Center for Taxpayer Rights v. Internal Revenue Service

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

CENTER FOR TAXPAYER RIGHTS, et al.,

Plaintiffs, v. Civil Action No. 25-0457 (CKK) INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION (November 21, 2025)

A nonprofit that provides tax advice to low-income Americans, an association of small

businesses, and two labor unions (“Plaintiffs”) seek an order staying the implementation of a new

policy through which the Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) has begun sharing certain taxpayer

data with Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). See Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 30. ICE is

not a party to this litigation.

Plaintiffs allege that the IRS has changed its longstanding policy of strictly protecting

confidential taxpayer information and, in its place, implemented a new “Data Policy” that

prioritizes large-scale, inter-agency sharing of confidential taxpayer information. Pursuant to this

new Data Policy, the IRS entered into an April 2025 agreement with ICE to share confidential

taxpayer address information and, on August 7, 2025, disclosed to ICE the confidential address

information of approximately 47,000 taxpayers. As a basis for its decision to transfer this

information to ICE, the IRS relied on a representation from ICE that a single individual at ICE was

“personally and directly engaged” in more than one million criminal investigations or proceedings.

See 26 U.S.C. 6103(i)(2) (authorizing disclosure of certain information from the IRS to individuals

1 “personally and directly engaged in” a nontax criminal investigation or proceeding, provided that

several other conditions are satisfied).

The Federal Defendants oppose Plaintiffs’ request for a stay of the new policy and have

moved to dismiss the case. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack standing, that the policy they

challenge is not reviewable final agency action, that Plaintiffs are unlikely to succeed in showing

that the policy is unlawful, that Plaintiffs and their members are not irreparably harmed by the

policy, and that the balance of the equities and the public interest do not warrant a stay or other

injunctive relief. See Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 26; Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31.

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the Data Policy is final

agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court. See 5 U.S.C. § 704. Based

on the data transfer that occurred on August 7, 2025, the Court also concludes that Plaintiffs have

established a substantial likelihood that the IRS has taken final, judicially reviewable agency action

by adopting and implementing a policy of disclosing the confidential address information of tens

of thousands of taxpayers to ICE under Section 6103(i)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code, in

reliance on representations from ICE that the addresses are relevant to and will be used for

immigration-related criminal investigations and proceedings, even when ICE identifies only a

single ICE employee (or a small number of ICE employees) as the employee(s) “personally and

directly engaged” in each of the tens of thousands of relevant criminal investigations or

proceedings. The Court shall refer to this aspect of the alleged Data Policy as the “Address-

Sharing Policy.”

The Court further concludes that the Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the

IRS’s adoption of the Address-Sharing Policy and the IRS’s subsequent sharing of taxpayer

information with ICE were unlawful under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). Plaintiffs

2 have shown that the IRS’s implementation of the Address-Sharing Policy was arbitrary and

capricious because the IRS failed to acknowledge and explain its departure from its prior policy

of strict confidentiality, failed to consider the reliance interests that were engendered by its prior

policy of strict confidentiality, and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for implementing the

new Address-Sharing Policy. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s disclosure of

confidential taxpayer address information to ICE was contrary to law because it did not comply

with certain requirements in Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). For similar reasons, the

Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the broader Data Policy is unlawful

under the APA.

The IRS’s unlawful conduct has created a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs and their

members will suffer irreparable harm. The Center for Taxpayer Rights is experiencing a

significant decline in interest and engagement with its core activities of providing pro bono

services to low-income taxpayers, including immigrant taxpayers—potentially jeopardizing its

federal funding—which it has attempted to mitigate by diverting resources to education and

outreach. Meanwhile, Plaintiffs’ members face an imminent risk that the confidential address

information they have provided to the IRS will be impermissibly used by ICE for civil immigration

enforcement. Accordingly, upon consideration of the parties’ submissions, 1 the relevant legal

1 The Court’s consideration has focused on the following documents, including the attachments and exhibits thereto: • The Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”), Dkt. No. 20; • The Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), Dkt. No. 26; • The Plaintiffs’ Opposition to the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (“Pls.’ Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 27; • The Defendants’ Reply in Support of the Motion to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Reply”), Dkt. No. 29; • The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Stay Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction (“Pls.’ Mem.”), Dkt. No. 30; • The Memorandum in Support of the Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Pls.’ Mem.”), Dkt. No. 30-1; • The Defendants’ Opposition to the Plaintiffs’ Motion (“Defs.’ Opp’n”), Dkt. No. 31; • The Plaintiffs’ Reply in Support of the Motion for Stay Under 5 U.S.C. § 705 or, in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction (“Pls.’ Reply”), Dkt. No. 34; • The Plaintiffs’ Response to September 5 Minute Order (“Pls.’ Resp.”), Dkt. No. 39;

3 authority, and the entire record, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs are entitled to a stay of the

Address-Sharing Policy and other appropriate injunctive relief, and that Plaintiffs’ APA claim

regarding the broader Data Sharing policy should not be dismissed. However, because the APA

affords a meaningful and adequate basis for judicial review of the Data Policy, Plaintiffs’ ultra

vires claim for similar relief on non-statutory, equitable grounds cannot succeed and must be

dismissed for failure to state a claim. The Court shall therefore GRANT IN PART and DENY

IN PART Defendants’ [26] Motion to Dismiss and GRANT Plaintiffs’ [30] Motion for Stay or,

in the Alternative, for Preliminary Injunction. The Court shall DISMISS WITHOUT

PREJUDICE Count One of Plaintiffs’ [20] Amended Complaint, STAY the Address-Sharing

Policy and ORDER other appropriate interim relief as this case proceeds.

I. BACKGROUND

Every year, millions of taxpayers submit sensitive, personal information to the Internal

Revenue Service (“IRS”). This case concerns the extent to which the IRS may share that

information with other federal agencies.

There was a time when taxpayer information was considered “public record[], the access

to which was controlled by the Executive Branch.” 2 But that changed in 1976, when, “in the wake

of Watergate and White House efforts to harass those on its ‘enemies list,’” Congress amended

Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code through the Tax Reform Act of 1976 (the “1976 TRA”)

“to protect the privacy of tax return information and to regulate in minute detail the disclosure of

this material.” Tax Analysts v. I.R.S., 117 F.3d 607, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Lake v. Rubin, 162 F.3d

• The Defendants’ Response to September 5 Minute Order (“Defs.’ Resp.”), Dkt. No. 40; • The Administrative Record (“Admin. R.”), Dkt. No. 48.

The Court has also considered the arguments and representations of counsel at the Preliminary Injunction Hearing held on September 5, 2025. See Tr. of Sept. 5, 2025 Mot. Hr’g (“Hr’g Tr.”), Dkt. No. 38. 2 Taxpayer Advoc. Serv., National Taxpayer Advocate: 2003 Annual Report to Congress at 238 (Dec. 31, 2003), https://perma.cc/37AU-WLKP (“Taxpayer Advocate Report”).

4 113, 115 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 3 These amendments established the “general rule” that taxpayer

“returns and return information shall be confidential.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (capitalization

modified). As explained in a report from the Senate Finance Committee, Congress decided that

taxpayer information “was entitled to essentially the same degree of privacy as those private papers

maintained in [the] home.” S. Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 328 (1976). 4 However,

Congress also provided exceptions to this general rule through provisions that permit—and

sometimes require—the IRS to disclose taxpayer returns and return information to various third

parties, including other federal agencies. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c)–(o). In the past, the IRS has

argued that disclosure under any of these exceptions “must be subjected to strict scrutiny,” as each

exception “whittles away at the core promise of the voluntary tax system: If you come forward

and file this highly personal information with [the IRS], [the IRS] will hold this information in

confidence.” 5

Plaintiffs claim that the IRS cultivated a “Privacy Policy” in response to the 1976 TRA

amendments. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 7. Plaintiffs define the Privacy Policy as “a policy of

strictly protecting taxpayer information both to conform with the requirements of the Internal

Revenue Code and to further the policy aims of the agency to engender trust in the tax system and

encourage the filing of tax returns and the paying of taxes.” Koskinen Decl., Dkt. No. 30-13 ¶ 12.

This Privacy Policy was evidenced, Plaintiffs argue, through a “combination of the IRS’s

adherence to statutory requirements, compliance with the IRS policy manual, and prioritization

and implementation of privacy-protective practices.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 7. For instance,

3 See also Taxpayer Advocate Report, supra note 2 at 241 (“The Act effected an important shift of power: determinations regarding disclosure no longer resided in the executive branch. Instead, all such exceptions would be authorized by Congress in the Internal Revenue Code.”). 4 This report was eventually adopted by the House with little revision. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 94-1515, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976). 5 Taxpayer Advocate Report, supra note 2 at 245.

5 the IRS has, in the past, conveyed to Congress that “if IRS data is to be provided at all, the IRS

should be the last stop—not the first—for information for purposes unrelated to tax

administration.” Id. The IRS has also instructed its own personnel that “Congress decided that

federal law enforcement officials should not have easier access to information about a taxpayer

maintained by the IRS than they would have if they sought to compel the production of that

information from the taxpayer themselves.” Id. at 8–9. And the IRS represented this policy to the

American public, as seen in one brochure that reads: “The General Rule - Tax Information Is

Confidential!” Id. at 8.

Plaintiffs now claim that the IRS has unlawfully replaced its Privacy Policy with a new

policy that Plaintiffs refer to as the “Data Policy.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 9–10. The Data

Policy, according to Plaintiffs, “(1) greatly expands access to and use of taxpayer information

within the IRS; (2) consolidates data systems to facilitate broad, not segregated access within the

agency; and (3) permits large-scale data-sharing with other agencies, unrelated to tax

administration.” Id. In other words, the Data Policy is “a permissive data-sharing policy that

prioritizes the consolidation and inter-agency sharing of sensitive taxpayer information in the

IRS’s custody.” Id.

The IRS and its co-defendants argue that the Data Policy does not exist. See Defs.’ Opp’n,

Dkt. No. 31 at 1. But Plaintiffs argue that the Data Policy “is apparent from recent IRS actions.”

Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 10. For instance, the IRS has recently invested in technical

infrastructure that will facilitate rapid access to massive amounts of IRS data by hiring a federal

contractor to build a “single, unified database of taxpayer information within the IRS” that will

“permit automated access to all IRS taxpayer information by IRS employees in one interface.” Id.

To initiate this project, leadership at the IRS had to provide the contractor with a modified scope

6 of work and new task orders because the contractor had originally “been working on a contract to

aid the IRS is making it more efficient for customer service representatives to access basic

information concerning taxpayers that contacted the agency with questions and concerns.” Am.

Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 180–86 (explaining this as a “highly irregular procurement process”).

Plaintiffs argue that the IRS’s new Data Policy is also evidenced by the IRS’s efforts to consolidate

taxpayer data with other data from across the federal government. For example, in April 2025, a

whistleblower reported to Congress that the IRS was providing taxpayer information to the

Department of Government Efficiency (“DOGE”) for DOGE to include in a master database of

information from across the federal government. Pls. Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 10–11. Plaintiffs

further argue that the Data Policy is apparent from the IRS’s efforts to facilitate sharing of IRS

data with other federal agencies. For instance, DOGE affiliates have asked the IRS to create an

“omnibus” agreement with other federal agencies that would allow those agencies to cross-

reference a broad swath of IRS data. Pls. Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 10.

Plaintiffs argue that the Data Policy is also evidenced by the IRS’s exclusion of senior

leadership who have opposed certain actions taken by the IRS pursuant to the Data Policy. Pls.’

Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 11 (“These leaders include multiple Acting IRS Commissioners, the Chief

Risk Officer, the Chief Privacy Officer, the Chief Financial Officer, the Chief Information Officer,

the subsequent Chief Information Officer, and approximately 50 senior IRS IT executives”).

Evidence surrounding the IRS’s review of three requests for taxpayer information made by ICE

between February 2025 and June 2025 provides an example. ICE first requested taxpayer

information from the IRS in February 2025, when it requested extensive information—including

addresses, SSN’s, relatives, and even IP information—for approximately 700,000 “illegal aliens

who ha[d] standing deportation orders.” Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_09. Documents from the

7 administrative record suggest that the legality of ICE’s first request was reviewed under the

direction of an IRS official whom the Court will refer to as “P.W.” Id. at TD_03. Under P.W.’s

direction, the IRS refused to disclose the taxpayer information requested by ICE because it

determined that ICE’s request did not meet certain legal requirements. Id. at TD_01–8. ICE made

its second request in June 2025, this time requesting taxpayer information for its “full alien

population” of over 7 million individuals. Id. at TD_86. ICE’s second request appears to have

been reviewed by the IRS’s legal team under the direction of one “A.D.”, rather than P.W. See id.

at TD_93. Under A.D.’s direction, the IRS determined that it was “again unable to process” ICE’s

request because it was again unlawful. Id. ICE’s third and last-known request for taxpayer

information also came in June 2025, this time for address information on 1.2 million taxpayers.

Id. at TD_112–3. The administrative record shows that A.D. was again tasked with providing

legal approval of ICE’s third request at the time the request was made. See id. at TD_105 (email

from IRS official to Treasury official explaining that the IRS had “not shared anything back with

ICE per the direction of [A.D.]”). However, shortly after the IRS received ICE’s third request,

Treasury officials directed IRS officials to bypass A.D. and obtain legal approval from a different

IRS official, “A.M.” Id. at TD_104. As one IRS official put it in an email to A.M., he was “told

by [A.D.] to not send anything back [to ICE] until he gave us the green light,” but he “received a

call from [a Treasury official] who asked me to get the green light from you.” Id. A.M. provided

legal approval for ICE’s third request that same day. Id. at TD_103.

Following A.M.’s legal approval, the IRS disclosed to ICE the last known address of

approximately 47,000 taxpayers. Plaintiffs claim that this known instance of information sharing

is further evidence of the IRS’s Data Policy.

8 Plaintiffs also claim that the IRS’s disclosure of address information to ICE violated the

Internal Revenue Code. As the Court referenced above, the IRS refused to disclose taxpayer

information to ICE in February 2025 because ICE’s request for that information did not qualify

for an exception to the Internal Revenue Code’s general rule of confidentiality. Shortly thereafter,

in April 2025, the IRS and ICE entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”). See Dkt.

No. 30-6. The MOU between the IRS and ICE “sets forth the agreement of the parties” regarding

ICE’s future use of the confidentiality exception found in Internal Revenue Code Section

6103(i)(2) “for the submission of requests for addresses” from the IRS. Id. § 1.e. Internal Revenue

Code Section 6103(i)(2) requires the IRS to disclose taxpayer information to federal agencies

engaged in a criminal investigation or proceeding on the condition that the requested information

be used solely for the relevant criminal investigation or proceeding. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2).

However, as the MOU outlines, a variety of requirements must be met before the IRS can lawfully

disclose taxpayer information pursuant to Section 6103(i)(2). For instance, an agency’s request

for information must be in writing and include the “name and address of the taxpayer” with respect

to whom the requested information relates, the “statutory authority” for the criminal investigation

or proceeding, 6 and the “specific reason or reasons” why disclosure is relevant to the criminal

investigation or proceeding. Id. § 6103(i)(2)(B). Furthermore, a request can only be made by an

agency’s head or Inspector General, and the IRS can only disclose the requested information to

“officers and employees of [the requesting] agency who are personally and directly engaged in”

the relevant criminal matter. Id. § 6103(i)(2)(A).

6 The MOU provides that the “statutory authority” for ICE’s requests under Section 6103(i)(2) will be “8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) or another specifically designated Federal criminal statute.” MOU, Dkt. No. 31-1 § 1.e. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) prohibits failing to depart the U.S. within 90 days of a removal order.

9 ICE’s first request for taxpayer information following the MOU came in mid-June 2025.

Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_86. This request—which, again, sought confidential information

for ICE’s “full alien population” of over 7 million individuals—failed to meet most of the Section

6103(i)(2) requirements outlined in the MOU. Id. at TD_83–90. When the IRS prompted ICE to

provide more information to bring its request into compliance with the MOU, an ICE official

represented that ICE was conducting criminal investigations under 8 U.S.C. § 1325 7 but added

that “the primary goal” of the request was “to enrich [ICE’s] data” with “the most recent” addresses

that the IRS could identify. Id. at TD_83. The IRS ultimately determined that it could not lawfully

fulfill ICE’s request under Section 6103(i)(2) because ICE had failed to provide: (i) a written

request from the head of ICE; (ii) the “specific reason or reasons” why the requested taxpayer

information would be relevant to a criminal investigation or proceeding; (iii) sufficient identity

information for the ICE officers or employees “personally and directly engaged” in the relevant

criminal matter; and (iv) an attestation that the requested information would only be used for the

relevant criminal investigations or proceedings. Id. at TD_93.

ICE submitted its second request following the MOU within a week after the IRS rejected

its prior request. Id. at TD_112–3. On June 27, 2025, ICE submitted a letter to the IRS requesting

“the last known address of approximately 1.28 million individuals identified by ICE.” Walker

Decl., Dkt. No. 31-1 ¶ 6. On August 7, 2025, the IRS responded to ICE’s request by disclosing to

ICE the last known addresses for approximately 47,000 individuals. Id. ¶ 7. Plaintiffs argue that

the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE was unlawful because ICE’s June 27 request failed to meet

several of the requirements necessary for disclosure under Section 6103(i)(2). For example,

Plaintiffs argue that the IRS violated Section 6103(i)(2)’s requirement that the IRS only disclose

7 This provision, unlike the provision listed in the MOU, criminalized illegal entry into the United States.

10 taxpayer information to agency personnel who are “personally and directly engaged in” the

relevant criminal matter because the IRS accepted ICE’s representation that one individual was

personally and directly engaged in approximately 1.2 million criminal investigations or

proceedings. See Defs.’ Resp. to Order, Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 2. Plaintiffs also claim that ICE intends to

impermissibly use the address information it obtained from the IRS to conduct civil immigration

enforcement such as deportation. See Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1. The Court shall discuss these

claims and several others in more detail below.

