Chaka L. Pratt v. State

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: June 8, 2005
• Docket: 07-04-00335-CR
• Status: Published

Opinion

NO. 07-04-0335-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL D

JUNE 8, 2005

______________________________

CHAKA L. PRATT, APPELLANT

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 137^TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;

NO. 99-430302; HONORABLE CECIL G. PURYEAR, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and REAVIS and CAMPBELL, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Chaka L. Pratt appeals a judgment revoking her community supervision probation and sentence for burglary of a habitation. We agree with appointed counsel's conclusion that the record fails to show any meritorious issue which would support the appeal, and affirm the trial court's judgment.

Subject to a plea bargain agreement, appellant pled guilty to the offense of burglary of a habitation on February 9, 2000. The trial court accepted this plea and, in accordance with the plea agreement, sentenced appellant to seven years incarceration probated for seven years. The State subsequently filed a motion to revoke appellant's community supervision alleging that appellant had violated ten of the terms and conditions of her probation. At the revocation hearing, appellant pled not true to the allegation that she violated her probation by committing the criminal offense of escape, but pled true to the nine remaining violations. At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found appellant had violated conditions of her community supervision and entered a judgment revoking her probation. The court ordered appellant serve the seven year sentence imposed upon her conviction. Appellant timely filed notice of appeal and the trial court appointed appellate counsel.

Counsel for appellant has filed a motion to withdraw and a brief in support pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744-745, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967), in which she certifies that she has searched the record and, in her professional opinion, under the controlling authorities and facts of this case, there is no reversible error or legitimate grounds upon which a non-frivolous appeal can arguably be predicated. Counsel thus concludes that the appeal is frivolous. Counsel has discussed why, under the controlling authorities, there are no arguably reversible errors in the trial court proceeding or judgment. See High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex.Crim.App. 1978).

Counsel has certified that a copy of the Anders brief and motion to withdraw have been served on appellant, and that counsel has appropriately advised appellant of her right to review the record and file a pro se response. Johnson v. State, 885 S.W.2d 641, 645 (Tex.App.-Waco 1994, pet. ref'd). By letter, this court also notified appellant of her opportunity to submit a response to the Anders brief and motion to withdraw filed by her counsel. Appellant has not filed a response.

In conformity with the standards set out by the United States Supreme Court, we will not rule on a motion to withdraw until we have independently examined the record. Nichols v. State, 954 S.W.2d 83, 86 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, no pet.). If this court determines the appeal has merit, we will remand it to the trial court for appointment of new counsel. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991).

In her brief, counsel identifies legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's determination that appellant violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision as the sole potential issue on appeal. She then details the evidence presented by the State, concluding it was sufficient. Appellate review of a revocation order is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex.Crim.App. 1984); Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex.Crim.App. 1983). The trial court abuses its discretion in revoking community supervision if the State fails to meet its burden of proof. Cardona, 665 S.W.2d at 493-94. In a revocation proceeding, the burden on the State is to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appellant violated a condition of community supervision as alleged in the motion to revoke. Cobb v. State, 851 S.W.2d 871, 874 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993). When the State's motion alleges more than one violation, proof of any one violation will support revocation. Moses v. State, 590 S.W.2d 469, 470 (Tex.Crim.App.1979). A defendant's plea of true to an alleged violation, standing alone, is sufficient to support the revocation. Id. Appellant pled that nine of the ten violations alleged in the State's motion to revoke were true.

Our review of counsel's brief and the record convinces us that appellate counsel conducted a thorough review of the record. We have also made an independent examination of the entire record to determine whether there are any arguable grounds which might support the appeal. We agree with counsel that there are no meritorious grounds for review.

Accordingly, counsel's motion to withdraw is granted and we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

James T. Campbell

Justice

Do not publish.

e campus. Appellant’s core defense was centered around the presentation of evidence tending to establish that he was insane at the time of the stabbing. In furtherance of that defensive theory, he produced three psychiatrists and two psychologists.

          Immediately prior to the submission of the case to the jury for deliberation during the guilt-innocence phase of the trial, in concluding the State’s closing argument, the prosecutor argued the following:

STATE:Not in his right mind. Yeah, we use that term, meaning it’s out of the ordinary, meaning it’s not what the average person would have done, not what you and I would have done.

You and I wouldn’t have stuck yourself in the throat with a knife. That’s not right mind, but that’s not insanity. John Wayne Gacy, the clown murderer, was killing those boys and putting them under the floor of his house.

DEFENSE:Your honor, I will object. That’s improper argument, to bring something that is not in evidence.

COURT:Overruled.

STATE:Wasn’t in his right mind. Sane. Jeffrey Dahmer, killing those boys and eating them.

DEFENSE:Your Honor, may I have a —

COURT:One minute.

DEFENSE:— running objection to this line of argument?

COURT:Yes, sir.

STATE:Out of his mind to eat somebody. Sane. Muhammed Atta flying a plane into the North Tower killing hundreds of innocent men, women, and children. Not something somebody ordinary would do, but those doctors would pat him on the back and say, “Poor little Muhammed Atta.” Thank you.

          Thereafter, the jury found Appellant guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon causing serious bodily injury, and this appeal followed.

Discussion

          Appellant contends the State’s closing argument was improper because the State argued facts not in evidence and compared Appellant’s state of mind to that of three notorious killers–John Wayne Gacy, Jeffrey Dahmer, and Mohammed Atta. As such, Appellant asserts the State’s argument interjected prejudicial facts not in evidence to repeatedly attack his insanity defense and improperly influence the jury.

