NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2790-23
CHAD JORDAN and KATHERINE COHEN, h/w,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
SWEET HAVEN FARMS, LLC, WILLIAM WILCZYNSKI, and KATHERINE WILCZYNSKI,
Defendants-Respondents.
Submitted May 14, 2025 – Decided July 2, 2025
Before Judges Marczyk and Paganelli.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Salem County, Docket No. L-0087-22.
Saltz Mongeluzzi Bendesky, PC, and Samuel A. Haaz (Saltz Mongeluzzi Bendesky, PC) of the Pennsylvania bar, admitted pro hac vice, attorneys for appellants (Robert W. Zimmerman and Samuel A. Haaz, on the briefs).
Rawle & Henderson, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Michael J. Dunn, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Plaintiffs Chad Jordan (Jordan) and Katherine Cohen (Cohen) appeal from
the trial court's April 18, 2024 order granting defendants Sweet Haven Farms,
LLP (Sweet Haven), William Wilczynski (William), and Katherine Wilczynski's
(Katherine)1 motion for summary judgment and dismissing plaintiffs' complaint
with prejudice. This matter presents an issue regarding the applicability of the
New Jersey Equestrian Activity Liability Act ("Equine Act" or "Act"), N.J.S.A.
5:15-1 to -12, in the context of an alleged misrepresentation in the sale of a horse
with purported dangerous tendencies, which resulted in a personal injury.
Plaintiffs allege they purchased a horse from defendants, relying on
defendants' representations that the horse could be safely ridden and was
suitable for a man of Jordan's size. We address whether N.J.S.A. 5:15-5 affords
defendants immunity against plaintiffs' claims arising from injuries sustained by
Jordan when he attempted to mount the horse twelve weeks after purchase, and
whether the exceptions to immunity under N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b) and (d) apply,
based on defendants' failure to match Jordan with a suitable horse and failure to
disclose the horse's dangerous propensities at the time of the sale. Following
1 Because defendants share the same last name, we refer to them by their first names to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect in doing so. A-2790-23 2 our review of the record and the applicable legal principles, we hold under the
facts presented here, defendants had a duty to disclose the horse's known vices
and dangerous propensities at the time of the sale. Therefore, viewing the facts
in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, because there are fact issues that must be
resolved by a jury as to whether the exceptions to immunity pursuant to N.J.S.A.
5:15-9(b) and (d) are applicable in this matter, we reverse.
I.
The Wilczynskis are the owners and operators of Sweet Haven horse farm.
In the spring of 2021, plaintiffs inquired about purchasing a horse for trail riding
from defendants that could accommodate Jordan, who was six-foot-three-inches
and weighed approximately 220 pounds, and his then-eleven-year-old daughter.
Defendants indicated they had an Arabian horse named Pyxy Ali (Ali) who
could be ridden by someone Jordan's size, was in good health, suitable for trail
riding, and would also be safe for Jordan's daughter and wife, Cohen, to ride.
Jordan testified at his deposition he had never purchased a horse and relied on
defendants' representations regarding Ali. Plaintiffs claim defendants never
A-2790-23 3 informed them that Ali had prior incidents of "bolting," 2 which resulted in two
other riders being injured within the past two years.
On June 6, 2021, plaintiffs purchased Ali for $1,000. They boarded Ali
at Sweet Haven, and Jordan testified he rode the horse on Sweet Haven's trails
approximately four or five times between June 10 and August 28, 2021.
On August 29, 2021, Jordan suffered serious injuries when he attempted
to mount Ali. He stated the last thing he remembered was putting his left foot
in the stirrup to pull himself onto Ali and then recalled "[b]eing on the ground"
in pain. He indicated he "do[es no]t know exactly what happened between [him]
getting on the horse and being on the ground."
