1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHADERICK A. INGRAM, Case No. 2:25-cv-2652-DAD-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC., 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff brought this action in state court alleging various “intentional tort” and “general 19 negligence” claims against the University of Phoenix, Inc. (“defendant”). He claims that 20 defendant: (1) mislead him about the application of credits he earned at another university; 21 (2) wrongfully denied or rejected his prior learning assessment (“PLA”) essays; (3) deliberately 22 harmed his credit scores; (4) provided false information about the availability of extra credits for 23 “CJA” credits; and (5) fabricated false information about his financial aid application. ECF No. 1 24 at 12-16. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 4, and plaintiff has 25 filed a motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 9. The motions are fully briefed, and, after 26 review of the pleadings, I recommend that defendant’s motion be granted and plaintiff’s be 27 denied. The complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. 28 1 Motion to Dismiss 2 I. Legal Standards 3 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 4 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 5 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 6 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 7 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 8 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 9 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 10 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 12 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 13 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 14 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 15 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 16 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 17 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 18 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 19 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 20 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 21 II. Analysis 22 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint is non-compliant with Rule 8 of the Federal 23 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 24 pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). I agree. Detailed allegations are not required, 25 but the standard requires “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 26 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 27 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to articulate any cognizable legal 28 theories or to allege any factual support for his vague claims. 1 Beginning with plaintiff’s claim regarding academic credits, he alleges that, prior to his 2 start date of April 9, 2024, defendant informed him that he had “30 to 39 credits” from Ashford 3 University. ECF No. 1 at 18. Then, at some later time, but still prior to the start date, defendant 4 reversed course and told him that it had never guaranteed that his credits would be accepted. Id. 5 He vaguely alleges that defendant and Ashford University “conspired a negative collaboration” to 6 reduce his credits. Id. It is unclear what, if any, legal theory undergirds this claim. Plaintiff 7 categorizes it as “general negligence,” but he has failed to plead allegations that, if true, would 8 establish that defendant was negligent. A California law claim for negligence requires a showing 9 that: “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and 10 (3) the breach was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.” Dougherty v. Bank of 11 Am., N.A., 177 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1257 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Here, plaintiff has not alleged that 12 defendant was under any legal duty to either accept his credits or to, from the first instance, 13 accurately inform him how credits from another institution would be applied. The allegation 14 being raised implicates only academic procedure. 15 Similarly, plaintiff’s claim that defendant did not accept his PLA essays that would have 16 earned him academic credits or tuition savings also fails to attach to any cognizable legal theory. 17 As with his credits claim, plaintiff argues that it sounds in general negligence, but there is no 18 identified legal duty allegedly breached by defendant. 19 Next, plaintiff alleges that defendant “collaborated and conspired” with the Department of 20 Education to “create a negative illegal unauthorized charge” that damaged his credit report. ECF 21 No. 1 at 20. He offers no details as to the circumstances of the conspiracy, the nature of the 22 charge, or any other context that would enable the reader to understand the specifics of this claim. 23 It is insufficient to meet federal pleading standards. The same fault applies to his claim that 24 defendant made false claims about him in connection with a “FASFA application.” Id. at 22. I 25 cannot tell what false claim was allegedly made or how it breached any purported legal duty 26 defendant owed plaintiff. 27 Based on the foregoing, I recommend that defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted. 28 Dismissal should be without leave to amend because plaintiff has a long history of frivolous 1 litigation and has been declared vexatious in this district. Defendant asks that I take judicial 2 notice of the court filings declaring him vexatious, ECF No. 4-1, and I will do so. See Chandler 3 v. United States, 378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967) (a court may take judicial notice of its own 4 records). Those filings show that plaintiff has a penchant for frivolous litigation. ECF No. 4-1 at 5 10. And the current suit appears no better insofar as, in essence, it is a dispute about the 6 application of school policy that plaintiff has attempted to thinly cloak in claims of “general 7 negligence” and “intentional tort.” Thus, I find that leave to amend would be futile and the 8 complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. See Gavin v. City & Cnty. of San 9 Francisco, No. 15-cv-05202-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156143, *7-8 (N.D. Cal.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 CHADERICK A. INGRAM, Case No. 2:25-cv-2652-DAD-JDP (PS) 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 14 THE UNIVERSITY OF PHOENIX, INC., 15 Defendant. 16 17 18 Plaintiff brought this action in state court alleging various “intentional tort” and “general 19 negligence” claims against the University of Phoenix, Inc. (“defendant”). He claims that 20 defendant: (1) mislead him about the application of credits he earned at another university; 21 (2) wrongfully denied or rejected his prior learning assessment (“PLA”) essays; (3) deliberately 22 harmed his credit scores; (4) provided false information about the availability of extra credits for 23 “CJA” credits; and (5) fabricated false information about his financial aid application. ECF No. 1 24 at 12-16. Defendant has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint, ECF No. 4, and plaintiff has 25 filed a motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 9. The motions are fully briefed, and, after 26 review of the pleadings, I recommend that defendant’s motion be granted and plaintiff’s be 27 denied. The complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. 