Certain Primary Underwriters at Lloyd's, London of M.E.C. &/Or Mobile Express Corporation and Certain Excess Underwriters at Lloyd's, London M.E.C. &/Or Mobile Express Corporation v. Herring Bank F/K/A Herring National Bank

Opinion

NO. 07-08-0490-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL B

APRIL 29, 2009

______________________________

CERTAIN PRIMARY UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S,

LONDON OF M.E.C. &/OR MOBILE EXPRESS CORPORATION AND

CERTAIN EXCESS UNDERWRITERS AT LLOYD’S, LONDON

OF M.E.C. &/OR MOBILE EXPRESS CORPORATION , APPELLANTS

V.

HERRING BANK F/K/A HERRING NATIONAL BANK, APPELLEE

_________________________________

FROM THE 181ST DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 93,282-B; HONORABLE JOHN B. BOARD, JUDGE

_______________________________

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ.

ON MOTION TO DISMISS

          On April 27, 2009, appellants Certain Primary Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London of M.E.C. &/or Mobile Express Corporation and Certain Excess Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London of M.E.C. &/or Mobile Express Corporation filed a motion to dismiss their appeal. According to the motion, the parties reached a settlement. In the motion, counsel for appellants states that he conferred with counsel for appellee and counsel for appellee does not oppose the motion. Appellants further request taxation of appellate costs against them.

          The motion to dismiss is granted and the appeal is dismissed. Tex. R. App. P. 42.1(a)(1). Costs of the appeal are taxed against appellants.

          Having dismissed the appeal at appellants’ request, we will not entertain a motion for rehearing and our mandate will issue forthwith.

                                                                James T. Campbell

                                                                           Justice

 

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NO. 07-10-0158-CR

   

                                                   IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

 

                                       FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

 

                                                                 AT AMARILLO

 

                                                                     PANEL D

 

                                                           SEPTEMBER 2, 2010

                                            ______________________________

 

                                                       MONICA SASHA JONES,

 

                                                                                                            Appellant

 

                                                                             v.

 

                                                        THE STATE OF TEXAS,

 

                                                                                                            Appellee

                                           _______________________________

 

                             FROM THE 66^TH DISTRICT COURT OF HILL COUNTY;

 

                       NO.  32,549; HON. F.B. (BOB) MCGREGOR, JR., PRESIDING

                                           _______________________________

 

Memorandum Opinion

_______________________________

 

Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.

            Appellant Monica Sasha Jones appeals the judgment adjudicating her guilty of endangering a child.  Through a single issue, she contends that she was denied due process when the trial court “re-reviewed the original presentence investigation report.”  We affirm.

 

 

Issue – Due Process

            Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion and denied her due process when it reviewed a presentence investigation report (at the adjudication hearing) that was prepared five years earlier instead of ordering a new one.  The record does not disclose where that objection or concern was contemporaneously brought to the attention of the trial court, however, and this is problematic.    

            To preserve a complaint for appellate review, the complainant must object to the purported error.  Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a)(1)(A); Saldano v. State, 70 S.W.3d 873, 891 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (holding that failure to make an objection may waive constitutional error); Nunez v. State, 117 S.W.3d 309, 319 (Tex. App.–Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that the failure to timely and specifically object at trial may waive even constitutional rights).  Furthermore, the objection must be made as soon as the ground for same becomes apparent.  House v. State, 909 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1995), aff’d, 947 S.W.2d 251 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).  Appellant did not comply with these directives here.  The trial court expressly informed the litigants of its intent to “re-review the presentence investigation” report.  No objection was made by appellant.  So, she failed to preserve the purported error.  See Summers v. State, 942 S.W.2d 695, 696-97 (Tex. App.–Houston [14th Dist.] 1997, no pet.) (holding that the appellant waived objection to the failure to order a PSI because the objection was not raised below).[1]

           

Accordingly, we overrule her issue and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                                               

                                                                                    Brian Quinn

                                                                                    Chief Justice

 

 

 

 

Do not publish.

 

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[1]To the extent that appellant’s issue could also encompass the notion that she was denied opportunity to present evidence on punishment, we again note that no one raised that particular ground below.  Thus, it too was waived.  See Harris v. State, 160 S.W.3d 621, 626 (Tex. App.–Waco 2005, pet. dism’d).