[Cite as Chagrin River Hardwood Co. v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2017-Ohio-4122.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
CHAGRIN RIVER : OPINION HARDWOOD CO., : CASE NO. 2016-A-0042 Appellant, :
- vs - :
ASHTABULA COUNTY : BOARD OF REVISION, et al.,
Appellee. :
Administrative Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2013 CV 00921.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Matthew M. Nee, Nee Law Firm, LLC, 26032 Detroit Road, Suite 5, Westlake, OH 44145 (For Appellant).
Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Robert L. Herman, Assistant Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Appellee).
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Chagrin River Hardwood Co. (“Chagrin River”), appeals from
the May 17, 2016 judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, overruling Chagrin River’s administrative appeal and affirming the decision of appellee, Ashtabula
County Board of Revision (“Board of Revision”), denying current agricultural use
valuation for Chagrin River’s parcels of land. In this appeal, Chagrin River asserts the
trial court erred by applying a “use” rather than a “devoted to” standard alleging that it
devoted its land exclusively to agriculture. Finding no error, we affirm.
{¶2} Chagrin River is the owner of several parcels of real property in Ashtabula
County. Chagrin River is engaged in commercially growing and harvesting timber.
Through the 1970s, Chagrin River regularly logged the subject property. Around that
time, Chagrin River determined the property had been excessively harvested. As a
result, Chagrin River discontinued logging on the property. Chagrin River recognized it
would take 35 to 50 years to re-grow timber that would be sufficiently mature for
commercial harvest.
{¶3} The parcels at issue have been taxed at a reduced tax valuation known as
the current agricultural use value, since the CAUV program was created in 1973. For
the 2012 tax year, the Ashtabula County Auditor denied Chagrin River’s CAUV
qualification. From the Auditor’s point of view, Chagrin River, for a number of years,
has not engaged in any physical activity on the property that would tend to prove that it
was cultivating trees for commercial purposes.
{¶4} Chagrin River filed a taxpayer complaint regarding the valuation of certain
real property. On August 19, 2013, the Board of Revision held a hearing on the
complaint. The Board of Revision agreed with the Auditor and found that Chagrin River,
for a number of years, has not engaged in any physical activity on the property that
would tend to prove that it was cultivating trees for commercial purposes.
2 {¶5} On December 23, 2013, Chagrin River filed a complaint for an
administrative appeal before the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. A hearing
was held on January 26, 2015. On May 17, 2016, the trial court overruled Chagrin
River’s administrative appeal and affirmed the Board of Revision’s decision denying
current agricultural use valuation for the various parcels of land. Chagrin River filed the
instant appeal and asserts the following assignment of error:
{¶6} “The trial court erred by applying a ‘use’ rather than a ‘devoted to’
standard because Chagrin River devoted its land exclusively to agricultural use.”
{¶7} Chagrin River presents two issues under its sole assignment of error:
{¶8} “[1.] Did the trial court err when it applied a ‘use’ standard, rather than a
‘devoted to’ standard?
{¶9} “[2.] Did Chagrin River comply with the Ohio Constitution and Ohio
Revised Code Chapter 5713, regardless of whether the court applies a ‘use’ standard or
a ‘devoted to’ standard?”
{¶10} As Chagrin River’s issues are interrelated, we will address them together.
{¶11} The standard of review in this case is abuse of discretion. See Wetland
Preservation Ltd v. Corlett, CPA, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0034, 2012-Ohio-
3884, ¶17. Regarding this standard, we recall the term “abuse of discretion” is one of
art, connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor
the record. State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676–678 (1925). An abuse of
discretion may be found when the trial court “applies the wrong legal standard,
misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”
Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶15 (8th Dist.)
3 {¶12} A taxpayer who files a complaint regarding the valuation of certain real
property bears the burden of proof before the board of revision. See Snavely v. Erie
Cty. Bd. of Rev., 78 Ohio St.3d 500, 503 (1997).
{¶13} “By a 1973 amendment to the state Constitution, Ohio voters authorized
the General Assembly to depart from uniformity in valuing real property by permitting
farms to be valued in accordance with their current agricultural use rather than their
market value. Section 36, Article II, Ohio Constitution; 1973 House Joint Resolution 13,
135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043; see Fife v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 120 Ohio St.3d
442, 2008-Ohio-6786, * * *, ¶3. ‘Under the authorizing amendment and the
implementing statutes, “the auditor disregards the highest and best use of the property
and values the property according to its current agricultural use,” a procedure that
“usually results in a lower valuation and a lower real property tax.”’ Id., ¶4, quoting
Renner v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 142, 143, * * *.”
