Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and Lance T. Mendoza v. Anesthesia Associates

CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedSeptember 4, 2025
Docket09-25-00302-CV
StatusPublished

This text of Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and Lance T. Mendoza v. Anesthesia Associates (Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and Lance T. Mendoza v. Anesthesia Associates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and Lance T. Mendoza v. Anesthesia Associates, (Tex. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

__________________

NO. 09-25-00302-CV __________________

CHAD R. DUBOIS, KENNETH D. SIMMONS III, MONICA BENTZEN, AND LANCE T. MENDOZA, Appellants

V.

ANESTHESIA ASSOCIATES, Appellee

__________________________________________________________________

On Appeal from the 136th District Court Jefferson County, Texas Trial Cause No. 25DCCV1411 __________________________________________________________________

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellants, Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and

Lance T. Mendoza, appeal the trial court’s temporary injunction in a suit for breach

of a covenant not to compete contained in employment contracts signed by

Appellants while they were employed by Appellee, Anesthesia Associates. Tex. Civ.

Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4). For the reasons explained below, we

1 conclude the order is void, and we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case

to the trial court.

Appellants are Certified Registered Nurse Anesthetists (CRNAs), formerly

employed by Appellee but now employed by a different anesthesia group. On the

day the trial court signed the order that is the subject of this appeal, Appellants were

working for a different employer at the same hospital where they had worked during

their employment with Appellee. The trial court held a hearing on the request for a

Temporary Injunction and thereafter on August 20, 2025, the trial court signed a

Temporary Injunction restraining Appellants from practicing nursing as CRNAs or

providing CRNA services, at Christus St. Elizabeth Hospital, Beaumont, Texas, or

at any physician office, hospital, ambulatory surgical center, or other health care

facility that is located within a twenty (20) mile radius of that location pursuant to

the terms of the non-competition agreement the CRNAs executed when they were

working for Appellees. The trial court set the effective date of its Temporary

Injunction as September 4, 2025. The trial court set a bond amount to be posted by

the Appellee in the Temporary Injunction, but the trial court denied Appellants’

request to set an amount for the Appellants to supersede the Temporary Injunction

during the accelerated appeal. Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal and an Emergency

Motion to Stay Temporary Injunction Pending Appeal. We suspended the twenty-

2 one-day notice rule and submitted the appeal on the record without briefs. See Tex.

R. App. P. 2, 28.1(e), 39.8.

“The requirements of Rule 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed.”

InterFirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Constr. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.

1986). A temporary injunction order that violates Rule 683 “is subject to being

declared void and dissolved.” Id.

“Every order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting

the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.” Tex. R.

Civ. P. 683. The trial court’s order states, “ORDERED ADJUDGED, and

DECREED that a hearing on the application for permanent injunction be, and it is

hereby set for the 8th day of June, 2026, (#1) at 9:00 o’clock, am.” In this case, the

Appellee, as plaintiff, filed an Original Petition asserting a breach of contract claim,

sought a TRO, a temporary injunction, and damages. A request for a permanent

injunction is not the ultimate relief sought in the Original Petition. Instead, the

ultimate relief sought is the “recovery of [a] judgment against each Defendant for

liquidated damages in the amount of $30,000.00 pursuant to Section 11.9(b)(ii) of

the Employment Agreement or, solely in the alternative, for its actual damages

proximately caused by that Defendant’s conduct.”

The trial court issued a temporary injunction without setting the entire case

for trial on the merits. We conclude the order is void. InterFirst Bank, 715 S.W.2d

3 at 641. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order and remand the case to the

trial court. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.3(a).

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

PER CURIAM

Submitted on September 3, 2025 Opinion Delivered September 4, 2025

Before Golemon, C.J., Johnson and Wright, JJ.

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Related

Interfirst Bank San Felipe, N.A. v. Paz Construction Co.
715 S.W.2d 640 (Texas Supreme Court, 1986)
Bugg v. Seitz
715 S.W.2d 3 (Missouri Court of Appeals, 1986)

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Chad R. Dubois, Kenneth D. Simmons III, Monica Bentzen, and Lance T. Mendoza v. Anesthesia Associates, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/chad-r-dubois-kenneth-d-simmons-iii-monica-bentzen-and-lance-t-texapp-2025.