Chad Kraemer v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)

• Court: Indiana Court of Appeals
• Decided: September 21, 2018
• Docket: 18A-CR-731
• Status: Published

Opinion

MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED this Memorandum Decision shall not be Sep 21 2018, 6:00 am regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Cara Schaefer Wieneke Curtis T. Hill, Jr. Wieneke Law Office, LLC Attorney General of Indiana Brooklyn, Indiana Caryn N. Szyper Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

Chad Kraemer, September 21, 2018 Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No. 18A-CR-731 v. Appeal from the Vigo Superior Court State of Indiana, The Honorable Michael J. Lewis, Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge Trial Court Cause No. 84D06-1702-F1-562

Brown, Judge.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 1 of 8 [1] Chad Kraemer appeals from the trial court’s order imposing his sentence. We

affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] On January 11, 2018, the court held a hearing at which Kraemer stated he

wished to plead guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to neglect of a dependent as

a level 5 felony, two counts of neglect of a dependent as level 6 felonies, and

failure to make a report as a class B misdemeanor.

[3] On February 22, 2018, the court held a hearing at which it asked Kraemer if he

understood that, after sentencing, he would have to provide a DNA sample,

and Kraemer responded affirmatively. The court asked Kraemer if he

understood that, if he was granted any period of probation, he would be

waiving his rights under the United States Constitution and the Indiana

Constitution as to his person, vehicle, residence, cell phones, computers, and

other electronic storage and communication devices and that, at any time and

without notice, probable cause, or a search warrant, any of those can be

searched and that he was consenting that anything that showed up could be

used against him, and Kraemer again responded affirmatively. The court

asked, “usually when . . . you’re on probation you could be . . . asked to do

drug screens and . . . [if] anything shows up it could be used against you at a

later date or hearing, do you understand that,” and Kraemer stated, “[y]es, sir.”

Transcript Volume II at 13. The court advised Kraemer of the rights he would

be giving up by pleading guilty and of the sentencing ranges for the charged

offenses. Kraemer pled guilty pursuant to the plea agreement. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 2 of 8 [4] The prosecutor stated, in presenting the factual bases for the pleas, that

Kraemer knowingly placed dependent children in a situation that endangered

their life or health and that three children had tested positive for

methamphetamine. Kraemer testified that he could live with his grandfather if

he were not in jail, that his children were six and three years old, and that he

used methamphetamine every other day at the time of the offenses. He

indicated that he pled guilty in 2004 to driving without a license as a class C

misdemeanor and was sentenced to one year of probation. When asked “you

understand part of what you’ve admitted to is failing to make a report and also

bringing drugs into a home of . . . a child that later died, are you aware of that,”

Kraemer answered “[y]es, sir.” Id. at 26. Kraemer indicated that he was asking

the court to consider allowing him to be placed on probation. When asked

“[y]ou understand that if you do that the Court will set a list of conditions

you’ll have to comply with,” Kraemer replied affirmatively, and when asked

“[a]nd that if you failed to do that the Court can revoke you and you’ll go to

prison,” he replied “[y]es, sir.” Id. at 27.

[5] The court found as aggravators that all of the children were less than fourteen

years of age, one of the children was disabled, two of the children were

Kraemer’s own children, and each of the children tested positive for

methamphetamine. At sentencing, the court stated “[e]ach one of them had

meth in their system um, and C.H. died. But he didn’t die from the meth in his

system, he died because of other matters that we’ve previously had a trial on.”

Id. at 40. The court found Kraemer’s limited criminal history to be a mitigator.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 3 of 8 It found the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, sentenced

Kraemer to five years for his level 5 felony, two years for each of his level 6

felonies, and 180 days for his class B misdemeanor, and ordered the sentences

for the felony convictions to be served consecutively for an aggregate sentence

of nine years. The court asked Kraemer if he understood that he was waiving

his constitutional rights while on probation as previously discussed, and

Kraemer responded affirmatively. The court informed Kraemer that, once he

was at the Department of Correction (the “DOC”), he would have to provide a

DNA sample.

[6] The court’s order provides: “Five (5) years of said sentence shall be executed at

the [DOC], two (2) years of said sentence shall be served as a direct

commitment to Vigo County Community Corrections In-Home Detention

Program. The balance of said sentence shall be suspended and [Kraemer] shall

be placed on formal probation for two (2) years.” Appellant’s Appendix

Volume II at 104. The order further provides:

In addition to the standard terms of probation, [Kraemer] shall:

If not serving an executed sentence [Kraemer] is Ordered to report to the Vigo County Sheriff’s Office within seven (7) business days of this date and provide a DNA sample, pursuant to I.C. 35-38-1-27.

[Kraemer] shall be subject to the rules and regulations of Vigo County Adult Probation for the balance of his probationary term, including payment of all probation user’s fees.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 4 of 8 Id. at 105.

Discussion

[7] Kraemer claims that the trial court erred in not issuing a home detention order

under Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6 and in not providing him with notice of the terms

of his probation under Ind. Code §§ 35-38-2-1 and -2(b).1 The State responds

that Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6 does not apply to a direct placement on home

detention, even if the statute did apply the trial court has ample time to advise

Kraemer of the terms of his placement, the court’s oral and written advisements

together satisfy Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1, and Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(b) is

satisfied as long as Kraemer receives a written statement of the terms of his

probation before his probationary term begins.

