Cesar Paz Suarez v. Aisar B. Hameid
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Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2763-23
CESAR PAZ SUAREZ,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
AISAR B. HAMEID,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted April 8, 2025 – Decided July 29, 2025
Before Judges Firko and Bishop-Thompson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. SC-000493-23.
Aisar B. Hameid, appellant pro se.
Respondent has not filed a brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Aisar B. Hameid appeals from the Law Division, Special Civil
Part (SCP) March 25, 2024 order denying his motion to vacate the entry of default judgment in favor of plaintiff Cesar Paz Suarez in the amount of $5,042.
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
We derive the following facts from the record. Plaintiff filed a small
claims complaint on September 20, 2023, asserting claims for breach of contract
and a violation of the Consumer Fraud Act (CFA), N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -20, based
on multiple misrepresentations made by defendant related to the sale of a car.
The total demand set forth in his complaint was $5,000. The alleged damages
included the amount plaintiff paid for the car, as well as the filing fees for the
complaint.
The complaint was served by mail on defendant. Defendant failed to
appear for the scheduled trial date and default was subsequently entered. The
same day, plaintiff then sought entry of a default judgment. Plaintiff testified
defendant represented the car was in excellent condition and had only 94,000
miles. Defendant also offered plaintiff a three-month car warranty. Plaintiff
purchased the car in cash for $4,266.
A mechanic's inspection revealed the car's mileage exceeded 200,000 and
identified issues with the differential. After the differential was repaired, the
car's sensors indicated problems with the motor, engine, and transmission.
Although the car was operable, plaintiff's car did not pass the motor vehicle
A-2763-23 2 inspection due to engine problems. Plaintiff ultimately stopped driving the car.
Plaintiff contacted defendant to repair the car, but he refused.
After hearing plaintiff's testimony, the SCP judge entered judgment in
favor of plaintiff. The judge found there was sufficient credible evidence in the
record that defendant breached the sales contract and violated the CFA based on
multiple misrepresentations. The judge concluded plaintiff was entitled to
damages in the amount of $4,266. The judge further concluded that plaintiff
was entitled to treble damages under the CFA; however, the amount of judgment
was limited to $5,000 plus costs because of the monetary limit for damages for
Small Claims Court. On October 18, 2023, the default judgment was entered.
That same day, defendant moved under Rule 4:50-1(a) to vacate the
default judgment, asserting that he missed the trial date because of his cousin's
death and funeral. Defendant argued the car was sold "AS-IS," "all forms were
signed" by plaintiff, and the car was purchased for "$2,666." On January 5,
2024, the judge denied defendant's motion without prejudice under Rule 4:50-
1(a), finding that defendant failed to appear for the trial date and had also failed
to "articulate a prima facie meritorious defense to the underlying complaint."
Thereafter, defendant moved to reconsider the denial of his motion to
vacate the default judgment and he renewed the argument presented in his initial
A-2763-23 3 motion. Defendant advanced a new argument, claiming plaintiff and his
mechanic had tested and inspected the car prior to purchase. Defendant also
submitted the sales document and New Jersey Motor Vehicle Commission
reassignment of certificate of ownership showing mileage of 207,050. In the
March 25, 2024 order, a different judge denied defendant's motion for
reconsideration, also finding defendant had failed to articulate a meritorious
defense.
Defendant raises two points on appeal. Defendant argues the SCP judge
erred in denying his motion for reconsideration of the January 5, 2024 order.
Defendant contends he has a meritorious defense because he has established that
he is not liable for plaintiff's damages. We reject defendant's arguments.
"Motions for reconsideration are governed by [Rule] 4:49-2, which
provides that the decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court." Pitney Bowes Bank, Inc. v. ABC
Caging Fulfillment, 440 N.J. Super. 378, 382 (App. Div. 2015). Accordingly,
we review under an abuse of discretion standard. AC Ocean Walk, LLC v. Blue
Ocean Waters, LLC, 478 N.J. Super. 515, 523 (App. Div. 2024).
However, "[a] trial court's interpretations of the law and the legal
consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special
A-2763-23 4 deference." Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366,
378 (1995). Its interpretation of court rules is also subject to de novo review.
Myron Corp. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Corp., 407 N.J. Super. 302, 309 (2010).
We likewise review a judge's determination under Rule 4:50-1 for abuse
of discretion. 257-261 20th Ave. Realty, LLC. v. Roberto, 259 N.J. 417, 436
(2025) (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)).
"A court abuses its discretion 'when a decision is made without a rational
explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies, or rested on an
impermissible basis.'" Parke Bank v. Voorhees Diner Corp., 480 N.J. Super.
254, 262 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting Mims v. City of Gloucester, 479 N.J. Super.
1, 5 (App. Div. 2024)).
Under Rule 4:50-1, "[a judge] may relieve a party . . . from final judgment
. . . for . . . (a) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect." A party
seeking relief from a default judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1(a) must
demonstrate both excusable neglect and "a meritorious defense." Dynasty Bldg.
Corp. v. Ackerman, 376 N.J. Super. 280, 28 (App. Div. 2005) (quoting Marder
v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1964)).
"[A] court should view the setting aside of a default judgment under [Rule
4:50-1] and Rule 4:43-3, with great liberality, and should tolerate every
A-2763-23 5 reasonable ground for indulgence . . . to the end that a just result is reached."
MTAG v. Tao Invs., LLC, 476 N.J. Super. 324, 333 (App. Div. 2023) (omission
in original) (quoting Mancini v. EDS ex rel. N.J. Auto. Full Ins. Underwriting
Ass'n, 132 N.J. 330, 334 (1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted). "All doubts
. . . should be resolved in favor of the part[y] seeking relief." Mancini, 132 N.J.
at 334. In doing so, the judge is required to "examine defendant's proposed
defense to determine its merit." Bank of N.J. v. Pulini, 194 N.J. Super. 163, 166
(App. Div. 1984).
Applying these principles, we conclude there was no basis to grant
defendant relief under Rule 4:50-1. Defendant's motion was timely filed under
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