Chambers v. Osteonics Corp.

917 F. Supp. 624, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, 1996 WL 86459
CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedFebruary 26, 1996
DocketIP 93-1060-C M/S
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 917 F. Supp. 624 (Chambers v. Osteonics Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chambers v. Osteonics Corp., 917 F. Supp. 624, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, 1996 WL 86459 (S.D. Ind. 1996).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

McKINNEY, District Judge.

This matter pends on the motion of defendant Osteonics Corporation (“Osteonics”) for summary judgment on the issue of preemption. Specifically, Osteonics argues that the state law claims brought by plaintiffs, William Chambers (“William”) and Beverly Chambers (the “Chambers”), are preempted by the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (“MDA”) to the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 360c et seq.; 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. In 1985, William underwent total hip replacement surgery to relieve the pain of osteoarthritis in his right hip. He received an implant of an Omnifit Micro-Structured Hip.Stem 1007 (the “hip stem”). This hip stem was manufactured and sold by Osteonics under the Investiga-tional Device Exemption regulations (“IDE”) issued by the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), 21 C.F.R. §§ 812.1 to 812.150.

Essentially, the Chambers raise two main issues with respect to their claims. First, they contend that the hip replacement operation proceeded with a lack of informed consent. They base this claim on their allegation that the consent document signed by William did not contain an explanation about whether any compensation or any medical treatment were available if injury occurred, as required by federal regulation. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.25. Second, they argue that the hip stem was defective and unreasonably dangerous because of weakness in the metal caused by negligent manufacturing.

Investigational device exemptions are exemptions for medical devices from the usual requirements of establishing safety and effectiveness of the device before they can be sold. 21 C.F.R. § 812.1. The purpose of these exemptions is to “encourage, to the extent consistent with the protection of public health and safety and with ethical standards, the discovery and development of useful devices intended for human use, and to that end to maintain optimum freedom for scientific investigators” to pursue this purpose. Id. As part of the process, a detailed *626 application is submitted to the FDA that establishes a plan for studying the product’s use with humans. The application must receive approval from both the FDA and from an institutional review committee at each institution at which the device will be tested. 21 C.F.R. § 812.62. Because the purpose of the experiment is to discern whether a device may be considered safe and effective, the regulation of IDE’s relates more to the procedures followed, rather than substantive issues. Slater v. Optical Radiation Corp., 961 F.2d 1380, 1833 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 506 U.S. 917, 113 S.Ct. 327, 121 L.Ed.2d 246 (1992). However, the FDA will not grant an IDE unless it believes the device will probably be proven safe and effective. Id.

Turning to the Chambers’ complaint regarding the consent, the Court notes that part of the FDA approval process for IDE’s requires a consent form that complies with the regulations. See 21 C.F.R. § 812.25(g). Although regulations prohibit the inclusion of exculpatory language by which a subject waives or appears to waive any legal rights, the consent form is required to at least alert the subject to the possibility of the loss of certain legal rights. See 21 C.F.R. § 50.20; 21 C.F.R. § 50.25(6) and (7) (consent shall include information about compensation or medical treatment available if injury occurs, where to get additional information, and who to contact for answers to “pertinent questions about the research and research subjects’ rights”).

Here, the consent form that Chambers signed simply explained the operation. Plfs.Brf. in Opp. to Mot. for Sum.J. of Def., Osteonics Corporation, Ex. 1. It explained the experimental nature of the hip stem’s absence of cement and the experimental nature and purpose of the use of a coating of fine metal beads in lieu of cement. The only additional risk discussed is the added risk of a possible unusual reaction to the 'metal because it would be in direct contact with the bone. The consent did not inform William about the availability or unavailability of compensation or medical treatment if injury occurred. But it did state that the metal used in the experiment was the same as had been used in hip replacement surgery for many years. The consent also failed to provide other required information as noted by the FDA in its March 27, 1984, letter to Osteonics regarding the modified consent form. See Supp.Subm. of Evid. of Osteonics Corporation in Supp. of Mot. for Sum.J., Koch Aff., Ex. B. Consequently, it did not conform to regulations relating to informed consents for IDEs.

The impact of an inadequate informed consent was anticipated in a case upon which defendant wishes to rely. In Slater, 961 F.2d 1330, the court observed that even within the scope of preemption, if the risks of the experimental procedure are not adequately explained to the patient, he or she retains the right to sue for the tort of medical battery. Id. at 1334. However, in that case' Slater, who received a lens implant in his eye, did not claim he was inadequately informed of the risks involved with the operation. Rather, he claimed the lens was poorly designed and was therefore unsafe. The court concluded from a statement in the consent form Slater signed that he understood he would have no remedy from the hospital in the event of injury to himself from the implantation. Id. Had it been otherwise, the court noted, a' claim for lack of informed consent would not be preempted by the MDA. Id. Consequently, the Slater court did not need to confront the issue of who would be liable in the event the consent was challenged.

This ease brings forth the exact situation anticipated by the court in Slater. The Chambers claim that the surgery occurred without a proper informed consent. Although such claims are not preempted by the MDA, the problem with the Chambers’s informed consent claim is its failure to show that Osteonics is liable for the absence of information. In most cases, a claim for lack of informed consent addresses the duty of the physician, not the manufacturer. Gile v. Optical Radiation Corp.,

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
917 F. Supp. 624, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2265, 1996 WL 86459, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chambers-v-osteonics-corp-insd-1996.