Chambers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJanuary 10, 2022
Docket19-140
StatusUnpublished

This text of Chambers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Chambers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Chambers v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2022).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 19-140V (not to be published)

************************* DANA CHAMBERS, * * Chief Special Master Corcoran Petitioner, * * v. * Filed: December 14, 2021 * SECRETARY OF HEALTH * AND HUMAN SERVICES, * * Respondent. * * *************************

Andrew Donald Downing, Van Cott & Talamante, PLLC, Phoenix, AZ, Petitioner.

Terrence Kevin Mangan, Jr, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Washington, DC, Respondent.

DECISION GRANTING INTERIM AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES AND COSTS 1

On January 28, 2019, Dana Chambers filed a petition seeking compensation under the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program (“Vaccine Program”). 2 Petitioner alleged that she had experienced vaccine-induced Undifferentiated Connective Tissue Disease, and later Central Sensitization Syndrome, after receipt of an influenza vaccine on October 7, 2016. Petition (ECF No. 1) at 1–13. An Entitlement Hearing was held on October 22, 2021, and a decision or ruling on entitlement is still pending.

1 Because this Decision contains a reasoned explanation for my actions in this case, it must be posted on the United States Court of Federal Claims website, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 (2012). As provided by 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(d)(4)(B), however, the parties may object to the Decision’s inclusion of certain kinds of confidential information. Specifically, under Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has fourteen days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). Otherwise, the whole Decision will be available to the public. Id.

2 The Vaccine Program comprises Part 2 of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3758, codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-10 through 34 (2012) (“Vaccine Act” or “the Act”). Individual section references hereafter will be to § 300aa of the Act (but will omit that statutory prefix). Petitioner has now filed a motion for an interim award of attorney’s fees and costs. Motion, dated Nov. 5, 2021 (ECF No. 61) (“Motion”). Petitioner requests a total of $125,335.73 in attorney’s fees and costs for the work of two attorneys, Mr. Andrew Downing and Ms. Courtney Van Cott, and two paralegals, for all work performed on the matter through the recent date of hearing in October of this year. Id. at 6. Respondent did not react through a filing, but via email has indicated no objection to the request as a general matter.

For the reasons set forth below, I hereby GRANT Petitioner’s motion, awarding fees and costs in the total amount of $125,335.73.

ANALYSIS

I. Requests for Interim Attorney’s Fees and Costs

I have in prior decisions discussed at length the standards applicable to determining whether to award fees on an interim basis. Auch v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 12-673V, 2016 WL 3944701, at *6-9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. May 20, 2016); Al-Uffi v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., No. 13-956V, 2015 WL 6181669, at *5-9 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Sept. 30, 2015). It is well-established that a decision on entitlement is not required before interim fees or costs may be awarded. Fester v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 10-243V, 2013 WL 5367670, at *8 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Aug. 27, 2013); see also Cloer v. Sec’y of Health and Human Servs., 675 F.3d 1358, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

While there is no presumption of entitlement to interim fees and cost awards, special masters may in their discretion make such awards, and often do so. Perreira v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., 27 Fed. Cl. 29, 34 (1992), aff’d, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Requests for interim costs are subject to the same standards. Perreira, 27 Fed. Cl. at 34; Presault v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 667, 670 (2002); Fester, 2013 WL 5367670, at *16. Criteria that I have found to be important in determining whether an interim award should be permitted include: 1) if the amount of fees requested exceeds $30,000; 2) where expert costs are requested, if the aggregate amount is more than $15,000; or 3) if the case has been pending for more than 18 months. See Knorr v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs., No. 15-1169V, 2017 WL 2461375 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 17, 2017).

I find that Petitioner has made a showing sufficient to justify an award of interim fees and costs. Criteria that I have found to be important in determining whether an interim fees request should be permitted include: 1) if the amount of fees requested exceeds $30,000; 2) where expert costs are requested, if the aggregate amount is more than $15,000; or 3) if the case has been pending for more than 18 months. See Knorr v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No. 15-1169V, 2017 WL 2461375 (Fed. Cl. Spec. Mstr. Apr. 17, 2017). This matter meets such criteria—in particular because it has been pending for almost three years and the total amount of attorney’s

2 fees requested exceeds the minimum threshold that I find to be appropriate. 3 I also find no reason to question the claim’s reasonable basis.

II. Calculation of Fees

Determining the appropriate amount of a fees award is a two-part process. The first part involves application of the lodestar method— “multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation times a reasonable hourly rate.” Avera v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., 515 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 888 (1984)). The second part involves adjusting the lodestar calculation up or down to take relevant factors into consideration. Id. at 1348. This standard for calculating a fee award is considered applicable in most cases where a fee award is authorized by federal statute. Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 429–37 (1983).

An attorney’s reasonable hourly rate is determined by the “forum rule,” which bases the proper hourly rate to be awarded on the forum in which the relevant court sits (Washington, D.C., for Vaccine Act cases), except where an attorney’s work was not performed in the forum and there is a substantial difference in rates (the so-called “Davis exception”). Avera, 515 F.3d at 1348 (citing Davis Cty. Solid Waste Mgmt. & Energy Recovery Special Serv. Dist. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 169 F.3d 755, 758 (D.C. Cir. 1999)). A 2015 decision established the hourly rate ranges for attorneys with different levels of experience who are entitled to the forum rate in the Vaccine Program. See McCulloch v. Sec’y of Health & Hum. Servs., No.

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