NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0783-23
CESAR CARIT RUIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WILLIAM T. BOURKE and KATHLEEN BOURKE,
Defendants-Respondents,
and
ALEJANDRO HOME IMPROVEMENTS, LLC, and AROMANDO CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Defendants.
Submitted December 17, 2024 – Decided March 31, 2025
Before Judges Perez Friscia and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-8212-20. Ginarte Gonzalez & Winograd, LLP, attorneys for appellant (Joseph A. Reardon III, on the brief).
Kahana & Feld, LLP, attorneys for respondents (Sofya Uvaydov and Kharis Lund, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Plaintiff Cesar Carit Ruiz appeals from an order granting summary
judgment to defendants William T. and Kathleen Bourke.1 Because we conclude
no genuine issues of material fact exist that defendants breached a duty of care
to plaintiff or that they had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous
railing, which collapsed and caused plaintiff's injuries, we affirm the trial court's
summary judgment order. We further affirm the trial court's order barring
plaintiff's expert report as a net opinion.
I.
Plaintiff was employed as a painter with SAM Painting Inc. In October
2020, plaintiff was painting at a property located on Clayton Avenue in Bay
Head. Defendants were the owners of the property. SAM was hired as a
subcontractor by codefendant Alejandro Home Improvements, LLC (AHI).
1 Because defendants are married and share the same surname, we reference them by their first names. We intend no disrespect. A-0783-23 2 Defendants had engaged AHI to paint the exterior of the two-story home located
on Barnegat Bay.
At the time of the incident, plaintiff was on the second-floor balcony
painting the outside wall of the home using a sixteen-foot extension ladder. At
the end of the workday, plaintiff handed the ladder down to a worker at ground
level by leaning over and pressing against the balcony railing on one leg. The
balcony railing gave way causing him to fall to the ground twelve feet below
causing serious injuries.
Defendants purchased the property approximately one year prior to the
accident. Before purchasing the property, defendants hired a licensed home
inspector John Youmans of Excel Home Inspection to perform a home
inspection and prepare a property report. William accompanied Youmans
during the inspection. Following the inspection, Youmans prepared a written
report with photographs and specific recommendations. William testified at his
deposition that he personally read the entire report and had no questions before
purchasing the property.
Section 6 of the report, entitled "Stairs and Railing," stated "Safety
Concern: Recommend all railing be structural evaluated by a qualified
professional for all repairs and replacement needed prior to closing for life safety
A-0783-23 3 of occupants. This is highly recommended." This bullet point was listed above
a single photograph of the property's ground floor deck.
Plaintiff retained liability expert Raymond Nolan, an engineer. Plaintiff
requested Nolan to perform an engineering investigation into the second-floor
porch guardrail failure that caused him to fall to the ground. After obtaining
documents from discovery and inspecting the property, Nolan prepared a report.
In the report, Nolan analyzed police body camera footage . Nolan's report noted
that his inspection revealed the end of the porch's guardrail at its top rail. He
opined that the dark appearance of the guardrail indicated the joint between the
rail and post was not sealed and atmospheric moisture got into the joint,
weakening it. Nolan also analyzed photos included in defendants' answers to
interrogatories. Nolan opined the darkened holes on the post of the guardrail
depicted in the photos "suggest moisture intrusion at the guardrail post joint that
failed." Nolan also reviewed Youmans' report and found "critical observations
[were] made over a year prior to the accident that bear upon the issues in this
case." Nolan's report also referenced Youmans' report by stating:
The home inspector recommended a full review for repair and replacement as necessary by a qualified professional prior to purchase.
e. Stairs and Railing Observations: The deck, stairway appears functional at the
A-0783-23 4 time of inspection but, due to its age We make no Warranty, guarantee or estimation as to the remaining life of all decks, stairs and railing . . . Safety Concern: Recommend all railing be structural, [structurally] evaluated by a qualified professional for all repairs and replacement needed prior to closing for the life safety of occupants. This is highly [recommended]. Page 16, Item 6.