          The State asserts that its arguments were a permissible response to Appellant’s statements that Appellant was not in his “right mind” at the time of the incident and should be found not guilty by reason of insanity. The State contends its arguments also responded to Appellant’s statements that one of his experts looked like Ernest Hemingway, sounded like God, and was telling the truth.

          I.        Standard of Review

          There are four general areas of proper jury argument: (1) pleas for law enforcement, (2) summations of the evidence, (3) reasonable deductions from the evidence, and (4) responses to arguments from opposing counsel. Jackson v. State, 17 S.W.3d 664, 673 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). An improper argument constitutes reversible error when, in light of the record as a whole, it is extreme or manifestly improper, violates a mandatory statute, or injects new facts harmful to the accused into the trial proceedings. Borjan v. State, 787 S.W.2d 53, 57 (Tex.Crim.App. 1990). See Barnes v. State, 70 S.W.3d 294 (Tex.App.–Fort Worth 2002, pet. ref’d). Moreover, arguments referencing matters that are not in evidence and may not be inferred from the evidence are usually “designed to arouse the passion and prejudices of the jury and as such are highly inappropriate.” Borjan, 787 S.W.2d at 57. That said, an instruction to the jury to disregard an improper jury argument is generally sufficient to cure error. Shannon v. State, 942 S.W.2d 591, 597 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996). See LeClear v. State, No. 07-06-0185-CR, 2007 WL 3004589, at *6 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 2007, no pet.) (not designated for publication).

          II.       Jury Argument

          Remarkably, this Court considered the propriety of the State’s jury argument, under similar circumstances, a little over ten years ago, and found reversible error. See Brown v. State, 978 S.W.2d 708, 713-14 (Tex.App.–Amarillo 1998, pet. ref’d). In Brown, the prosecutor compared the accused to notorious murderers during closing argument for the proposition that, although the accused claimed to be mentally ill or legally insane, so did Jeffrey Dahmer, John Wayne Gacy, and Ted Bundy–all of whom either went to prison or received the death penalty. Id. In finding reversible error, the Brown Court stated the following:

Comparing an accused or his acts to those of a notorious criminal is, according to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, an improper and erroneous interjection of facts not in the record. [citations omitted]. Here, the State’s comments are tantamount to comparing appellant and his defense to Jeffrey Dahmer, John Wayne Gacy, and Ted Bundy and the defenses they raised. Each of the three individuals to which he was compared was or is a notorious serial murderer whose despicable acts remain fresh in the collective mind of the public. And, in arguing as it did, the State not only invoked the memory of the horrific crimes they committed but also effectively asked the jurors to punish appellant like they were punished, that is, by the assessment of imprisonment. This violated Shell [v. State, 711 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex.App.–Corpus Christi 1986, no pet.)].

978 S.W.2d at 714 (emphasis added).

          The Brown Court reversed the accused’s conviction finding harmful error because: (1) the error arose immediately prior to the jury retiring for deliberations; (2) over the appellant’s objection, the trial court permitted the State to continue its argument possibly lending its imprimatur to a sanity finding; and (3) the State did not stop once it had made its point by reference to Dahmer but continued to invoke the names of two other heinous murderers. “Each additional comparison added to the incendiary and emotional effect the criminal acts of Dahmer, Gacy, and Bundy had on a reasonable juror’s psyche.” 978 S.W.2d at 715.

          Here, again, the State’s argument is tantamount to comparing Appellant and his defense to John Wayne Gacy, Jeffrey Dahmer, and Mohammed Atta and the defenses they raised. Because the State’s argument relied on facts not in evidence and was highly improper, we find the trial court erred when it overruled Appellant’s objection and permitted the State to continue its improper comparisons.

          Although we have reviewed the entire record and found ample evidence to support the jury’s verdict of guilt, however, as in Brown, we find the trial court’s error harmful because: (1) the error arose immediately before the jury began deliberations, (2) the trial court permitted the State to continue its line of argument over Appellant’s objection possibly lending its imprimatur to a sanity finding, (3) no curative instruction was issued, (4) the State did not stop with a single reference to Gacy but continued with references to Dahmer, and Atta, and (5) the State sought to use Atta’s notoriety in order to discredit, not only Appellant’s core defense, but also his experts’ testimony.

          In response to the State’s assertions, it suffices to say simply that jury argument unsupported by the record designed to arouse the jurors’ passion and prejudices is “no response” to an opponent’s arguments. Quite the contrary, the State’s closing argument was “an improper and erroneous interjection of facts not in the record.” Brown, 978 S.W.2d at 714.

           Although an accused is not entitled to a perfect trial, he or she is entitled to a trial that is at least “tolerably fair.” Id. at 716. “In assessing the potentialities at bar, we are unable to say that the cumulative effect of each instance of misconduct was nil or only slight.” Id. Because we cannot say with confidence that the error stemming for the improper argument had no influence, or only a slight influence on the jury’s decision to reject Appellant’s insanity defense, we hold that the prosecutor’s argument was both improper and harmful. The prosecutor made the arguments and “must have believed that the jury would place at least some weight on its improper argument; otherwise, the State would not have included the references in its soliloquy to the jury.” Massey, 1999 WL 792454, at *6. Accordingly, we find the trial court erred in overruling Appellant’s objection to the State’s improper jury arguments and the error was harmful. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(b). See also Gonzalez, 115 S.W.3d at 283-86; Brown, 978 S.W.2d at 714-16; Massey, 1999 WL 792454, at *4-6. Appellant’s third issue is sustained and his remaining issues are pretermitted. Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.

Conclusion

          The trial court’s judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

                                                                           Patrick A. Pirtle