Chalk v. United States

114 F.2d 207, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 3094
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedAugust 30, 1940
Docket4627
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 114 F.2d 207 (Chalk v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chalk v. United States, 114 F.2d 207, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 3094 (4th Cir. 1940).

Opinion

NORTHCOTT, Circuit Judge.

This is a civil suit brought by the appel-lee, UnitedjStates of America, here referred to as the plaintiff, in March, 1939, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh, against the appellants, J. D. Chalk, Commissioner of Game and Inland Fisheries, of the State of North Carolina, and E. B. Kugler; J. A. Bradshaw, J. H. Long-shore, Seaman S. Whittaker and C. N. Mease, State Officials under the direction and supervision of the said Chalk, here referred to as the defendants. The object of the suit was to permanently enjoin and restrain the defendants, and anyone acting under them in their official capacity, from enforcing or attempting to enforce the state-wide game laws of the State of North Carolina with respect to the game, birds and fish on the lands of the plaintiff known as the Pisgah National Forest and the Pisgah National Game Preserve, located in the Western part of the State of North Carolina.

Motion was made by the defendants to dismiss the suit for want of jurisdiction, which motion was denied and the defendants answered. Thereafter, the plaintiff instituted a second suit against the same parties in the same Court upon substantially identical allegations in the "complaint, with the exception that it set up a determination and authorization made by the Secretary of Agriculture in September,, 1939, and seeking the same relief prayed for in the original suit.

The defendants filed a motion, in the nature of a plea in bar, to dismiss the second action, on the grounds that a prior suit was pending and in October, ’1939, an agreement was reached between the litigants whereby the plaintiff was to dismiss the second suit with the privilege of filing an amended complaint in the suit first brought. Such amended complaint was filed containing an allegation setting up the determination and authorization made by the Secretary of Agriculture, of the United' States, with respect to the said Pisgah National Game Preserve, determining that the deer herd in said Game Preserve was damaging and injuring the land and forest and authorizing the diminishing of said herd by hunting and trapping under such conditions as the Chief of the Forest Service might find necessary.

Defendants answered the amended complaint and requested that a jury trial be had on the issue as to whether the lands and forest of the plaintiff were being damaged by the deer thereon as alleged by the plaintiff.

The cause came on for trial on November 6, 1939, and a jury was impaneled to pass upon the one issue of fact raised by the pleadings.

At the close of plaintiff’s evidence defendants moved for a directed verdict, which motion was denied. At the close of all the evidence the defendants again moved for a directed verdict. The Court thereupon instructed the jury that “from the evidence in the case, the opinion of the Court with respect to the application of the facts to the law and the law to the facts is such that if the jury should return a verdict *209 contrary to the Court’s determination of the value of the evidence, the Court would not feel in conscience bound to follow it”, and thereupon the jury was discharged, and the Court found as a fact that “the land, forest and vegetative cover comprising said Game Preserve have been and are being severely damaged by the deer on said Preserve.”

A decree was entered granting the relief prayed for by the plaintiff and enjoining the defendants from interfering with the reduction of the deer herd on the lands in question, under the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture of the United States. From this action this appeal was brought.

The State of Michigan, the Camp Fire Club of America and the North Carolina Flunters’ and Fishers’ Association upon petition were each granted leave to appear in this Court as amicus curiae and fded briefs in support of the defendants’ contention.

Two questions are involved in this appeal : First, whether the deer herd was causing serious damage to the Pisgah National Game Preserve and second, whether the United States, without regard to State Laws, may protect the Game Preserve in question against damage caused by the excessive number of deer in a herd on such Preserve.

Pursuant to the Weeks Act of March 1, 1911, c. 186, 36 Stat. 961, and with the consent of the State of North Carolina (N.C.Laws 1901, c. 17), the plaintiff acquired approximately 150,000 acres of land in western North Carolina for the Pisgah National Forest.

In the year 1915 the Legislature of the State of North Carolina passed the following Act with respect to the control of the plaintiff over the game animals, birds and fish on the lands acquired by the United States, in the State:

N.C.Laws 1915, c. 205, N.C.Code Ann. (1939), sec. 2099:

“An Act To give the consent of the State of North Carolina to the making by the Congress of the United States, or under its authority, of all such rules and regulations as in the opinion of the Federal Government may be needful in respect to game animals, game and non-game birds, and fish on lands, and in or on the waters thereon, acquired or to be acquired by the Federal Government in the western part of North Carolina for the conservation of the navigability of navigable rivers.
“Whereas, the Government of the United States, with the consent of the General Assembly of the State of North Carolina, has acquired and will acquire areas of forested land in the western part of said State for the purpose of conserving the navigability of navigable streams, and said lands and waters thereon are and will be stocked, naturally and artificially, with game animals, game and non-game birds, and fish: and
“Whereas, in order adequately to enjoy and protect the occupancy and use of said areas, it is important that the United States be fully authorized to make all needful rules and regulations in respect to such animals, birds, and fish: Therefore,
“The General Assembly of North Carolina do enact:
“Section 1. That the consent of the General Assembly of North Carolina be, and hereby is, given to the making by the Congress of the United States, or under its authority, of all such rules and regulations as the Federal Government shall determine to be needful in respect to game animals, game and non-game birds, and fish on such lands in the western part of North Carolina as shall have been, or may hereafter be, purchased by the United States under the terms of the Act of Congress of March first, one thousand nine hundred and eleven, entitled ‘An act to enable, any State to cooperate with any other State or States, or with the United States, for the protection of the watersheds of navigable streams, and to appoint a commission for the acquisition of lands' for the purposes of conserving the navigability of navigable rivers,’ (Thirty-sixth United States Statutes at Large, page nine hundred and sixty-one), and acts of Congress supplementary thereto and amendatory thereof, and in or on the waters thereon.”

Acceptance of such a grant, as is made by this Act of 1915, may be presumed. Fort Leavenworth Railroad Company v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 5 S.Ct. 995, 29 L.Ed. 264; Silas Mason Co. et al. v.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
114 F.2d 207, 1940 U.S. App. LEXIS 3094, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chalk-v-united-states-ca4-1940.