Chagolla v. Schultz

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: January 14, 2026
• Docket: 24-6865
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 14 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

RAYMUNDO JOSE CHAGOLLA, AKA No. 24-6865 Reymundo Chagolla, D.C. No. 5:23-cv-01378-CAS-BFM Petitioner - Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

JASON SCHULTZ, Acting Warden,

Respondent - Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Christina A. Snyder, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted December 1, 2025** Pasadena, California

Before: CALLAHAN, OWENS, and KOH, Circuit Judges.

Petitioner Raymundo Chagolla (“Chagolla”) appeals the district court’s

judgment dismissing with prejudice his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition

challenging his 2000 conviction of first-degree murder for the killing of Billy

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Medlin (“Medlin”). The only question in this appeal is whether the district court

erred in determining that the Petition failed to satisfy the requirements for a second

or successive habeas petition under § 2244(b)(2)(B). Because the district court

properly found that Chagolla failed to satisfy the requirements under

§ 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), we affirm.

We review de novo the district court’s dismissal of Chagolla’s Petition as

second or successive. Henderson v. Lampert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1052 (9th Cir. 2005).

Pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996

(“AEDPA”), a petitioner must make a threshold showing before they can file a

second or successive habeas petition and have it considered on the merits. Pub. L.

No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1)-(2). “A claim presented in a

second or successive habeas corpus application under section 2254 that was

presented in a prior application shall be dismissed.” 28 U.S.C § 2244(b)(1).

However, “[a] claim presented in a second or successive habeas corpus

application under section 2254 that was not presented in a prior application” may

be considered under two circumstances: (1) if “the applicant shows that the claim

relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral

review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable,” id.

§ 2244(b)(2)(A), or (2) if “the factual predicate for the claim could not have been

discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence” and “the facts

2 24-6865 underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole,

would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for

constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty

of the underlying offense,” id. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i)-(ii).

Like the district court, we presume without deciding that the factual

predicate for Chagolla’s claims could not have been discovered previously though

due diligence. We review only whether the facts underlying the claims, if proven

and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by

clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable

factfinder would have found Chagolla guilty of the underlying offense. See

Charboneau v. Davis, 87 F.4th 443, 452-53 (9th Cir. 2023).

1. Chagolla first argues that the prosecution failed to turn over two material

pieces of evidence as required by Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).

Specifically, Chagolla argues that the prosecution failed to turn over: (1) evidence

that a third party had a motive and an opportunity to murder Medlin; and (2)

evidence that a witness, Horry Robertson, failed to identify Chagolla as the shooter

from a six-pack photo lineup. Chagolla’s third-party motive evidence relates to the

“Westfall case,” a case about a murder kidnapping plot involving Medlin’s

brother-in-law. The evidence from the Westfall case, however, suggests only that

someone other than Chagolla may have had a motive to kill Medlin. But the

3 24-6865 evidence is largely speculative and offset by the three separate eyewitnesses who

saw the shooting and separately identified Chagolla as the shooter. We thus agree

with the district court that Chagolla failed to show by clear and convincing

evidence that Medlin’s connection to the Westfall case, considered in light of all

the evidence, demonstrates that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted him

of murder.

The withheld identification evidence relates to Robertson, who was at the

motel the night Medlin was murdered. In 2017—17 years after the murder—

Robertson signed a declaration stating that the night of the murder he saw a Black

man wearing a black hoodie running away from the motel and that he gave this

information to the police. Robertson further stated that law enforcement presented

him with “some mug shots” of Latino men and in response he reiterated that the

person he saw was a Black man and thus was none of the individuals in the mug

shots. This information was never provided to the defense. Robertson, however,

admitted that he did not witness the shooting and provided no connection between

the Black man he observed and the shooting itself, stating only that he believed

that the Black man was running from the scene. Additionally, no other evidence

supported or corroborated Robertson’s account. Therefore, we agree with the

district court that a reasonable juror could credit this testimony, harmonize it with

the eyewitness testimony, and find that Chagolla was the shooter. A reasonable

4 24-6865 juror could also discredit Robertson’s testimony completely and find that Chagolla

was the shooter based on the eyewitness testimony that identified Chagolla as the

shooter.

In sum, the facts underlying the alleged Brady claims, accepted as true, fail

to meet the standard under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii). See Gable v. Williams, 49 F.4th

1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 2022) (evidence of third-party guilt can only satisfy innocence

standard under Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995), if it is sufficiently reliable,

supported by other evidence, and casts serious doubt on the petitioner’s guilt).

2. Chagolla next argues that his trial counsel was ineffective because he

failed to interview several witnesses and present character evidence. Chagolla

argues, inter alia, that Robertson would have informed defense counsel that he saw

a Black man running from the scene, Antoine Darcell Greer and Abby Lynn

Stevens would have informed defense counsel that they saw the shooter run toward

a getaway car, and character witnesses including Chagolla’s mother and aunt

would have provided relevant information that this random act of violence did not

comport with Chagolla’s character. Though this evidence could provide support

for Chagolla’s defense, it does not clearly and convincingly demonstrate that no

reasonable juror could find that Chagolla committed this murder. See Charboneau,

87 F.4th at 458-61 (considering new facts “in light of all the evidence” and finding

that they fail to meet the standard under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii)). Accordingly, we

5 24-6865 again agree with the district court that taking the underlying facts of this claim as

true, Chagolla fails to clear the high bar of § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii).

3. Because Chagolla’s Petition fails under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii), we need not

reach the question of whether it was sufficient under § 2244(b)(2)(B)(i). See

Charboneau, 87 F.4th at 444. We also decline to reach the question of whether the

Petition is barred by § 2244(d)(1)(D).

AFFIRMED.

6 24-6865