Nolan's report ultimately concluded:
. . . Defendants hired a professional home inspector to inspect the house in detail and report findings. The inspection report specifically warned that exterior elements of the house, including railing, was in poor condition and recommended further evaluation by a qualified professional for safety to the occupants before closing. The [d]efendant homeowners failed to follow this recommendation and failed to post warnings regarding the railings.
It is my opinion that, within a reasonable degree of engineering certainty, [d]efendant homeowners failed to follow the recommendations in their home inspector's report. They failed to get recommended further evaluation of the railings and also failed to post or issue warnings. If the homeowners had followed the recommendations of their home inspector, the defective guardrail would have been discovered and repairs or replacement could have been done and there would have been no accidental fall and reported significant personal injury. In addition, if warning signs had been posted on the guardrails plaintiff would have been warned of the dangerous condition and taken steps to avoid the guardrail.
A-0783-23 5 After discovery was completed, defendants moved for summary
judgment, arguing: (l) there was no evidence that they exercised any control
over plaintiff's work; (2) that they did not owe any duty to plaintiff; and (3) that
Nolan's report and opinion should be barred as a net opinion.
Plaintiff filed opposition and a cross-motion for summary judgment as to
liability only against defendants. Plaintiff argued that Nolan's opinion created
material issues of fact regarding defendants' failure to correct and/or warn
plaintiff of the dangerous property conditions and failure to take measures to
prevent the fall as their home inspection report provided notice of the dangerous
condition. Plaintiff also argued his expert opinion should not be barred, as it
was adequately supported and would aid a jury's understanding of the facts.
Plaintiff argued in the alternative that his cross-motion against defendants for
liability only should be granted because the relevant evidence confirmed that
they owed a duty to him and had breached that duty causing his injuries.
In their reply, defendants argued: (l) plaintiff was injured in the course of
his work when he made unusual/unsafe decisions about how to use the subject
railing while handing down a ladder horizontally; (2) there was no legal
violation of a defense duty here, since no one can explain exactly what was
wrong with the railing or how the alleged "defect" could have been discovered
A-0783-23 6 by reasonable inspection; and (3) plaintiff's expert report is a net opinion entirely
comprised of conclusions without proper basis and/or scientific rationale.
Following oral argument, the trial court granted defendants' motion for
summary judgment and denied plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment
as to liability only. In its written decision, the court noted summary judgment
was appropriate because defendants did not breach any duty owed to plaintiff.
The court found there were no issues of material fact to establish defendants
failed to exercise their duty of "ordinary care to render the outside of their home
reasonably safe for the purpose of painting."
Further, the court opined plaintiff was unable to provide any evidence
showing defendants were "actively interfering or participating in any manner
whatsoever on how [p]laintiff's work was performed." The court noted
defendants only set the boundaries of what they wanted painted at their home.
The court relied upon Gibilterra v. Rosemawr Homes, Inc., which held that a
landowner is under no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor
from the very hazard created by the work. 19 N.J. 166, 170 (1995). The court
highlighted that defendants were not present when plaintiff leaned over the
railing and were not suggesting or interfering with how plaintiff performed his
work. The trial court thus concluded that plaintiff was unable to establish the
A-0783-23 7 existence of negligence because he could not demonstrate how defendants
breached any duty of care.
In addition, the court rejected plaintiff's expert's opinion finding it was "a
net opinion and does not establish any negligence on the part of [d]efendants,"
because Nolan failed to provide a factual basis for his conclusions, pursuant to
N.J.R.E. 703. The court found the report failed to reference any applicable
standard of care regarding the negligence of defendants and did not provide any
explanation or evidence of a defect related to the deck railing that caused it to
give way. The court stated without any factual detail of the railing's defect,
there is no basis for the claim that defendants had an obligation to hire someone
to inspect the railings after the purchase of their home.
Lastly, the court found the home inspection report "does not provide any
detail that any railings are unsafe or unsound." The court noted the section of
the report regarding the railings being unsafe was "referenc[ing] a photograph
of the first-floor deck, not the second floor—and even that photograph provides
no detail as to a problem with the railing." Thereafter, the court entered an order
dismissing the complaint as against defendants with prejudice.