* * * *

Plaintiffs filed their First Amended Complaint against Defendants on May 16, 2025. Am.

Compl., Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint attacked the IRS’s Data Policy generally.

Id. Plaintiffs claimed that the Data Policy constituted ultra vires agency action and violated the

Internal Revenue Code along with the Privacy Act. Id. ¶¶ 216–29. On July 10, 2025, Defendants

moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint. Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 26. Plaintiffs opposed

Defendants’ motion. Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27. And Defendants replied. Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No.

29.

On August 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a motion to stay and preliminarily set aside the IRS’s

Data Policy. Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 30; Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1. Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary

relief focuses on the IRS’s Data Policy as it relates to information sharing with ICE, rather than

the IRS’s Data Policy generally. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief does

not claim that the IRS’s Data Policy constitutes ultra vires agency action, nor does it claim that

the Data Policy violates the Privacy Act. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 5 n. 5. Rather, Plaintiffs’

motion for preliminary relief is brought “solely on the basis” of Plaintiffs’ claim that Defendants

have violated the APA because the IRS’s implementation of the Data Policy with respect to sharing

11 confidential taxpayer address information with ICE was arbitrary and capricious, and the IRS’s

sharing of confidential taxpayer address information with ICE violated the Internal Revenue Code.

Id. Plaintiffs seek an Order that (i) stays the Data Policy to the extent that the Policy “permits

disclosures of IRS data to ICE under [Section] 6103(i)(2)” of the Internal Revenue Code; (ii)

prohibits Defendants from transferring to DHS or its component agencies any IRS data relating to

taxpayer address information or a taxpayer’s receipt of tax credits or refunds; (iii) requires

Defendants to ensure that any information the IRS has disclosed to ICE pursuant to Internal

Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2) is destroyed; and (iv) prohibits Defendants from implementing

a policy similar to the Data Policy under a different name. Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 30 at 1–2; Proposed

Order, Dkt. No. 30-2. The Defendants opposed Plaintiffs’ motion. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31.

And Plaintiffs replied. Pls.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 34.

On September 5, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief.

See Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 38. On September 9, after concluding that Plaintiffs had established both a

substantial likelihood of Article III standing and a substantial likelihood that at least one aspect of

the challenged policy was reviewable, final agency action, the Court ordered the Defendants to

produce the administrative record. See Min. Order, September 9, 2025. The Defendants produced

the administrative record on October 29, 2025. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48. Plaintiffs filed objections

to the administrative record on November 3, 2025, arguing that two additional documents should

be included in the record. Pls.’ Not. of Objections, Dkt. No. 49. Defendants responded to

Plaintiffs’ objections on November 10, 2025, by consenting to the inclusion of those two

documents in the record. Defs.’ Response to Objections, Dkt. No. 51. Accordingly, the Court has

included the two documents identified in Plaintiffs’ November 3 objections in its review of the

record.

12 Defendants’ motion to dismiss and Plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary relief are now ripe

for decision.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) provides for judicial review of “final agency

action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. If final agency

action is shown to be arbitrary and capricious or contrary to law, the reviewing court must “set

aside” the action. Id. § 706. Section 705 of the APA provides that a reviewing court may, on such

conditions as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury, issue “all

necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action or to preserve

status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.” 5 U.S.C. § 705.

Courts in the D.C. Circuit assess motions for interim relief under Section 705 using the

same four-part standard that governs requests for preliminary injunctions. Nat’l Council of

Nonprofits v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 775 F. Supp. 3d 100, 121 (D.D.C. 2025) (LLA); Nw.

Immigrant Rts. Project v. United States Citizenship & Immigr. Servs., 496 F. Supp. 3d 31, 45

(D.D.C. 2020) (RDM); Sierra Club v. Jackson, 833 F. Supp. 2d 11, 30 (D.D.C. 2012) (PLF); see

Cuomo v. U.S. Nuclear Regul. Comm’n, 772 F.2d 972, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1985). To obtain a

preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish (1) that they are “likely to succeed on the merits,”

(2) that they are “likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief,” (3) that

“the balance of equities tips in [their] favor,” and (4) that “an injunction is in the public interest.”

Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). When the Government is the

opposing party, as it is in this case, the balance-of-equities and public-interest factors “merge,”

and courts address those factors together. Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009).

13 To obtain a preliminary injunction, “the movant has the burden to show that all four Winter

factors, taken together, weigh in favor of the injunction.” Abdullah v. Obama, 753 F.3d 193, 197

(D.C. Cir. 2014) (citation modified). Before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Winter,

courts in this Circuit applied a “sliding-scale” approach to the preliminary-injunction factors, under

which “a strong showing on one factor could make up for a weaker showing on another.” Sherley

v. Sebelius, 644 F.3d 388, 392 (D.C. Cir. 2011). In the years since Winter, courts in this Circuit

have repeatedly declined to decide “whether the sliding-scale approach remains valid.” See

Changji Esquel Textile Co. v. Raimondo, 40 F.4th 716, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2022). However, this Circuit

has held variously that a failure to show a substantial likelihood of standing, Food & Water Watch,

Inc. v. Vilsack, 808 F.3d 905, 913 (D.C. Cir. 2015), success on the merits, Ark. Dairy Co-op Ass’n

v. USDA, 573 F.3d 815, 832 (D.C. Cir. 2009), or irreparable harm, Alpine Sec. Corp. v. Fin. Indus.

Regul. Auth., 121 F.4th 1314, 1336–37 (D.C. Cir. 2024), are each independently fatal to a request

for injunctive relief.

III. ANALYSIS

Because there is substantial overlap between the issues implicated by Plaintiffs’ motion for

preliminary relief and the issues implicated by Defendants’ motion to dismiss, the Court shall

resolve both motions here. Plaintiffs’ burden under their motion for preliminary relief is more

significant than their burden under Defendants’ motion to dismiss. To succeed on their motion for

preliminary relief, Plaintiffs must show a substantial likelihood of standing and show that they are

entitled to relief under the four Winter factors mentioned above. See Food & Water Watch, 808

F.3d at 913. For Plaintiffs’ Complaint to survive Defendants’ motion to dismiss, on the other hand,

Plaintiffs need only state a plausible claim to standing and a plausible claim to relief. Id.

14 A. Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of Article III standing

The federal judicial power is confined to the resolution of “Cases” and “Controversies.”

U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “For there to be a case or controversy under Article III, the plaintiff

must have a personal stake in the case—in other words, standing.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez,

594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021); Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (“Though some of

its elements express merely prudential considerations that are part of judicial self-government, the

core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy

requirement of Article III.”).

“A plaintiff must demonstrate standing ‘with the manner and degree of evidence required

at the successive stages of the litigation.’” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 431 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S.

at 561). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff need only “state a plausible claim” to standing. Food &

Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 913. Plaintiffs seeking a preliminary injunction, however, face “a

significantly more rigorous burden to establish standing.” Swanson Grp. Mfg. LLC v. Jewell, 790

F.3d 235, 240 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C.

Cir. 2011)). A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must show a “substantial likelihood” of

standing. Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 913. Moreover, a plaintiff seeking a preliminary

injunction cannot rely on past injuries alone to establish standing; they must show that they are

either “suffering an ongoing injury” or facing “an immediate threat of injury.” Dearth v. Holder,

641 F.3d 499, 501 (D.C. Cir. 2011).

The Plaintiffs in this case are organizations. When an organization seeks to establish

standing, it may do so in two ways. It may show that it has “organizational standing” to sue on its

own behalf. See FDA v. All. For Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393 (2024). Or it may

demonstrate that it has “associational standing” to sue on behalf of its members. See Hunt v.

15 Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). Plaintiffs assert both forms

of standing.

In determining whether Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of either form

of standing, the Court “must be careful not to decide the questions on the merits for or against” the

Plaintiffs. Tanner-Brown v. Haaland, 105 F.4th 437, 444 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (citing City of

Waukesha v. E.P.A., 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (per curiam)). The Court “must therefore

assume that on the merits the Plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” Id. (capitalization

modified).

1. Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of organizational standing

The Center for Taxpayer Rights (“the Center”) is the only Plaintiff to assert organizational

standing. See Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1; Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27 at 27; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 189–215.

An organization asserts organizational standing when it seeks to sue on its own behalf for

injuries it has sustained. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 393 (citing Havens Realty Corp.

v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379, n. 19 (1982)). To establish organizational standing, an

organization must satisfy the usual standards for Article III standing that apply to individuals:

injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Id. at 393–94. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have

failed to show that the Center has suffered an injury in fact. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 17–20;

Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 26-1 at 14–16. Therefore, the key issue in determining whether the Center

has organizational standing is whether the Center “has suffered a concrete and demonstrable injury

to [its] activities.” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 797 F.3d

1087, 1093 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citation omitted).

To establish that the Center has suffered a concrete and demonstrable injury to its activities,

Plaintiffs must show that the IRS’s Data Policy has “perceptibly impaired [the Center’s] ability to

provide . . . services for [its members],” Havens, 455 U.S. at 379, or “directly affected and 16 interfered with [the Center’s] core business activities,” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 395.

Plaintiffs must show that the Center has suffered “far more than simply a setback to [its] abstract

social interests.’” All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 393–94 (citing Havens, 455 U.S. at

379). To determine whether the Center’s injury “is ‘concrete and demonstrable’ or merely a

‘setback’ to its ‘abstract social interests,’” the Court must ask, first, “whether the [Defendants]

action or omission to act ‘injured the [Center’s] interest’” and, second, “whether the [Center] ‘used

its resources to counteract that harm.’” People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, 797 F.3d at

1094 (citing Havens Realty Corp., 455 U.S. at 379; Equal Rights Ctr., 633 F.3d at 1140). The

Center, however, “cannot spend its way into standing simply by expending money to gather

information and advocate against” the IRS’s Data Policy. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at

394. Therefore, the Center will “not suffer an injury in fact where it ‘expend[s] resources to

educate its members and others’ unless doing so subjects the [Center] to ‘operational costs beyond

those normally expended.’” Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 920 (quoting Nat’l Taxpayers

Union, Inc. v. United States, 68 F.3d 1428, 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1995)).

For the reasons stated below, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs have shown a substantial

likelihood that the IRS’s Data Policy has injured the Center’s interests and “subject[ed] the

[Center] to ‘operational costs beyond those normally expected.’” Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d

at 920 (quoting Nat’l Taxpayers Union, Inc., 68 F.3d 1428 at 1434). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have

established that the Center has organizational standing to bring its motion for preliminary relief.

The Center’s mission “is to advance taxpayer rights, promote trust in the tax system, and

increase access to justice in the tax system,” particularly for “the most vulnerable populations,

including immigrants, people whose first language is not English, low-income people, and

domestic violence survivors.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 16 (citing Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8

17 ¶ 3–6). The Center pursues this mission through a variety of services and activities. For instance,

the Center provides pro bono or nominal fee legal representation to low-income taxpayers through

its federally funded Low-Income Taxpayer Clinic (“LITC”). Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 7. To

receive federal funding for its LITC, the Center must serve “taxpayers who are low-income or

speak English as a second language” and “identify and advocate for issues that impact these

taxpayers.” Id. ¶ 8. The Center also operates a nationwide network, known as “LITC Connect,”

of other LITCs, attorneys, accountants, and enrolled agents. Id. ¶ 5 (“LITC Connect has

approximately 160 individual members and 90 LITC members.”). The Center’s LITC Connect

“holds weekly calls with several dozen representatives of its member LITCs, provides training and

support, and carries professional liability insurance for the network of professionals that serve

LITC members.” Id. ¶ 19. Finally, the Center “holds conferences, workshops, webinars, and other

events to educate individuals on issues related to taxpayer rights, including privacy rights, and

promoting trust in the tax system.” Id. ¶ 6.

Plaintiffs claim that the IRS’s Data Policy has significantly harmed the Center’s ability to

provide services and activities in furtherance of its mission. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 16.

Plaintiffs argue that public reporting on the Data Policy has made taxpayers less willing to come

to the Center’s events, to seek its legal guidance, or to engage with the Center’s education and

outreach. Id. at 17; Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 3-8 ¶¶ 41–44. Plaintiffs argue that this is especially true

for taxpayers who do not speak English as a first language and are more likely to be immigrants,

for whom the Center is required to conduct outreach and education as a statutory condition of its

LITC’s federal funding. Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 3-8 ¶ 41. To support this claim, Plaintiffs point to

the fact that, this year, the Center “has held only a tenth of the events it did compared to last year.”

Id. ¶¶ 41–44. And while last year the Center provided representation in 14 cases involving

18 immigrant taxpayers with Individual Taxpayer Identification Numbers (“ITINs”), this year it has

only provided representation in one such case. Id. To adapt to this “dramatic decline in interest

and engagement,” the Center has been forced to expend nearly 10 percent of its LITC’s operating

expenses on additional education and outreach. See Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶¶ 44–46. But

even when this additional outreach is successful and the Center finds itself in a position to represent

a taxpayer, Plaintiffs argue that the Center’s LITC “can no longer provide substantive advice about

whether or not the taxpayers should or can safely submit information to the IRS” because it “cannot

reconcile the IRS’s reported data-sharing conduct with [its] understanding of the laws that should

constrain it.” Id. ¶¶ 47–49. Plaintiffs convey that this “has resulted in immediate impairment to

[the Center’s] ability to counsel [its] clients.”

Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the IRS’s Data Policy has “perceptibly

impaired [the Center’s] ability to provide . . . services” for the population it serves. Havens, 455

U.S. at 379. Plaintiffs have introduced evidence showing that the taxpayers the Center is statutorily

required to serve are no longer willing to engage with the Center due to the IRS’s Data Policy.

This decrease in engagement harms the Center’s ability to provide educational services for the

taxpayers it is statutorily required to serve. To address this harm, the Center has been forced to

expend resources beyond what it typically expects to expend in an effort to stay in compliance

with its requirements for federal funding. This increase in expenditure cannot rightfully be

characterized as an attempt by the Center to “spend its way into standing.” All. for Hippocratic

Med., 602 U.S. at 394. If the Center were to forgo these additional expenses, then the Center

would risk losing its federal funding. See Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 4. The loss of such funding

due to unlawful action is a concrete harm.

19 Plaintiffs have also shown that the IRS’s Data Policy has interfered with the Center’s

ability to provide its pro bono or nominal fee representation services. This interference closely

resembles the injury found sufficient for organizational standing in Havens Realty Corp. v.

Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982). The relevant question in Havens was whether a housing

counseling organization, HOME, had standing to sue Havens Realty, which owned and operated

apartment complexes, for engaging in unlawful “racial steering” by lying to certain racial groups

about the availability of rental units. Havens, 455 U.S. at 366-68; see also All. for Hippocratic

Med., 602 U.S. at 395. The Supreme Court found that HOME had standing because it showed that

Havens Realty’s practice of racial steering “perceptibly impaired HOME’s ability to provide

counseling and referral services for low-and moderate-income homeseekers” and required HOME

“to devote significant resources to identify and counteract” the racially discriminatory steering

practices. Id. at 379. The Court explained that “[s]uch concrete and demonstrable injury to the

organization’s activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes

far more than simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.” Id. Although the

Supreme Court “has been careful not to extend the Havens holding beyond its context,” All. for

Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. at 396, the Center’s alleged injuries fall squarely within that context.

“Critically,” like HOME, the Center is not only “an issue-advocacy organization,” but it also

operates a “counseling service” by representing clients who are low-income taxpayers in their tax

disputes. Id. at 395; Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 194. And like HOME, the Center has shown that

its ability to provide these services is perceptibly impaired by the IRS’s Data Policy. See, e.g.,

Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 51 (“The data sharing policy will drastically erode [the Center’s] pro

bono legal services program, which is central to [its] mission and vision to increase access to

counsel for low-income individuals, and in particular the ESL community.”); Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No.

20 30-1 at 16–18, 37; Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27 at 29–30. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have alleged injuries

to the Center that are analogous to the injuries the Supreme Court found sufficient for

organizational standing in Havens Realty.

Contrary to Defendants’ argument, the connection between the IRS’s Data Policy and the

Center’s injuries is not too speculative. Plaintiffs have provided ample public reporting on the

IRS’s Data Policy sufficient to infer that taxpayers across America are informed of the IRS’s shift

in disclosure policy. See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 20. Plaintiffs have also introduced evidence

showing that the promise of confidentiality is critical to participation in a voluntary tax system.

See Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 53 (“It is an axiom of tax administration that taxpayer trust in the

system is critical to maintaining and increasing voluntary compliance.”) (providing additional

sources); id. ¶ 30 (“These confidentiality protections serve not only taxpayers’ interests; they also

strengthen the system of tax administration, which necessarily relies on voluntary compliance.”);

Memorandum from Peter J. Wallison, General Counsel, Department of the Treasury, to Secretary

Regan, Disclosure to the Selective Service System (May 17, 1982) at 2 (“The costs of IRS

disclosure also seem high. . . . A potentially costly and burdensome class action law suit is likely

to be filed on behalf of those whose addresses were disclosed, and the publicity generated by the

event will inevitably have some effect on the public’s willingness to disclose information

voluntarily to the IRS.”). And while the promise of confidentiality is important to every taxpayer,

Plaintiffs have submitted evidence showing that it is especially important to the low-income and

immigrant taxpayers the Center is statutorily required to serve. See Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at

15–16 (explaining that immigrant taxpayers face unique risks related to immigration enforcement

and misidentification). Taken together, it is clear why the former National Taxpayer Advocate

and the Center’s current Executive Director submitted a declaration stating “that the sudden

21 difficulty the Center and other LITCs have experienced in reaching the population who [they] exist

to serve is caused by the IRS’s change in its data policy and shift to more open sharing of sensitive

taxpayer information across the federal government.” Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶¶ 2, 10.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the Center has suffered

and will continue to suffer a concrete injury. Plaintiffs have also shown that this continuing injury

is caused by the IRS’s Data Policy. In addition, the Court determines that the Center’s continuing

injury would be remedied by a positive judicial outcome, as such an outcome would likely temper

the continuing loss of taxpayer trust and allow the Center to start building that trust back without

expending an abnormal amount of funds to accomplish their statutorily-approved duty.

* * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the Center has organizational

standing to bring its claims for preliminary relief. Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood

that the IRS’s Data Policy has caused taxpayers to become unwilling to engage with the Center,

which has forced the Center to dedicate resources and make expenditures beyond its normal

operational levels at the risk of losing its federal funding. Plaintiffs have also shown that the IRS’s

Data Policy has undermined the Center’s ability to provide legal representation to its LITC clients.

Accordingly, the Court concludes that the Center has organizational standing to bring its claims

against the Defendants.

2. The Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of associational standing

Plaintiffs also bring this suit on behalf of their members, so they must establish

associational standing. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 39; Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27 at 20. A

membership organization has associational standing to bring suit on behalf of its members if it can

establish that: “(a) its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the

interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither the claim 22 asserted nor the relief requested requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit.”

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). To satisfy the first

element of associational standing—i.e., to show that their members otherwise have standing to sue

in their own right—Plaintiffs “must show (i) that [their members] suffered an injury in fact that is

concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent; (ii) that the injury was likely caused by the

defendant; and (iii) that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” TransUnion, 594

U.S. at 423. Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack associational standing because their members’

alleged injuries are neither “concrete” nor “actual or imminent.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 10–

17; Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 26 at 8–14.

Plaintiffs assert associational standing on the basis of an increased risk of harm to their

members. 8 Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 38–9; Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27 at 20. Specifically,

Plaintiffs claim that the IRS has unlawfully disclosed their members’ confidential address

information to ICE, and that there is an “imminent risk” that their members’ confidential address

information will either be publicly disclosed or impermissibly used. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at

39. The D.C. Circuit “has limited its jurisdiction over cases alleging the possibility of increased-

risk-of-harm to those where the plaintiff can show ‘both (i) a substantially increased risk of harm

and (ii) a substantial probability of harm with that increase taken into account.’” Food & Water

8 On the present record, it is not clear that the Center has “members” in the relevant sense. Although the Center has clients whose interests it “represents in good faith,” it does not appear to be a “voluntary membership organization” in which its clients are members who finance the organization, guide its activities, or select its leadership. See Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard Coll., 600 U.S. 181, 201 (2023); Viasat, Inc. v. FCC, 47 F.4th 769, 781 (D.C. Cir. 2022). However, because the Court has already concluded that the Center has established a substantial likelihood of organizational standing, and because other Plaintiffs are traditional membership organizations with similarly situated members who assert identical claims and seek the same relief, the Court need not resolve whether the Center also has associational standing. See Am. Anti-Vivisection Soc’y v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 946 F.3d 615, 619–20 (D.C. Cir. 2020). For the same reason, the Court declines to take up the third-party standing argument that the Center briefly asserted as a further alternative basis for standing. See Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 30 at 35 n.58; Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27 at 30–32. When the Court refers to “Plaintiffs’ members” in this section, it refers to the identifiable members of those Plaintiffs that are traditional membership organizations.

23 Watch, 808 F.3d at 914 (quoting Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 489

F.3d 1279, 1295 (D.C. Cir. 2007)) (emphasis in original). In this context, the word “substantial”

poses “questions of degree” that are “far from fully resolved.” Va. State Corp. Comm’n v. FERC,

468 F.3d 845, 848 (D.C. Cir. 2006). The D.C. Circuit, however, has explained that “the

constitutional requirement of imminence . . . necessarily compels a very strict understanding of

what increases in risk and overall risk levels can count as ‘substantial.’” Food & Water Watch,

808 F.3d at 915 (quoting Public Citizen I, 489 F.3d at 1296).

“[T]he proper way to analyze an increased-risk-of-harm claim is to consider the ultimate

alleged harm . . . as the concrete and particularized injury and then to determine whether the

increased risk of such harm makes injury . . . sufficiently ‘imminent’ for standing purposes.”

Public Citizen I, 489 F.3d at 1298. Accordingly, the Court shall first consider whether the

Plaintiffs’ ultimate alleged harm—the unlawful disclosure or use of confidential tax return

information under the Data Policy—is a concrete injury under Article III. See Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt.

No. 27 at 21.

In determining whether an injury is sufficiently “concrete” for Article III standing, the

Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to “ask[] whether plaintiffs have identified a close

historical or common-law analogue for their asserted injury.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424 (citing

Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016)). The “most obvious” examples of concrete

harms “are traditional tangible harms, such as physical harms and monetary harms,” but “[v]arious

intangible harms can also be concrete.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. “Chief among” the concrete

intangible harms “are injuries with a close relationship to harms traditionally recognized as

providing a basis for lawsuits in American courts,” including, for example, “reputational harms,

disclosure of private information, and intrusion upon seclusion.” Id.

24 Here, Plaintiffs’ members’ ultimate alleged harm is the intangible “harm of improper

access and sharing of protected information” stemming from the “unlawful inspection or

disclosure of confidential tax return information under the [IRS’s] Data Policy.” Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt.

No. 27 at 21; Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 39. Plaintiffs argue that this harm satisfies the

requirements of Article III standing because it has a close historical or common-law analogue in

the torts of intrusion upon seclusion and breach of confidence. Id. The Court will start with the

tort of intrusion upon seclusion before moving on to breach of confidence.

Traditionally, the tort of intrusion upon seclusion has been “recognized as providing a basis

for lawsuits in American courts.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425 (citing Gadelhak v. AT&T Servs.,

Inc., 950 F.3d 458, 462 (7th Cir. 2020) (Barrett, J.); see also Gadelhak, 950 F.3d at 462 (“The

common law has long recognized actions at law against defendants who invaded the private

solitude of another by committing the tort of ‘intrusion upon seclusion.’”). At common law, “the

essential features of intrusion upon seclusion are that the defendant intentionally intruded ‘upon

the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns’ and that such intrusion ‘would

be highly offensive to a reasonable person.’” All. for Retired Americans v. Bessent, 770 F. Supp.

3d 79, 102 (D.D.C. 2025) (CKK) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B). Plaintiffs have

adequately pled both features.

First, Plaintiffs have adequately pled an intrusion into their members’ “private affairs or

concerns.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B. In determining whether an alleged intrusion

involves a plaintiff’s “private affairs or concerns,” this Court has explained that “one frequent

consideration is whether the plaintiff had a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in the information

or thing intruded upon.” All. for Retired Americans, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 102 (collecting cases).

Here, Plaintiffs’ members had a reasonable expectation that the privacy of their sensitive

25 information would be protected by “the explicit statutory protections provided by the . . . Internal

Revenue Code.” 9 Id. As this Circuit has explained, Internal Revenue Code Section 6103 provides

an “assurance of privacy” that is “fundamental to a tax system that relies upon self-reporting.”

Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 791 F.2d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1986). This

assurance of privacy reflects the congressional policy that taxpayer information should be “entitled

to essentially the same degree of privacy as those private papers maintained in [the] home.” S.

Rep. No. 94-938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., at 328 (1976). Plaintiffs have shown that their members

have developed a reasonable expectation of privacy in their taxpayer information based on these

statutory protections and public statements made by the IRS pursuant to these statutory protections.

See, e.g., Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 199 (“MSA’s members have understood the information they

submit to IRS to be private, barring a discrete list of specific exceptions. Their trust in IRS is

engendered by their understanding of the privacy laws the agency is subject to and the agency’s

own public commitments to data privacy.”).

In addition to Plaintiffs’ members’ reasonable expectation of privacy, the type of invasion

at issue here closely resembles another type of invasion that constitutes an intrusion upon seclusion

under D.C. common law. In Wolf v. Regardie, 553 A.2d 1213 (D.C. 1989), the D.C. Court of

Appeals explained that “examining a plaintiff’s private bank account” is one of the “types of

invasion intrinsic in the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.” 553 A.2d at 1217–18. The alleged

invasion at issue here includes “the exact type of private information that might be found through

inspection of an individual’s bank account.” All. for Retired Americans, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 103.

9 See also IRS Pub. 4639, Disclosure & Privacy Law Reference Guide, at 1-9 (Oct. 2012 ed.), https://perma.cc/JH2L- QQZP (“Congress recognized that the IRS had more information about citizens than any other federal agency and that other agencies routinely sought access to that information. Congress also understood that citizens reasonably expected the IRS would protect the privacy of the tax information they were required to supply. If the IRS abused that reasonable expectation of privacy, the resulting loss of public confidence could seriously impair the tax system.”).

26 Plaintiffs’ alleged intrusion also includes information that is arguably more sensitive than standard

bank account information, including “Social Security numbers; information about individuals’

income and net worth; bank account information; tax liability; [] sensitive information regarding

deductions, such as charitable donations, dependents, and medical expenses; [and] whether an

individual’s tax return has been or is being investigated.” Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 13. While

Plaintiffs’ members have “opened [their] affairs to some scrutiny” by providing this information

to the IRS, there are still some matters that Plaintiffs’ members have “not exhibited to the public

gaze,” and there “may still be invasion of privacy when there is intrusion upon these matters.” All.

for Retired Americans, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 103. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt.

c). As this Court explained in Alliance for Retired Americans,

An illustration from the Restatement clarifies the point: A is seeking evidence for a suit against B; B has disclosed his financial information to a bank; A goes to the bank with a forged court order and demands access to B’s bank records; when the bank acquiesces to that demand, “A has invaded B’s privacy.” The fact that B had disclosed his information to the bank does not defeat A’s liability because B still has a privacy interest in those records vis-à-vis A. That disclosure is closely analogous to the scenario Plaintiffs have alleged here: Plaintiffs’ members disclosed their information to Treasury; individuals falsely purporting to have lawful access to that information demanded its disclosure; when Treasury acquiesced to that demand, the individuals invaded Plaintiffs’ members’ privacy.

Id. (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B cmt. c).

Plaintiffs have also shown that the type of intrusion detailed above “would be highly

offensive to a reasonable person.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B. D.C. common law

makes clear that “[i]n this age of identity theft and other wrongful conduct through the

unauthorized use of electronically-stored data, . . . conduct giving rise to unauthorized viewing of

personal information such as a plaintiff’s Social Security number and other identifying information

can constitute an intrusion that is highly offensive to any reasonable person.” Randolph v. ING

Life Ins. & Annuity Co., 973 A.2d 702, 710 (D.C. 2009). Plaintiffs “allege exactly this kind of

27 unauthorized viewing.” All. for Retired Americans, 770 F. Supp. 3d at 103. Furthermore, this

allegedly unauthorized viewing involves personal information that taxpayers provided to the IRS

pursuant to a promise that the IRS would prioritize keeping the information confidential. A

reasonable taxpayer would likely find it highly offensive to discover that the IRS now intends to

share that information permissively because it has replaced its promise of confidentiality with a

policy of disclosure.

Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ alleged injuries to their members are not analogous to the

injuries protected by the tort of intrusion upon seclusion. Specifically, Defendants argue that the

highly offensive intrusions protected by the tort are “in no way analogous” to an instance of a

federal agency “sharing lawfully obtained information, contained in data systems that the agency

lawfully maintains, with another agency pursuant to a memorandum of understanding.” Defs.’

Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 14. But “[i]n reviewing the standing question, the court must be careful not

to decide the questions on the merits for or against the plaintiff, and must therefore assume that on

the merits the plaintiffs would be successful in their claims.” Muir v. Navy Fed. Credit Union,

529 F.3d 1100, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing City of Waukesha v. EPA, 320 F.3d 228, 235 (D.C.

Cir. 2003)). Therefore, the correct analogy here is whether it would be highly offensive for a

federal agency to share lawfully obtained information through unlawfully maintained data systems

pursuant to an illegal information-sharing agreement. As the Court explained above, a reasonable

person would find it highly offensive to find that their confidential information has been illegally

disclosed because the IRS unlawfully replaced its promise of confidentiality with a policy of

disclosure. Moreover, as the D.C. Circuit recently recognized, the extent to which a disclosure

would offend a reasonable person “goes to the degree of harm, not the injury’s recognition at

common law, and so does not affect the concreteness of the [relevant] injury under Article III.”

28 Pileggi v. Washington Newspaper Publ’g Co., LLC, 146 F.4th 1219, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2025).

Because “drawing lines between degrees of harm implicates policy judgments that fall more

naturally in Congress’s wheelhouse,” this Court will not hold that Plaintiffs lack standing based

on a subjective judgment about the extent to which a reasonable person would be offended by the

alleged conduct. Id.

Accordingly, the ultimate harm facing Plaintiffs’ members is a “concrete” injury under

Article III because it has a close relationship to the harm protected by the tort of intrusion upon

seclusion.

Plaintiffs also claim that their members’ alleged injuries have a close relationship to

another common-law tort: the tort of breach of confidence. Plaintiffs argue that the Internal

Revenue Code vests their members with “a concrete interest in submitting information to the IRS

in connection with their tax returns without incurring a risk that this information will be shared,”

except in accordance with the Code’s “narrow legally permissible exceptions” to the general rule

of confidentiality. Pls.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 27 at 24. “Where the IRS discloses a taxpayer’s

information in violation of these statutory provisions,” Plaintiffs argue, “it causes a concrete injury

akin to the common-law tort of breach of confidence.” Id.

Defendants raise two arguments with respect to Plaintiffs’ analogy to the tort of breach of

confidence. First, Defendants argue that the tort cannot “serve as a valid analogue under

TransUnion’s requirement of a historically grounded cause of action” because it has a “nascent

and underdeveloped pedigree.” Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 29 at 7. Second, Defendants argue that,

even if the tort has sufficient historical grounding, Plaintiffs’ members’ alleged injury is not

sufficiently analogous to the tort. Id. at 8. The Court rejects both of these arguments.

29 In Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059 (D.C. Cir. 2019), the D.C. Circuit

treated the tort of breach of confidence as a tort that has “traditionally been regarded as providing

a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.” 928 F.3d at 1064 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S.

at 341) (holding that “an increased risk of identity theft” was a concrete injury because it involved

“risk of the very harm the breach of confidence tort makes actionable”). Defendants urge the Court

to ignore Jeffries because it “predates TransUnion, does not address whether the tort [of breach of

confidence] has a sufficient historical origin, and relies, in part, on an Eleventh Circuit panel

decision that was later overturned by the Eleventh Circuit sitting en banc.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No.

31 at 16 (citing Muransky v. Godiva Chocolatier, Inc., 922 F.3d 1175 (11th Cir.), reh’g en banc

granted, opinion vacated, 939 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2019), and on reh’g en banc, 979 F.3d 917

(11th Cir. 2020)). But the Court shall decline to do so. To start, the Court does not ascribe much

significance to the fact that Jeffries predates TransUnion, as both cases applied the concrete-harm

analysis set forth in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330 (2016). Compare Jeffries, 928 F.2d at

1064 (quoting Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 340–41) (“‘In determining whether an intangible harm’ like

risk is concrete, ‘both history and the judgment of Congress play important roles.’ The historical

analysis focuses on ‘whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has

traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.’”)

with TransUnion LLC, 594 U.S. at 424–25 (“. . . with respect to the concrete-harm requirement in

particular, this Court’s opinion in Spokeo v. Robins indicated that courts should assess whether the

alleged injury to the plaintiff has a ‘close relationship’ to a harm ‘traditionally’ recognized as

providing a basis for a lawsuit in American courts.”). The Court does not find Defendants’

remaining arguments sufficient to undermine Jeffries, either. While the D.C. Circuit did not spill

much ink on the common-law origins of breach of confidence, Defendants are wrong to say that

30 Jeffries did “not address” the issue: Jeffries explained the need to identify a traditionally

recognized harm and then identified the tort of breach of confidence as such a harm. Jeffries, 928

F.2d at 1064–65. And although Jeffries does cite to the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Muransky

that was eventually overturned en banc, those citations relate to the content of the tort of breach of

confidence, not the historical validity of the tort. Id. (citing Muransky, 922 F.3d at 1190–91).

Accordingly, the tort of breach of confidence has a sufficient pedigree to serve as an

analogous common-law harm for Article III standing. The issue, therefore, is whether Plaintiffs’

alleged harms have a sufficiently close relationship to a breach of confidence. A common law

breach of confidence “lies where a person offers private information to a third party in confidence

and the third party reveals that information’ to another,” thereby breaching the person’s

expectation of privacy. Jeffries, 928 F.3d at 1064 (quoting Muransky, 922 F.3d at 1190–91). The

tort is “rooted in the concept that the law should recognize some relationships as confidential” in

order to “encourage uninhibited discussions between the parties involved.” Id. (quoting Young v.