[8] Kraemer essentially claims he should have been provided with a written

statement of the exact terms of his home detention and probation at the time of

sentencing. With respect to home detention, Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6, cited by

Kraemer, provides that an order for home detention “under section 5 of this

chapter” must include certain terms.2 Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-5, in turn, relates

1 Kraemer cites Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2, which was repealed by Public Law No. 1-1991, § 197 (1991). Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2(b) (1990) provided: “When a person is placed on probation, the person shall be given a written statement of the conditions of probation.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3 was initially enacted by Public Law No. 1-1991, § 198 (1991). Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(b) currently provides: “When a person is placed on probation, the person shall be given a written statement specifying . . . the conditions of probation . . . .” 2 The statute provides that the order must include, among other things, a requirement that the offender be confined to the offender’s home except during certain times such as during approved employment, notice that a violation may subject the offender to prosecution for escape, and requirements that the offender abide by a schedule prepared by a probation department or community corrections program, not commit another crime, obtain approval before changing residences, maintain a working telephone and if ordered a monitoring

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 5 of 8 to home detention as a condition of probation. Here, the court ordered that

Kraemer serve two years as a direct commitment to the Vigo County

community corrections in-home detention program and not as a condition of

probation. Ind. Code §§ 35-38-2.6 relate to direct placement in a community

corrections program, and Ind. Code § 35-38-2.6-4.5 provides that, if a court

places a person on home detention as part of a community corrections program,

the placement must comply with all applicable provisions in Ind. Code §§ 35-

38-2.5. Even assuming Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6 is an applicable provision,

reversal is not required. The statute, as observed by the State, does not require

that an order for home detention be issued at the time of sentencing. The court

imposed an aggregate sentence of nine years and ordered “Five (5) years of said

sentence shall be executed at the [DOC], two (2) years of said sentence shall be

served as a direct commitment to Vigo County Community Corrections In-

Home Detention Program.” Appellant’s Appendix Volume II at 104. Kraemer

has not shown that he has been prejudiced by the fact the court did not issue an

order for home detention at the sentencing hearing. To the extent the

sentencing order does not include all of the requirements of Ind. Code § 35-38-

2.5-6 and it is an applicable provision, the trial court may issue an order for

home detention in accordance with the statute prior to or at the time Kraemer

completes his term in the DOC and begins his home detention placement. See

Brock v. State, 558 N.E.2d 872, 877 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (finding that the trial

device, pay applicable fees, and provide a DNA sample if applicable and not previously provided. See Ind. Code § 35-38-2.5-6.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 6 of 8 court’s order for home detention did not comply with every subsection of Ind.

Code § 35-38-2.5-6 but that the defendant did not demonstrate how he had been

prejudiced by the omissions, and instructing the trial court, to the extent the

defendant had not been released from the home detention ordered, to enter a

home detention order in compliance with the statute).

[9] With respect to probation, Ind. Code § 35-38-2-1 provides in part that,

“[w]henever it places a person on probation, the court shall . . . specify in the

record the conditions of the probation.” Also, Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3(b)

provides in part that, “[w]hen a person is placed on probation, the person shall

be given a written statement specifying . . . the conditions of probation.” Ind.

Code § 35-38-2-2.3(b) does not specify that the written statement must be

provided by the court. See Ind. Code § 11-13-1-3 (providing that a probation

officer shall, among other things, furnish probationers under the officer’s

supervision with a written statement of the conditions of the probation and

instruct the probationer regarding the conditions).

[10] The trial court advised Kraemer of the rights he waived while on probation as

to his person, vehicle, residence, cell phones, computers, and other electronic

storage and communication devices, that at any time without notice or probable

cause any of those could be searched, that he could be asked to submit to a drug

screen, and that anything that showed up could be used against him. Also, the

plea agreement expressly provides that Kraemer waived his constitutional

rights, that his devices, residence, or person may be searched at any time

without notice and without reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a search

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 7 of 8 warrant, and that any evidence derived from a search may be introduced

against him at a probation revocation hearing or criminal prosecution. The

court’s written order provides that Kraemer shall be subject to the rules and

regulations of Vigo County Adult Probation during his probationary term and

that, in addition to the standard terms of probation, he was required to provide

a DNA sample. Kraemer was adequately advised as to these conditions. See

Kerrigan v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1251, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (“Although the

trial court did not give Kerrigan a written copy of the terms and conditions of

his probation when he was sentenced, the record reveals the trial court orally,

on the record, explained the conditions to him, and which Kerrigan

acknowledged he understood.”); see also Freije v. State, 709 N.E.2d 323, 325

(Ind. 1999) (observing that “a defendant who enters into a plea agreement that

calls for a probationary sentence should reasonably expect that the county’s

standard conditions may apply”). Also, the court ordered an executed sentence

at the DOC and direct placement on home detention, suspended the remainder

of the sentence, and ordered that Kraemer be placed on formal probation for

two years. To the extent Kraemer has not been provided with a written

statement specifying the terms of his probation, such a written statement may

be furnished to him prior to or at the time that he begins his probation.

[11] For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s order.

[12] Affirmed.

Altice, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-731 | September 21, 2018 Page 8 of 8