Katherine was the only other eyewitness to the incident. She testified that
she "looked up and saw [Jordan] attempting to mount Ali from the ground." She
observed Jordan's left foot in the stirrup as he tried to "swing his right leg up
over [Ali]." She stated Ali "popp[ed] off the ground about 8 inches to a foot"
approximately four times as Jordan attempted to mount her. She believed that
on the fourth attempt, Jordan "released his foot out of the left stirrup and fell to
2 Plaintiffs use the terms bolting and bucking to describe the horse's behavior. "Bolting" occurs when a horse suddenly and unexpectedly runs away at full speed. "Bucking" is when a horse raises its hind limbs in the air with total body weight on the front limbs.
A-2790-23 4 his left side and rolled to his stomach." Sierra Willingham, who worked at Sweet
Haven, spoke with Katherine following the incident. She testified that Katherine
advised her that as Jordan was attempting to mount Ali, the horse "just bolted."
When Jordan was recovering in the hospital, Cohen received a text
message from Sharon Kaminski, an acquaintance who also rode horses at Sweet
Haven and was familiar with Ali. Kaminski informed Cohen that Ali had
previously injured two other riders at the farm—Katherine, and Christina
Jacobson. Cohen further testified that Kaminski told her she was upset and that
she should have advised her about other incidents involving Ali before plaintiffs
purchased the horse.
Jacobson testified she leased Ali from defendants in the fall of 2020, just
months prior to plaintiffs' purchasing the horse. She indicated that before
deciding to lease Ali, Katherine introduced her to the horse and disclosed that
she was previously injured when Ali bolted on her. Jacobson recounted an
incident within a few weeks of leasing Ali, where Ali bolted on her as they were
finishing a ride. Jacobson stated Ali suddenly "took off," and she could not stop
the horse. She fell off the saddle and ended up "badly" injuring her hip and
breaking her middle finger. Jacobson stated she informed the Wilczynskis about
the incident in November 2020.
A-2790-23 5 Katherine testified when she was riding Ali in January 2020, she did not
realize she had dropped the rein, which caused the horse to step on it. She stated
the saddle slipped and started going under Ali, which "spooked" the horse. She
recounted Ali then "took off running," which caused her to dismount, throw
herself onto the ground, and break her shoulder.
Willingham also testified regarding Ali's history of bolting. She stated
Ali had a reputation at the farm as "the horse that would bolt on you. We all
knew it." She acknowledged the bolting incidents occurred prior to plaintiffs'
purchase of the horse from defendants.
William conceded bolting is a dangerous activity and should be disclosed
to individuals purchasing a horse. However, he disagreed with characterizing
the prior incidents described by Jacobson and Katherine as bolting. He testified
he never mentioned "the Jacobs[o]n incident" when selling Ali to Jordan but
may have discussed his wife's injury while riding Ali. Plaintiffs both denied
being advised of any prior bolting incidents involving Ali.
Plaintiffs retained Dr. Carleigh Fedorka, a veterinarian, as an expert in the
field of equine science and sales practices. Dr. Fedorka opined that Ali was an
inappropriate horse for Jordan due to Ali's small size, advanced age, and poor
muscle tone. She noted Ali measured fifty-seven inches tall, which classified
A-2790-23 6 her as a pony, not a horse. She also stated Ali's body condition was very thin,
with little muscle or fat over her topline. She further noted Ali was twenty-five
years old at the time of the sale and suffered from back pain. She opined these
factors increased the risk that Ali would bolt due to back pain when Jordan rode
her. Dr. Fedorka concluded that because defendants had knowledge of Ali's
prior incidents resulting in injuries to riders, they were required to disclose th at
history.
Plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging negligence based on defendants'
failure to disclose Ali's dangerous history of injuring riders prior to the sale and
misrepresentations regarding Ali's health and suitability for Jordan to safely ride
her. Following discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment seeking to
dismiss plaintiffs' complaint under the Equine Act.
Defendants argued the Equine Act, as interpreted by Hubner,3 applies to
this matter and affords them immunity because Jordan's accident involved
equestrian activity. They asserted Jordan cannot prove the causation element of
his claim because he does not recall how or why he fell from Ali and "had
exclusive custody and control over the horse for nearly 12 weeks before the date
on which this accident occurred." They conceded Katherine saw the horse lift
3 Hubner v. Spring Valley Equestrian Ctr., 203 N.J. 184 (2010). A-2790-23 7 its hooves eight to twelve inches off the ground but asserted that such conduct
from a horse is an inherent risk of equestrian activity under the Act.