U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 882 F.2d 633, 640 (2d Cir. 1989)). “The harm in a breach-of-confidence

case ‘occurs when the plaintiff’s trust in the breaching party is violated, whether or not the breach

has other consequences.’” Id. (quoting Muransky, 922 F.3d at 1190).

The Court concludes that Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that their members

have suffered a harm analogous to the harm protected by the common law tort of breach of

confidence. In Jeffries, the D.C. Circuit held that a statutory interest in “avoiding an increased risk

of identity theft” was sufficiently connected to the concrete harms protected by the tort of breach

of confidence. 928 F.3d at 1064. The statutory interest at issue in Jeffries was rooted in the Fair

and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (“FACTA”), which prohibited merchants that

processed credit card transactions from printing more than the last five digits of the credit card

31 number on the receipt. Id. at 1062. Noting that the harm in a breach-of-confidence case “occurs

when the plaintiff’s trust in the breaching party is violated,” the D.C. Circuit explained that

“FACTA’s truncation requirement establishes a similar relationship of trust between consumer

and merchant, requiring the merchant to safeguard the consumer’s credit or debit card information

and thus preventing an increased risk of identity theft.” Id. at 1064–65. Furthermore, FACTA’s

truncation requirement protected against “the risk of the very harm the breach of confidence tort

makes actionable—an unauthorized disclosure of privileged information to a third party.” Jeffries,

928 F.3d at 1065 (citing Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct. at 1549). The same can be said of the alleged

injuries to Plaintiffs’ members. Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes a

relationship of trust between taxpayers and the IRS because it creates the general rule that the IRS

must keep taxpayer information confidential. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a). The detailed statutory

regime surrounding maintenance of this information and the exceptions to the general rule of

confidentiality further establish the IRS’s role as a protector of the confidential information it

receives from taxpayers. See id. § 6103(c)–(p). Plaintiffs allege that the IRS has breached this

trust by replacing the promise of confidentiality with a policy of permissive disclosure, which has

led to the unlawful transfer of taxpayer information in violation of Internal Revenue Code Section

6103(i)(2). Like the statute at issue in Jeffries, Section 6103(i)(2) “protects against the risk of the

very harm the breach of confidence tort makes actionable—an unauthorized disclosure of

privileged information to a third party.” Jeffries, 928 F.3d at 1065 (citing Spokeo, Inc., 136 S. Ct.

at 1549).

Accordingly, because Plaintiffs’ alleged injury mirrors the alleged injury at issue in Jeffries,

they have also established a common-law analogue through the tort of breach of confidence.

32 In sum, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that their members’ ultimate alleged

harm is a “concrete” injury under Article III. Public Citizen I, 489 F.3d at 1298. Therefore,

Plaintiffs must now show that the “increased risk of such harm” makes injury “sufficiently

‘imminent’ for standing purposes.” Id. Because Plaintiffs’ intrusion upon seclusion claim and

breach of confidence claim both stem from the same series of events, the Court will assess the

imminence of Plaintiffs’ alleged harm under both causes of action together.

While the “imminence” of an injury “is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot

be stretched beyond its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for

Article III purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.

555, 564 n.2 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted). When injury is based on an increased risk

of harm, the “threatened injury must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact;”

“allegations of possible future injury” are not sufficient. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S.

398, 409 (2013) (citing Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (citation modified);

Food & Water Watch, 808 F.3d at 914 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“An actual or imminent

injury is certainly impending and immediate—not remote, speculative, conjectural, or

hypothetical.”). “A plaintiff must show a ‘substantial probability of injury’ to establish imminent

injury.” Sierra Club v. Jewell, 764 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (quoting Chamber of Commerce of

the U.S. v. EPA, 642 F.3d 192, 200 (D.C. Cir. 2011)).

Defendants claim that the increased risk of harm alleged by Plaintiffs “is too attenuated to

support this Court’s jurisdiction” because “it is built on a speculative chain of events that is

unlikely to occur.” Defs.’ Reply, Dkt. No. 29 at 2. Defendants argue that the “likelihood that

Plaintiffs’ members’ specific address information was included in the IRS’s provision of

information to ICE is remote,” and that any claim that Plaintiffs’ members’ addresses may be

33 shared in the future or impermissibly used “is entirely speculative.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at

12. The Court disagrees.

To start, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that their members belong to

identifiable groups that have been the focus of ICE’s information requests from the IRS. The

Center’s LITC represents immigrant taxpayers. See Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 15. Between

February 2025 and June 2025, ICE submitted three requests to the IRS for information on

immigrant taxpayers. See Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_01–110. One of these requests sought

taxpayer information on ICE’s “full alien population” of over 7 million individuals. Id. at TD_86.

Furthermore, the Center has encouraged immigrant taxpayers it represents to file for an Individual

Taxpayer Identification Number (“ITIN”). Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶¶ 33–36. Evidence

introduced by Plaintiffs and statements made by counsel for Defendants at the September 5 hearing

suggest that many of the addresses the IRS provided to ICE on August 7 were provided, in part,

because ICE provided the IRS with matching taxpayer identification numbers, which likely include

ITINs. See Pls.’ Mem. Ex. 2, Dkt. No. 30-4 (stating that the addresses the IRS provided to ICE on

August 7 “were mainly [for] the individuals for whom DHS provided an [ITIN]”); H’rg Tr., Dkt.

No. 38 at 29:2–5 (“I can tell you that the number of people with whom the IRS matched using a

taxpayer identification number was quite high, most of them around 39,000.”).

In addition, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that their members information

may be shared in the future. ICE’s first June 2025 request for information on its “full alien

population” of over 7 million individuals suggests that ICE’s second June 2025 request for address

information relating to 1.2 million immigrant taxpayers—which ‘only’ resulted in address

information for around 47,000 individuals—is not the final request ICE intends to make. Admin.

R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_86. The inference is bolstered by evidence submitted by Plaintiffs regarding

34 the Administration’s stated focus on obtaining taxpayer information for immigration enforcement

and the corresponding personnel changes at the IRS detailed by the Court elsewhere. See Pls.’

Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 43; supra Section I. Moreover, the Administration’s expressed desire to

investigate Earned Income Tax Credits (“EITCs”) and Child Tax Credits (“CTCs”) implicates

Plaintiffs’ members who are low-income taxpayers who qualify for EITCs and CTCs. See Am.

Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 41–42, 150, 203, 209, 215. Furthermore, although counsel for Defendants

stated at the September 5 hearing that the IRS was done processing ICE’s June 27 request for

address information, the administrative record suggests that the IRS may be ‘required’ to disclose

more information in response to this request as time goes on. See H’rg Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 11:15.

The administrative record shows that the IRS refused to fulfill ICE’s June 27 request with respect

to individuals who did not have an order of removal date beyond 90 days at the time of the IRS’s

review. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_145. However, as one internal IRS email shows, some of

the requests that the IRS deemed invalid because 90-days had not elapsed would become valid

once the 90-days had passed. Id. (email between two IRS officials that reads, “Per our discussion

yesterday, the final number of matches will change based on the date/time of the run, as it is

associated with the Final Order Date.”). If this is true, and if the IRS is operating as if ICE’s June

27 requires the IRS to disclose the requested information, then additional taxpayers are at risk of

having their confidential information disclosed to ICE pursuant to ICE’s June 27 request for

address information.

Finally, for reasons discussed elsewhere in this Opinion, see infra Section III.C.2., the

Court determines that Plaintiffs have also shown a substantial likelihood that their members’

confidential address information will be impermissibly used for civil immigration enforcement.

35 Accordingly, the Plaintiffs have shown that the risk of harm to their members is sufficiently

“imminent” for Article III standing. Public Citizen I, 489 F.3d at 1298. Plaintiffs have shown a

high likelihood that the IRS disclosed their members’ confidential address information to ICE on

August 7. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have shown that there is an imminent risk of the IRS disclosing

their members’ confidential address information again in the future, either pursuant to new

requests from ICE or pursuant to ICE’s June 27 request. Finally, Plaintiffs have shown that there

is an imminent risk that their members’ confidential address information that has already been

shared with ICE will be impermissibly used for civil immigration enforcement.

* * * *

Plaintiffs have established associational standing because they have shown that their

members are substantially likely to have standing to sue in their own right. Plaintiffs allege a

concrete harm to their members that has a close relationship to the harms protected by the common

law torts of intrusion upon seclusion and breach of confidence. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have shown

that the IRS has either disclosed their members’ confidential address information already or will

likely do so in the future. Regarding Plaintiffs’ members who have already had their confidential

address information disclosed by the IRS to ICE, Plaintiffs have shown that there is an imminent

risk that ICE will impermissibly use this information for civil immigration enforcement.

B. Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

To succeed on their motion for preliminary relief, Plaintiffs must establish that they are

likely to succeed on the merits. See Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. The merits of Plaintiffs’ motion are

governed under the framework of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). See Pls.’ Mem.,

Dkt. No. 30-1 at 5 n. 3 (explaining that Plaintiffs “move for relief solely on the basis of their APA

contrary to law claim concerning the Internal Revenue Code as well as APA arbitrary and

capricious claims”). The APA provides that “final agency action for which there is no other 36 adequate remedy in a court [is] subject to judicial review.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. “On such conditions

as may be required and to the extent necessary to prevent irreparable injury,” a reviewing court

“may issue all necessary and appropriate process to postpone the effective date of an agency action

or to preserve status or rights pending conclusion of the review proceedings.” Id. § 705.

Furthermore, a reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action” found to be

“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Id. § 706.

1. Plaintiffs challenge final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court.

As noted above, the APA subjects to judicial review any “final agency action for which

there is no other adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Therefore, to establish a likelihood

of success on the merits, Plaintiffs must first show that their claims arise out of “final agency

action” taken by the IRS. Id. If they can make this showing, then Plaintiffs must show that there

is “no other adequate remedy in a court” for their claims. Id.

a. Plaintiffs have established a strong likelihood that the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy is final agency action.

The APA limits judicial review of agency action to actions that are “final.” 5 U.S.C. § 704.

Plaintiffs argue that the IRS has implemented a policy of sharing confidential taxpayer address

information with ICE—the Data Policy—that “amounts to a wholesale rewrite of the IRS’s data

privacy policy” and thus constitutes final agency action. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 20. Plaintiffs

claim that the IRS’s Data Policy has “abandoned the agency’s prior promise that taxpayer

information be kept confidential” in an effort to (1) expand access to and the use of taxpayer

information within the IRS; (2) consolidate data systems to facilitate broad, not segregated access

within the agency; and (3) permit large-scale data-sharing with ICE unrelated to tax administration.

Id. at 10, 20. Defendants dispute the existence of the Data Policy, arguing that “there is no such

37 ‘Data Policy.’” Defs.’ Opp’n to PI, Dkt. No. 31 at 21. But Plaintiffs claim the Data Policy is

apparent from recent IRS actions. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 20.

Courts apply a two-prong test to determine whether agency action is “final.” Agency action

is “final” if it (1) marks the “consummation” of the agency’s decision-making process (i.e., it is

not “of a merely tentative or interlocutory nature”) and (2) constitutes action “by which rights or

obligations have been determined, or from which legal consequences will flow.” MediNatura,

Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 998 F.3d 931, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (quoting Bennett v. Spear, 520

U.S. 154, 178 (1997)). Agency action must satisfy both prongs in order for the action to be final.

Id. The D.C. Circuit has explained that this is a “pragmatic and flexible” inquiry. Id. (quoting

Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab., 824 F.3d 1023, 1027 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).

The Court first considers whether the Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s alleged Data

Policy with respect to sharing taxpayer address information with ICE marks the “consummation”

of the IRS’s decision-making process. This requires the Court to determine whether the Data

Policy “is properly attributable to the [IRS] itself and represents the culmination of [the IRS’s]

consideration of an issue,” or, instead, is simply the conduct “of a subordinate official, or

tentative.” Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Wheeler, 955 F.3d 68, 78 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (quoting

Soundboard Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 888 F.3d 1261, 1267 (D.C. Cir. 2018)).

On the present record, the Court determines that at least one aspect of the IRS’s alleged

Data Policy marks the consummation of the IRS’s decision-making process: the agency has made

a final decision to adopt and implement a policy of disclosing the confidential address information

of tens of thousands of taxpayers to ICE under Section 6103(i)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code,

in reliance on representations from ICE that the addresses are relevant to and will be used for

immigration-related criminal investigations and proceedings, even when ICE identifies only a

38 single ICE employee (or a small number of ICE employees) as the employee(s) “personally and

directly engaged” in each of the tens of thousands of relevant criminal investigations or

proceedings. See Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 30 (arguing that “it is ICE’s responsibility under

the MOU to ensure that the ‘personally and directly engaged’ requirement is satisfied”); Hr’g Tr.,

Dkt. No. 38 at 85:23–25 (counsel for Defendants explaining that “IRS relied on [ICE’s] attestation

that this particular person would be personally and directly involved”). The Court shall refer to

this specific aspect of the IRS’s alleged Data Policy as the “Address-Sharing Policy.” Although

the IRS has not publicly announced this decision as a new policy, an agency does not have to

formally announce a policy in order for that policy to be final agency action. Her Majesty the

Queen in Right of Ontario v. U.S. E.P.A., 912 F.2d 1525, 1531 (D.C. Cir. 1990). And “[a]lthough

the details of the [IRS’s] disclosure policy are still unclear, the record leaves no doubt the [IRS]

has a policy of disclosing confidential information” to ICE in a manner that it has not previously

been disclosed before. Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. E.E.O.C., 530 F.3d 925, 929–30 (D.C.

Cir. 2008).

Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS has developed a “single, unified database of taxpayer

information within the IRS” that will “permit automated access to all IRS taxpayer information by

IRS employees in one interface.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 10. This is just one example of the

IRS’s implementation of the “technical infrastructure necessary for mass data sharing” of the kind

that the IRS undertook when it shared taxpayer address information with ICE on August 7. Id. at

21–22. In addition, Plaintiffs bring factually uncontested claims that the IRS has reached out to

other federal agencies to initiate and encourage the sharing of taxpayer information. The IRS

manifested its newfound capability and willingness to share confidential taxpayer information by

entering into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with ICE to share confidential taxpayer

39 address information. See Pls.’ Mem. Ex. 4, Dkt. No. 30-6. This MOU was executed by the

Treasury Secretary on behalf of the IRS. Id. Furthermore, the administrative record shows that,

pursuant to this MOU, high-level officials in the IRS shepherded ICE through the requirements

for information sharing under the Internal Revenue Code. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_01–110.

Plaintiffs’ factually uncontested allegations show that the IRS spent an unknown amount

of money developing the capability to conduct mass transfers of taxpayer information; entered into

an agreement with ICE to conduct mass transfers of confidential taxpayer address information;

and then completed a mass transfer of confidential taxpayer address information to ICE pursuant

to this agreement, all while removing high-level individuals who disagreed about the disclosure

process. This marks the consummation of the IRS’s decision-making process.

The Court now considers whether the IRS’s new Address-Sharing Policy constitutes

agency action “by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from which legal

consequences will flow.” MediNatura, Inc., 998 F.3d at 938. The D.C. Circuit has explained that,

under this prong, “the finality analysis can look to whether the agency action has a practical effect

on regulated parties, even if it has no formal legal force.” Valero Energy Corp. v. Env’t Prot.

Agency, 927 F.3d 532, 537 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (emphasis in original).

Plaintiffs have established that legal consequences will flow from the IRS’s new policy of

sharing tens of thousands of taxpayers’ address information with ICE for use in immigration-

related criminal investigations based on a representation that a single person is “personally and

directly engaged” in each of those investigations.

This case is similar to Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C. v. E.E.O.C., 530 F.3d 925 (D.C. Cir.

2008), in which the D.C. Circuit held that “[a]dopting a policy of permitting employees to disclose

confidential information without notice is surely a ‘consummation of the agency’s decisionmaking

40 process,’ and ‘one by which [the submitter’s] rights [and the agency’s] obligations have been

determined.’” 530 F.3d at 931. Defendants push back on the analogy to Venetian Casino, arguing

that it is not analogous to this case because it “did not deal with disclosure within the federal

executive branch to a federal law enforcement agency with statutory rights to the information in

question.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 23. But this distinction, while relevant, does not cut the

many cords that connect this case to the holding in Venetian Casino. To start, Plaintiffs’ members

are similarly situated to the plaintiff in Venetian Casino: Plaintiffs’ members voluntarily provided

information to a federal agency—the IRS—with the understanding that the agency would keep the

information confidential, just like the plaintiff in Venetian Casino. See 530 F.3d at 927 (“To assist

the [defendant-agency] with its investigation of the ADEA claims, [plaintiff] supplied the

[defendant-agency] with information that [plaintiff] deemed, and identified as, confidential.”). In

addition, Plaintiffs’ clients and members and the plaintiff in Venetian Casino both faced potential

legal consequences from the agency’s sharing of their confidential information. The disclosure of

Plaintiffs’ members’ confidential information is accompanied by—in fact it must be accompanied

by—the threat that it will be used in a criminal investigation or prosecution. See 26 U.S.C. §

6103(i)(2). Similarly, the disclosure of the Venetian Casino plaintiff’s confidential information

raised the possibility of civil liability. 530 F.3d at 927–29. If the threat that disclosure of

information would lead to civil litigation from a private plaintiff is a sufficient “legal consequence”

to make an agency action “final,” then a guarantee that disclosed information will be used in a

criminal investigation or prosecution must be “final,” too. 10

10 Plaintiffs also allege that a different kind of legal consequence may flow from the sharing of this information: The information could be used—contrary to the Internal Revenue Code—to facilitate “mass deportation” or other civil immigration enforcement actions against Plaintiffs’ members and clients. See Pls.’ Mem. at 41. This possibility reinforces the conclusion that the IRS’s decision to share taxpayer address information with ICE is substantially likely to be final agency action.