(Parallel citations omitted.) Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 Ohio
St.3d 316, 2011-Ohio-5448, ¶13.
{¶14} The implementing legislation is set forth at R.C. 5713.30 et seq. Central
to the resolution of the instant case is the definition of “land devoted exclusively to
agricultural use” at R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a), which states in part:
{¶15} “(A) ‘Land devoted exclusively to agricultural use’ means:
{¶16} “(1) Tracts, lots, or parcels of land totaling not less than ten acres to
which, during the three calendar years prior to the year in which application is filed
under section 5713.31 of the Revised Code, and through the last day of May of such
year, one or more of the following apply:
4 {¶17} “(a) The tracts, lots, or parcels of land were devoted exclusively to * * * the
production for a commercial purpose of timber * * *.”
{¶18} Thus, a careful reading of R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a) reveals three separate
elements that must be satisfied before a tract, lot, or parcel may be deemed “devoted
exclusively to agricultural use.” The tract, lot, or parcel must: (1) not be less than ten
acres; (2) be used exclusively for production for a commercial purpose; and (3) be
devoted to the foregoing use during the three calendar years prior to the year in which
application is filed and through the last day of May of that year.
{¶19} The only element in dispute in the case sub judice is whether the property
at issue is devoted exclusively to the production of timber for a commercial purpose.
Chagrin River asserts the trial court erred in affirming the Board of Revision’s decision
revoking its CAUV status by alleging that the court should not have considered the use
of the property but rather Chagrin River’s intent as the property owner. We disagree.
{¶20} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the intent test in 1979.
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[Cite as Chagrin River Hardwood Co. v. Ashtabula Cty. Bd. of Revision, 2017-Ohio-4122.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
ASHTABULA COUNTY, OHIO
CHAGRIN RIVER : OPINION HARDWOOD CO., : CASE NO. 2016-A-0042 Appellant, :
- vs - :
ASHTABULA COUNTY : BOARD OF REVISION, et al.,
Appellee. :
Administrative Appeal from the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 2013 CV 00921.
Judgment: Affirmed.
Matthew M. Nee, Nee Law Firm, LLC, 26032 Detroit Road, Suite 5, Westlake, OH 44145 (For Appellant).
Nicholas A. Iarocci, Ashtabula County Prosecutor, and Robert L. Herman, Assistant Prosecutor, Ashtabula County Courthouse, 25 West Jefferson Street, Jefferson, OH 44047 (For Appellee).
COLLEEN MARY O’TOOLE, J.
{¶1} Appellant, Chagrin River Hardwood Co. (“Chagrin River”), appeals from
the May 17, 2016 judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas, overruling Chagrin River’s administrative appeal and affirming the decision of appellee, Ashtabula
County Board of Revision (“Board of Revision”), denying current agricultural use
valuation for Chagrin River’s parcels of land. In this appeal, Chagrin River asserts the
trial court erred by applying a “use” rather than a “devoted to” standard alleging that it
devoted its land exclusively to agriculture. Finding no error, we affirm.
{¶2} Chagrin River is the owner of several parcels of real property in Ashtabula
County. Chagrin River is engaged in commercially growing and harvesting timber.
Through the 1970s, Chagrin River regularly logged the subject property. Around that
time, Chagrin River determined the property had been excessively harvested. As a
result, Chagrin River discontinued logging on the property. Chagrin River recognized it
would take 35 to 50 years to re-grow timber that would be sufficiently mature for
commercial harvest.
{¶3} The parcels at issue have been taxed at a reduced tax valuation known as
the current agricultural use value, since the CAUV program was created in 1973. For
the 2012 tax year, the Ashtabula County Auditor denied Chagrin River’s CAUV
qualification. From the Auditor’s point of view, Chagrin River, for a number of years,
has not engaged in any physical activity on the property that would tend to prove that it
was cultivating trees for commercial purposes.
