the circumstances and conditions under which an opening in a street is made. No positive rule, naming a fixed charge, can be laid down which would be applicable in any and all cases that may arise. “Necessarily any rule that may be adopted must leave some latitude for the exercise of the discretion of the borough officers. Unless this has been exceeded; unless the court is able to say from the facts of which it may take judicial cognizance, or from the undisputed or admitted facts, or if there be a conflict of evidence, then from the duly ascertained facts, that the ordinance is a revenue measure in the guise of a police regulation or that the license fee is grossly excessive of what was necessary to cover the reasonably to be anticipated expense of proper police supervision, it is not justified in interfering. Even if it be conceded that where there is a conflict of evidence, the controverted facts [318]*318are to be determined by the jury, still, the burden of proof being on the defendant, the court cannot be convicted of error in giving bind ng instructions in favor of the borough where the defendant has not furnished evidence from which the jury could find facts which would justify the court in declaring the ordinance unreasonable. For it is to be borne in mind that this is not an action on a quantum meruit, and that where an ordinance is not unreasonable on its face, it is incumbent on one who alleges its invalidity upon the ground of its unreasonableness, to aver and prove the facts that make it so:,J Kittanning Borough v. Natural Gas Company, 26 Pa. Superior Ct. 355. It was in this case held that, in a case which presented no federal question, the tribunal having jurisdiction to decide whether or not, under an agreed or duly ascertained state of facts, an ordinance is unreasonable, is the court.

The appellant contends that the court below should have held the charges unreasonable and the ordinance invalid because of what was disclosed by the evidence to have been actually done by the borough in the way of inspection and supervision. The evidence disclosed that the borough had adopted a system for the issuance of the permit, under which although the permit was granted by the chairman of the street committee the permit was actually issued by the city clerk. The city clerk was paid a salary of $15.00 per month for all services rendered in connection with his office, and received in addition a commission of three per centum on all collections made by him, the charges for these permits to open streets being included in said collections. No particular part of the salary of the clerk was designated as compensation for his services in issuing these permits. The police force of the borough consisted of a chief and four patrolmen and the testimony clearly established that it was a part of the duty of all these officers to inspect the streets and alleys of the borough, and that they were required to go over their beats twice a day and report all obstructions and defects in the public highways. It was shown that in some instances the police officers had found the ditches of the defendant company in a dangerous condition and had themselves placed lights at the work, to guard against accidents. The salaries of these [319]*319officers amounted to $231 a month. The salary was not split up allowing them so much for each service they performed, and there was therefore no particular part of the salary designated as the compensation which was paid for the inspection of the ditches of this particular company. The evidence disclosed, in addition, that the members of the street committee of councils gave personal attention to the condition of the highways and to the condition of the openings made therein, and that complaints had been made by the members of the committee to this very company.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
38 Pa. Super. 311, 1909 Pa. Super. LEXIS 132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chambersburg-borough-v-chambersburg-gas-co-pasuperct-1909.