41 * * * *

In sum, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the IRS has adopted

a new Data Policy to share confidential taxpayer address information outside the agency, and at

least one aspect of this Data Policy—the Address-Sharing Policy—is substantially likely to

constitute final agency action. The IRS’s apparent investment in the Data Policy, its MOU with

ICE, and the involvement of high-level IRS and Treasury officials all support the conclusion that

the IRS’s decision to share taxpayer address information with ICE under the circumstances at issue

here is the consummation of the IRS’s decision-making process. Furthermore, the fact that the

relevant aspect of the Address-Sharing Policy involves the sharing of information that, by statute,

can only be lawfully used in criminal investigations or proceedings shows that legal rights and

consequences will flow from the IRS’s decision to share this information. 11 For all these reasons,

the Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the IRS’s new Address-Sharing Policy is

final agency action.

b. The Internal Revenue Code does not provide an adequate alternative remedy.

The APA further restricts judicial review to final agency action “for which there is no other

adequate remedy in a court.” 5 U.S.C. § 704 (emphasis added). The “primary thrust” of this

restriction “was to codify the exhaustion requirement.” Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879,

903 (1988). But the restriction “also makes it clear that Congress did not intend the general grant

of review in the APA to duplicate existing procedures for review of agency action.” Id. However,

the fact that Congress “intended to avoid such duplication should not be construed to defeat the

[APA’s] central purpose of providing a broad spectrum of judicial review of agency action.” Id.;

see also id. at 904 (quoting Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955)) (“A restrictive

11 See also supra note 9.

42 interpretation of § 704 would unquestionably, in the words of Justice Black, ‘run counter to § 10

and § 12 of the Administrative Procedure Act. Their purpose was to remove obstacles to judicial

review of agency action under subsequently enacted statutes . . . .’”).

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs are barred from seeking injunctive relief through the APA

because the Internal Revenue Code’s “highly reticulated scheme” of civil damages and criminal

penalties provides them with an adequate alternative remedy. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 23–5.

Defendants identify the following provisions of the Internal Revenue Code in support of their

argument: (i) Section 7431, which authorizes civil damages against the United States for a willful

or negligent violation of Section 6103 but “does not authorize injunctive relief,” Defs.’ Opp’n to

PI, Dkt. No. 31 at 23–4 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7431); (ii) Section 7713A, which authorizes damages,

a fine, and imprisonment for a United States officer or employee that willfully inspects return

information in violation of Section 6103, id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7213A); and (iii) Section 7213,

which authorizes damages, a fine, and imprisonment for a United States officer or employee that

willfully discloses return information in violation of Section 6103, id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 7213).

Defendants conclude that “the civil and criminal remedies discussed above represent the exclusive

recourse for taxpayers aggrieved by the unlawful inspection or disclosure of their return

information.” Defs.’ Opp’n to PI, Dkt. No. 31 at 24.

The Court finds that the Internal Revenue Code does not bar review of Plaintiffs’ claims

under the APA. A fundamental issue with the Defendants argument to the contrary is that, as the

Defendants point out, the Internal Revenue Code does not provide the relief Plaintiffs are seeking

in this case, and Defendants do not explain how ex post penalties are an adequate alternative to ex

ante prohibitions. The Court is “not willing to assume, categorically, that a naked money judgment

against the United States will always be an adequate substitute for prospective relief fashioned in

43 the light of the rather complex ongoing relationship between the parties.” Bowen, 487 U.S. at 905.

It is clear that the injunctive relief that Plaintiffs seek does not duplicate the relief provided by the

Internal Revenue Code. Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code’s provision of civil damages and

criminal penalties does not warrant a finding that the Code prohibits injunctive relief under other

statutes. “The mere fact that some acts are made reviewable should not suffice to support an

implication of exclusion as to others.” Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967),

abrogated on other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977). “The right to review is

too important to be excluded on such slender and indeterminate evidence of legislative intent.” Id.

Accordingly, the Court does not consider relief under the Internal Revenue Code to be an adequate

alternative to relief under the APA under the circumstances presented here.

c. The Privacy Act also does not provide an adequate alternative remedy.

For similar reasons, the Court is not persuaded by Defendants’ argument that Plaintiffs’

APA challenge to the IRS’s broader Data Policy is foreclosed by the availability of alternative

relief under the Privacy Act. 12 See Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 26 at 18–21. Defendants are correct that

injunctive relief under the APA “will rarely be appropriate” to remedy an alleged Privacy Act

violation because the Privacy Act provides for damages remedies and certain kinds of injunctive

relief that are often exclusive of remedies under the APA. See Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of

Indus. Organizations v. Dep’t of Lab., 778 F. Supp. 3d 56, 79–81 (D.D.C. 2025) (JDB). However,

here, Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that Defendants’ actions present the “rare case” in which an

APA injunction is necessary to prevent imminent harm that cannot be remedied through the limited

forms of injunctive relief available under the Privacy Act. See id. As Plaintiffs correctly note,

retrospective damages remedies and narrow opportunities for individualized injunctive relief are

12 Plaintiffs are not seeking preliminary relief on this aspect of their broader APA claim. See Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 30.

44 “inadequate to address a policy of ongoing data sharing at mass scale” of the kind that Plaintiffs

allege in their Amended Complaint. Pls.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 30, at 22. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have

plausibly alleged that the Privacy Act does not afford an adequate alternative remedy for their

injuries arising from Defendants’ alleged violations of the Privacy Act.

* * * *

In sum, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS has taken final agency action

by adopting and implementing the Address-Sharing Policy: a policy of sharing address information

for tens of thousands of taxpayers with ICE in response to a representation from ICE that a single

ICE employee is (or a small number of ICE employees are) “personally and directly engaged” in

investigating each of those taxpayers for committing immigration-related criminal offenses. The

Court also finds that Plaintiffs do not have another adequate remedy for the harms allegedly caused

by the Address-Sharing Policy. Accordingly, the Court shall determine whether Plaintiffs have

established a likelihood that the IRS’s information sharing with ICE was contrary to law and that

the IRS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the Address-Sharing Policy.

The Court’s ruling on this threshold APA issue leads it to shut the door on Plaintiffs’ claim

for ultra vires review. See Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶¶ 216–23. Ultra vires review of an agency’s

compliance with a statutory requirement is unavailable if “a statutory review scheme provides

aggrieved persons ‘with a meaningful and adequate opportunity for judicial review.’” Nuclear

Regul. Comm’n v. Texas, 605 U.S. 665, 681 (2025) (quoting Board of Governors, FRS v. MCorp

Financial, Inc., 502 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)). In part because of that limitation, ultra vires claims of

the type at issue here—that is, equitable claims alleging that the Government has acted in violation

of a federal statute—are “‘extremely limited’ in scope.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Vought,

149 F.4th 762, 791 (D.C. Cir. 2025) (quoting Griffith v. FLRA, 842 F.2d 487, 493 (D.C. Cir.

45 1988)). Because the Court has determined that the APA provides Plaintiffs with a meaningful and

adequate opportunity for judicial review of the data-sharing practices that Plaintiffs challenge, the

Court shall GRANT Defendants’ [26] Motion to Dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ ultra vires

claim and DISMISS WITHOUT PREJUDICE Count One of Plaintiffs’ [20] Amended

Complaint for failure to state a claim. See Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. No. 26, at 16–18; see also Pls.’ Opp’n,

Dkt. No. 27, at 36 (framing Plaintiffs’ ultra vires claim as a challenge to “a change in IRS data

sharing practices”). However, because Plaintiffs have established that their challenge under the

Internal Revenue Code addresses final agency action that is judicially reviewable under the APA,

and because Plaintiffs’ APA claims based on the Privacy Act substantially mirror their claims

based on the Internal Revenue Code, the Court shall not dismiss Plaintiffs’ APA claims based on

the Internal Revenue Code and the Privacy Act on these grounds.

2. The Address-Sharing Policy is contrary to the Internal Revenue Code.

Under the APA, a reviewing court must “hold unlawful and set aside agency action . . .

found to be . . . not in accordance with law.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). “Agency action is obviously

‘not in accordance with law’ if it violates some extant federal statute or regulation.” E. Band of

Cherokee Indians v. United States Dep’t of the Interior, 534 F. Supp. 3d 86, 97 (D.D.C. 2021)

(JEB) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)), appeal dismissed, No. 21-5114, 2022 WL 102544 (D.C.

Cir. Jan. 5, 2022). “Courts must exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an

agency has acted within its statutory authority.” Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369,

412 (2024); id. at 395 (explaining that “the role of the reviewing court under the APA is . . . to

independently interpret the statute and effectuate the will of Congress subject to constitutional

limits”).

Plaintiffs argue that the IRS’s Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with ICE and its

August 7 disclosure of return information to ICE are unlawful under Section 6103(i)(2) of the 46 Internal Revenue Code. Dkt. No. 30-1 at 23. Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code

establishes the “general rule” that taxpayer “returns and return information shall be confidential.”

26 U.S.C. § 6103(a) (capitalization altered). This general rule of confidentiality is rooted in the

Tax Reform Act of 1976, which Congress “passed in the wake of Watergate and White House

efforts to harass those on its ‘enemies list’ . . . to protect the privacy of tax return information and

to regulate in minute detail the disclosure of this material.” Lake v. Rubin, 162 F.3d 113, 115 (D.C.

Cir. 1998). But this general rule has its exceptions. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(c)–(o); Cause of Action

v. Internal Revenue Serv., 125 F. Supp. 3d 145, 153 (D.D.C. 2015) (“Subsection (a) sets forth the

general proposition that returns and return information shall be confidential, and subsection (b)

defines the key terms in the statute. The provisions that follow delineate the exceptions to the

confidentiality rule. . .”) (internal citations omitted). The exception at issue here is found in Section

6103(i)(2), which requires the IRS to disclose return information to a requesting federal agency

for use in a nontax criminal matter if certain conditions are met. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2).

The conditions that must be met before the IRS can disclose return information to a federal

agency for use in a nontax criminal matter can be separated into two groups: “personnel

limitations” and “request requirements.” The personnel limitations are found in Section

6103(i)(2)(A), which provides, in relevant part, that

upon receipt by the Secretary of a request which meets the requirements of subparagraph (B) from the head of any Federal agency or the Inspector General thereof, . . . the Secretary shall disclose return information (other than taxpayer return information) to officers and employees of such agency who are personally and directly engaged in- (i) preparation for any judicial or administrative proceeding [pertaining to the enforcement of a specifically designated Federal criminal statute (not involving tax administration) to which the United States or such agency is or may be a party], (ii) any investigation which may result in such a proceeding, or (iii) any [Federal grand jury proceeding pertaining to enforcement of such a criminal statute to which the United States or such agency is or may be a party], solely for the use of such officers and employees in such preparation, investigation, or grand jury proceeding.

47 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In short, Section 6103(i)(2)(A) shows that, when

disclosing taxpayer information to other federal agencies for the purposes of a nontax criminal

matter, the IRS must limit its disclosure to officers and employees of the requesting agency who

are “personally and directly engaged in” the relevant nontax criminal matter “solely for the use of

such officers and employees in such [nontax criminal matter].” Id. The above-referenced

“requirements of subparagraph (B)” refer to Section 6103(i)(2)’s request requirements. These are

found in Section 6103(i)(2)(B), which requires that, before the IRS can make a disclosure, it must

ensure that an agency’s request

is in writing and sets forth- (i) the name and address of the taxpayer with respect to whom the requested return information relates; (ii) the taxable period or periods to which such return information relates; (iii) the statutory authority under which the proceeding or investigation described in subparagraph (A) is being conducted; and (iv) the specific reason or reasons why such disclosure is, or may be, relevant to such proceeding or investigation.

Id. § 6103(i)(2)(B).

Plaintiffs raise a variety of arguments as to why the IRS’s August 7 disclosure of taxpayer

address information to ICE was likely unlawful under the personnel limitations and request

requirements of Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). The Court will address these

arguments in turn after providing an overview of the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE.

In April 2025, the IRS entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) with ICE

that “set[] forth the agreement of the parties with respect to ICE’s use of the authority in [Internal

Revenue Code Section] 6103(i)(2) for the submission of requests for addresses” to the IRS. Mem.

of Understanding, Dkt. No. 30-6 ¶ 1.e. On June 27, 2025, the IRS received a Section 6103(i)(2)

request from ICE, pursuant to the terms of the MOU, for “the last known address of approximately

1.28 million individuals.” Walker Decl., Dkt. No. 31-1 ¶ 6. In its request, ICE listed one

48 individual—the Assistant Director of the ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ERO”)

Field Operations—as the “officer[]” or “employee[]” “personally and directly engaged in” the

relevant nontax criminal matter. Defs.’ Response to Court Order, Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 2. The IRS

responded to ICE’s request on August 7, 2025, providing ICE with the last known address for

approximately 47,000 of the 1.28 million individuals requested by ICE. Walker Decl., Dkt. No.

31-1 ¶ 7. The IRS made this disclosure through its preferred file sharing platform “with the

understanding that it would be delivered” to the lone Assistant Director identified by ICE as the

individual personally and directly engaged in the relevant criminal matters. Defs.’ Response to

Court Order, Dkt. No. 40 ¶ 2. However, “[t]he IRS understands that four ICE employees possessed

the necessary permissions to retrieve the [shared information] on [the] Assistant Director[’s]

behalf: two ICE Government Contractor Systems Architects; the ICE Homeland Security

Investigations (“HSI”) Acting Special Assistant to [the identified] Assistant Director []; and an

ICE HSI Criminal Analyst.” Id.

The IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE is in tension with the personnel limitations found in

Section 6103(i)(2)(A). These personnel limitations require, in relevant part, that the IRS disclose

information only to officers and employees of the requesting agency who are “personally and

directly engaged in” the relevant criminal matter, “solely for the use of such officers and

employees” in the relevant criminal matter. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A).

The Internal Revenue Code does not define what is means for an officer or employee to be

“personally and directly engaged” in a criminal matter. But the Court can delineate the outer

bounds of the phrase by looking to its plain meaning and some textual clues. To start, the term

“personally” in the 1976 TRA is best read to require that the officers or employees receiving a

disclosure from the IRS pursuant to Section 6103(i)(2) be themselves working on the specific

49 criminal matter contained in the agency’s request for disclosure, rather than merely supporting

others who are doing so. See Personally, Webster’s New World Dictionary of the American

Language (2d ed. 1972) (defining “personally” to mean “without the help of others; in person”);

see also Webster’s New International Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition,

Unabridged (“Webster’s Second”) (1959) (defining “personal” to mean “[d]one in person, without

the intervention of another; direct from one person to another” and “[c]arried on between

individuals directly”); Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language,

Unabridged (“Webster’s Third”) (1968) (same); Shyvers v. Sec.-First Nat. Bank of Los Angeles,

108 F.2d 611, 612 (9th Cir. 1939) (holding that an “absentee landlord” was not “personally

engaged” in farming under Section 75 of the Bankruptcy Act). Similarly, the term “directly” is

best read to emphasize that the work being done by the officer or employee should not be merely

tangential to the work of the matter; in other words, an officer or employee is not “directly”

involved in a criminal matter if their only role is to relay taxpayer information to those who are

directly working on the matter. See Directly, Webster’s Second (1959) (defining “directly” to

mean “[i]n a direct way; without anything intervening; personally”); Directly, Webster’s Third

(1968) (defining “directly” to mean “without any intervening agency or instrumentality or

determining influence; without any intermediate step” and “in independent action without any

sharing of authority or responsibility”); Directly, Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968)

(defining “directly” to mean “[i]n a direct way without anything intervening; not by secondary,

but by direct, means”). Finally, the officer or employee must be “engaged” in the criminal matter,

which reinforces the conclusion that the relevant individual must be more than a passive, short-

term contributor. As the edition of Black’s Law Dictionary that was current at the time of the 1976

TRA’s enactment explains, “engage” denotes “more than a single act or single transaction or an

50 occasional participation.” See Engage, Black’s Law Dictionary (Rev. 4th ed. 1968). To “engage”

requires more than to “participate,” which “means simply to take or have a part or share in.” Id.;

see also Martinez Matute v. CNN Constr. Inc., 415 F. Supp. 3d 226, 233 (D.D.C. 2019) (RMC)

(“For an employee to be ‘engaged in commerce’ under the FLSA, he must be directly participating

in the actual movement of persons or things in interstate commerce . . .”) (internal citations

omitted).

Accordingly, the Court determines that, under the plain meaning of the phrase, an officer

or employee “personally and directly engaged” in a criminal matter under Section 6103(i)(2) is

someone working on the substance of the relevant criminal matter who will be able to apply to the

criminal matter the information obtained through the IRS’s disclosure.

This plain-meaning interpretation is supported by the surrounding statutory text. For

instance, Section 6103(i)(2)(A) mandates that the IRS disclose information “solely for the use” of

the “personally and directly engaged” officers and employees who receive the disclosed material.