Moreover, defendants contended the two exceptions to the immunities
provided under the Equine Act upon which plaintiffs relied were inapplicable.
They argued the first exception—"[f]ailure to make reasonable and prudent
efforts to determine the participant's ability to safely manage the particular
equine animal," N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b)—did not apply because defendants did not
match Jordan with Ali. Instead, Jordan purchased the horse and rode her for
hours at a time over the course of twelve weeks without incident. They averred
the second exception—an operator's act or omission that "constitutes negligent
disregard for the participant's safety" and causes the injury, N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(d)—
was inapplicable because plaintiffs provided no evidence that defendants were
negligent, given Jordan rode the horse many times prior to the accident.
Defendants claimed that even assuming they had a duty to disclose Ali's prior
instances of bolting, plaintiffs could not satisfy the second exception because
plaintiffs were unable to demonstrate the failure to disclose caused the accident.
Plaintiffs countered they could prove Ali bucked or bolted on the date of
the accident because the horse had prior bolting incidents; Katherine's
deposition suggested Ali bucked and bolted; and Willingham testified that
A-2790-23 8 Katherine described plaintiff's incident as involving Ali "bolting." They argued,
relying on Stoffels v. Harmony Hill Farm,4 the exceptions under N.J.S.A. 5:15-
9(b) and (d) both apply here. Under section (d), plaintiffs contended defendants'
failure to disclose Ali's history was not an inherent risk of horseback riding but
rather "deals with the decision-making of . . . defendants when they decide to
sell a horse." They asserted defendants knew Ali had a history of bolting,
contrary to defendants' representations. They maintained defendants breached
their duty to disclose "known vices or known instances of bucking and bolting"
when such instances caused serious injuries to other riders in the past.
Next, plaintiffs asserted defendants' failure to match Jordan with an
appropriate horse would meet an additional exception under N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b).
They contended they relied on defendants' representations as first-time
purchasers that Ali could handle Jordan's weight. They claimed that had they
known about the bolting incidents or Ali not being the proper size for Jordan,
they would never have purchased Ali, and the accident would not have occurred.
4 Stoffels v. Harmony Hill Farm, 389 N.J. Super. 207 (App. Div. 2006).
A-2790-23 9 On April 18, 2024, the trial court entered an order accompanied by a
written opinion granting defendants' motion for summary judgment. 5 The court
found defendants were "operators" as defined under the Act because they owned
the facility where Ali was boarded and ridden. 6 The court further determined
plaintiffs were "participant[s]" under the Act because they rode the horse. 7
Additionally, the court indicated there was no dispute Jordan's injuries occurred
when he attempted to mount Ali, which constituted an "inherent risk of equine
animal activity" due to an animal's propensity to behave in a manner that results
in injury, N.J.S.A. 5:15-2.
The court further found this was the "exact type[] of inherent risk[] that
the Legislature deemed participants must assume" under N.J.S.A. 5:15-3. As
5 The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Act does not apply to injuries relating to misrepresentations or omissions related to the sale of a horse. Plaintiffs do not challenge the applicability of the Act on appeal. 6 "'Operator' means a person or entity who owns, manages, controls or directs the operation of an area where individuals engage in equine animal activities whether or not compensation is paid." N.J.S.A. 5:15-2. 7 "Participant" is defined as "any person . . . engaging in an equine animal activity, whether or not a fee is paid to engage in the equine animal activity . . . or any person coming onto the property of the provider of equine animal activities or equestrian area whether or not an invitee or person pays consideration." N.J.S.A. 5:15-2.
A-2790-23 10 such, the court concluded the Act applies because Section 5 of the Act provides
a complete bar to a participant's suit against an operator where injuries result
from an assumed risk of equine activity. It noted plaintiffs' attempt to
distinguish the case regarding defendants' duty to disclose information or pair
an appropriate horse with a rider "sp[oke] more to the exceptions to the Act
rather than removing the case out of the Act's scope entirely." Noting our
Supreme Court in Hubner warned against allowing claims that deflect causation
onto an earlier action, the court concluded that "as a matter of law," N.J.S.A.
