Chad Reese Bennett v. Shannon Marie Remington and M.R.

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

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No. 25-0814

Filed August 19, 2026

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Chad Reese Bennett, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.

Shannon Marie Remington

and M.R.,

Defendants–Appellees.

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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Marion County, The Honorable Thomas P. Murphy, Judge.

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AFFIRMED

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Chad R. Bennett, Clarinda, self-represented appellant.

Lynnette M. Lindgren of Broerman, Lindgren & Denny, Oskaloosa, attorney for appellees.

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Considered without oral argument by Tabor, C.J., Schumacher, J., and Vogel, S.J.

Opinion by Schumacher, J.

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SCHUMACHER, Judge.

Chad Bennett appeals the dismissal of his “petition for relief from a personal injury tort,” in which Bennett raised a variety of claims against the minor victim of his prior criminal acts and the child’s mother. Upon our review, we affirm.

I. Background Proceedings

In April 2023, while confined at the Clarinda Correctional Facility, Chad Bennett filed a petition against S.R. and her minor child, M.R. (collectively, Remington), alleging “Defendants acted individually and/or jointly to cause Plaintiff to suffer injury through false arrest, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, defamation, misrepresentation, deceit, interference with contract rights, civil rights violations, and other actions.” To support his claims, Bennett alleged in part:

 Defendant M.R. . . . is the minor child of Defendant [S.R.] and resided with her under her supervision at all times material hereto.

 On June 29, 2020, at about 3:00 a.m., [S.R.] reported M.R. missing from home to law enforcement. M.R. was subsequently seen by witnesses near her home. M.R. returned home voluntarily at about 5:15 a.m. Upon returning home . . . M.R. did not mention any kind of assault or sexual activity to these people according to written statements and deposition testimony.

 Shortly after M.R.’s return home, police officer Joseph Mrstik arrived to speak with M.R. Mrstik met with M.R. . . . Mrstik would later admit under oath that he brought up the subject of sexual activity, asking M.R. directly if Bennett touched her inappropriately or sexually abused her.

 M.R. indicated there was sexual contact with Bennett.

 M.R. was [then brought to the police station to be] interviewed.

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 After repeated questioning in the interview, M.R. told Mrstik that she had intimate contact with Bennett five times over the prior one to two months. M.R. denied intercourse.

 [Bennett] was arrested by Mrstik. . . . In a recorded conversation, Mrstik told Bennett what M.R. allegedly said to him: “she said that [describing sexual acts].” Bennett denied that M.R. did this to him, but Mrstik arrested him on second degree sexual abuse.

 Mrstik instructed [S.R.] to take M.R. to Blank Children’s for a medical examination . . . . The [sexual-assault-nurse-examiner] SANE exam of M.R. revealed no evidence of sexual activity. . . . Evidence swabs taken during the exam would be analyzed and would show no substance of male origin and no DNA other than M.R.’s.

 On June 30, 2020, M.R. gave a [child protection center] CPC forensic interview. . . . M.R. told the forensic interviewer that she had been with Bennett on six occasions and that on the night of June 28/29, she had sexual intercourse with Bennett, on his bed, for thirty minutes. This contradicted the statement M.R. made to Mrstik on June 29 in the police station interview. M.R. promised and “pinky swore” to the forensic interviewer that she was telling the truth.

 At [an interview on July 3, 2020], M.R. told Mrstik that there was sexual intercourse on three of the four occasions she claimed to have been with Bennett, to include the night of June 28/29. This contradicted her June 29 statement to Mrstik. M.R. stated there was vaginal and anal intercourse with Bennett’s penis on the night of June 28/29 that lasted for 50 minutes and that took place on Bennett’s bed and couch.

 A criminal trial information against Bennett was filed July 15, 2020.

Included in this formal charging document were Mrstik’s own summaries of allegations made by M.R. in the June 30 forensic interview and the July 3 interview with Mrstik.