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A) (emphasis added). In other words, the statute clearly contemplates that

the individuals receiving disclosure from the IRS under Section 6103(i)(2) will then use the

disclosed information in the relevant criminal matter. Furthermore, the statute’s distinction

between the personnel who must submit a request for the requesting agency—the agency’s head

or Inspector General—and the personnel who may receive the IRS’s disclosure resulting from that

request—the officers or employees personally and directly engaged in the criminal matter—shows

that Section 6103(i)(2) does not authorize the IRS to make disclosures to high-level officials whose

only duty is to dole out the disclosed information at a later date. Id. To allow for such disclosure

would risk the IRS disclosing confidential information to another agency before that agency ever

began the criminal investigation or proceeding that must already be underway before the agency

51 can obtain disclosure from the IRS under Section 6103(i)(2). See id. § 6103(i)(2)(B) (providing

that the requesting agency must “set[] forth . . . the statutory authority under which the [criminal]

proceeding or investigation . . . is being conducted”) (emphasis added).

With this interpretation in mind, the Court finds it unlikely that a single individual could

be “personally and directly engaged” in approximately 47,000 criminal matters, let alone 1.28

million of them, as ICE represented to the IRS. See Walker Decl., Dkt. No. 31-1 ¶ 6. Defendants

make two arguments to the contrary, both of which are unavailing. First, Defendants argue that

an individual “could be ‘personally and directly’ engaged in an investigation that starts with a

high-level view of agency data.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 30. As counsel for Defendants

elaborated at the hearing, “one person may very well be able to determine if 47,000 people are

subject to criminal investigation under 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1), 13 because it is simply a matter of

looking at the removal order date and then the current date to determine if 90 days has passed.”

Dkt. No. 38 at 25:8–12. But this argument misses the point. An individual’s ability to take a

“high-level view” of data has nothing to do with their ability to be “personally and directly

engaged” in the investigation of 47,000 criminal matters. 14 And even if one individual can be

personally and directly engaged in 47,000 criminal investigations if those investigations involve

only a “calculation of days,” as Defendants suggest, the Court cannot turn a blind eye to the

13 As the Court will explain in more detail below, 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1) criminalizes remaining in the United States more than 90-days after a final order of removal. 14 Although not raised by the parties, the Court notes that the regulatory regime under Section 6103(i)(2) provides that “return information . . . disclosed to officers and employees” of a federal agency “may be disclosed by such officers and employees to other persons, . . . but only to the extent necessary in connection” with a nontax criminal investigation or proceeding. 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(i)-1(b). “Among those persons to whom returns and return information may be disclosed by officers and employees of [a] . . . Federal agency . . . are . . . (i) Other officers and employees of the [agency], such as clerical personnel (for example, secretaries, stenographers, docket and file room clerks, and mail room employees) and supervisory personnel . . .; (ii) Officers and employees of another Federal agency working under the direction and control of such officers and employees of the . . . Federal agency . . .; and (iii) Court reporters.” 26 C.F.R. § 301.6103(i)-1(b)(2)(i)-(iii). These regulations support the interpretation that the initial individuals who receive the disclosure—the individuals who are personally and directly engaged in the criminal matter—must be individuals who are actively working on the relevant criminal matter.

52 disconnect between Defendants’ hypothetical and the facts of the case. H’rg Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at

82:14. ICE’s June 27 letter to the IRS requested only address information; it made no mention of

dates. Defs.’ Resp. to Order of Court, Dkt. No. 40. Furthermore, if, as Defendants argue, the

relevant “calculation of days” was simply “a matter of looking at the removal order date and then

the current date to determine if 90 days has passed,” Dkt. No. 38 at 25:8–12, then there was no

need for ICE to request confidential taxpayer information from the IRS. ICE already had the data

necessary for this equation: ICE possessed the relevant removal order dates before making its June

27 request to the IRS—as evidenced by the fact that ICE provided those dates to the IRS in its

request—and ICE does not have to request confidential taxpayer information to determine the

current date. See H’rg Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 89:20–90:5.

Defendants fall back on the argument that “it is ICE’s responsibility under the MOU to

ensure that the ‘personally and directly engaged’ requirement is satisfied, and it is neither

unreasonable nor unlawful for the IRS to rely on ICE’s representations in that respect.” Defs.’

Opp’n, Dkt No. 31 at 30 (citing MOU § 6(E)); Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 85:23–25 (counsel for

Defendants explaining that “IRS relied on the attestation that this particular person would be

personally and directly involved”). But Section 6103 is the IRS’s statute to administer, and the

IRS’s conduct must be judged by the statutory standards set out therein. The IRS relied on ICE’s

representation that one individual was “personally and directly engaged in” 1.28 million criminal

matters. As the Court explained above, Plaintiffs have shown that the single individual identified

by ICE could not have been “personally and directly engaged in” 47,000 criminal matters on the

facts of this case. Accordingly, because the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE was likely unlawful,

it was likely unreasonable, too. While the IRS certainly has discretion in making disclosures under

the Internal Revenue Code, that discretion does not extend to violations of the statute. To find

53 otherwise would risk reading the detailed disclosure requirements of Section 6103—requirements

that exist to protect the general confidentiality of taxpayer information—out of the statute. Mercy

Hosp., Inc. v. Azar, 891 F.3d 1062, 1068 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting Antonin Scalia & Bryan A.

Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 176-77 (2012)) (“We presume that

Congress did not ‘include words that have no effect,’ and so we generally ‘avoid a reading that

renders some words altogether redundant.’”).

In addition to the personnel limitations found in Section 6103(i)(2)(A), the IRS must ensure

that an agency’s request “meets” the request requirements of Section 6103(i)(2)(B) before it may

disclose return information pursuant to that request. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A). As a reminder,

an agency’s request meets these requirements if

the request is in writing and sets forth- (i) the name and address of the taxpayer with respect to whom the requested return information relates; (ii) the taxable period or periods to which such return information relates; (iii) the statutory authority under which the proceeding or investigation described in subparagraph (A) is being conducted; and (iv) the specific reason or reasons why such disclosure is, or may be, relevant to such proceeding or investigation.

Id. § 6103(i)(2)(B).

Plaintiffs raise a variety of arguments with respect to the request requirements found in

Section 6103(i)(2)(B). The Court starts with Plaintiffs’ argument that ICE’s June 27 request was

unlawful because it requested only address information. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 24–26.

Plaintiffs identify two statutory hooks to support their argument that requests for address

information alone are unlawful. The first is Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(i), which requires the IRS to

ensure that a requesting agency has provided “the name and address of the taxpayer with respect

to whom the requested return information relates” before disclosing the requested information. 26

U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(i). Clearly, the requesting agency’s provision of an address is more than

just a box to be checked, as the address must be the address “of the taxpayer with respect to whom

54 the requested return information relates.” Id. But the statute is ambiguous as to whether an agency

must provide the IRS with the current address of the taxpayer. One could reasonably read the

statute, as Plaintiffs do, to require that the requesting agency provide a current address, as the

statute refers to the address “of” the taxpayer in the present tense. Id.; see also Pls.’ Mem., Dkt.

No. 30-1 at 25 (emphasis in original) (arguing that the statute does not permit disclosure when an

agency provides “a former address, or a suspected address”). Such a reading would likely make

requests for address information alone unlawful because they would involve requests that provide

either a former address or a suspected address.

Plaintiffs highlight two internal IRS publications in support of their interpretation that

requests for address information only are invalid. First, Plaintiffs highlight Internal Revenue

Manual Section 11.3.28.4, which states that “Requests for addresses only are invalid because IRC

6103(i)(2) requires that the requester provide an address.” IRM § 11.3.28.4, Disclosure of Return

Information (Other Than Taxpayer Return Information) Pursuant to IRC 6103(i)(2), IRS (April

17, 2025), https://perma.cc/C5WU-ADPX at (5). Plaintiffs also highlight the IRS’s Disclosure

and Privacy Law Reference Guide, which provides: “Requests under section 6103(i)(2) seeking

only taxpayers’ addresses do not comply with the section. The section contemplates requests for

return information in addition to taxpayers’ addresses.” IRS Pub. 4639, Disclosure & Privacy Law

Reference Guide, at 5-4 (Oct. 2012 ed.), https://perma.cc/JH2L-QQZP. While these internal

publications do not have the force of law, the “interpretations of those responsible for

implementing” a statute “‘constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts

and litigants may properly resort for guidance’ consistent with the APA.” Loper Bright, 603 U.S.

at 394 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). However, as another court

in this District recently noted, like the statutory language at issue, the meaning of these two

55 publications is not entirely clear. Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, No. 25-cv-0677,

2025 WL 1380420, at *6 (D.D.C. May 12, 2025) (DLF) (explaining that both publications may be

contemplating a request that does not include an address).

The Court finds the statute’s requirement that a requesting agency provide the “address of

the taxpayer” to be genuinely ambiguous as to whether the address provided by the agency must

be the current address of the taxpayer. For now, the Court is satisfied with the fact that the best

interpretation of the statute requires, at the very least, that the IRS confirm that the address

provided by the requesting agency is the “address of the taxpayer,” whether that be the current

address or a former address. Cf. Centro de Trabajadores Unidos, 2025 WL 1380420, at *7 (“As

long as the agency has a name and an address for a taxpayer, it can request address and name

information from the IRS to assist the requesting agency in a criminal investigation or proceeding,

and the IRS must comply.”).

On August 7, the IRS disclosed to ICE the address information of thousands of taxpayers

without first confirming that ICE provided the “address of the taxpayer” in its request, as required

by statute. At the September 5 hearing, counsel for the Defendants explained that, if ICE’s June

27 request to the IRS provided a name and taxpayer identification number for an individual that

“matched up” with the name and taxpayer identification number that the IRS had in its system,

then the IRS disclosed the last known address for that individual without confirming whether the

address ICE provided for that individual matched an address the IRS had in its system. H’rg Tr.,

Dkt. No. 38 at 28:3–4 (“If the name and the taxpayer identification number matched up and an

address was provided, IRS then provided the last known address.”). In other words, only in

“instances in which there was no tax identification number provided” did the “IRS look[] to make

sure that there was an exact match between the address in the system and the one that ICE

56 provided.” 15 Id. at 31:21–24. Those instances were few and far between. As counsel for the IRS

explained, “the number of people with whom the IRS matched using a taxpayer identification

number” rather than address confirmation “was quite high,” with the estimated number being

“around 39,000” of the 47,000 addresses the IRS provided to ICE on August 7. Id. at 29:2–5.

Without confirming that an address provided by ICE matched an address the IRS had in its system,

the IRS had no way of knowing that the address provided was the “address of the taxpayer,” as

required by Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(i). Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established another reason why

the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE was contrary to the Internal Revenue Code.

Plaintiffs’ second argument with respect to the invalidity of requests for address

information alone is connected to Section 6103(i)(5), which permits the IRS to disclose return

information “to locate fugitives from justice.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(5) (the “fugitive exception”).

This fugitive exception provides that, pursuant to a valid court order, “the return of an individual

or return information with respect to such individual shall” be open to “officers and employees of

any Federal agency exclusively for use in locating such individual.” Id § 6103(i)(5)(A). Plaintiffs

argue that Section 6103(i)(5) is the applicable Section here—which means the IRS acted

unlawfully because ICE did not obtain a court order—because statements made by the Trump

Administration and the MOU between ICE and the IRS “make clear that locating individuals

suspected of violating immigration law, not prosecuting them criminally, is the intent of the

disclosures at issue here.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 26.

15 Although the Court does not decide whether the Internal Revenue Code requires the requesting agency to provide the current address of the taxpayer in order to receive disclosure, the Court notes that counsel for the IRS represented that, for disclosures made pursuant to an address match, the IRS made a disclosure even when the address provided by ICE did not match the current address in the IRS’s system. See Hearing Transcript 31:24–32:2 (“. . . IRS can have multiple addresses in its system, and so long as the address matched an address in the system at IRS, then it would have provided the last known address of the individual.”).

57 Plaintiffs’ argument regarding the fugitive exception goes hand-in-hand with their

argument regarding the invalidity of requests for address information alone under Section

6103(i)(2). Without implicating the latter argument, the Court determines that the fugitive

exception found in Section 6103(i)(5) does not provide the only mechanism for using tax records

to locate individuals. As another court in this District has noted, the fugitive exception “serves an

entirely different purpose than Section 6103(i)(2).” Centro de Trabajadores Unidos, 2025 WL

1380420, at *6. The fact that “the fugitive provision authorizes the IRS to release more extensive

tax return information” under the fugitive exception’s “more onerous prerequisites” “does not

preclude the IRS from releasing a taxpayer’s name and address to an agency” under Section

6103(i)(2). Id.

Plaintiffs also attack the general sufficiency of the IRS’s determination that ICE’s June 27

request met the request requirements of Section 6103(i)(2)(B). Plaintiffs argue that, instead of

engaging in a “meaningful review” of ICE’s request to “ensure compliance” with Section

6103(i)(2)(B), the IRS used “an automated process” to make “automated disclosures” in violation

of its “obligations to confirm compliance with Section 6103(i)(2) before transferring data.” Pls.

Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 24. Plaintiffs’ claim is supported by an internal IRS presentation titled,

“DHS-ICE Data Exchange Overview,” that characterizes the IRS’s data sharing with ICE as an

“on demand process to provide last known address information based on the individual’s

information request from ICE.” Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48-4 at TD_136.

The Internal Revenue Code does not explain how the IRS must ensure that a request “meets

the requirements” of Section 6103(i)(2)(B). But the request must be made in writing and set forth

the four categories of information listed in the statute, so there must be some level of review. See

26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2). Nothing in the statute suggests that automated processes are an inherently

58 impermissible method of review. Automated processes could be useful, for instance, in confirming

that a requesting agency has provided “the taxable period or periods to which [the requested] return

information relates,” and they could even be used to shepherd the relevant information from that

period should the rest of the requirements be satisfied. Id. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(ii). However, an

agency’s request for disclosure must also meet certain requirements that do not appear susceptible

to automation. The prime example of such a requirement is found in Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv),

which requires the IRS to determine whether a request sets forth “the specific reason or reasons

why such disclosure is, or may be, relevant to such proceeding or investigation.” Id. §

6103(i)(2)(B)(iv) (emphasis added).

In requiring the IRS to ensure that a request set forth the “specific” reason or reasons why

disclosure is “relevant,” Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv) confers a responsibility on the IRS to engage in

some level of individualized, non-automated review when evaluating agency requests for

disclosure of taxpayer information. At the very least, the IRS must determine whether the “reason

or reasons” provided by a requesting agency are “specific” (as opposed to “general,”

presumably). 16 The Court does not have to define the contours of the term “specific” to conclude

that it requires the use of human judgment. However, it appears that, at least with respect to the

requirement in Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv), the IRS made a non-automated determination that ICE

provided a sufficiently “specific reason or reasons” in its June 27 request. See, e.g., H’rg Tr., Dkt.

No. 38 at 97:14–18 (explaining why the IRS determined that ICE provided sufficiently “specific”

reasons). Accordingly, remaining for the Court to consider is whether the IRS’s determination

was unlawful.

16 This provision could also be read to task the IRS with determining whether an agency’s proffered reason or reasons are adequately “relevant,” as well. Given that the Court does not know the details of how the IRS processed ICE’s June 27 request, it does not find it necessary to answer this interpretive question.

59 In its June 27 request to the IRS, ICE represented that it sought the disclosure of address

information pursuant to its authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1), which criminalizes staying in

the country 90 days past a final order of removal. See Dkt. No. 40-1; see also Dkt. No. 38 at 16:8–

9. ICE further represented that the “specific reason” why disclosure of address information was

“relevant to such proceeding or investigation” was that “the requested information may contain

address information which is potentially at issue with respect to investigating or proving a violation

under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).” ICE’s June 27 Request Letter, Dkt. No. 40-1. In other words, ICE

represented that an individual’s address information was relevant for the “specific reason” that

their address information could “potentially [be] at issue” with respect to an investigation or

proceeding involving whether the individual stayed in the country 90 days past a final order of

removal. The IRS determined that this “specific reason” was sufficient under the statute. See H’rg

Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 90:1–5 (“So taken together, the specific reason is because [ICE is] investigating

for a criminal violation of 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1), and with the additional information of the person-

specific removal order date, we think that easily satisfies subparagraph ([iv]).”); id. at 95:10–13

(“The specific information is that because they are investigating whether the statute has been

violated and the removal order date, that is the specific information provided that satisfies (iv).”).

Again, the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE is in tension with the Internal Revenue Code.

Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv) requires the IRS to determine that a requesting agency has provided a

“specific reason” that justifies the agency’s entitlement to taxpayer information. 26 U.S.C. §

6103(i)(2)(B)(iv). If Congress thought any reason could be provided, then it would have omitted

the term “specific,” as it did elsewhere in Section 6103. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(k)(12) (providing

that qualified tax collection contractors may contact certain taxpayers and disclose to them “the

nature, subject, and reason for the contact”); id. § 6103(p)(4)(A) (providing that any federal agency

60 “shall, as a condition for receiving returns or return information,” establish and maintain “a

permanent system of standardized records with respect to any request, the reason for such request,

and the date of such request”). Given that a requesting agency’s “specific” reason or reasons will

inherently relate to the relevance of the information sought, and given that this determination of

relevance requires some deference to the judgment of the requesting agency, the Court does not

read the specificity requirement of Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv) as a burden for the IRS. But it clearly

requires more than a cursory consideration of the reason or reasons provided by the agency. ICE’s

June 27 request is a generalized one. The “reason” provided by ICE is more circular than specific:

ICE told the IRS that the requested address information was relevant to its investigations or

proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) because the address information was “potentially at issue

with respect to investigating or proving a violation under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1).” ICE’s June 27

Request Letter, Dkt. No. 40-1. Put in generic terms, an agency represented to the IRS that the

“specific reason” why confidential taxpayer information was relevant to an investigation or

proceeding under a criminal statute was because the agency was conducting an investigation or

proceeding under that criminal statute. Such a request does not comport with the requirement that

an agency provide a specific, individualized reason in order to gain access to confidential taxpayer

information.