{¶4} Chagrin River filed a taxpayer complaint regarding the valuation of certain
real property. On August 19, 2013, the Board of Revision held a hearing on the
complaint. The Board of Revision agreed with the Auditor and found that Chagrin River,
for a number of years, has not engaged in any physical activity on the property that
would tend to prove that it was cultivating trees for commercial purposes.
2 {¶5} On December 23, 2013, Chagrin River filed a complaint for an
administrative appeal before the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas. A hearing
was held on January 26, 2015. On May 17, 2016, the trial court overruled Chagrin
River’s administrative appeal and affirmed the Board of Revision’s decision denying
current agricultural use valuation for the various parcels of land. Chagrin River filed the
instant appeal and asserts the following assignment of error:
{¶6} “The trial court erred by applying a ‘use’ rather than a ‘devoted to’
standard because Chagrin River devoted its land exclusively to agricultural use.”
{¶7} Chagrin River presents two issues under its sole assignment of error:
{¶8} “[1.] Did the trial court err when it applied a ‘use’ standard, rather than a
‘devoted to’ standard?
{¶9} “[2.] Did Chagrin River comply with the Ohio Constitution and Ohio
Revised Code Chapter 5713, regardless of whether the court applies a ‘use’ standard or
a ‘devoted to’ standard?”
{¶10} As Chagrin River’s issues are interrelated, we will address them together.
{¶11} The standard of review in this case is abuse of discretion. See Wetland
Preservation Ltd v. Corlett, CPA, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2011-A-0034, 2012-Ohio-
3884, ¶17. Regarding this standard, we recall the term “abuse of discretion” is one of
art, connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor
the record. State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676–678 (1925). An abuse of
discretion may be found when the trial court “applies the wrong legal standard,
misapplies the correct legal standard, or relies on clearly erroneous findings of fact.”
Thomas v. Cleveland, 176 Ohio App.3d 401, 2008-Ohio-1720, ¶15 (8th Dist.)
3 {¶12} A taxpayer who files a complaint regarding the valuation of certain real
property bears the burden of proof before the board of revision. See Snavely v. Erie
Cty. Bd. of Rev., 78 Ohio St.3d 500, 503 (1997).
{¶13} “By a 1973 amendment to the state Constitution, Ohio voters authorized
the General Assembly to depart from uniformity in valuing real property by permitting
farms to be valued in accordance with their current agricultural use rather than their
market value. Section 36, Article II, Ohio Constitution; 1973 House Joint Resolution 13,
135 Ohio Laws, Part I, 2043; see Fife v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 120 Ohio St.3d
442, 2008-Ohio-6786, * * *, ¶3. ‘Under the authorizing amendment and the
implementing statutes, “the auditor disregards the highest and best use of the property
and values the property according to its current agricultural use,” a procedure that
“usually results in a lower valuation and a lower real property tax.”’ Id., ¶4, quoting
Renner v. Tuscarawas Cty. Bd. of Revision (1991), 59 Ohio St.3d 142, 143, * * *.”
(Parallel citations omitted.) Maralgate, L.L.C. v. Greene Cty. Bd. of Revision, 130 Ohio
St.3d 316, 2011-Ohio-5448, ¶13.
{¶14} The implementing legislation is set forth at R.C. 5713.30 et seq. Central
to the resolution of the instant case is the definition of “land devoted exclusively to
agricultural use” at R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a), which states in part:
{¶15} “(A) ‘Land devoted exclusively to agricultural use’ means:
{¶16} “(1) Tracts, lots, or parcels of land totaling not less than ten acres to
which, during the three calendar years prior to the year in which application is filed
under section 5713.31 of the Revised Code, and through the last day of May of such
year, one or more of the following apply:
4 {¶17} “(a) The tracts, lots, or parcels of land were devoted exclusively to * * * the
production for a commercial purpose of timber * * *.”
{¶18} Thus, a careful reading of R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a) reveals three separate
elements that must be satisfied before a tract, lot, or parcel may be deemed “devoted
exclusively to agricultural use.” The tract, lot, or parcel must: (1) not be less than ten
acres; (2) be used exclusively for production for a commercial purpose; and (3) be
devoted to the foregoing use during the three calendar years prior to the year in which
application is filed and through the last day of May of that year.
{¶19} The only element in dispute in the case sub judice is whether the property
at issue is devoted exclusively to the production of timber for a commercial purpose.