5:15-5 operated as a complete bar to plaintiffs' claims unless an exception
applied.
In determining whether plaintiffs' claims could proceed under N.J.S.A.
5:15-9(b) or (d), the court found "the undisputed facts of the case" failed to
support plaintiffs' negligence claim because defendants sold Ali to plaintiffs on
June 6, 2021, and the injuries did not occur until August 29, 2021. Viewing the
disputed testimony regarding Ali's behavior on the day of the incident in the
light most favorable to plaintiffs, the court assumed the horse bucked when
Jordan attempted to mount it. However, the court found these facts did not
indicate a failure to "determine the participant's ability to safely manage the
A-2790-23 11 particular equine animal" under exception (b) because Jordan safely rode Ali for
twelve weeks without an issue.
The court further rejected plaintiffs' reliance on Stoffels because, here,
defendants did not select a horse for plaintiffs to ride immediately but rather
recommended a horse for sale, which had significant experience being ridden .
The court noted the "attenuated parallels" between Stoffels and this matter, but
ultimately found the case distinguishable. The court emphasized that plaintiffs
rode Ali for twelve weeks without any problems, which falls "within the bounds
of the complete bar [rather] than the facts of Stoffels."
Lastly, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that exception (d) applied
due to "an act or omission on the part of the operator that constitutes negligent
disregard for the participant's safety, which act or omission causes the injury."
The court indicated Hubner requires a plaintiff to show the injury was caused
by the facility operator's breach of a recognized duty of care owed to the
participant. It found the inherent danger of equine activity "indisputably"
caused Jordan's injuries, not defendants' alleged failure to disclose Ali's history
of bucking. The court stated, "Ali did what horses sometimes do—buck—a type
of behavior the Legislature expressly stated participants must assume the risk of
happening."
A-2790-23 12 As such, the court found defendants' failure to disclose or appropriately
pair the horse "did not cause any injury." The court reasoned that if Ali bucked
within twelve minutes after the sale, it would be more akin to Stoffels and a
closer call as to whether the exception would apply. However, the court
determined that if a horse can be ridden without issue, "any subsequent harm
must be a logical result of the inherent danger of the sport." The court, therefore,
concluded the exceptions did not apply to this case and that plaintiffs' claims
must be dismissed as a matter of law.
II.
An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's ruling on a motion for
summary judgment, applying the same standard used by the trial court. Samolyk
v. Berthe, 251 N.J. 73, 78 (2022) (citing Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts,
Inc., 237 N.J. 501, 511 (2019)). This court must decide whether "there is [a]
genuine issue as to any material fact" when the evidence is "viewed in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." Davis v. Brickman Landscaping, Ltd.,
219 N.J. 395, 405-06 (2014) (first quoting R. 4:46-2(c); and then quoting Brill
v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995)). "To decide whether
a genuine issue of material fact exists, the trial court must 'draw[] all legitimate
inferences from the facts in favor of the non-moving party.'" Friedman v.
A-2790-23 13 Martinez, 242 N.J. 449, 472 (2020) (alteration in original) (quoting Globe Motor
Co. v. Igdalev, 225 N.J. 469, 480 (2016)).
"The court's function is not 'to weigh the evidence and determine the truth
of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Rios
v. Meda Pharm., Inc., 247 N.J. 1, 13 (2021) (quoting Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). "If
there is no genuine issue of material fact, we must then 'decide whether the trial
court correctly interpreted the law.'" DepoLink Ct. Reporting & Litig. Support
Servs. v. Rochman, 430 N.J. Super. 325, 333 (App. Div. 2013) (quoting
Massachi v. AHL Servs., Inc., 396 N.J. Super. 486, 494 (App. Div. 2007)). On
de novo review, "[a] trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (alteration
in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).
