CHADWICK v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY

District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania·Decided July 10, 2023·No. 5:21-cv-03991·Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JAMES CHADWICK : CIVIL ACTION : v. : NO. 21-3991 : NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY : COMPANY :

MEMORANDUM

SCHMEHL. J. July 10, 2023

Plaintiff brought this action claiming the Defendant Norfolk Southern Railway Company (“Norfolk Southern”) violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Rehabilitation Act (“RA”) and the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) when it allegedly: 1) medically disqualified him from returning to work as a locomotive engineer (Count I); denied his request for a reasonable accommodation (Count II); and 3) retaliated against him for filing a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (Count III). He also claims that Norfolk Southern medically disqualified him and did not offer any vocational assistance because of his age in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) (Count IV). Presently before the Court is Norfolk Southern’s motion for summary judgment. In his Response in Opposition to Norfolk Southern’s Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff has conceded his claims for retaliation (Count III) and age discrimination (Count IV). ECF 42 at p.1. For the reasons that follow, the motion is denied without prejudice. STANDARD OF REVIEW A court shall grant a motion for summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). An issue is “genuine” if there is a

sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non- moving party. Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). A factual dispute is “material” if it might affect the outcome of the case under governing law. Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). Under Rule 56, the Court must view the evidence presented on the motion in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. However, “[u]nsupported assertions, conclusory allegations, or mere suspicions are insufficient to overcome a motion for summary judgment.” Betts v. New Castle Youth Dev. Ctr., 621 F.3d 249, 252 (3d Cir. 2010). The movant bears the initial responsibility for informing the

Court of the basis for the motion for summary judgment and identifying those portions of the record that demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Where the non-moving party bears the burden of proof on a particular issue, the moving party’s initial burden can be met simply by “pointing out to the district court that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party’s case.” Id. at 325. After the moving party has met the initial burden, the non-moving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuinely disputed factual issue for trial by “citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations . . . , admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials” or by “showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Summary judgment is appropriate if the non-moving party fails to rebut by

making a factual showing “sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322. FACTS

The following facts have either been stipulated to by the parties (where indicated) or construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff: 1. Plaintiff started working for Norfolk Southern as a locomotive engineer on June 1, 1999 following Norfolk Southern’s acquisition of Conrail. Joint Statement of Undisputed Material Facts (“SOF”) ECF 40 at ¶ 1; See ECF 40-2, Career Service Record, at NORFOLK_00000425; Ex. 3, Plaintiff’s Answers to Interrogatories No. 16. 2. Locomotive engineers operate locomotives and are responsible for moving freight safely and efficiently in accordance with all applicable regulations. SOF at ¶ 2; See ECF 40-4, Deposition Transcript of Shaun McCoy, at pp. 8:18-9:3; ECF 40-3, Ans. to Interrogatory, at Ans. No. 16. 3. Failure to operate a locomotive in a safe manner can impact on an individual’s own safety, their co-workers, and the general public; therefore, the Federal Railway Administration (“FRA”) deems a locomotive engineer to be a safety-sensitive position. SOF at ¶ 3; See 49 C.F.R. § 209.303; ECF 40- 1, Deposition Transcript of J. Chadwick, at pp. 79:15-19; ECF 40-5, Deposition Transcript of Anita Euell, at pp. 75:18-22; ECF 40-6, Locomotive Engineer Job Demand Forms, at NORFOLK_00000444-445 and NORFOLK_00000446-447.

4. Engineers must maintain sufficient alertness and concentration to safely operate the locomotive which includes monitoring engine speed and air brake pressure, moving engine controls, and maintaining communications with other personnel, including conductors, to properly control train movements. SOF at ¶ 5; See ECF 40-6, Locomotive Engineer Job Demand Forms, at NORFOLK_00000444-445 and NORFOLK_00000446-447; See ECF 40-4, Deposition Transcript of S. McCoy, at pp. 39:12-40:3. 5. Plaintiff testified that he understood that there are safety rules imposed by the federal government on Norfolk Southern. ECF 40-1, at pp. 44:23-47:7, 51:5- 11.

6. Plaintiff testified that he understood that the unsafe operation of a locomotive poses a significant risk to the community. SOF at ¶ 4; See ECF 40-1, Deposition Transcript of J. Chadwick, at pp. 47:14-48:19. 7. Plaintiff was at all times relevant to this matter, a member of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (“BLET”) union, and subject to a Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”) which establishes a process for challenging medical disqualification. ECF 40-32, BLET CBA. 8. Plaintiff underwent surgery to remove a brain tumor on August 26, 2013 and developed a seizure disorder in 2014. SOF at ¶ 6; See ECF 40-7, September 30, 2015 Physical Therapy Initial Examination, RFPOD 00167; ECF 40-8, June 12, 2014 Neurology Office Visit Notes, at Plaintiff’s RFPOD 000147- 148. 9. After recovering from surgery, Plaintiff returned to work in January 2014 and

remained in-service until he suffered a series of focal motor seizures in 2014 and 2015. SOF at ¶ 7; See ECF 40-7, September 30, 2015 Physical Therapy Initial Examination, at Plaintiff’s RFPOD 00167; ECF 40-8, June 12, 2014 Neurology Office Visit Notes, at Plaintiff’s RFPOD 000147-148; ECF 40-9, October 9, 2014 Neurology Office Visit Note, at Plaintiff’s RFPOD 000141- 145; ECF 40-10, February 11, 2015 Neurology Office Visit Notes, at Plaintiff’s RFPOD 000138; ECF 40-11, February 19, 2015 Neurology Office Visit Notes, at Plaintiff’s RFPOD 00135. 10. In a letter to Plaintiff dated August 21, 2014 which requested further medical information from Plaintiff, the then Director of Medical Services for Norfolk

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CHADWICK v. NORFOLK SOUTHERN RAILWAY COMPANY, (E.D. Pa. 2023).

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