 Bennett became convinced that Mrstik had induced M.R. to make untruthful statements in her interviews with Mrstik and with the forensic interviewer. In the fall of 2020, Bennett endeavored to inform M.R. of the importance of telling the truth in her upcoming deposition because, “unlike the interviews, a deposition is under oath and lying

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can be punished by a judge.” Bennett, still in jail, requested his mother to get the message to M.R. M.R. lived next door to Bennett’s brother.

 In January of 2021, M.R. gave sworn testimony in a deposition. M.R.

testified she had been with Bennett on fifteen to twenty occasions.

 In April of 2021, Mrstik criminally charged Plaintiff and his mother for attempting to inform M.R. to be truthful in her deposition.

 M.R. testified at trial in 2023 [about sexual abuse by Bennett].

 In statements made in August of 2023, [S.R.] and M.R. made defaming accusations against Plaintiff that, if true, would have resulted in additional criminal charges but did not.

Bennett alleged the “[i]ntentional and negligent actions of Defendants were the proximate cause of injury” to him. He requested the court enter an award of “compensatory and punitive damages in an amount to be determined.”

Remington moved to dismiss Bennett’s petition, maintaining it was “an act to further harass, intimidate and to access the minor child victim, and her mother, both named defendants” after Bennett had been convicted of multiple offenses stemming from his sexual abuse, stalking, and other acts against M.R. Remington claimed Bennett failed to state a claim for which relief could be granted under Iowa law “due to his criminal convictions.” Remington also raised several counterclaims against Bennett.

The district court dismissed the entirety of Bennett’s claims in two orders. In November 2023, after a hearing, the court dismissed Bennett’s claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, abuse of process, deceit, and interference with contract rights. In March 2025, the court revisited its

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November 2023 decision and granted Remington’s motion to dismiss “in its entirety.”1 Bennett appeals.

II. Standard of Review

We review the district court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for the correction of errors at law. Est. of Tornell v. Trinity Health Corp., 31 N.W.3d 162, 166 (Iowa 2026). “For purposes of reviewing a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true the petition’s well-pleaded factual allegations, but not its legal conclusions.” Shumate v. Drake Univ., 846 N.W.2d 503, 507 (Iowa 2014).

III. Motion to Strike

Bennett moved to strike portions of Remington’s brief, specifically “references . . . to [his] convictions and sentencing” outside the record. The supreme court ordered this issue submitted with the appeal. We do not consider “any outside-the-record factual statements provided in appellate briefs,” and we limit our review to the record before us. Est. of Hazen by Hazen v. Genesis Health Sys., No. 23-0335, 2024 WL 3050527, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 19, 2024).

IV. Motion to Dismiss

“The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the legal sufficiency of the petition.” Shumate, 846 N.W.2d at 507 (cleaned up). “We will affirm a district court ruling that granted a motion to dismiss when the petition’s allegations, taken as true, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Id.

1 Meanwhile, Remington dismissed the counterclaims against Bennett.

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Here, in two separate orders, the district court succinctly and appropriately evaluated the nature and viability of each claim raised by Bennett. The court determined that Bennett’s allegations, in their entirety and taken as true, failed to state claims upon which relief may be granted. Upon review, we find no error in the court’s conclusion. See Rees v. City of Shenandoah, 682 N.W.2d 77, 79 (Iowa 2004) (“A motion to dismiss is properly granted only when there exists no conceivable set of facts entitling the non-moving party to relief.” (citation omitted)).

In affirming the district court, we specifically reject Bennett’s contentions that Remington’s motion to dismiss did “not apply to [his] amended petition”; the court erred in granting the motion because it “was not timely, there was no certificate of service, and Bennett moved to strike”; summary judgment was “the proper method of challenge”; the petition was sufficient to survive the motion to dismiss; the court erred by “restricting Bennett’s discovery” by requiring him to use an attorney to conduct any deposition of M.R. and disallowing him to be present during such deposition; and the court erred by appointing a guardian ad litem for M.R.

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s dismissal of Bennett’s petition.

AFFIRMED.