On appeal, plaintiff contends the trial court improperly "toggled between"
theories of premises liability and construction liability. Plaintiff asserts he did
A-0783-23 8 not advance a construction liability theory, nor was one supported by the facts.
Plaintiff argues if the court had solely rested its decision on a premise liability
theory, it is clear defendants failed to discharge their duty of care. Plaintiff
argues, as an invitee, a property owner owes him a duty to "use reasonable care
to make the premises safe, including a reasonable inspection to discover
defective conditions" quoting Daggett v. Di Trani, 194 N.J. Super 185, 192
(App. Div. 1984).
Plaintiff also asserts defendants were placed on actual notice of the
dangerous condition of the railing from Youmans' home inspection report
provided to them. Plaintiff maintains the report notified defendants as to the
dangerous condition of the railings. Further, plaintiff notes there is no question
that William read the report in its entirety and had a full understanding of its
contents. Plaintiff argues defendants had actual and constructive knowledge of
the dangerous railing condition. Plaintiff asserts that the report provided
defendants notice of the dangerous condition of the railing which created a
"question of fact that prevented summary judgment." Plaintiff further asserts
defendants failed to exercise reasonable care to discover, correct or warn of the
condition of the railing.
A-0783-23 9 Plaintiff also argues Nolan's report was not a net opinion and should have
been considered. He notes the report "included the deposition testimony of
defendants, the forty-nine-page home inspection report and the video recorded
of the accident scene." Plaintiff asserts Nolan offered an "engineering opinion"
that Youmans' report, if followed, would have "permitted discovery of the
defective guardrail presumably resulting in repair or replacement." Plaintiff also
argues it was "plain error" for the trial court not to hold a N.J.R.E. 104 hearing
prior to barring Nolan's opinion.
II.
A trial court shall grant summary judgment if "the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact challenged and
that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or order as a matter of law." R.
4:46-2(c). "An issue of fact is genuine only if, considering the burden of
persuasion at trial, the evidence submitted by the parties on the motion, together
with all legitimate inferences there from favoring the non-moving party, would
require submission of the issue to the trier of fact." Ibid.; see also Brill v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995). On appeal, we employ
the same summary judgment standard. Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59
A-0783-23 10 (2015). If there is no factual dispute, and only a legal issue to resolve, the
standard of review is de novo and the trial court rulings "are not entitled to any
special deference." Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140
N.J. 366, 378 (1995).
We review a trial court's decision regarding the admissibility of expert
evidence for an abuse of discretion. Hisenaj v. Kuehner, 194 N.J. 6, 16 (2008).
The abuse of discretion standard applies to evidentiary rulings regarding the
evaluation, admission, or exclusion of expert testimony. Est. of Hanges v.
Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 202 N.J. 369, 384-85 (2010). An abuse of
discretion occurs when a trial judge's decision "was not premised upon
consideration of all relevant factors, was based upon consideration of irrelevant
or inappropriate factors, or amounts to a clear error in judgment." Masone v.
Levine, 382 N.J. Super. 181, 193 (App. Div. 2005); see also State v. S.N., 231
N.J. 497, 515 (2018).
III.
Because plaintiff relies on Nolan's expert opinion to support his theory of
liability against defendants, we begin with his argument that the court abused
its discretion by finding Nolan's report was barred from consideration as a net
opinion. The admissibility of expert opinion is guided by N.J.R.E. 702 and 703.
A-0783-23 11 N.J.R.E. 702 provides that "[i]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
An expert's opinion must be based on "'facts or data derived from (1) the
expert's personal observations, or (2) evidence admitted at the trial, or (3) data
relied upon by the expert which is not necessarily admissible in evidence but
which is the type of data normally relied upon by experts in forming opinions
on the same subject.'" Polzo v. Cnty. of Essex, 196 N.J. 569, 583 (2008)
(quoting State v. Townsend, 186 N.J. 473, 494 (2006)). An expert opinion not
supported by factual evidence or other data is considered a "net opinion" and is
inadmissible. Ibid. To avoid presenting a "net opinion," the expert must "give
the why and wherefore of his or her opinion, rather than a mere conclusion. "
Ibid. (quoting Townsend, 186 N.J. at 494).
