Cermeno-Avila v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: November 12, 2024
• Docket: 23-2833
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

DELIA CERMENO-AVILA; STEEVEN No. 23-2833 ELISEO RAMOS-CERMENO, Agency Nos. A220-605-034 Petitioners, A220-151-885 v. MEMORANDUM* MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted November 7, 2024** Pasadena, California

Before: PARKER, HURWITZ, and DESAI, Circuit Judges.***

Delia Cermeno-Avila and her minor son Steeven Eliseo Ramos-Cermeno,

natives and citizens of Guatemala, petition for review of a decision of the Board of

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). *** The Honorable Barrington D. Parker, United States Circuit Judge for the Court of Appeals, Second Circuit, sitting by designation. Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing an appeal from a decision of an

Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and protection

under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 Exercising jurisdiction under 8

U.S.C. § 1252(a), we deny the petitions.

1. Cermeno-Avila asserted persecution on account of her membership in

two proposed particular social groups (“PSGs”), “Women in Guatemala” and

“Female Business Owners.” The IJ found that she “failed to establish that any past

harm was on account of a protected group” and “[h]er claim of a well-founded fear

of future persecution also fail[ed] on the nexus element.” That conclusion, which

the BIA adopted, citing Matter of Burbano, 20 I. & N. Dec. 872 (BIA 1994), is

supported by substantial evidence. The record does not compel the conclusion that

the armed men who threatened Cermeno-Avila were motivated by anything other

than greed. Although the men left Cermeno-Avila with a newspaper article about a

dismembered woman, she testified that the men “investigate all the businesses to

make money,” not just those businesses owned by women. Her mere “desire to be

free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft or random violence by gang

members bears no nexus to a protected ground.” Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007,

1 Ramos-Cermeno, a derivative beneficiary of his mother’s asylum application, also submitted separate applications for asylum and withholding. The BIA did not address the latter applications separately, and no distinct arguments about Ramos- Cermeno are raised in the petitioners’ briefing. We therefore address only the arguments raised by Cermeno-Avila.

2 23-2833 1016 (9th Cir. 2010). Moreover, “[p]ersecution on account of economic reasons is

not a protected ground for asylum.” Perez-Lopez v. Wilkinson, 846 F. App’x 500,

502 (9th Cir. 2021). Because Cermeno-Avila has not established a sufficient nexus,

we need not consider whether her proposed groups were cognizable. See Rodriguez-

Zuniga v. Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2023).

2. Finally, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that

Cermeno-Avila did not qualify for CAT protection. Applicants for CAT protection

must establish that it is more likely than not they would be tortured if removed, 8

C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2), “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or

acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” 22

C.F.R. § 95.1(b)(1). Past torture is “ordinarily the principal factor” in assessing

whether an applicant will likely suffer future torture. Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d

1207, 1218 (9th Cir. 2005).

The record does not compel the conclusion that Cermeno-Avila suffered past

torture. As Cermeno-Avila admits, she was never physically harmed by the armed

men who threatened her. Cf. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013)

(concluding that physical beatings did not rise to the level of torture); Ahmed v.

Keisler, 504 F.3d 1183, 1201 (9th Cir. 2007) (concluding that the petitioner being

beaten four times did not necessarily rise to the level of torture); Kumar v. Gonzales,

444 F.3d 1043, 1055 (9th Cir. 2006) (affirming the BIA’s determination that a

3 23-2833 petitioner was not tortured despite “a month-long detention that included severe

physical attacks and threats to his life”).

The IJ’s conclusion that Cermeno-Avila did not establish a probability of

future government instigation, consent, or acquiescence in torture is also supported

by the record. Although there is evidence of generalized “human rights abuses,

impunity, crime, violence, and corruption in Guatemala,” that evidence does not

compel a finding of a “particularized, ongoing risk of future torture.” Tzompantzi-

Salazar v. Garland, 32 F.4th 696, 707 (9th Cir. 2022).

PETITIONS FOR REVIEW DENIED.

4 23-2833