On appeal, plaintiffs argue the court erred in granting defendants' motion
because disputed questions of material fact preclude summary judgment,
including Ali's tendency to bolt, defendants' knowledge of Ali's history, and
Ali's actions on the day Jordan was injured. They assert the court improperly
decided disputed questions of fact that must be determined by a jury. Plaintiffs
A-2790-23 14 further maintain the Act does not bar their claims because the exceptions under
N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b) and (d) apply to this case. They contend the facts in this case
are "far more egregious" than in Stoffels, where this court reversed the trial
court's summary judgment order in favor of the defendant horse farm.
Plaintiffs argue actions within defendants' control during a sale do not
constitute inherent risks of equine activity within the meaning of the Act.
Lastly, they assert the court erred by concluding the proximate cause of the
incident was an inherent danger of equine animal activity as opposed to
defendants' failure to disclose Ali's bolting or defendants' negligence in pairing
Ali with Jordan when the horse was too small for Jordan's stature.
Defendants counter, relying on Hubner, that the Act's immunity
provisions should be interpreted broadly and the exceptions narrowly. 203 N.J.
at 631. They argue Jordan's injuries "occurred plainly due to the inherent risks
of riding a horse" and not from an act or omission of defendants. They also
maintain there is no evidence that Ali bucked or bolted to cause Jordan's injuries.
They further contend the trial court properly determined the Act barred
plaintiffs' claims because none of the exceptions to operator immunity are
applicable.
A-2790-23 15 The issues presented in this matter require us to address the immunity
provisions of the Equine Act, as well as the exceptions therein, against the
backdrop of the Hubner and Stoffels decisions. Our primary "task in statutory
interpretation is to determine and effectuate the Legislature's intent." Bosland
v. Warnock Dodge, Inc., 197 N.J. 543, 553 (2009). "In doing so, we look first
to the plain language of the statute, seeking further guidance only to the extent
that the Legislature's intent cannot be derived from the words that it has chosen."
Pizzullo v. N.J. Mfrs. Ins. Co., 196 N.J. 251, 264 (2008). If the language is
unclear or ambiguous, "we look to other interpretive aids to assist us in our
understanding of the Legislature's will." Ibid. The task of effectuating the
legislative intent "is often assisted by interpreting a statute consistently with the
overall statutory scheme in which it is found." Bosland, 197 N.J. at 554.
In enacting the Equine Act, our Legislature found and declared that
"equine animal activities involve risks that are essentially impractical or
impossible for the operator to eliminate; and that those risks must be borne by
those who engage in those activities." N.J.S.A. 5:15-1. As such, the Legislature
determined "the allocation of the risks and costs of equine animal activities is
an important matter of public policy" and deemed it appropriate "to state in law
those risks that the participant voluntarily assumes for which there can be no
A-2790-23 16 recovery." Ibid. Our Supreme Court noted the legislative "findings demonstrate
an intention to limit claims by participants, by defining those risks that the
facility operator cannot effectively eliminate and that the participant assumes,
and by precluding any recovery for an injury resulting from any of those
assumed risks." Hubner, 203 N.J. at 196.
The "[i]nherent . . . risks of an equine animal activity" entail "dangers
which are an integral part of equine animal activity." N.J.S.A. 5:15-2. The
Legislature set forth a non-exhaustive list of specific inherent risks, including:
a. The propensity of an equine animal to behave in ways that result in injury, harm, or death to nearby persons;
b. The unpredictability of an equine animal's reaction to such phenomena as sounds, sudden movement and unfamiliar objects, persons or other animals;
c. Certain natural hazards, such as surface or subsurface ground conditions;
d. Collisions with other equine animals or with objects; and
e. The potential of a participant to act in a negligent manner that may contribute to injury to the participant or others, including but not limited to failing to maintain control over the equine animal or not acting within the participant's ability.
[N.J.S.A. 5:15-2(a) to (e).]
A-2790-23 17 "A participant . . . [is] deemed to assume the inherent risks of equine animal
activities created by equine animals, weather conditions, conditions of trails,
riding rings, training tracks, equestrians, and all other inherent conditions."