28 1 Motion to Dismiss 2 I. Legal Standards 3 A complaint may be dismissed under that rule for “failure to state a claim upon which 4 relief may be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to 5 state a claim, a plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its 6 face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim has “facial plausibility 7 when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference 8 that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 9 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not akin to a “probability 10 requirement,” but it requires more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. 11 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. 12 For purposes of dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), the court generally considers only 13 allegations contained in the pleadings, exhibits attached to the complaint, and matters properly 14 subject to judicial notice, and construes all well-pleaded material factual allegations in the light 15 most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Sys./Loral, Inc., 710 16 F.3d 946, 956 (9th Cir. 2013); Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1212 (9th Cir. 2012). 17 Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either: (1) lack of a cognizable legal 18 theory, or (2) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal theory. Chubb Custom Ins. Co., 710 F.3d 19 at 956. Dismissal also is appropriate if the complaint alleges a fact that necessarily defeats the 20 claim. Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1228-1229 (9th Cir. 1984). 21 II. Analysis 22 Defendant argues that plaintiff’s complaint is non-compliant with Rule 8 of the Federal 23 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 24 pleader is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). I agree. Detailed allegations are not required, 25 but the standard requires “more than labels and conclusions” or a “formulaic recitation of the 26 elements of a cause of action.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Papasan v. 27 Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). Plaintiff’s complaint fails to articulate any cognizable legal 28 theories or to allege any factual support for his vague claims. 1 Beginning with plaintiff’s claim regarding academic credits, he alleges that, prior to his 2 start date of April 9, 2024, defendant informed him that he had “30 to 39 credits” from Ashford 3 University. ECF No. 1 at 18. Then, at some later time, but still prior to the start date, defendant 4 reversed course and told him that it had never guaranteed that his credits would be accepted. Id. 5 He vaguely alleges that defendant and Ashford University “conspired a negative collaboration” to 6 reduce his credits. Id. It is unclear what, if any, legal theory undergirds this claim. Plaintiff 7 categorizes it as “general negligence,” but he has failed to plead allegations that, if true, would 8 establish that defendant was negligent. A California law claim for negligence requires a showing 9 that: “(1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a legal duty, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and 10 (3) the breach was a proximate or legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries.” Dougherty v. Bank of 11 Am., N.A., 177 F. Supp. 3d 1230, 1257 (E.D. Cal. 2016). Here, plaintiff has not alleged that 12 defendant was under any legal duty to either accept his credits or to, from the first instance, 13 accurately inform him how credits from another institution would be applied. The allegation 14 being raised implicates only academic procedure. 15 Similarly, plaintiff’s claim that defendant did not accept his PLA essays that would have 16 earned him academic credits or tuition savings also fails to attach to any cognizable legal theory. 17 As with his credits claim, plaintiff argues that it sounds in general negligence, but there is no 18 identified legal duty allegedly breached by defendant. 19 Next, plaintiff alleges that defendant “collaborated and conspired” with the Department of 20 Education to “create a negative illegal unauthorized charge” that damaged his credit report. ECF 21 No. 1 at 20. He offers no details as to the circumstances of the conspiracy, the nature of the 22 charge, or any other context that would enable the reader to understand the specifics of this claim. 23 It is insufficient to meet federal pleading standards. The same fault applies to his claim that 24 defendant made false claims about him in connection with a “FASFA application.” Id. at 22. I 25 cannot tell what false claim was allegedly made or how it breached any purported legal duty 26 defendant owed plaintiff. 27 Based on the foregoing, I recommend that defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted. 28 Dismissal should be without leave to amend because plaintiff has a long history of frivolous 1 litigation and has been declared vexatious in this district. Defendant asks that I take judicial 2 notice of the court filings declaring him vexatious, ECF No. 4-1, and I will do so. See Chandler 3 v. United States, 378 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1967) (a court may take judicial notice of its own 4 records). Those filings show that plaintiff has a penchant for frivolous litigation. ECF No. 4-1 at 5 10. And the current suit appears no better insofar as, in essence, it is a dispute about the 6 application of school policy that plaintiff has attempted to thinly cloak in claims of “general 7 negligence” and “intentional tort.” Thus, I find that leave to amend would be futile and the 8 complaint should be dismissed without leave to amend. See Gavin v. City & Cnty. of San 9 Francisco, No. 15-cv-05202-EMC, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 156143, *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 10 2015) (“While pro se litigants are generally given the opportunity to amend deficient pleadings, 11 leave may be denied where amendment would be futile. Given the legal deficiency in the vast 12 majority of Plaintiff’s claims, as well as Plaintiff’s problematic history of litigation in this district, 13 the Court finds that dismissal with prejudice is warranted in this case.”). 14 Conclusion 15 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that: 16 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 4, be GRANTED and the complaint be 17 DISMISSED without leave to amend. 18 2. Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 9, be DENIED. 19 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge 20 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within forty-five days 21 after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written 22 objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned 23 “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the 24 objections shall be served and filed within fourteen days after service of the objections. The 25 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to 26 appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449, 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez 27 v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991). 28 1 IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: _ June 25, 2026 Q_———— 4 JEREMY D. PETERSON 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28