Chamberlain v. Lyndeborough

14 A. 865, 64 N.H. 563

• Court: Supreme Court of New Hampshire
• Decided: June 5, 1888
• Status: Published

Opinion

Blodgett, J.

It is unnecessary to consider tbe question of the validity of tbe proceedings as to which complaint is made, because, whatever may have been the original equity of the plaintiffs’ case (concerning which no opinion is expressed), they have disentitled themselves to equitable relief by their long and unexplained delay in making the application.

It appears from tbe reserved case that tbe vote which tbe plaintiffs complain of and set forth, making an appropriation of money by taxation for objects alleged to be illegal and unauthorized, was passed at tbe last annual meeting of the town, b olden on March 31; that, acting under tbis vote, tbe selectmen seasonably assessed tbis tax ifi commqn witb other taxes, and committed tbe list to the town collector for collection; that a part of these taxes bad been collected prior to tbe filing of tbe plaintiffs’ bill on June 16; and that in the meantime tbe building committee, in tbe discharge of their duties under the vote, bad commenced operations towards tbe erection of tbe building.

Upon these facts (and without regard to those offered to be proved by tbe defendants as to tbe acceptance by tbe town of a deed of the land, etc.) tbe plaintiffs fail to show proper diligence in coming to tbe court. As inhabitants of the town, they were doubtless fully cognizant of tbe vote, and also of tbe consequent proceedings which would follow in carrying it into effect unless restrained by injunction, and it was therefore obligatory upon them, if dissatisfied, to take measures accordingly. Tbis they were in a legal condition to do as soon as tbe vote was passed; and if not bound to assert their rights then, on tbe ground that delay in taking proceedings is not material so long as matters remain in statu quo, they were at least bound to assert them within a reasonable time thereafter, and before tbe town, in good faith and in the exercise of ordinary diligence, should take further action in pursuance of tbe requirements of tbe vote. Tbe well established rule in equity is, that if a party is guilty of laches or unrea ■sonable delay in the enforcement of his rights, he thereby forfeits his claim to equitable relief. Kerr Inj., ss. 23, 123, 184, 278, 319, 372, 484; Drewry Inj. 294; 2 Sto. Eq. Jur., s. 959, a. And this is more especially so where a party, being cognizant of his rights, does not take those steps which are open to him, but lies by and suffers other parties to incur expenses and enter into engagements and contracts of a burdensome character. Tash v. Adams, 10 Cush. 252, 253. The unexplained failure of the plaintiffs to take any legal action whatever for a period of more than two and a half months after their right accrued, and until after the town had incurred expense, assumed obligations, and changed its position, brings this case far within the rule.

As the case now stands, the bill must be dismissed. If, however, the plaintiffs desire an opportunity to explain their delay, it will be afforded them at the trial term.

Case discharged nisi.

Clark, J., did not sit: the others concurred.