N.J.S.A. 5:15-3. The Legislature declared a participant is "assumed to know the
range of his ability" and imposed "the duty o[n] each participant to conduct
himself within the limits of such ability to maintain control of his equine animal
and to refrain from acting in a manner which may cause or contribute to the
injury of himself." Ibid.
The assumption of risk set forth in N.J.S.A. 5:15-3 "shall be a complete
bar of suit and shall serve as a complete defense to a suit against an operator by
a participant for injuries resulting from the assumed risks . . . ." N.J.S.A. 5:15-
5. N.J.S.A. 5:15-9, in turn, provides limited exceptions to "temper" the
"apparent breadth of the protections afforded to operators of equine facilities."
Hubner, 203 N.J. at 197. The pertinent exceptions to the limitations on operator
liability include:
b. Failure to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the participant's ability to safely manage the particular equine animal, based on the participant's representation of his ability . . . .
....
A-2790-23 18 d. An act or omission on the part of the operator that constitutes negligent disregard for the participant's safety, which act or omission causes the injury . . . .
[N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b), (d).]
The Hubner8 Court observed the words defining the risks assumed and
barring claims which arise from those risks are broadly preclusive while the
words delineating the exceptions are equally as broad. 203 N.J. at 197. The
Court indicated "the risk assumption and the exception provisions are in
conflict," revealing a "latent ambiguity in the overall meaning of the statute."
Ibid. The Court expressed concern that simply viewing the words of the
exceptions in isolation might "effectively swallow the Act's protections
entirely," including, for example, where a facility operator acted with "negligent
disregard for a participant's safety." Ibid.
The Hubner Court concluded the Act "is designed to establish a dividing
line between the known and inherent risks of the endeavor that are assumed by
a participant, and those events or conditions that are within the control of, and
thus are part of the ordinary obligations of, the facility's operators." Id. at 203.
8 In Hubner, the plaintiff alleged faulty equipment at the equestrian center caused the plaintiff's injury, implicating N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(a). 203 N.J. at 192-93. The Court found the equipment was not faulty, and the accident occurred as a result of the inherent danger of the equine activity. Id. at 205, 207. A-2790-23 19 In resolving the tension between the risks assumed and the exceptions, the Court
focused on the legislative policy supporting equine activities. Id. at 203 (citing
N.J.S.A. 5:15-1). It noted "the Legislature intended that the provisions
expressing the scope of the risks assumed would be read broadly in favor of the
operators, while the obligations of the operators would be narrowly construed if
the two sections of the statute appear to conflict." Id. at 203-04. The Hubner
Court further observed some exceptions "need[ed] little explanation" and stated
exception (b) would apply where, for example, an injury resulted from an
operator assigning "a first-time rider to a horse that the operator knows is
particularly high-strung, fractious, or difficult to manage." Id. at 204 (citing
N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b); Stoffels, 389 N.J. Super. at 217-18).9
In Stoffels, this court reversed the trial court's order granting the
defendants' summary judgment motion and remanded the case for trial to
determine whether the operator was negligent in assigning the plaintiff a
particular horse, which was inexperienced under saddle. 389 N.J. Super. at 218.
There, the defendant-operator advertised she had horses that "needed
exercising." Id. at 212. The plaintiff expressed interest in the opportunity and
9 Although the Court cited Stoffels in its discussion of subsection (b), it noted the Stoffels court ultimately considered the "failure to take reasonable measures to match the rider to a suitable mount" under subsection (d). A-2790-23 20 went to the defendant's farm seeking to ride a horse. Id. at 212-13. The
defendant suggested the plaintiff ride a particular horse. Id. at 213. Although
the horse had no known dangerous history, the horse had limited experience
being ridden. Id. at 213, 218. The plaintiff, who was sixty-two years old and
short in stature, had experience in riding horses. Ibid. She expressed concerns
about the horse's large size, but nevertheless proceeded to ride it. Ibid. After
riding the horse for a short period of time on steep terrain, the horse "suddenly
bucked three times, causing [the] plaintiff to fall . . . onto the ground" and suffer
significant injuries. Id. at 214.
