Central Flyway Air Inc v. Grey Ghost LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Washington
DecidedOctober 7, 2025
Docket3:20-cv-05506
StatusUnknown

This text of Central Flyway Air Inc v. Grey Ghost LLC (Central Flyway Air Inc v. Grey Ghost LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Washington primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Flyway Air Inc v. Grey Ghost LLC, (W.D. Wash. 2025).

Opinion

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein

5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 6 AT TACOMA

7 Case No. 3:20-cv-05506-BJR CENTRAL FLYWAY AIR, INC., a Canadian 8 corporation, and JON BOYCHUK, an ORDER GRANTING COUNTER- individual, PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 9 SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS Plaintiffs, 10 v. 11 GREY GHOST INTERNATIONAL, LLC., 12 Defendant. 13

14 GREY GHOST INTERNATIONAL, LLC, and GREY GHOST GEAR OF CANADA, LTD. 15 Counter-Plaintiffs, 16 v. 17 JON BOYCHUK; CENTRAL FLYWAY AIR, 18 INC; and MILBURN MOUNTAIN DEFENSE, LTD., 19 Counter-Defendants. 20

21 I. INTRODUCTION 22 This matter is before the Court on Counter-Plaintiff Grey Ghost Gear of Canada, Ltd.’s 23 (“GGGC”) Motion for Supplemental Proceedings, Dkt. No. 140. GGGC seeks an order from this

24 ORDER GRANTING COUNTER-PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 1 Court directing Judgment Debtors/Counter-Defendants Jon Boychuk; Central Flyway Air, Inc.; and 2 Milburn Mountain Defense, Ltd. (“MMD”), by and through its sole owner, Krystle Boychuk, to 3 appear before the Court to testify and produce documents regarding any non-exempt property that 4 may be used to satisfy the judgment entered by the Court in this action. Having reviewed the 5 materials and the relevant legal authorities the Court grants GGGC’s Motion for Supplemental 6 Proceedings. The reasoning for the Court’s decision follows. 7 II. BACKGROUND 8 The underlying action involved a commercial dispute between several parties. See Or. 9 Granting Def.’s Motion for Summary Judgm. at 2-8, Dkt. No. 99. The Court entered a final 10 judgment in the amount of $3,113.315.88 in favor of GGGC, and against Counter-Defendants, 11 jointly and severally. Final Judgm., Dkt. No. 124.

12 GGGC now moves for supplemental proceedings. GGGC asserts that, to date, 13 Counter-Defendants have paid approximately $60,000 toward the judgment entered by this Court. 14 Counter-Pl.’s Mot. at 2. GGGC further asserts that it has reason to believe that Counter-Defendants 15 own property that they are concealing to avoid paying the judgment. Id. GGGC thus seeks discovery 16 in aid of satisfying the judgment. Id. at 1. 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 governs the execution of judgments and postjudgment 19 discovery proceedings in federal court. Rule 69(a)(2) provides the following: 20 (2) Obtaining Discovery. In aid of the judgment or execution, the judgment creditor or a successor in interest whose interest appears of record may obtain discovery 21 from any person--including the judgment debtor--as provided in these rules or by the procedure of the state where the court is located. 22 23

24 ORDER GRANTING COUNTER-PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 1 Fed. R. Civ. P 69(a)(2). It is well-established that, under subsection (a)(2) of Rule 69, a judgment 2 creditor has a choice of using either federal or state discovery methods. See Fuddruckers, Inc. v. 3 KCOB I, LLC, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1274, 1278-79 (D. Kan. 1998); El Salto, S.A. v. PSG Co., 444 F.2d 4 477, 484 n.3 (9th Cir. 1971) (“A judgment creditor proceeding under Rule 69(a) may utilize either 5 state practice or the Federal Rules for taking depositions.”). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 GGGC moves for supplemental proceedings pursuant to Rule 69(a)(2), seeking 8 postjudgment discovery under procedures outlined in Washington law at RCW § 6.32.010. 9 Counter-Pl.’s Mot. at 4-5. That statute permits the Court to issue an order requiring the judgment 10 debtor “to appear at a specified time and place before the judge granting the order, or a referee 11 appointed by the judge, to answer concerning the same.” RCW § 6.32.010(1). The issue before the

12 Court is whether, proceeding under state law, GGGC must also comply with the venue provision at 13 RCW § 6.32.190. Under RCW § 6.32.190, 14 [a] judgment debtor who resides or does business in the state cannot be compelled to attend pursuant to an order made under the provisions of this chapter at a place 15 without the county where his or her residence or place of business is situated.

16 Id. § 6.32.190. MMD argues that, applying this statutory language, Counter-Defendants, as 17 individuals and entities based in Canada, cannot be compelled to attend supplemental proceedings 18 in Washington. Counter-Def.’s Resp. at 4-6, Dkt. No. 141. 19 Resolving the issue posed by the parties, that is, whether a judgment creditor seeking 20 postjudgment discovery in Rule 69(a)(2) proceedings pursuant to RCW § 6.32.010 is subject to the 21 venue requirement of RCW § 6.32.190, the Court finds instructive the Ninth Circuit’s decision in 22 Duchek v. Jacobi, 646 F.2d 415, 418 (9th Cir. 1981). In Duchek, the Ninth Circuit addressed 23 whether, in the context of Rule 69(a)(1) proceedings to enforce a judgment, California law requiring

24 ORDER GRANTING COUNTER-PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 1 certain judgment creditors to file a petition for enforcement in state court deprived the federal 2 district court of jurisdiction. Id. at 417. Rule 69(a)(1) provides that the procedure for supplementary 3 proceedings to aid in execution of a judgment “must accord with the procedure of the state where 4 the court is located, but a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 69(a)(1). 5 The Duchek court concluded that Rule 69(a)(1) should not be construed to eliminate a district 6 court’s jurisdiction to enforce judgments when the applicable state procedure facially requires that 7 proceedings be held in a state tribunal. Duchek, 646 F.2d at 417-18. In reaching this conclusion, the 8 court emphasized that state law should not be applied in a “hypertechnical manner,” rather, “‘state 9 rules are to be applied in a common sense manner and those which make sense only where applied 10 to state courts need not be imported into federal practice.’” Id. at 418 (quoting Anderson v. Tucker, 11 68 F.R.D. 461, 462-63 (D. Conn. 1975)).

12 Applying the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in Duchek, importing RCW § 6.32.190’s venue 13 requirement here would defy common sense. See id.; Counter-Pl.’s Reply at 5, Dkt. No. 144 14 (“Washington has 39 counties—but only two federal district courthouses. If this venue provision 15 were read to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts as MMD suggests, then even Washington 16 judgment debtors who reside in 37 counties would be immune from the Court’s authority to compel 17 their appearance.”). Furthermore, applying RCW § 6.32.190

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