Cesar Ulises Perez Salmeron v. Pam Bondi, et al.

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedOctober 22, 2025
Docket1:25-cv-01067
StatusUnknown

This text of Cesar Ulises Perez Salmeron v. Pam Bondi, et al. (Cesar Ulises Perez Salmeron v. Pam Bondi, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cesar Ulises Perez Salmeron v. Pam Bondi, et al., (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10

11 CESAR ULISES PEREZ SALMERON, Case No. 1:25-cv-01067-SAB-HC

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF 13 v. PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND DENIAL OF APPLICATION 14 PAM BONDI, et al., FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER 15 Respondents. ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT 16 TO RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE AND UPDATE PETITIONER’S 17 ADDRESS

18 Petitioner is a federal immigration detainee proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of 19 habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. 20 On August 25, 2025, Petitioner filed the instant federal petition for writ of habeas corpus, 21 claiming asylum and requesting withholding of removal under the Convention Against Torture 22 (“CAT”). In addition, Petitioner seeks an ex parte temporary restraining order (“TRO”) for 23 release from detention and stay of removal. (ECF No. 1 at 5.1) 24 Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases2 requires preliminary review of a 25 habeas petition and allows a district court to dismiss a petition before the respondent is ordered 26 1 Page numbers refer to the ECF page numbers stamped at the top of the page. 27 2 The Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases apply to § 2241 habeas petitions. See Rule 1(b) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases (“The district court may apply any or all of these rules to a habeas corpus petition not covered 1 to file a response, if it “plainly appears from the petition and any attached exhibits that the 2 petitioner is not entitled to relief in the district court.” Rule 4, Rules Governing Section 2254 3 Cases in the United States District Courts, 28 U.S.C. foll. § 2254. 4 A. Asylum and CAT Claims 5 The INA [Immigration and Nationality Act] contains a provision entitled “Exclusive means of review,” which reads, in relevant part: 6 Notwithstanding any other provision of law (statutory or 7 nonstatutory), including section 2241 of Title 28, or any other habeas corpus provision, and sections 1361 and 1651 of such title, 8 a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means 9 for judicial review of an order of removal entered or issued under any provision of this chapter, except as provided in subsection (e) 10 of this section.

11 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) (emphasis added). The language of the statute is clear. The exclusive means to challenge an order of removal is the petition for review 12 process. 13 Martinez v. Napolitano, 704 F.3d 620, 622 (9th Cir. 2012). “The INA also contains a ‘zipper 14 clause’ that consolidates all ‘questions of law and fact ... arising from any action taken or 15 proceeding brought to remove an alien’ into a petition for review.” Id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. 16 § 1252(b)(9)). “This statutory scheme was designed to ‘limit all aliens to one bite of the apple 17 with regard to challenging an order of removal.’” Martinez, 704 F.3d at 622 (quoting Singh v. 18 Gonzales, 499 F.3d 969, 976 (9th Cir. 2007)). 19 Section “1252(b)(9) has built-in limits. By channeling only those questions ‘arising from 20 any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien,’ the statute excludes from the PFR 21 [petition for review] process any claim that does not arise from removal proceedings.” J.E.F.M. 22 v. Lynch, 837 F.3d 1026, 1032 (9th Cir. 2016). “Accordingly, claims that are independent of or 23 collateral to the removal process do not fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9).” Id. Thus, “an 24 immigrant c[an] challenge his [prolonged] administrative detention by filing a petition for a writ 25 of habeas corpus in district court, notwithstanding § 1252(b)(9).” Id. (citing Nadarajah v. 26 Gonzales, 443 F.3d 1069, 1075–76 (9th Cir. 2006)). On the other hand, claims that “are bound 27 up in and an inextricable part of the administrative process” fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9) 1 Here, Petitioner is claiming asylum and requesting withholding of removal under CAT. 2 (ECF No. 1 at 5.) As Petitioner’s claims “are bound up in and an inextricable part of the 3 administrative process,” they fall within the scope of § 1252(b)(9) and “must be channeled 4 through the PFR process.” J.E.F.M., 837 F.3d at 1032. Accordingly, Petitioner’s asylum and 5 CAT claims should be dismissed. 6 B. Temporary Restraining Order 7 Petitioner also seeks a TRO for release from detention and stay of removal. (ECF No. 1 at 8 5.) The standards governing the issuance of temporary restraining orders are “substantially 9 identical” to those governing the issuance of preliminary injunctions. Stuhlbarg Intern. Sales Co., 10 Inc. v. John D. Brushy and Co., Inc., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). “A plaintiff seeking 11 a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely 12 to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in 13 his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Resources Defense 14 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). 15 In support for his TRO request, Petitioner cites to Hernandez v. Lyons, 2025 WL 16 20019969, 2025 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116789 (C.D. Cal. June 18, 2025). However, Hernandez is 17 distinguishable from the instant matter and does not provide support for Petitioner’s release and 18 stay of removal. In Hernandez, the petitioner had been released on bond for approximately two 19 and a half years, had been granted protection against removal under CAT, and was arrested and 20 detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) when he attended a regular 21 Intensive Supervision Appearance Program (“ISAP”) check-in. Hernandez was transferred from 22 an ICE facility in Santa Ana, California to an ICE facility in El Paso, Texas, and there was 23 “evidence before the court indicat[ing] that the government is taking sufficient practical steps to 24 remove Petitioner from the United States.” Id. at *2, 4–6, 12. In contrast, here, there is no 25 evidence before this Court indicating that the government is taking sufficient practical steps to 26 remove Petitioner from the United States. Further, Petitioner has not provided sufficient 27 information for the Court to determine whether his detention is unlawful. See Demore v. Kim, 1 permissible part of that process.”); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870, 877, 879 (E.D. Cal. 2 2022) (“find[ing] that unreasonably prolonged mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) 3 without an individualized bond hearing violates due process” and considering “the total length of 4 detention to date, the likely duration of future detention, and the delays in the removal 5 proceedings caused by the petitioner and the government” to “determine whether § 1226(c) 6 detention has become unreasonable”). Accordingly, Petitioner has not established that he is 7 likely to succeed on the merits and thus, the application for a TRO should be denied. 8 III.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Cesar Ulises Perez Salmeron v. Pam Bondi, et al., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cesar-ulises-perez-salmeron-v-pam-bondi-et-al-caed-2025.