The plaintiff in Stoffels argued the defendant was negligent in providing
her with an untrained horse, not advising her that the horse was untrained, and
failing to inquire about the plaintiff's riding experience to match her with a
suitable horse. Ibid. This court found the plaintiff's activities fell within the
Act and that "[t]he failure to take reasonable measures to match the rider to a
suitable [horse] falls easily within exception (d) of the Act as 'an act or omission
on the part of the operator that constitutes negligent disregard for the
participant's safety.'" Id. at 218 (citing N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(d)). We found sufficient
evidence to reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment because the
plaintiff's expert opined the horse was barely broken, and the defendant had an
A-2790-23 21 opportunity to assess the horse she assigned to the plaintiff. Ibid. Although we
ultimately relied on exception (d), we alternatively could have relied on
exception (b) given our focus on the defendant's failure to pair the rider with the
proper horse.
Applying these principles to this case, we conclude there exists a genuine
issue of material fact as to whether the circumstances presented here implicate
the exceptions under both N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b) and (d). Although the facts here
do not involve the precise facts as that of a first-time rider paired with a known
fractious horse as described in the Hubner Court's illustration, we are satisfied
this matter involves circumstances from which a jury could reasonably find fall
within N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b) because of the alleged mismatch between Jordan's
experience and size and Ali's stature and physical issues. Moreover, a jury could
find defendants' failure to disclose Ali's dangerous propensities might exempt
them from immunity under N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(d).
We recognize defendants dispute Ali's bolting tendencies and whether Ali
bolted to cause Jordan's injuries. However, despite Jordan's not recalling
precisely what occurred, Willingham testified that Katherine told her Ali
"bolted" causing Jordan's fall. Evaluating the facts most favorably to plaintiffs,
Ali behaved precisely in the way defendants failed to disclose—by bolting—
A-2790-23 22 which, according to Dr. Fedorka, was likely caused by the horse's advanced age
and poor physical condition and Jordan's large size, contrary to defendants'
alleged representations that the horse would be appropriate for Jordan to ride.
Indeed, William conceded—despite denying Ali's history of bolting—that he
would inform a buyer about a horse's history of bolting and considered bolting
to be dangerous conduct.
The facts here provide a more glaring example of a horse's dangerous
propensities than in Stoffels, where we noted the immunity under the Equine
Act was not "absolute." 389 N.J. Super. at 218. In Stoffels, the horse at issue
had no known dangerous propensities and the prior owner "vouched" for the
safety of the horse. Nevertheless, we found the plaintiffs satisfied exception (d)
because the plaintiff was not advised the horse was a "recent acquisition with
limited experience under [the] saddle." Id. at 210-11, 218. Here, defendants
were aware of Ali's dangerous tendencies—viewing the facts most favorably to
defendants—yet failed to disclose this information to plaintiffs.
We are mindful that bucking and bolting are normally inherent risks
associated with horse riding. However, the Equine Act does not shield an
operator from concealing a horse's dangerous tendencies in the context of a sale.
If Ali had no known history of bolting, but bolted and injured a rider shortly
A-2790-23 23 after being purchased, N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(d) would not be implicated. Whether
defendants' failure to disclose Ali's history is characterized as an "act" or an
"omission" under section (d), a fact issue arises as to whether this was in
"negligent disregard for the participant's safety" under the Act. Although an
individual may proceed with the purchase of a horse notwithstanding being
apprised about a horse's propensities, the Act does not provide immunity for an
operator's negligent or intentional misrepresentations regarding a horse's known
purported dangerous propensities that had resulted in prior injuries to other
riders.
The Hubner Court noted, "[u]nderstanding and harmonizing the statute's
provisions requires us to see them in the context of an activity that has inherent
risks and dangers that are beyond the ability of the operator to control." Id. at
204 (emphasis added). Defendants' alleged misrepresentations or failure to
disclose information regarding the dangerous propensity of Ali were not
inherent risks under the Act or beyond their control. Rather, defendants'
representations were clearly within their control and are reasonably considered
ordinary obligations under the Act.