Defendants argue that the above reason given by ICE is sufficiently specific when viewed

in combination with the dates of the final orders of removal that ICE included in its June 27 request.

See H’rg Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 90:1–5. But it’s not clear why those dates have any bearing on the

specificity of the request. The date of the final order of removal might have been relevant if ICE

had requested dated information in its June 27 request. But ICE’s June 27 letter requested the “last

known address of [1.28 million] individuals” without any limitations on date. ICE’s June 27

61 Request Letter, Dkt. No. 40-1. The administrative record suggests that the IRS ran ICE’s June 27

request for the taxable period of January 2022 until the present. See Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48-3 at

TD_100. But it is not clear whether this date range was chosen by the IRS or ICE. Either way,

Section 6103(i)(2) plainly requires that an agency requesting confidential taxpayer information

submit a written request that sets forth “the taxable period or periods to which such return

information relates.” 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(ii). The IRS disclosed confidential taxpayer

information to ICE despite ICE’s failure to submit a request that met this requirement. Therefore,

the IRS’s disclosure to ICE violated Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2).

Accordingly, the Court finds that the IRS’s August 7 disclosure of confidential taxpayer

address information to ICE violated Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv) because

ICE’s June 27 request failed to provide a specific reason or reasons why the taxpayer information

it requested was relevant to the criminal investigations or proceedings it was conducting. In

addition, the IRS’s August 7 disclosure of confidential taxpayer information to ICE violated

Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(ii) because ICE’s June 27 request failed to provide

“the taxable period or periods” to which its requested taxpayer information related.

* * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS committed multiple violations of Internal

Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2) when it disclosed confidential taxpayer address information to

ICE on August 7, 2025. The IRS’s disclosure of address information for 47,000 taxpayers to a

single individual at ICE violated the requirement in Section 6103(i)(2)(A) that the IRS disclose

taxpayer information only “to officers and employees of [a requesting] agency who are personally

and directly engaged in” a criminal proceeding or investigation. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A).

Furthermore, the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE violated Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(i) because the

62 IRS disclosed thousands of taxpayers addresses to ICE without first confirming that ICE provided

the “address of the taxpayer with respect to whom the requested return information relate[d].” Id.

§ 6103(i)(2)(B)(i). In addition, the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE violated Section

6103(i)(2)(B)(iv) because the IRS disclosed taxpayer information to ICE even though ICE’s

request for disclosure did not adequately set forth the “specific reason or reasons” why taxpayer

address information was relevant to a criminal proceeding or criminal investigation under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1253(a)(1). Id. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(iv). Finally, the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE violated

Section 6103(i)(2)(B)(ii) because ICE’s June 27 request failed to provide “the taxable period or

periods” to which its requested taxpayer information related. Id. § 6103(i)(2)(B)(ii).

3. The adoption of the Address-Sharing Policy was arbitrary and capricious.

The APA requires a reviewing court to hold unlawful and set aside agency action that is

“arbitrary” or “capricious.” 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The APA’s arbitrary-and-capricious standard

requires that agency action be “reasonable and reasonably explained.” Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n

v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021). Accordingly, courts must ensure that an

agency “has acted within a zone of reasonableness and, in particular, has reasonably considered

the relevant issues and reasonably explained [its] decision.” Id. An agency changing an existing

policy must, at the very least, “display awareness that it is changing position” and “show that there

are good reasons for the new policy.” F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 515

(2009) (emphasis in original). Agencies may not “depart from a prior policy sub silentio or simply

disregard rules that are still on the books.” Id. An agency “acts arbitrarily and capriciously when

it abruptly departs from a position it previously held without satisfactorily explaining its reason

for doing so.” Wisconsin Valley Improvement v. FERC, 236 F.3d 738, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2001).

Accordingly, agency action may be arbitrary or capricious if the agency “entirely fail[s] to consider

an important aspect of the problem,” Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of the United States, Inc. 63 v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), or if there is an “[u]nexplained

inconsistency” in agency policy. Nat’l Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Brand X Internet

Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981 (2005)). Furthermore, an agency’s change in policy is arbitrary and

capricious when the agency fails to consider reliance interests engendered by its prior policy. Fox

Television, 556 U.S. at 515.

In determining whether agency action is arbitrary and capricious, the Court’s “review must

‘be based on the full administrative record that was before the [agency] at the time [it] made its

decision.’” Am. Bioscience, Inc. v. Thompson, 243 F.3d 579, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting

Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971)). The Court may also

consider other records if they are relevant to “a showing of bad faith or improper behavior,”

Oceana, Inc. v. Ross, 920 F.3d 855, 865 (D.C. Cir. 2019), or if further factual development is

necessary “to ascertain the contours of the precise policy at issue,” Venetian Casino Resort, L.L.C.

v. E.E.O.C., 409 F.3d 359, 367 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Hisp. Affs. Project v. Acosta, 901 F.3d 378, 388

(D.C. Cir. 2018).

Plaintiffs claim that the IRS’s implementation of the Data Policy was arbitrary and

capricious because the IRS failed to present a reasoned basis for the Policy, failed to consider key

issues implicated by the Policy, and failed to consider the reliance interests engendered by the

IRS’s prior policy regarding disclosure of confidential taxpayer information. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No.

30-1 at 28–35. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have established a likelihood of success based on

all three grounds.

As discussed above, Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS has adopted and implemented a

new policy—the Address-Sharing Policy—pertaining to the disclosure of confidential taxpayer

information. See supra Section III.B.1.a. The IRS’s new Policy furthers a different set of interests

64 than its prior policy. Whereas the IRS’s prior disclosure policy was rooted in individualized

review, segmentation, and limited, last-resort disclosure, the Address-Sharing Policy—like the

broader Data Policy that the Plaintiffs allege the IRS has adopted—has shifted the IRS’s focus

toward automation, consolidation, and rapid, large-scale disclosure. Pls. Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at

7–14. Pursuant to its new Data Policy, the IRS executed a Memorandum of Understanding

(“MOU”) with ICE that laid out the ground rules regarding future requests from ICE for

confidential taxpayer address information. See Mem. of Understanding, Defs.’ Opp’n Ex. 1, Dkt.

No. 31-1. Shortly thereafter, the IRS processed a request from ICE for the last-known addresses

of approximately 1.2 million taxpayers in a little over a month, ultimately providing ICE with the

last-known addresses of about 47,000 taxpayers. See Walker Decl., Dkt. No. 31-1 ¶¶ 5–8.

The IRS did not provide a “reasoned explanation” for its implementation of the Address-

Sharing Policy. Fox Television, 556 U.S. at 515. In fact, the record before the Court indicates that

the IRS did not even display an awareness that it was changing its position. Id. Typically, this

would mean that the IRS’s implementation of the new Policy was arbitrary and capricious. But

Defendants argue against that conclusion by claiming that, in executing the MOU with ICE and

transferring taxpayer address information to ICE, the IRS acted within the “zone of

reasonableness.” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 31 (citing Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. at

423 (explaining that courts must “simply ensure[] that the agency has acted within a zone of

reasonableness and, in particular, has reasonably considered the relevant issues and reasonably

explained the decision”)).

The Court disagrees with Defendants’ conclusion and framing of the issue. Defendants’

conclusion is premised on the claim that Section 6103(i)(2) required the IRS to make its August 7

disclosure to ICE. See Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 31 (arguing that “it cannot be unreasonable

65 for an agency to do what is required by law”) (emphasis in original). But as the Court has

explained elsewhere, Section 6103(i)(2) did not require the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE, it

prohibited it. See supra Section III.B.2. Furthermore, Defendants’ framing of the issue eliminates

significant portions of the picture. Defendants ignore the fact that the IRS has “historically, as a

matter of both law and policy, not shared taxpayers’ information with immigration authorities for

the purpose of locating individuals suspected to be present in the country illegally.” Koskinen

Decl., Dkt. No. 30-13 ¶ 11. In addition, Defendants fail to address Plaintiffs’ claim that, in April

2025, the same month the IRS entered into the MOU with ICE, the IRS amended its procedures

for reviewing Section 6103(i)(2) requests for taxpayer information. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at

30. These amendments converted a process through which Section 6103(i)(2) requests were

“undertaken carefully” and “handled on a case-by-case basis strictly in accordance with the law”

into a process through which massive requests for confidential taxpayer information could be

processed quickly in bulk without much human interaction. Koskinen Decl., Dkt. No. 30-13 ¶ 12;

Admin R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_80–152. Finally, Defendants’ attempt at characterizing the IRS’s

information sharing with ICE as business-as-usual is undermined by Plaintiffs’ showings

regarding the IRS’s overhaul of its technical infrastructure and belied by the administrative record.

For example, about a week before the IRS made its August 7 disclosure to ICE, the IRS’s Chief

Privacy Officer sent an email explaining that, because of the “unique circumstances of this data

exchange,” it was “unclear if the Commissioner ha[d] been briefed by Chief Counsel or IT” on the

status of ICE’s request for taxpayer information. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_131.

In light of the above, Plaintiffs have shown that, through its implementation of the Address-

Sharing Policy, the IRS unreasonably departed from its prior policy sub silentio. Fox Television,

66 556 U.S. at 515. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood that the IRS acted arbitrarily and

capriciously in implementing the Address-Sharing Policy. Id.

Plaintiffs also argue that the IRS failed to consider key issues in adopting the Address-

Sharing Policy. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 30 (citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. at 43

(explaining that it is arbitrary and capricious for an agency to “fail[] to consider an important aspect

of the problem”)). Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the IRS failed to consider (1) the need to

protect taxpayers’ privacy, (2) the impact on participation and trust in the tax system, and (3) the

harm that could result from disclosures, and in particular mistaken disclosures. Id. On the present

record, there is no question that the IRS failed to consider these issues when adopting the Address-

Sharing Policy, as the record before the Court indicates that the IRS failed to consider any

countervailing issues at all when adopting the new Policy. The Court also finds that these issues

are important issues that the IRS likely should have considered when adopting the Address-Sharing

Policy. Accordingly, Plaintiffs have provided another reason why the IRS’s implementation of

the Address-Sharing Policy was arbitrary and capricious.

Finally, the Court finds that the IRS’s prior policy engendered significant reliance interests

that the IRS failed to consider when adopting the Address-Sharing Policy. Fox Television, 556

U.S. at 515. The IRS’s prior focus on the confidentiality of taxpayer information was a

“cornerstone of the Center’s ability to (1) effectively counsel [its] clients, and (2) provide

education and outreach that encourages participation in the tax system. Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-

8 ¶ 32. Furthermore, the Center has, “for years, assured [its] clients who are worried about

confidentiality of the stringent protection in place at the IRS with respect to the protection of

information.” Id. ¶ 33. Based on these protections, the Center has encouraged undocumented

immigrants to file for ITINs, which may now be used to the detriment of those undocumented

67 immigrants under the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy. Id. ¶ 35. In addition, small business owners

represented by MSA have “relied on reassurances by public officials” and “the Tax Code itself”

to protect their sensitive information for decades. Phetteplace Decl., Dkt. No. 30-9 ¶¶ 16, 6;

Piacsek Decl., Dkt. No. 30-11 ¶ 3. Furthermore, individuals represented by the Plaintiffs have

been submitting their sensitive information to the IRS “with the understanding that in doing so, it

will be protected by the IRS and used only for limited purposes.” Jane Doe Decl., Dkt. No. 30-10

¶ 13; Koskinen Decl., Dkt. No. 30-13 ¶ 11. It was arbitrary and capricious for the IRS to ignore

these significant reliance interests.

* * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the IRS’s implementation of the

Address-Sharing Policy was both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law. The IRS failed to

acknowledge its change in policy and failed to provide a reasoned explanation for its

implementation of the Address-Sharing Policy. Furthermore, in implementing the Address-

Sharing Policy, the IRS failed to consider significant reliance interests that were endangered by its

prior policy. Finally, Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that the Address-Sharing

Policy is contrary to the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. Plaintiffs have therefore

made an adequate showing of likelihood of success on the merits as to the Address-Sharing Policy

to support a preliminary injunction.

For similar reasons, Plaintiffs have also plausibly alleged that the IRS’s broader Data

Policy is both arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law and therefore in violation of the APA.

Accordingly, the Court shall DENY Defendants’ [26] Motion to Dismiss with respect to Count

Two of Plaintiffs’ [20] Amended Complaint, in which Plaintiffs challenge the Data Policy under

68 the APA. Although Plaintiffs have sought a preliminary injunction as to only one aspect of this

broad claim, their allegations are sufficient to permit the claim to proceed.

C. Plaintiffs have made a strong showing of a likelihood of irreparable harm.

To obtain a stay of the Address-Sharing Policy, Plaintiffs must make a sufficient showing

that the Policy will cause them irreparable harm. The “basis of injunctive relief in the federal

courts has always been irreparable harm.” Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England, 454

F.3d 290, 297 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974)). “A movant’s

failure to show any irreparable harm is therefore grounds for refusing to issue a preliminary

injunction, even if the other three factors entering the calculus merit such relief.” Id.

The D.C. Circuit “has set a high standard for irreparable injury,” which must be established

through a two-step inquiry. Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297. First, in order to establish irreparable

harm, a plaintiff must show that they are at risk of an injury that is “both certain and great,” or

“actual and not theoretical.” Id. A plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must “demonstrate that

irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,

555 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (emphasis in original). Second, a plaintiff seeking preliminary relief must

show that they are likely to suffer an injury that would be “beyond remediation” absent preliminary

relief. Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297. Accordingly, the “possibility that adequate compensatory or

other corrective relief will be available at a later date, in the ordinary course of litigation weighs

heavily against a claim of irreparable harm.” Va. Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v. FPC, 259 F.2d 921,

925 (D.C. Cir. 1958).

1. Plaintiff Center for Taxpayer Rights has shown a likelihood of irreparable harm to core activities in support of its mission.

Plaintiffs have shown that the Center has suffered a concrete injury due to the IRS’s new

Address-Sharing Policy. See supra Section III.A.1. Here, the Court determines that the IRS’s

69 Address-Sharing Policy has caused a “certain and great” injury to the Center’s organizational

interests that would be “beyond remediation” absent a stay of the Policy. Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at

297.

The injury to the Center’s organizational interests caused by the IRS’s Address-Sharing

Policy is both “certain and great.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297. Plaintiffs have introduced

evidence showing that, since public reporting began on the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy,

taxpayers—particularly those whom the Center is statutorily required to engage—have become

less willing to come to the Center’s events, to seek its guidance, or to engage with the Center’s

education and outreach. See Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 27-1 ¶ 8. As a result, the Center has been

forced to expend additional resources to avoid losing its federal funding. Id. ¶¶ 40–46. Plaintiffs

have therefore shown that the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy has caused the Center harm that will

continue to occur absent a stay of the Policy. Wisconsin Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674.

The threatened injury is not a minor harm to the Center. Record evidence makes clear that

“it is very difficult to restore” trust in the tax system. Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 53. If the IRS

continues to transfer confidential taxpayer information to ICE pursuant to the Address-Sharing

Policy, then “trust in the system will further plummet,” creating “insurmountable obstacles” to the

Center’s work. Id. The Center’s harm resulting from this loss of trust is irreparable because it is

“difficult to replace or measure” and one the Center “should not be expected to suffer.” WPIX,

Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275, 285 (2d Cir. 2012). The harm to the Center caused by the Address-

Sharing Policy is also irreparable because it “threaten[s] the existence” of the Center’s pro bono

legal services program and threatens to eliminate the federal funding the Center receives to conduct

its representation and engagement. NACM-New England, Inc. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Credit Mgmt., Inc.,

927 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2019); Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 51. Furthermore, the IRS’s Address-

70 Sharing Policy threatens to erode the goodwill that the Center has cultivated with taxpayers in a

way that cannot be adequately measured at a later date, which is “a prime example of intangible,

irreparable harm.” S. Glazer’s Distributors of Ohio, LLC v. Great Lakes Brewing Co., 860 F.3d

844, 853 (6th Cir. 2017). Finally, absent a stay, the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy will continue

to “impair” the Center’s “ability to provide representation” to taxpayers, which other courts in this

District have found “sufficient to warrant preliminary relief.” Cath. Legal Immigr. Network, Inc.

v. Exec. Off. for Immigr. Rev., No. 21-cv-094, 2021 WL 3609986, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 4, 2021)

(RJL) (collecting cases).

The Center’s injury would also be “beyond remediation” absent a stay. Chaplaincy, 454

F.3d at 297. Without a stay, the Center will continue to lose taxpayer trust, which, as the Court

referenced above, cannot be regained easily. See Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 53. But more

importantly, the Center’s injury is not one that can be adequately remedied through future awards

of damages or other relief. As the Center argues, its “ability to engage [taxpayers] through its

counseling and educational efforts are time sensitive” due to the “strict deadlines” the IRS imposes

upon taxpayers. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 37. Once those deadlines pass, “there can be no do

over and no redress.” Newby, 838 F.3d at 9 (citing League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North

Carolina, 769 F.3d 224, 247 (4th Cir. 2014)). Furthermore, the continuing erosion of taxpayer

trust that would occur if the Address-Sharing Policy were not stayed would not be remediated by

a judicial ruling at a later date, for, as the IRS has noted in the past, if the IRS abused taxpayers’

reasonable expectation of privacy, the “resulting loss of public confidence could seriously impair

the tax system.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 38.

