Cerny v. First National Bank

479 P.2d 697, 106 Ariz. 554, 1971 Ariz. LEXIS 207
CourtArizona Supreme Court
DecidedJanuary 19, 1971
DocketNo. 10072-PR
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 479 P.2d 697 (Cerny v. First National Bank) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Arizona Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cerny v. First National Bank, 479 P.2d 697, 106 Ariz. 554, 1971 Ariz. LEXIS 207 (Ark. 1971).

Opinions

STRUCKMEYER, Chief Justice.

This appeal is from a determination of heirship in which the rights of 103 claimants under the will of James Kidd were adjudicated.

James Kidd was a bachelor of frugal nature who came to Arizona about 1920. On January 2, 1946, he wrote a holographic will which was sealed in an envelope and placed in a safety deposit box. A few years later, Kidd disappeared without a trace. But it was not until shortly before March 6, 1964 that his will was discovered and on that date offered for probate. On proof [556]*556that Kidd had absented himself from Maricopa County, Arizona for such a period as to be presumed dead, see A.R.S. § 12-509, his will was admitted to probate and the First National Bank of Arizona was appointed as Administrator With Will Annexed.

Pursuant to A.R.S. § 14-641, the First National Bank filed a petition to determine heirship and subsequently moved for summary judgment, asking the court to declare that Kidd’s will created a valid charitable trust. The trial court granted the motion of the bank, declaring that Kidd’s will created a valid charitable trust, and set for hearing the petitions, statements of interest, and claims of those individuals and organizations who sought distribution of the estate under the terms of the will. Hearings were held which continued for a period of almost three months — the trial court taking testimony and receiving exhibits from more than sixty claimants in addition to the more than forty claims submitted without oral testimony.

After extended consideration, the court decreed that the claim of the Neurological Sciences Foundation be granted, and that the residue of James Kidd’s estate, amounting to about $175,000.00, be distributed in trust to be used for the purpose of research to be performed and carried on by the Barrow Neurological Institute of Phoenix, Arizona. It rejected the petitions and statements of interest of the other 102 claimants.

Kidd’s holographic will provided:

“This is my first and only will and is dated the second day in January 1946. I have no heirs have not been married in my life, after all my funeral expenses have been paid and #100. one hundred ■ dollars to some preacher of the gospital to say fare well at my grave sell all my property which is all in cash and stocks with E. F. Hutton Co Phoenix some in •safety box, and have this balance money •to go in a reserach or some scientific ■•proof of a soul of the human body which ■leaves at death I think in time their can be a Photograph of soul leaving the human at death,
James Kidd
(dated 2nd January 1946)
some cash in Valley bank some in Bank America LA Cal"

While the proceedings in the court below were extensive, the questions raised on this appeal by the admission to probate of this extraordinary document can in the main be determined perfunctorily.

We note first, as did the court in Opinion of the Justices, 109 N.H. 335, 251 A.2d 330, at 330:

“In this state the right of an individual to dispose of his property by will to individuals, public and private corporations, charities and public entities, * * *, is singularly free from restrictions or limitations, constitutional, statutory or judicial.”

The power to make a will is a power that belongs to the testator and is not subject to a veto power of the courts. So, unless limited 'by statute, a testator may dispose of his property by will as he pleases. In In re Greene’s Estate, 40 Ariz. 274, 11 P.2d 947, 949, this Court said:

“Nor is a court concerned with the abstract justice or injustice of the will. [Citation] Unless it clearly appears the testator did not fully realize what he was doing with his property, it was his to dispose of as he pleases.”

And in In re Nolan’s Estate, 56 Ariz. 353, 108 P.2d 385, 387, we said :

“The general rule is that in the absence of statutory provision limiting it, a man may dispose of his property as he sees fit, regardless of the fact that the prevailing code or morals may consider such disposition as unwarranted from any standpoint.”

Other courts have said:

“The value of property consists largely in the right to dispose of it as the owner desires, and this power of disposal, either by deed or by will, is not to be interfered with so long as the requisite mental [557]*557capacity exists. Cole v. Drum, 109 Kan. 148, 197 P. 1105, and cases cited therein. The right to make a will includes the right to make it according to the testatrix’ own desires, subject only to the statutory restrictions. It is no condition of this right that the will shall please a jury, or a court, or the testatrix’ relatives, or anyone else. If the will was properly executed, and the testatrix was of competent sanity, and no undue influence has been established, it is the testatrix’ will, and no tribunal is appointed on earth to inquire whether it ought to have been her will.” In Re Millar’s Estate, 185 Kan. 510, 345 P.2d 1033, 1041.
“Though a testator may be aged, infirm, and sick he has the right to dispose of his property in any manner that he may desire if his mental ability meets the law’s tests. It is not for the courts, juries, relatives, or friends to say how property should be passed by will, or to rewrite a will for a testator because they do not believe he made a wise or fair distribution of his property.” Farmer v. Dodson, 326 S.W.2d 57, 61 (Tex. Civ.App.).
“ ‘No man is bound to make a will in such a manner as to deserve approbation from the prudent, the wise, or the good. A testator is permitted to be capricious and improvident, and is, moreover, at liberty to conceal the circumstances and the motives by which he has been actuated in his dispositions. Many a testamentary disposition may seem to the world arbitrary, capricious and eccentric, for which the testator, if he could be heard, might be able to answer most satisfactorily.’ ” In Re Wayne’s Estate, 134 Or. 464, 291 P. 356, 362.

And see also, In re Woehr’s Estate, 166 Cal.App.2d 4, 332 P.2d 818, 826; In re Heaton’s Estate, 404 Pa. 360, 172 A.2d 293, 296-297; Feiler v. Feiler, 149 Ohio 17, 77 N.E.2d 237, 240.

Appellants are six of the 102 claimants whose statements of interest and claims were disapproved by decree of the court below. Four of the appellants, Emma G. Clausser, Joe H. Cerny, Joseph W. Still, M.D., and Russell Dilts, urge that the trial court erroneously ruled that a valid charitable trust was created by the words used in Kidd’s will.

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Related

In Re Estate of Kidd
479 P.2d 697 (Arizona Supreme Court, 1971)

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Bluebook (online)
479 P.2d 697, 106 Ariz. 554, 1971 Ariz. LEXIS 207, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cerny-v-first-national-bank-ariz-1971.