Chagrin River asserts the trial court erred in affirming the Board of Revision’s decision
revoking its CAUV status by alleging that the court should not have considered the use
of the property but rather Chagrin River’s intent as the property owner. We disagree.
{¶20} The Ohio Supreme Court rejected the intent test in 1979. See Bd. of Edn.
of Mentor Exempted Village School Dist. v. Bd. of Revision of Lake Cty, 57 Ohio St.2d
62, 66, fn.4 (1979) (“It is true that the intent of the constitutional amendment was to give
relief to farmers whose land was slowly being engulfed by commercial land through the
growth of towns and cities and who were being driven out of business by the soaring
real property taxes attendant upon revaluation of their property under the ‘highest and
best use’ rule. Admittedly, the landowners herein do not fit cleanly into this category,
however, the approach of the appellant would require a determination of the subjective
motive of every person applying for the benefits of R.C. Chapter 5713. The results
would not comport with the concepts of due process and equal protection of the laws.”)
5 {¶21} In addition, R.C. 5713.30 makes no reference to intent. Rather, as stated,
R.C. 5713.30(A) references “‘Land devoted exclusively to agricultural use.” We
perceive nothing in the statutory language suggesting it is ambiguous. Moreover, the
Ohio Supreme Court has stated that “the wording of [R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)] is
straightforward and its meaning is clear.” Bd. of Edn. of Mentor Exempted Village
School Dist., supra, at 68.
{¶22} Based on the foregoing, the trial court did not err in not applying an intent
standard suggested by Chagrin River. The court instead properly followed the modicum
of activity standard approved by the Ohio Supreme Court in affirming a decision of the
Board of Revision. Fife, supra. Specifically, the Supreme Court held:
{¶23} “Citing previous decisions, the BTA acknowledged ‘(t)he difficulty in
determining whether the land in question is being used for the commercial production of
timber’ because ‘it may take decades for a timber crop to mature to a size and nature
that can be commercially harvested.’ Fife, BTA No. 2006–V–783, at 7. Accordingly, the
BTA applied its previous holding that ‘a modicum of activity designed to further the
growth of timber for commercial purposes’ must be discernible. Id. at 10. Moreover, the
record supports the BTA’s finding that the Fifes satisfied that standard through activity
on the property that established the ‘commercial purpose’ harbored by the owners.” Id.
at ¶13.
{¶24} Unlike the facts in Fife, there is no evidence in the case at bar of any
activity consistent with growing timber for commercial harvest within the three years
leading up to the Auditor’s decision to deny continued CAUV status to Chagrin River for
the property at issue. See R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a). In fact, the record reveals that
6 nothing has been done to maintain the property for a decade or more. Chagrin River
presented no evidence of recent commercial activity on the land.
{¶25} Chagrin River received notice in July 2012 asking for a woodland
management plan in order to remain on CAUV status. Brad Childs and Tim Brewster,
registered foresters, were later consulted in 2013. Childs determined the timber crop
was harvestable but needed another 20 years to fully mature. Brewster believed it was
closer to ten years. When Brewster viewed the land, it did not appear that any recent
activity to maintain the property had occurred. An inspection of the property revealed
an infestation of grapevines. Also, beaver dams and plants harmful to the timber were
observed on the property. Thus, Brewster’s plan called for grapevine control,
destruction of beaver dams, and cutting of plants and trees that were dangerous to the
growth of timber.
{¶26} In addition to Brewster’s testimony, Chagrin River admitted to not actively
maintaining the property. Chagrin River failed to demonstrate that a modicum of activity
designed to further the growth of timber for commercial purpose was taking place. The
land in question was not devoted exclusively to the production of commercial timber.
{¶27} The industry at issue does not allow the landowner to plant trees and
merely leave them alone. Rather, R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a) is clear that a modicum of
activity take place within the three year time period for land devoted exclusively to
agricultural use. See Fife, supra. As stated, nothing has been done to maintain the
property for a decade or more. Based on the facts presented, we find the trial court
correctly applied and complied with the “use” standard under R.C. 5713.30(A)(1)(a) in
affirming the Board of Revision’s decision.
7 {¶28} For the foregoing reasons, appellant’s sole assignment of error is without
merit. The judgment of the Ashtabula County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
CYNTHIA WESTCOTT RICE, P.J.,
THOMAS R. WRIGHT, J.,
concur.