Cesar Paz Suarez v. Aisar B. Hameid

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedJuly 29, 2025
DocketA-2763-23
StatusUnpublished

This text of Cesar Paz Suarez v. Aisar B. Hameid (Cesar Paz Suarez v. Aisar B. Hameid) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cesar Paz Suarez v. Aisar B. Hameid, (N.J. Ct. App. 2025).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2763-23

CESAR PAZ SUAREZ,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AISAR B. HAMEID,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted April 8, 2025 – Decided July 29, 2025

Before Judges Firko and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. SC-000493-23.

Aisar B. Hameid, appellant pro se.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Aisar B. Hameid appeals from the Law Division, Special Civil

Part (SCP) March 25, 2024 order denying his motion to vacate the entry of default judgment in favor of plaintiff Cesar Paz Suarez in the amount of $5,042.

For the reasons that follow, we affirm.

We derive the following facts from the record. Plaintiff filed a small

claims complaint on September 20, 2023, asserting claims for breach of contract

and a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20, based

on multiple misrepresentations made by defendant related to the sale of a car.

The total demand set forth in his complaint was $5,000. The alleged damages

included the amount plaintiff paid for the car, as well as the filing fees for the

complaint.

The complaint was served by mail on defendant. Defendant failed to

appear for the scheduled trial date and default was subsequently entered. The

same day, plaintiff then sought entry of a default judgment. Plaintiff testified

defendant represented the car was in excellent condition and had only 94,000

miles. Defendant also offered plaintiff a three-month car warranty. Plaintiff

purchased the car in cash for $4,266.

A mechanic's inspection revealed the car's mileage exceeded 200,000 and

identified issues with the differential. After the differential was repaired, the

car's sensors indicated problems with the motor, engine, and transmission.

Although the car was operable, plaintiff's car did not pass the motor vehicle

A-2763-23 2 inspection due to engine problems. Plaintiff ultimately stopped driving the car.

Plaintiff contacted defendant to repair the car, but he refused.

After hearing plaintiff's testimony, the SCP judge entered judgment in

favor of plaintiff. The judge found there was sufficient credible evidence in the

record that defendant breached the sales contract and violated the CFA based on

multiple misrepresentations. The judge concluded plaintiff was entitled to

damages in the amount of $4,266. The judge further concluded that plaintiff

was entitled to treble damages under the CFA; however, the amount of judgment

was limited to $5,000 plus costs because of the monetary limit for damages for

Small Claims Court. On October 18, 2023, the default judgment was entered.

That same day, defendant moved under Rule 4:50-1(a) to vacate the

default judgment, asserting that he missed the trial date because of his cousin's

death and funeral. Defendant argued the car was sold "AS-IS," "all forms were

signed" by plaintiff, and the car was purchased for "$2,666." On January 5,

2024, the judge denied defendant's motion without prejudice under Rule 4:50-

1(a), finding that defendant failed to appear for the trial date and had also failed

to "articulate a prima facie meritorious defense to the underlying complaint."

Thereafter, defendant moved to reconsider the denial of his motion to

vacate the default judgment and he renewed the argument presented in his initial

A-2763-23 3 motion. Defendant advanced a new argument, claiming plaintiff and his

mechanic had tested and inspected the car prior to purchase. Defendant also

submitted the sales document and New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission

reassignment of certificate of ownership showing mileage of 207,050. In the

March 25, 2024 order, a different judge denied defendant's motion for

reconsideration, also finding defendant had failed to articulate a meritorious

defense.

Defendant raises two points on appeal. Defendant argues the SCP judge

erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the January 5, 2024 order.

Defendant contends he has a meritorious defense because he has established that

he is not liable for plaintiff's damages. We reject defendant's arguments.

"Motions for reconsideration are governed by [Rule] 4:49-2, which

provides that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests

within the sound discretion of the trial court." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC

Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). Accordingly,

we review under an abuse of discretion standard. AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Blue

Ocean Waters, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 515, 523 (App. Div. 2024).

However, "[a] trial court's interpretations of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

A-2763-23 4 deference." Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,

378 (1995). Its interpretation of court rules is also subject to de novo review.

Myron Corp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 302, 309 (2010).

We likewise review a judge's determination under Rule 4:50-1 for abuse

of discretion. 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC. v. Roberto, 259 N.J. 417, 436

(2025) (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)).

"A court abuses its discretion 'when a decision is made without a rational

explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an

impermissible basis.'" Parke Bank v. Voorhees Diner Corp., 480 N.J. Super.

254, 262 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting Mims v. City of Gloucester, 479 N.J. Super.

1, 5 (App. Div. 2024)).

Under Rule 4:50-1, "[a judge] may relieve a party . . . from final judgment

. . . for . . . (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." A party

seeking relief from a default judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(a) must

demonstrate both excusable neglect and "a meritorious defense." Dynasty Bldg.

Corp. v. Ackerman, 376 N.J. Super. 280, 28 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Marder

v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1964)).

"[A] court should view the setting aside of a default judgment under [Rule

4:50-1] and Rule 4:43-3, with great liberality, and should tolerate every

A-2763-23 5 reasonable ground for indulgence . . . to the end that a just result is reached."

MTAG v. Tao Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324, 333 (App. Div. 2023) (omission

in original) (quoting Mancini v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting

Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "All doubts

. . . should be resolved in favor of the part[y] seeking relief." Mancini, 132 N.J.

at 334. In doing so, the judge is required to "examine defendant's proposed

defense to determine its merit." Bank of N.J. v. Pulini, 194 N.J. Super. 163, 166

(App. Div. 1984).

Applying these principles, we conclude there was no basis to grant

defendant relief under Rule 4:50-1. Defendant's motion was timely filed under

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Related

Bank of New Jersey v. Pulini
476 A.2d 797 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1984)
Manalapan Realty v. Township Committee of the Township of Manalapan
658 A.2d 1230 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1995)
Myron Corp. v. Atlantic Mut. Ins. Corp.
970 A.2d 1083 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2009)
Dynasty Bldg. Corp. v. Ackerman
870 A.2d 629 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2005)
Marder v. Realty Construction Co.
202 A.2d 175 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 1964)
US Bank National Ass'n v. Guillaume
38 A.3d 570 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2012)
The Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. Abc Caging Fulfillment
113 A.3d 1217 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2015)
Johnny Medina v. Ceasar G. Pitta, M.D.
120 A.3d 944 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2015)

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