As we have explained, "'[e]xpert testimony should not be received if it
appears the witness is not in possession of such facts as will enable him [or her]
to express a reasonably accurate conclusion as distinguished from a mere guess
or conjecture.'" Dawson v. Bunker Hill Plaza Assocs., 289 N.J. Super. 309, 323
A-0783-23 12 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting Vuocolo v. Diamond Shamrock Chems. Co., 240 N.J.
Super. 289, 299 (App. Div. 1990)).
We have stressed that "opinion testimony 'must relate to generally
accepted . . . standards, not merely to standards personal to the witness.'" Taylor
v. DeLosso, 319 N.J. Super. 174, 180 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Fernandez v.
Baruch, 52 N.J. 127, 131 (1968)); see also Kaplan v. Skoloff & Wolfe, P.C., 339
N.J. Super. 97, 103 (App. Div. 2001) (discussing that the court in Taylor was
"concerned by 'the total absence in [plaintiff's expert's] testimony of reference
to any textbook, treatise, standard, custom or recognized practice, other than his
personal view'" (quoting Taylor, 319 N.J. Super. at 182) (alteration in original)).
Here, Nolan provided his opinion on liability in the summary and
conclusion section of the report which exclusively relied upon Youmans' report
that recommended all railings be evaluated by a qualified professional for
repairs before closing on the property. Relying on this recommendation, Nolan
opined, "if defendants had followed the recommendation of their home
inspector, the defective guardrail would have been discovered and repairs or
replacement could have been done and there would have been no accidental fall
and reported significant personal injury." He also opined "if warning signs had
A-0783-23 13 been posted on the guardrails the plaintiff would have been warned of the
dangerous condition and taken steps to avoid the guardrail."
We emphasize Nolan's opinion was exclusively based on Youmans' home
inspection report which recommended an inspection of the railings before
closing. Youmans' report did not find any of the railings were in a dangerous
condition at the time of the accident. In the body of his report Nolan noted that
he observed accident scene photos which showed the subject railing was dark at
the end where it connected to the post because it was not sealed properly which
allowed the joint to weaken. He also stated other portions of the second-floor
deck railing were not properly sealed and in the same dark condition when he
made his inspection several months after the accident. Glaringly missing from
the opinion is any applicable standard of care, a description of any duty owed
by the homeowner or a factual basis that defendants breached any standard of
care. Also, Nolan's report did not opine within a reasonable degree of
engineering probability that the railings were faulty or dangerous on or about
the time of the accident. Nor did he opine that the condition of the railing
provided constructive notice of its dangerous condition to defendants or that it
was the proximate cause of the accident.
A-0783-23 14 We agree with the trial court that Nolan's conclusions in his report were
inadmissible net opinions and the court's failure to consider these conclusions
was not an abuse of discretion. We further determine there is no merit in
plaintiff's contention that a hearing was required pursuant to N.J.R.E. 104
because plaintiff failed to request a hearing and was satisfied in arguing what
was stated in Nolan's report. We conclude a hearing was not needed because
the deficiencies in the report itself were readily apparent.
IV.
We now address plaintiff's arguments that (1) defendants had a duty of
care to exercise reasonable measures to protect plaintiff from a known dangerous
condition; and they had actual notice of the dangerous condition but failed to
correct the condition or warn plaintiff and; (2) notwithstanding defendants'
actual notice of the dangerous condition, defendants failed to exercise
reasonable care to discover, correct, or warn of the condition.
A cause of action for negligence "requires the establishment of four
elements: (1) a duty of care; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) actual and proximate
causation; and (4) damages." Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. Melcar Util.
Co., 212 N.J. 576, 594 (2013). The plaintiff "bears the burden of establishing
those elements 'by some competent proof.'" Davis v. Brickman Landscaping
A-0783-23 15 Ltd., 219 N.J. 395, 406 (2014) (citing Buckalew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 524
(1981), then quoting Overby v. Union Laundry Co., 28 N.J. Super. 100, 104
(App. Div. 1953)).
