Central Coloso, Inc. v. Tax Court of Puerto Rico

70 P.R. 62
CourtSupreme Court of Puerto Rico
DecidedJune 13, 1949
DocketNo. 209
StatusPublished

This text of 70 P.R. 62 (Central Coloso, Inc. v. Tax Court of Puerto Rico) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Puerto Rico primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Central Coloso, Inc. v. Tax Court of Puerto Rico, 70 P.R. 62 (prsupreme 1949).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Snyder

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The problem here is whether railroad cane cars used to haul cane to a central were exempt from excise taxes under § 16-B of the Internal Revenue Act, as amended by Act No. 77, Laws of Puerto Rico, 1944, and § 2, article 4(d) (1) of Regulation 52 of the Treasurer issued pursuant thereto.1 Central Coloso, Inc. paid $7,341.38 under protest as excise taxes on 100 cars it brought to Puerto Rico in 1946 and sued in the Tax Court for refund. The case is here on certiorari to-review the decision of that court dismissing the complaint.

The petitioner owns and operates an industrial plant dedicated to the production of raw sugar. The cars in question are used to haul cane to their factory, including the 32% per cent of the cane it grinds which it receives from colonos. In the dead season it uses these cars whenever necessary to move parts of factory machinery being repaired or maintained.

Cases interpreting exemption statutes even broader than ours hold that equipment used by an industrial plant in transporting raw materials to the plant is not considered as equipment essential to the industrial operation, and consequently does not come under a tax exemption for an industrial plant, its equipment and machinery. The theory of these cases is that, in the light of the restrictive interpretation required [64]*64of tax exemption statutes,2 the industrial pr.oeess does not include transportation of the raw materials needed for that process. Adams County v. National Box Co., 88 So. 168 (Miss., 1921); Dawkins Lumber Co. v. Caudill, 279 S.W. 617 (Ky., 1926); City of Louisville v. Howard, 208 S.W. 2d 522, 526 (Ky., 1947). Cf. State Tax Commission v. Baltimore Asphalt B. & T. Co., 26 A. 2d 371 (Md., 1942); City of Columbus v. Muscogee Mfg. Co., 140 S. E. 860 (Ga., 1927). By the same token, our statute is even clearer in requiring this same result. It shows on its face that the Legislature intended to restrict the exemption to the unit which constituted the industrial plant.

In view of the foregoing, we do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that § 2, article 4 (d) of the Regulation is not in accord with the statute. Cf. Chabrán v. Bull Insular Line, Inc., 69 P.R.R. 250.

Section 16-B was amended by Act No. 436, Laws of Puerto Rico, 1947, after these cars were introduced into Puerto Rico. The new Act contains a specific provision denying the exemption claimed herein.3 Nevertheless, § [65]*6516-B, although- couched in general terms, meant substantially the same thing prior to the'amendment, which on this point was merely declaratory of already existing law by making it more detailed and specific. 1 Sutherland, Statutory Construction, 3rd ed., § 1930, p. 415. Indeed, the chief purpose of Act No. 436 apparently was to meet the situation created by our decision in Buscaglia, Treas., v. Tax Court, 67 P.R.R. 53, as to parts and accessories, rather than to include the incidental clause involving the problem herein. See also, Caparra Dairy v, Tax Court, 67 P.R.R. 292. We are therefore of the view that Act No. 436 does not affect the result in this case.4

The petitioner also relies on certain regulations of the Public Service Commission as to hauling cáne and on Calaf v. González, 127 F. 2d 934 (C.C.A. 1, 1942), which holds that employees of the mill engaged in transporting cane are covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act. But regulation of the petitioner as a public utility and coverage óf a remedial wage statute which must be liberally interpreted have no bearing on a tax exemption statute which clearly does not cover transportation of raw materials and which in any event must be strictly construed. And cf. Sancho v. Bowie, 93 F. 2d 323, 326 (C.C.A. 1, 1937).

The order of the Tax Court dismissing the complaint will be affirmed.

Mr. Justice Negrón Fernández did not participate herein.

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Related

Calaf v. Gonzalez
127 F.2d 934 (First Circuit, 1942)
City of Louisville Ex Rel. v. Howard
208 S.W.2d 522 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1947)
Dawkins Lumber Co. v. Caudill, Sheriff
279 S.W. 617 (Court of Appeals of Kentucky (pre-1976), 1926)
State Tax Commission v. Baltimore Block & Tile Co.
26 A.2d 371 (Court of Appeals of Maryland, 1942)
City of Columbus v. Muscogee Mfg. Co.
140 S.E. 860 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1927)
Sancho v. Bowie
93 F.2d 323 (First Circuit, 1937)
Adams County v. National Box Co.
88 So. 168 (Mississippi Supreme Court, 1921)

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Bluebook (online)
70 P.R. 62, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/central-coloso-inc-v-tax-court-of-puerto-rico-prsupreme-1949.