Cerna v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 23, 2026
• Docket: 25-1240
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 23 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WILLIAM EDENILSON CERNA, No. 25-1240 Agency No. Petitioner, A205-315-511 v. MEMORANDUM*

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted June 23, 2026**

Before: GOULD, FRIEDLAND, and MENDOZA, JR., Circuit Judges.

William Edenilson Cerna petitions for review of the decision by the Board

of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirming the denial by the Immigration Judge (IJ)

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). of Petitioner’s applications for asylum and withholding of removal.1 We have

jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we deny the petition.

We review denials of asylum and withholding of removal for substantial

evidence. Guo v. Sessions, 897 F.3d 1208, 1212 (9th Cir. 2018). Under the

substantial evidence standard, “‘findings of fact are conclusive unless any

reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.’” Dong v.

Garland, 50 F.4th 1291, 1296 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Iman v. Barr, 972 F.3d

1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2020)).

1. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of Petitioner’s

application for asylum. It is undisputed that Petitioner failed to meet the one-year

statutory deadline to file his application for asylum. But “the Government may

still consider a late application if the applicant establishes (1) changed

circumstances that materially affect the applicant’s eligibility for asylum or (2)

extraordinary circumstances directly related to the delay in filing an application.”

Singh v. Holder, 656 F.3d 1047, 1052 (9th Cir. 2011).

Petitioner argues that the agency failed to consider the extraordinary

circumstances that prevented him from filing a timely application for asylum,

namely the “the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the murder of his mother,

1 Petitioner originally also sought relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), but he forfeited that basis for relief by not raising it in his brief to the BIA or in his brief to our court.

2 25-1240 which prevented the petitioner from timely filing his application for relief.” But

the BIA held that Petitioner failed to challenge the IJ’s decision with respect to the

one-year bar in his appeal to the BIA, so any new argument or evidence was

waived. Petitioner points to no errors in the BIA’s reasoning. Because this issue is

unexhausted, we do not consider it. Umana-Escobar v. Garland, 69 F.4th 544, 550

(9th Cir. 2023).

2. Substantial evidence supports the agency’s denial of withholding of

removal. Petitioner argues that the agency erred in determining that his particular

social group was not cognizable. To be eligible for withholding of removal,

Petitioner was required to establish that “his ‘life or freedom would be threatened

in that country because of [his] race, religion, nationality, membership in a

particular social group, or political opinion.’” Diaz-Torres v. Barr, 963 F.3d 976,

980 (9th Cir. 2020) (alteration in original) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A)). A

“particular social group” is “a group that is ‘(1) composed of members who share a

common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially

distinct within the society in question.’” Akosung v. Barr, 970 F.3d 1095, 1103

(9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A.

2014)).

The IJ determined that Petitioner’s proposed social groups were not

particular enough or socially distinct. Before the BIA, Petitioner did not challenge

3 25-1240 the IJ’s rejection of the social groups he had originally proposed and instead

proposed a new particular social group, internally displaced persons. The BIA

declined to consider that group because it had not been raised before the IJ,

essentially treating the issue as forfeited. Petitioner points to no error in the BIA’s

reasoning, instead criticizing the IJ’s reasoning in rejecting the original proposed

social groups. The Government correctly contends that the argument Petitioner

now makes was unexhausted before the BIA. We accordingly deny the petition as

to this issue. Umana-Escobar, 69 F.4th at 550.

3. Petitioner also argues that the agency erred in determining that he did not

suffer past persecution and had no well-founded fear of future persecution. We

need not reach this argument, however, because to be eligible for withholding of

removal, Petitioner was required to establish a nexus between the persecution

suffered and a protected ground. Khudaverdyan v. Holder, 778 F.3d 1101, 1106

(9th Cir. 2015). Petitioner failed to establish his membership in a particular social

group, so we need not consider his arguments about past or future persecution.

Petition DENIED.

4 25-1240