The duty owed to a plaintiff is determined by the circumstance that
brought him to the property in the first place. There is no exact rule that
determines when one owes a legal duty to another to prevent harm. "Duty is a
fluid concept." Tighe v. Peterson, 356 N.J. Super. 322, 330 (App. Div. 2002),
judgment aff'd, 175 N.J. 240 (2002). Whether a defendant owes a legal duty and
the scope of that duty are questions of law for the court to decide. Carvalho v.
Toll Bros. and Devs., 143 N.J. 565, 572 (1996).
A landowner generally has "a non-delegable duty to use reasonable care
to protect invitees against known or reasonably discoverable dangers." Rigatti
v. Reddy, 318 N.J. Super. 537, 541 (App. Div. 1999) (quoting Kane v. Hartz
Mountain Indus., Inc., 278 N.J. Super. 129, 140 (App. Div. 1994)). Although
that duty extends to an independent contractor's employee, "[t]he landowner is
under no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from the very
hazard created by doing the contract work." Sanna v. Nat'l Sponge Co., 209 N.J.
Super. 60, 67 (App. Div. 1986); see also Olivo v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 186 N.J.
394, 406-07 (2006) (recognizing "exception to the requirement that premises be
A-0783-23 16 made safe for an independent contractor when the contractor is invited onto the
land to perform a specific task in respect of the hazard itself"); Cassano v.
Aschoff, 226 N.J. Super. 110, 115 (App. Div. 1988) (landowner not liable when
employee of tree-removal contractor was struck by falling limb).
This exception exists because a "landowner may assume that the
independent contractor and [its] employees are sufficiently skilled to recognize
the dangers associated with their task and adjust their methods accordingly to
ensure their own safety." Accardi v. Enviro-Pak Sys. Co., 317 N.J. Super. 457,
463 (App. Div. 1999).
[T]he general principle is that the landowner is under no duty to protect an employee of an independent contractor from the very hazard created by the doing of the contract work, provided that the landowner does not retain control over the means and methods of the execution of the project. Gibilterra, 19 N.J. at 170. In Wolczak v. National Electric Products Corp., 66 N.J. Super. 64, 71 (App. Div. 1961), [we] held that '[a]bsent control over the job location or direction of the manner in which the delegated tasks are carried out,' the party contracting out the work, be it a landowner or a general contractor, 'is not liable for injuries to employees of the []contractor resulting from either the condition to the premises or the manner in which the work is performed.' Further, '[t]his immunity [is not] disturbed by the exercise of merely such general superintendence as is necessary to insure that the []contractor performs his agreement . . . .' Ibid. That is so especially when the contractor
A-0783-23 17 is an experienced laborer hired either to correct the very danger present or to perform his tasks amidst the visible hazards. The landowner may assume that the worker, or his superiors, are possessed of sufficient skill to recognize the degree of danger involved and to adjust their methods of work accordingly. Thus the unimpaired line of holdings to the effect that the duty to provide a reasonably safe working place for employees of an independent contractor does not relate to known hazards which are part of or incidental to the very work the contractor was hired to perform.
[Muhammad v. N.J. Transit, 176 N.J. 185, 198-99 (2003) (quoting Wolczak, 66 N.J. Super. at 71) (citations reformatted).]
When an invitee is injured by a dangerous condition on the homeowner's
premises, the owner is liable for such injuries if the owner had actual or
constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition that caused the accident.
Prioleau v. Ky. Fried Chicken, Inc., 223 N.J. 245, 257 (2015). "A defendant has
constructive notice when the condition existed 'for such a length of time as
reasonably to have resulted in knowledge and correction had the defendant been
reasonably diligent.'" Troupe v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 443
N.J. Super. 596, 602 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting Parmenter v. Jarvis Drug Stores,
Inc., 48 N.J. Super. 507, 510 (App. Div. 1957)). "Constructive notice can be
A-0783-23 18 inferred" from eyewitness testimony or from "[t]he characteristics of the
dangerous condition," which may indicate how long the condition lasted. Ibid.
