Certish Construction Corp. v. Madison Heat Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Certish Construction Corp. v. Madison Heat Corp.

56 A.D.2d 642, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17463, 391 N.Y.S.2d 889

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 28, 1977

StatusPublished

This text of 56 A.D.2d 642 (Certish Construction Corp. v. Madison Heat Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Certish Construction Corp. v. Madison Heat Corp., 56 A.D.2d 642, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17463, 391 N.Y.S.2d 889 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1977).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages predicated upon a fraudulent mortgage, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated March 15, 1976, which granted defendant’s motion to strike the first four causes of action in the complaint, on the ground of collateral estoppel. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. It appears that appellants’ sole argument is based upon a five-month delay between the date of the court’s decision and the execution and entry of an order thereon. We believe that it was within the discretion of Special Term to permit the delayed entry of the order, particularly where the sole prejudice arising from the delay affected only the respondent. Hopkins, Acting P. J., Martuscello, Cohalan and Damiani, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages predicated upon a fraudulent mortgage, plaintiffs appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County, dated March 15, 1976, which granted defendant’s motion to strike the first four causes of action in the complaint, on the ground of collateral estoppel. Order affirmed, with $50 costs and disbursements. It appears that appellants’ sole argument is based upon a five-month delay between the date of the court’s decision and the execution and entry of an order thereon. We believe that it was within the discretion of Special Term to permit the delayed entry of the order, particularly where the sole prejudice arising from the delay affected only the respondent. Hopkins, Acting P. J., Martuscello, Cohalan and Damiani, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

56 A.D.2d 642, 1977 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 17463, 391 N.Y.S.2d 889, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/certish-construction-corp-v-madison-heat-corp-nyappdiv-1977.