CERRACHIO v. LYCAON

District Court, D. New Jersey·Decided August 22, 2024·No. 3:22-cv-00113·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

MICHAEL CERRACHIO, Civil Action No. 22-113 (GC) (TJB)

Plaintiff,

v. REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

LYCAON, et al.

Defendants.

BONGIOVANNI, United States Magistrate Judge This matter comes before the Court sua sponte based on Plaintiff Michael Cerrachio’s (“Plaintiff” or “Mr. Cerrachio”) failure to prosecute this matter. For the reasons set forth below, the Court recommends that Mr. Cerrachio’s claims be dismissed. I. Background and Procedural History On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff initiated this action by way of a Complaint. Soon thereafter, the Complaint was amended on January 24, 2022, and January 26, 2022, respectively. (Docket Entry Nos. 1, 3-4). On August 19, 2022, parties were advised that a Scheduling Conference was set for October 6, 2022. (Docket Entry No. 13); (Text Minute Entry of 10/06/2022). Upon discussion with counsel during the Scheduling Conference, the Court stayed formal discovery, directing the parties to exchange discovery necessary to facilitate settlement. (Text Order of 10/06/2022; Docket Entry No. 15). Given the nature of Plaintiff’s injuries, the Count anticipated that upon completion of treatment, Plaintiff’s medical records and lien information would be produced. In the ensuing months, the parties continued to exchange discovery to facilitate settlement and engage in settlement discussions. (Docket Entry Nos. 16-26). Despite counsel’s diligent efforts, discussions were thwarted by the lien holder’s delay in providing crucial information. On January 17, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel notified that Plaintiff Michael Cerrachio had passed away and that Counsel was in the process of determining whether Plaintiff’s estate representative intended to pursue this action on Plaintiff’s behalf. (Pl.’s Counsel’s E-mail of 01/17/2024, to the Chambers of the Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.) (on file with the

Chambers of Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.). On March 27, 2024, the Court directed Plaintiff’s Counsel to submit a status update by April 5, 2024, regarding whether Plaintiff’s Counsel had an opportunity to speak with Plaintiff’s estate representative concerning the prosecution of this action. (Chambers of the Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.’s E-mail of 03/27/2024, to Pl.’s and Defs.’ Counsel) (on file with the Chambers of Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.). Upon Plaintiff’s Counsel’s request, the foregoing deadline was extended to April 19, 2024. (Id.) On April 15, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel requested a 30-day extension to provide a further status update, notifying that he had spoken to Plaintiff’s father several weeks prior, but no estate representative had been appointed at that time. (Pl.’s Counsel’s E-mail of 04/15/2024, to the

Chambers of the Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.) (on file with the Chambers of Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.). Plaintiff’s Counsel further stated that he was awaiting confirmation that Plaintiff’s estate would not be pursuing this matter. (Id.) The Court granted Plaintiff’s Counsel’s request for a 30-day extension of time to provide a further state update. (Chambers of the Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.’s E-mail of 04/15/2024, to Pl.’s and Defs.’ Counsel) (on file with the Chambers of Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.). On April 16, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel mailed a letter to Plaintiff’s father.1 In his letter, Plaintiff’s Counsel sought to confirm whether Plaintiff’s father intended to form an estate to pursue this matter. (Pl.’s Counsel’s Letter of 04/16/2024) (on file with the Chambers of Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.). Plaintiff’s Counsel also advised Plaintiff’s father that if no confirmation

or communication stating otherwise was received within 30 days of the date of the letter, then Counsel would close his file and assume that there was no intention to further prosecute this matter. (Id.) On May 17, 2024, Plaintiff’s Counsel notified the Court that he had not heard from anyone regarding this matter, despite his efforts to communicate with Plaintiff’s father. (Pl.’s Counsel’s E-mail of 05/17/2024, to the Chambers of the Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.) (on file with the Chambers of Hon. Tonianne J. Bongiovanni, U.S.M.J.); (See Pl.’s Counsel’s Letter of 04/16/2024). On June 11, 2024, the Court issued and mailed its own Letter to Plaintiff’s father, Michael Cerrachio, at the address provided by and utilized by Plaintiff’s Counsel. (Letter of 06/11/2024;

Docket Entry No. 27). The Court advised Mr. Cerrachio that: “if the legal representative of your son’s estate wishes to continue this litigation, he/she should either contact your son’s counsel (William D. Wright, Esq. and David T. Wright, Esq.), Defendants’ counsel (Christopher G. Mavros, Esq.), this Court, or all of the foregoing.” (Id. at 1.) The Court accordingly provided the address(es) and email address(es) for the Court and the foregoing attorneys. (Id. at 2.) The Court also instructed that, “If no word is received as to this matter by July 11, 2024, then this matter will likely be dismissed.” (Id.) (emphasis in original).

1 In light of the fact that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s letter was submitted informally to Chambers, the Court has not attached same hereto. As of this date, the Court has neither heard from Plaintiff’s father nor any other representative of Plaintiff’s estate. II. Analysis The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorize courts to impose sanctions for failure to

provide discovery, obey court orders and/or prosecute a case. See FED.R.CIV.P. 37(b)(2), 41(b). Where such failures have occurred, dismissal may be an appropriate penalty. Id. Generally, in determining whether to impose an involuntary order of dismissal with prejudice, the Court considers the factors set forth in Poulis v. State Farm Casualty Co., 747 F.2d, 863, 868 (3d Cir. 1984). These factors include: (1) The extent of the party’s personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the adversary caused by the plaintiff’s conduct; (3) the history of dilatoriness; (4) whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the meritoriousness of the claim.

Id. No single Poulis factor is determinative, and dismissal may be appropriate even if some of the factors are not met. See Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992); Hicks v. Feeney, 850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988). If a court finds dismissal appropriate under Poulis, it may dismiss an action sua sponte, pursuant to its inherent powers and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). See Iseley v. Bitner, 216 Fed App’x 252, 254-55 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31, 82 S.Ct. 1386, 8 L.Ed.2d 734 (1962)). The Court considers the Poulis factors in determining whether to recommend the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice. For the reasons that follow, the Court finds that under the circumstances presented here, the Poulis factors support the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims with prejudice: 1. Plaintiff’s Personal Responsibility: Despite being afforded ample opportunity, as outlined above, Plaintiff’s estate, including Plaintiff’s father, has not responded to Plaintiff’s Counsel’s and the Court’s Letters regarding whether the estate representative intends to prosecute this matter on Plaintiff’s behalf. Such responsibility belongs to

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Mindek v. Rigatti
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Scarborough v. Eubanks
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850 F.2d 152 (Third Circuit, 1988)