However, "[t]he mere '[e]xistence of an alleged dangerous condition is not
constructive notice of it.'" Arroyo v. Durling Realty, LLC, 433 N.J. Super. 238,
243 (App. Div. 2013) (second alteration in original) (quoting Sims v. City of
Newark, 244 N.J. Super. 32, 42 (Law Div. 1990)).
We determine plaintiff's first argument claiming defendants had a duty to
protect plaintiff from the dangerous railing and had actual notice of the
dangerous condition based on Youmans' inspection report holds no merit.
Plaintiff failed to provide any proofs that defendants breached any duty owed to
him nor proof that the railing was in a dangerous condition at the time of the
accident which created a genuine issue of material fact.
Again, as we touched on in Section III, Nolan's report did not provide a
standard of care which created any duty on defendants to follow their home
inspector's prophylactic recommendation to inspect all the home's railings prior
to closing. Nor did plaintiff provide any proofs that the railings were in a
dangerous condition at the time of the accident. Here, we concur with the trial
court that plaintiff failed to provide any evidence that defendants breached any
A-0783-23 19 duty or failed to exercise ordinary care to render their house and decks
reasonably safe for the purpose of painting the structure.
We further conclude the painting of a large two-story home assumed
certain hazards created by the job itself including: (1) placing a sixteen-foot
ladder on the second story deck; and (2) transporting the ladder to and from the
second-floor deck. These actions were part of the contracted work of painting
the home. Climbing ladders, using the deck of the existing home to place ladders
on and moving the ladder to and from the deck are all part of the work plaintiff's
company was contracted to perform and part of the risk reasonably foreseeable
to its employees. Plaintiff's decision to place his weight and the ladder's weight
onto a second floor guardrail to transport the ladder were actions to carry out
the work his company was contracted to perform.
There is also no evidence in the summary judgment record that defendants
were present at the time of the accident or that they were directing the work to
be performed by plaintiff. Based on these determinations, we conclude
defendants did not breach any duty of care owed to plaintiff and the property
was in a reasonable condition for purposes of the work plaintiff's company was
contracted to perform.
A-0783-23 20 Finally, even if we assume defendants owed a duty to plaintiff, we
conclude plaintiff failed to show defendants had actual or constructive notice
that a dangerous condition existed. The report recommended "all railings be
structural[ly] evaluated by a qualified professional for all repairs and
replacement needed prior to closing for life safety of occupants." As we
previously determined in this opinion, this recommendation in the report did not
provide actual notice of a dangerous condition since it did not find the second
floor railing nor any railings outside the home were in a poor or dangerous
condition. Concerning constructive notice, as the trial court found, both William
and plaintiff testified they never noticed anything wrong with the deck rails.
Plaintiff testified at his deposition that the railing did not "look old" and he did
not notice anything wrong with the railing. Defendant testified at his deposition
in a similar manner in concluding he was on the second-floor deck
approximately eight to twelve times prior to the accident and never saw anything
wrong with the deck railing. Further, Nolan's report provided no opinion related
to the outward appearance of the railing on or about the time of the accident
which would have provided defendants with constructive notice of a dangerous
condition. Without such, plaintiff's argument fails, and summary judgment was
appropriately granted.
A-0783-23 21 Based on our conclusion that defendants were entitled to summary
judgment, plaintiff's final argument that the trial court erred by denying his
cross-motion for liability only is moot. We further observe plaintiff never filed
a cross-appeal concerning this issue and therefore has waived his argument on
appeal. A party may [only] argue points the trial court either rejected or did not
address, so long as those arguments are in support of the trial court's order. See
Lippman v. Ethicon, Inc., 432 N.J. Super. 378, 381 (App. Div. 2013) ("As
respondents, defendants can raise alternative arguments in support of the trial
court's judgment without filing a cross-appeal"); Chimes v. Oritani Motor Hotel,
Inc., 195 N.J. Super. 435, 443 (App. Div. 1984) ("[W]ithout having filed a cross-
appeal, a respondent can argue any point on the appeal to sustain the trial court's
judgment"). Because plaintiff seeks to reverse the trial court's order denying his
cross-motion, he was required to file a cross-appeal.
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendants' remaining
arguments, we conclude those arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-0783-23 22