Because defendants failed to disclose known incidents of Ali's bolting and
causing injuries to other riders and represented to plaintiffs that Ali was suitable
A-2790-23 24 for Jordan, we conclude plaintiffs have demonstrated factual issues under both
N.J.S.A. 5:15-9(b) and (d) as to whether defendants can be immune from
liability. Given plaintiffs' status as first-time horse owners and their reliance on
defendants' representations and familiarity with Ali, a jury could find defendants
mismatched the horse—knowing Ali suffered from back pain, was frail, too old,
and too small for Jordan's size—with plaintiffs under section (b). Likewise, a
jury could conclude defendants acted with negligent disregard for plaintiffs'
safety under section (d) because defendants sold the horse without disclosing to
an unsuspecting buyer Ali's propensity to bolt. In this respect, defendants'
actions would not be considered an inherent risk in equine activity because they
had control over mitigating the risks posed to Jordan, had they disclosed Ali's
known proclivities.
Turning to the proximate cause issue, we note this was the first time
Jordan had purchased a horse, and he had never taken horseback riding lessons.
Plaintiffs assert they relied on defendants' representations that Ali was in good
health, could be ridden safely by someone of Jordan's size, and that the horse
would be appropriate for his daughter. They assert they would not have
purchased the horse had they known Ali's bolting history or that the horse was
not a good fit for Jordan. We determine the court erred in finding the cause of
A-2790-23 25 the incident was the inherent danger in horse riding, when there is a factual issue
of whether plaintiffs would have purchased the horse had they known Ali's
history, and, in turn, whether this bolting incident would have occurred, leading
to Jordan's injuries. A fact finder could reasonably conclude that had plaintiffs
known of Ali's bolting tendencies, they would not have purchased the horse, and
Jordan would not have sustained his injuries.
Although the Hubner decision provides guidance for this court in
interpreting the Equine Act, it did not address issues regarding alleged
misrepresentations concerning a horse's dangerous tendencies in the context of
a sale. The Equine Act recognizes the inherent risks of equine animal activity—
such as bolting—that can result in injuries to riders. N.J.S.A. 5:15-2. However,
defendants' interpretation of the statute would allow owners to sell equine
animals and conceal known dangerous propensities from unsuspecting buyers
with no repercussions. We reject such an interpretation. In allocating the risks
of equine activity, we are unconvinced the Legislature intended to immunize
horse owners under the facts presented here. A buyer may be on notice under
the Act regarding the inherent dangers of equine activity but is still entitled to a
disclosure about a horse's known vices or propensities. The two concepts are
not mutually exclusive.
A-2790-23 26 Plaintiffs presented evidence, coupled with expert testimony, that raised
debatable issues of negligence and the existence of circumstances falling within
the exceptions to the Act's statutory immunity. Plaintiffs may have assumed a
risk under the statute in purchasing a horse, but they did not assume the risk of
a misrepresentation. It is one thing to know that horses in general may have a
tendency to behave in a way that can cause an injury, but it is another to be
aware that a particular horse has in fact acted dangerously in the past and caused
other riders serious injuries. Given Ali's purported dangerous history, plaintiff s
had the right to know—to the extent defendants were aware of the history—prior
to purchasing the horse.
The trial court, in part, rested its decision on the fact that the bolting
incident occurred twelve weeks after the sale, as opposed to immediately
thereafter. That the accident occurred twelve weeks later is not dispositive of
whether there is a factual issue regarding whether the misrepresentation caused
the accident.
In sum, we conclude, under the facts presented in this matter, defendants
owed a duty to disclose Ali's vices or dangerous propensities and to properly
assess plaintiffs' ability to safely manage Ali and that there are factual issues
that need to be resolved as to both issues. Our interpretation of the Act does not
A-2790-23 27 threaten to extinguish the statute's broad protective scope, but instead imposes
common sense duties upon a seller of a horse. We conclude that viewing the
evidence in a light most favorably to plaintiffs under Rule 4:46-2, the facts in
this matter are not so one-sided that a reasonable jury could only find in favor
of defendants. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order granting
defendants summary judgment.
Reversed.
A-2790-23 28