Century ML-Cable Corp. v. Carrillo Diaz

39 F. Supp. 2d 121, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3538, 1999 WL 160079
CourtDistrict Court, D. Puerto Rico
DecidedFebruary 8, 1999
Docket98-1193(PG)
StatusPublished
Cited by5 cases

This text of 39 F. Supp. 2d 121 (Century ML-Cable Corp. v. Carrillo Diaz) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Century ML-Cable Corp. v. Carrillo Diaz, 39 F. Supp. 2d 121, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3538, 1999 WL 160079 (prd 1999).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

PEREZ-GIMENEZ, District Judge.

This matter having come before the Court on the motion of the plaintiffs Century-ML Cable Corporation and Century-ML Cable Venture (collectively, “plaintiffs” or “Cable TV”) requesting an award of monetary damages, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees incurred in prosecuting this action against defendant Edwin F. Carrillo Díaz, and the Court having considered the submissions and affidavits filed by them with respect to the motion, it hereby makes the following findings and rulings:

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 9, 1998, Plaintiffs filed a “Motion and Memorandum for Order to Show Cause Why Defendant Carrillo Should Not Be Held in Civil Contempt of the Court’s Prior Orders and in Violation of Fed. R.Civ.P. 37 and a Default Judgment Entered Against Him Together with an Award of Attorneys’ Fees” (“Motion for Contempt”). The basis for the Motion for Contempt was defendant Carrillo’s contumacious conduct of destroying evidence of his illegal cable converter/decoder modification business after the Court specifically ordered that such evidence not be destroyed. Included among the evidence destroyed were records and client lists of Carrillo’s illegal decoder modification business, as well as a laptop computer allegedly used in the illegal modification of cable TV converter/decoders.

On August 28,1998, this Court issued an Order (“Order”) granting Plaintiffs the relief requested in the Motion for Contempt and further gave Plaintiffs 45 days within which to submit a breakdown of their costs, attorneys’ fees and damages stemming from defendant Carrillo’s illegal decoder modification business. In accordance with that Order, Plaintiffs submitted a Motion and Memorandum of Law with Affidavits attesting to the nature and amount of the costs, attorneys’ fees and damages that they incurred and/or suffered as a result of defendant Carrillo’s illegal conduct.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The defendant has been held in civil contempt for his actions described above by this Court in an Order dated August 28, 1998. As a sanction for that civil contempt, and with respect to Plaintiffs’ requested relief under Rule 37(b)(2), the Court entered a default judgment against defendant Carrillo. See Reebok Intern. Ltd. v. Sebelen, 959 F.Supp. 553, 556-57 (D.P.R.1997). In addition to the entry of default judgment as a contempt and Rule 37 sanction, the defendant has *123 failed to appear or defend in this action and has been adjudged in default under a separate and prior Order of the Court, dated June 24, 1998 (docket no. 41). It is well established that upon a default for a “failure to plead or otherwise defend” against a complaint, a defendant admits every “well-plead allegation” of the complaint, except those relating to damages. Dow Chemical Pacific Ltd. v. Rascator Maritime S.A., 782 F.2d 329, 336 (2nd Cir.1986) (“In principle, [the defendant] had no standing to participate in the further adjudication of issues as to its liability to plaintiffs.”); Au Bon Pain Corp. v. Artect, Inc., 653 F.2d 61, 65 (2d Cir.1981); Flaks v. Koegel, 504 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir.1974) (“While a default judgment constitutes an admission of liability, the quantum of damages remains to be established unless the amount is liquidated or susceptible of mathematical computation”); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hughes, 449 F.2d 51, 63 (2d Cir.1971), rev’d on other grounds, 409 U.S. 363, 93 S.Ct. 647, 34 L.Ed.2d 577 (1973). Therefore, the Court makes the following findings of fact with respect to the Plaintiffs’ costs, attorneys’ fees and damages in this case.

Plaintiffs brought this action under the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, Title 47 U.S.C. §§ 553 and 605 (the “Communications Act”). As this Court has previously found, the defendant modified the Plaintiffs cable television decoding devices so that they would be capable of intercepting and permitting viewing of all of Plaintiffs’ scrambled programming services, including premium and Pay Per View sendees, in violation of § 553(a)(1) and § 605(a) and (e) of the Communications Act. Plaintiffs’ claims are based on an investigation of the defendant that resulted in the seizure of numerous cable television decoders that had been modified in such a manner as to enable them to steal all of Plaintiffs’ programming services. The tests performed by Cable TV on the seized devices evidenced that they enabled their users to descramble all of Plaintiffs’ programming services, including premium and Pay Per View services.

As part of the execution of the temporary restraining order, dated February 26, 1998, Plaintiffs seized 86 tags each of which was used by Carrillo to identify one of his clients for whom he had modified Cable TV converters/decoders. Each of the 86 tags seized contained an imprinted number ranging from 65 to 688. The numbers on the tags comport with what defendant Carrillo himself admitted to Mr. Vázquez, Plaintiffs initial counsel in this action, was the total number of clients that he had, 750. See Vázquez Affidavit at par. 4; see also, Affidavit of Plaintiffs investigator José Marrero, at pars. 8, 10, 19, 25 (discussing the “hundreds” of clients that Carrillo must have had and the system of numbering for each client).

Plaintiffs now seek a finding by this Court of defendant’s precise monetary liability under 47 U.S.C. §§ 605(a) and (e) and 553(a) for his violations of these statutes resulting from his assistance in the unauthorized reception of Plaintiffs’ cable programming. In pertinent part, § 553(a)(1) provides:

No person shall intercept or receive ... any communications service offered over a cable system unless specifically authorized to do so by a cable operator or as may otherwise be specifically authorized by law.

47 U.S.C. § 553(a)(1). Subsection (a)(2) states as follows:

For the purpose of this section, the term “assist in intercepting or receiving” shall include the manufacture or distribution of equipment intended by the manufacturer or distributor (as the case may be) for unauthorized reception of any communications service offered over a cable system in violation of subparagraph (1).

In pertinent part, section 605(a) provides:

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Bluebook (online)
39 F. Supp. 2d 121, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3538, 1999 WL 160079, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/century-ml-cable-corp-v-carrillo-diaz-prd-1999.