Chadwick v. Clapp

69 Ill. 119
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedSeptember 15, 1873
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 69 Ill. 119 (Chadwick v. Clapp) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Chadwick v. Clapp, 69 Ill. 119 (Ill. 1873).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Sheldon

delivered the opinion of the Court:

The only real controversy in this case is, as to whether there was here any equitable mortgage in favor of Edwin Clapp, and if so, whether Chadwick was a purchaser for a valuable consideration, without notice.

We do not find it necessary to consider whether there was, in fact, a deposit of title deeds as security for a loan of money; nor to decide whether the well established doctrine in English law, that the deposit of title deeds alone, as such' security, will create an equitable lien on the estate, prevails in this State.

We find in the letter of Henry Clapp to Edwin Clapp, of the date of October-2, 1867, the following: “With respect to what I owe my father, there will be no trouble, for you hold in your name, on the records in Dixon, land enough to nearly pay double the amount I am owing him ; but I can not rest easy until I have this matter all straightened up and my father paid.” We consider that'there was here, in writing, an implied assent that the title to this land should be held as security for the payment of the $2600 loan by Ebenezer Clapp to Henry Clapp, which was sufficient to create an equitable lien on the land for the payment.

The assent being manifested in writing, avoids the difficulty which may be supposed to arise under the Statute of Frauds, where there is but a mere deposit of title deeds, or such deposit accompanied with a verbal agreement that the deeds should be held as security.

To prove that Chadwick had notice of this equitable lien, the defendant seems to rely upon the family connection between Chadwick and Henry Clapp—the testimony as to understanding in the neighborhood as to the reported ownership of the land—that Cephas Clapp acted as agent of the land for some one other than Henry Clapp—and what took place at an interview with the witness Arnold, where the claim of Edwin or Jason Clapp was spoken of.

This family connection had existed at the time when Chadwick acquired title, for a little over two years. There was nothing in any associations or confidence shown to exist between the parties, to raise the presumption that they had resulted in Chadwick’s acquiring any knowledge as to Henry?s dealing with his father.

The neighborhood reports established little more than that, for years before, it had been the understanding through the community that the title to the property was in “some Clapp East.”

This was true as to the legal title, and Henry testifies that he had an object in letting such an understanding prevail, on account of his indebtedness. The proof shows that he had failed in business at the east, and was embarrassed with debt. He had been the equitable owner of the lands ever since their purchase from the United States some years prior to 1855, .and had continuously from that time resided on the land, some one else holding the legal title.

To counterbalance any such neighborhood reports, and exonerate the conduct of Chadwick from the imputation of fraud in acquiring the title, are the following facts: Years before, that legal title had been transferred to R. W. Clapp. The deeds had been filed for record, and one of them recorded. About the time they were filed for record, R. W. Clapp executed a mortgage of the land to one McLean, to secure the payment of $6000 for a stock of goods purchased for Henry Clapp. Mr. Ives, an attorney, drew the mortgage, and there was exhibited to him at the . time an abstract of the title, signed by the recorder. We must suppose, from the fact of ,Mr. Ives accepting the mortgage, that the abstract showed a good title of record in R. W. Clapp. This abstract had been exhibited to Chadwick previous to his purchase ; and some fourteen months before the purchase, R. W. Clapp and wife had executed to Henry Clapp a deed of the property, describing themselves in the deed as of the "city and State of Hew York.

These were circumstances to allay any suspicion which might have been excited by such neighborhood report, and good faith would not seem to have required that Chadwick should seek out any other persons of the name of Clapp, who might be found at the east, and inquire whether they had any interest in the land.

The note for the $2600 borrowed of Ebenezer Clapp was executed to Jason Clapp and Edwin Clapp, on account, as alleged, of Ebenezer’s incapacity to transact business. In 1860, Jason Clapp and Edwin Clapp, by letter to Henry Clapp, informed him that they had decided to appoint Cephas Clapp their agent of their affairs in Lee county, and referring Henry to Cephas to make any arrangement for occupying the ■land.

Afterwards, Cephas, to some extent, performed acts of agency and supervision of the property j but we find nothing in the proof sufficient to bring home to Chadwick the knowledge that Cephas was acting as the agent of Jason and Edwin, especially at the time of the purchase; as it may be inferred, from Cephas’ testimony, that he had ceased to act as such agent before that time—he testifying that he commenced so acting in 1860, and acted to 1868, which, the beginning of the year 1868, would be fourteen months before Chadwick’s purchase.

The witness Arnold, was the agent or owner of the McLean mortgage before spoken of, which had never been satisfied of record, though claimed to have been paid. At an interview which was had between Arnold and Henry Clapp, in the presence of Chadwick, in reference to the adjustment of that mortgage, Arnold testifies that mention was made of the Edwin Clapp or Jason Clapp claim, and Chadwick remarked that he did not care anything about that claim; that he did not consider it worth any thing; and this is relied on as actual notice.

But the mention of that claim was general, without its being in any manner particularized what it was; and as Edwin had a good claim of title, as appeared of record, to a portion of the land, and the signatures of both Edwin and Jason to their deeds to R. W. Clapp had been defaced by drawing ink lines through them, Chadwick might have had reference to Edwin’s and Jason’s claim to the land arising from these circumstances. On this occasion Arnold exhibited the abstract of title which he had in his possession, before referred to as shown to Ives, when he drew the McLean mortgage.

In view of the whole evidence upon the subject, we regard it as of a nature too vague and indefinite to affect Chadwick with notice of this equitable lien upon the land. There had been no information of it communicated to him sufficiently definite to enable him to ascertain whether it was authentic. We do not perceive that such circumstances were brought to his knowledge that were sufficient to put him on inquiry, or that, in view of them, his conduct was tainted with fraud in taking the title. In the editor’s note to the ease of Le Neve v. Le Neve, on pages 156, 157, vol. 2, pt. 1, Leading Cases in Equity, where this subject of notice is fully treated, it is said : “ Where circumstances are brought directly home to the knowledge of the purchaser, which would have been sufficient in themselves to put him on inquiry, and thus amount to notice, he will be entitled to rebut the presumption of notice, which would otherwise arise, by showing the existence of other and attendant circumstances of a nature to allay his suspicions, and lead him to suppose the inquiry was not necessary.”

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Bluebook (online)
69 Ill. 119, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chadwick-v-clapp-ill-1873.