Defendants fail to undercut Plaintiffs’ showing of irreparable harm to the Center’s interests.

Defendants’ primary argument is that the Center has not alleged an adequate harm for Article III

71 standing, let alone irreparable harm. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 34. The Court rejected this

argument elsewhere. See supra Section III.A.1. Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs delayed

bringing their motion for a preliminary injunction, and that this delay undercuts their claim to

irreparable harm. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 35. But, as Plaintiffs point out, it was reasonable

for Plaintiffs to “wait for the facts to ripen before bringing this Motion to the Court.” Pls.’ Reply,

Dkt. No. 34 at 20. Furthermore, Plaintiffs did not delay once those facts had ripened. As Plaintiffs

explain, the IRS “began its mass disclosure of data to ICE on August 7, it was publicly reported

on August 8, and Plaintiffs filed their Motion on August 20.” Id. Defendants also argue that, even

if Plaintiffs have suffered irreparable harm, it is too late to remedy that harm. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt.

No. 31 at 36. But the IRS has the authority to require the return or destruction of taxpayer

information that is being improperly maintained or used. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(p)(4); 26 C.F.R. §

301.6103(p)(7)-1. Furthermore, the Court has the authority to issue prospective relief that prevents

future unlawful disclosures of taxpayer information.

* * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs have shown that the Center’s injuries are “certain and great” and are not

injuries for which “adequate compensatory or other corrective relief will be available at a later

date.” Chaplaincy, 454 F.3d at 297 (quoting Wis. Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674). Accordingly,

Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of irreparable harm to the Center absent a stay.

2. The association Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of irreparable harm to their members.

As the Court explained above, Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy

and August 7 disclosure to ICE presents a future risk of concrete harm analogous to the harm

protected by the torts of intrusion upon seclusion and breach of confidence. See supra Section

III.A.2. Here, the Court determines that this harm is “both certain and great” because there is an

72 imminent risk that Plaintiffs’ members’ confidential address information will be impermissibly

used by ICE for civil immigration enforcement. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at

297. The Court also finds that this harm would be “beyond remediation” absent a stay. Id.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have established that their members face irreparable harm.

Plaintiffs argue that the IRS’s August 7 disclosure of confidential taxpayer information to

ICE “is itself an irreparable injury” to their members because “there is an imminent risk of public

disclosure or impermissible use” of that information. Pls. Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 39. To assess

whether the IRS’s likely unlawful “disclosure of private information amounts to irreparable harm,”

the Court considers “(1) the type of information disclosed and (2) the breadth of disclosure and

use of the information disclosed.” Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Organizations v. Dep’t of

Lab., No. 25-cv-0339, 2025 WL 1783899, at *11 (D.D.C. June 27, 2025) (JDB).

The Court starts with the “type of information disclosed” by the IRS in its August 7

disclosure to ICE. Am. Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 2025 WL 1783899, at

*11. “The type of information disclosed matters because it determines the risk a movant faces

from disclosure: the more sensitive the information, the more its use could further harm the

movant.” Id. The type of information at issue here is Plaintiffs’ members’ confidential address

information, which the IRS disclosed to ICE on August 7.

Congress has determined that the IRS must keep Plaintiffs’ members’ address information

confidential. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(a). Therefore, at a general level, Congress has decided that

the disclosure of this material presents some risk to Plaintiffs’ members. However, the level of

risk that Plaintiffs’ members face from the unlawful disclosure of their confidential address

information depends on whether the risk stems from future public disclosure of future

impermissible use. If the risk stems from future public disclosure, then this type of confidential

73 taxpayer information—address information—does not present the same risk of future harm as

other types of confidential taxpayer information. For instance, if Plaintiffs’ members are relying

on the threat of future public disclosure, then information such as their Social Security numbers,

their income and net worth, and their tax liability would present a higher degree of risk than their

address information, which people generally make public in a variety of ways. However, if there

is an imminent risk that ICE will impermissibly use Plaintiffs’ members’ confidential taxpayer

information for civil immigration enforcement, then the type of information at issue—again,

address information—carries more weight. When it comes to harm stemming from impermissible

civil immigration enforcement such as deportation, no piece of information presents a greater risk

to Plaintiffs’ members’ than address information.

Accordingly, the Court will turn to the risk Plaintiffs’ members’ face from either the future

public disclosure or the future impermissible use of their confidential address information. Am.

Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 2025 WL 1783899, at *11. In general, “courts

find disclosure necessitates a preliminary injunction when there is an imminent risk that

information privately disclosed or obtained illegally will either be impermissibly used or publicly

disclosed.” Id. at *12. Plaintiffs’ argument concerns both public disclosure and impermissible

use. Pls. Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 39.

Regarding the risk of public disclosure, the D.C. Circuit has held that “the individual

interest in protecting the privacy of [] information sought by the government is significantly less

important where the information is collected by the government but not disseminated publicly.”

Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urb. Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 793 (D.C. Cir.

1997). This Court has explained that, while there “is no doubt that public dissemination of

sensitive, private information is an irreparable harm,” courts in this District “have consistently

74 ‘declined to find irreparable injury’ from the disclosure of private information ‘where the

challenged disclosure is not public,’ but instead is to a small number of ‘individuals obligated to

keep [the information] confidential.’” All. for Retired Americans v. Bessent, 770 F. Supp. 3d 79,

108 (D.D.C. 2025) (quoting Univ. of Cal. Student Ass’n v. Carter, No. 25-cv-0354 (RDM), 766

F.Supp.3d 114, 121 (D.D.C. Feb. 17, 2025)). Accordingly, the argument that “private disclosure

of personal information alone amounts to irreparable harm holds no water in this Circuit.” Am.

Fed’n of Lab. & Cong. of Indus. Organizations, 2025 WL 1783899, at *14. Furthermore, if the

government has “enacted reasonable devices to secure the confidentiality” of the information that

has been disclosed, then courts “cannot, without grounds, assume that the devices will prove

insufficient.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at 793.

Plaintiffs have failed to establish irreparable harm on the basis that their members’

confidential address information will be disclosed publicly. The record does not suggest that ICE

will disclose Plaintiffs’ members’ address information to the public. Therefore, Plaintiffs have

failed to show that their members’ confidential address information will not be secured by the

various legal protections that prohibit its public disclosure. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO,

118 F.3d at 793. The Internal Revenue Code establishes criminal and civil penalties for federal

officers and employees who wrongfully disclose confidential taxpayer information. See 26 U.S.C.

§ 7431 (providing civil penalties for wrongful disclosure or inspection); Id. § 7213A (providing

for dismissal or discharge for wrongful disclosure); Id. § 7213 (providing criminal penalties for

wrongful disclosure). Furthermore, the Internal Revenue Code requires that ICE implement a

variety of safeguards to protect the confidentiality of Plaintiffs’ members’ address information.

Id. § 6103(p)(4). These legal protections raise the presumption that Plaintiffs’ members’

confidential address information will neither be intentionally disclosed to the public by ICE nor

75 accidentally disclosed to the public by ICE. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, 118 F.3d at

793. Because Plaintiffs have failed to introduce evidence to rebut this presumption, they have

failed to establish irreparable harm to their members on the basis that their members’ confidential

address information is at risk of future public disclosure.

However, Plaintiffs have introduced sufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that

these legal protections will guard against the future impermissible use of their members’

confidential address information. Plaintiffs argue that there is an imminent risk that their

members’ confidential address information will be impermissibly used by ICE for civil

immigration enforcement (e.g., removal), which would be illegal under Internal Revenue Code

Section 6103(i)(2) and a violation of the MOU. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 39; I.N.S. v. Lopez-

Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1984) (explaining that removal proceedings are civil actions).

Defendants characterize Plaintiffs’ claim as pure speculation and argue that the MOU’s “strict

limitations on the use of information provided under Section 6103(i)(2)” protect against any

impermissible use of Plaintiffs’ members’ address information. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 12–

3. Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs’ claim should be rejected under the “presumption of

regularity,” which “supports the official acts of public officers” and requires that, “in the absence

of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [those officers] have properly discharged

their official duties.” Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps., AFL-CIO, 870 F.2d at 727 (quoting United States

v. Chemical Found., 272 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1926)).

After careful consideration of the record and weighing the various arguments of the parties,

the Court determines that Plaintiffs have shown that the risk of ICE impermissibly using their

members’ address information for civil immigration enforcement “is of such imminence that there

is a ‘clear and present’ need for equitable relief to prevent irreparable harm.” Chaplaincy of Full

76 Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at 297 (citing Wisconsin Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674). While the Internal

Revenue Code and the MOU establish meaningful safeguards to prevent against the misuse of

Plaintiffs’ members’ confidential address information, the Defendants and ICE have exhibited

“material noncompliance with those safeguards.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 41.

At the outset, Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE violated

many of the safeguards contained in Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). See supra Section

III.B.2. These violations indicate a strong likelihood that ICE will impermissibly use Plaintiffs’

members’ confidential address information for civil immigration enforcement. For example, the

IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE violated Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2) because it

relied on ICE’s representation that one individual was “personally and directly engaged in”

approximately 1.28 million criminal investigations or proceedings, approximately 47,000 of which

the IRS provided taxpayer information for. Id. This is not a formalistic violation. Rather, this

violation suggests that ICE was not really conducting the criminal investigations or proceedings

that formed the basis of the IRS’s disclosure of confidential taxpayer information to ICE. In

addition, the IRS’s August 7 disclosure to ICE likely violated Internal Revenue Code Section

6103(i)(2) because ICE did not provide a “specific reason or reasons” why Plaintiffs’ members’

confidential address information was relevant to the approximately 1.28 million criminal

investigations or proceedings ICE claimed it was conducting under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1), which

criminalizes staying in the country 90 days past a final order of removal. See ICE’s Request Letter,

Dkt. No. 40-1; Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 16:8–9. The Court has noted that this was not a high bar

for ICE to meet. See supra Section III.B.2. ICE’s failure to provide any semblance of a specific

reason as to why Plaintiffs’ members’ address information was relevant to the criminal

investigations or proceedings it was conducting lends further support to Plaintiffs’ claim that ICE

77 intends to use Plaintiffs’ members’ address information for civil, rather than criminal,

enforcement.

In addition to the IRS’s statutory violations, the MOU between the IRS and ICE could be

read to suggest that ICE sought taxpayer address information for civil immigration enforcement.

The Introduction to the MOU provides that DHS, acting on behalf of ICE, entered into the MOU

at the direction of Executive Order (“EO”) No. 14161. MOU, Dkt. No. 31-1 § 1.a. (citing

Executive Order (EO) No. 14161, Protecting the United States from Foreign Terrorists and Other

National Security and Public Safety Threats, 90 Fed. Reg. 8451 (Jan. 20, 2025)). The MOU

provides that EO 14161 directed DHS “to take immediate steps to identify, exclude, or remove

aliens illegally present in the United States.” Id. But a directive to “identify, exclude, or remove”

appears to be a directive focused on civil enforcement. Id. Accordingly, the MOU itself appears

to provide that it was formed to further a directive from the President to “take immediate steps” to

further civil immigration enforcement. Id.

Furthermore, the text of EO 14161 strongly suggests that it was implemented to further

civil rather than criminal immigration enforcement. The EO is generally focused on “vigilan[ce]

during the visa-issuance process” and “ensur[ing] that admitted aliens and aliens otherwise already

present in the United States do not bear hostile attitudes toward its citizens, culture, government,

institutions, or founding principles, and do not advocate for, aid, or support designated foreign

terrorists and other threats to our national security.” 90 Fed. Reg. 8451 § 1(a)–(b). The direction

pursuant to which the MOU was purportedly executed appears to come from Section 2 of EO

14161, which is titled, “Enhanced Vetting and Screening Across Agencies.” Id. § 2. Section 2

directs the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Attorney General, the Secretary of

Homeland Security, and the Director of National Intelligence, to “re-establish a uniform baseline

78 for screening and vetting standards and procedures” and “identify[] countries throughout the world

for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a partial or full suspension

on the admission of nationals from those countries . . . [and] how many nationals from those

countries have entered or have been admitted into the United States on or since January 20, 2021.”

Id. § 2(a)–(b). Section 2 further provides that

Whenever information is identified that would support the exclusion or removal of any alien [who is deemed to be a national of a country for which vetting and screening information is so deficient as to warrant a partial or full suspension on the admission of nationals from that country], the Secretary of Homeland Security shall take immediate steps to exclude or remove that alien unless she determines that doing so would inhibit a significant pending investigation or prosecution of the alien for a serious criminal offense or would be contrary to the national security interests of the United States.

Id. § 2(c) (emphasis added). This directive from EO 14161 § 2(c) appears to have been the impetus

for the MOU between the IRS and ICE. The primary directive of EO 14161 § 2(c) is that DHS

“shall take immediate steps to exclude or remove” an individual determined to be a national of a

country with deficient vetting and screening information. Id. This is a civil directive.

Furthermore, EO 14161 § 2(c) provides that this primary, civil directive must be pursued in all

scenarios where doing so would not “inhibit” a “significant” and “pending” investigation or

prosecution for a “serious criminal offense” or be “contrary to the national security interests of the

United States.” Id. Limiting this exclusion to civil actions that would “inhibit” a “pending”

criminal matter suggests that EO 14161 was not calling for the initiation of new criminal

investigations or proceedings. Id. Accordingly, EO 14161 is in tension with the fact that ICE

listed only one individual as being “personally and directly engaged in” the approximately 1.2

million criminal investigations or proceedings at issue in its June 27 request, which, as counsel for

the Defendants alluded to in the September 5 hearing, suggests that those investigations or

proceedings were relatively new. Defs.’ Resp. to Order, Dkt. No. 40; Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at

79 25:8–12 (where counsel for Defendants argued that “one person may very well be able to

determine if 47,000 people are subject to criminal investigation under 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1), because

it is simply a matter of looking at the removal order date and then the current date to determine if

90 days has passed”). Furthermore, EO 14161 excludes civil enforcement only for “significant”

investigations or prosecutions for “serious” serious criminal offenses, or to protect national

security. 90 Fed. Reg. 8451 § 2(c). This suggests that EO 14161 directed DHS to prioritize civil

enforcement over all but the most serious criminal matters. One could reasonably question

whether the MOU and ICE’s subsequent June 27 request adhered to this presidential priority, as

investigations or proceedings under 8 U.S.C. 1253(a)(1) include a wide range of offenses that do

not readily assume a comparable importance to issues of national security.

On top of the violations of Section 6103 and the inferences flowing from the MOU and EO

14161, the history of ICE’s requests for taxpayer information contained in the administrative

record establishes a genuine concern that ICE may use Plaintiffs’ members’ address information

for civil immigration enforcement. The administrative record shows that ICE submitted at least

three requests for taxpayer information between February and June 2025. The first request came

in late February 2025, when ICE’s Acting Director emailed officials at Treasury and the IRS “a

list of approximately 700 thousand criminal illegal aliens who ha[d] standing deportation orders”

and requested that the IRS “provide all possible information” for “each alien” on ICE’s list,

“including but not limited to: (1) known aliases, (2) known home addresses, (3) known employers’

information, (4) known phone numbers, (5) known relatives, (6) known emails, (7) known Bank

Name, (8) known IP information, and (9) SSN or TIN.” Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48-3 at TD_09–10

(“We would like to have this data within two weeks”) (cleaned up). The IRS’s Chief Counsel

concluded that disclosure would have been unlawful given their “understanding [] that ICE’s

80 request [did] not relate to a criminal investigation, because removal proceedings are generally civil

in nature.” Id. at TD_03–4. Just over a month after ICE’s first request, the MOU was executed.

See MOU, Dkt. No. 31-1 (signed on April 7, 2025). ICE’s second request for taxpayer information

came in early June 2025. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_86. This time, ICE requested taxpayer

information for its “full alien population” of over 7 million individuals. Id. After the IRS

prompted ICE to supplement its second request to bring it into compliance with the MOU, ICE

represented to the IRS that it was conducting investigations or proceedings for each of these 7

million individuals under 8 U.S.C. § 1325—which criminalizes improper entry into the United

States—and that the “primary goal” of the request was to “enrich [ICE’s] data with relevant

address data” so that ICE would have “the most recent address that IRS can identify associated

with any of the individuals” included in ICE’s request. Id. at TD_84. ICE also identified a single

Assistant Director as the officer or employee “personally and directly engaged in” these 7 million

investigations or proceedings. Id. The IRS, however, was “again unable to process [ICE’s request]

in accordance with the MOU” because ICE failed to rectify several deficiencies, which included

the failure to provide an attestation that the requested information would only be used for the

relevant criminal proceedings or investigations. Id. at TD_93. The IRS received ICE’s third

request—the request that ultimately led to the disclosure of address information for 47,000

individuals at issue in this case—within a week after the IRS denied ICE’s second request. Id. at

TD_112. ICE’s third request sought taxpayer information for approximately 1.2 million

individuals rather than 7.6 million, and it also represented that ICE was conducting investigations

or proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1)—which criminalizes remaining in the United States

90 days past a final order of removal—rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1325—which, again, criminalizes

improper entry into the United States. Id. at TD_106–16. However, ICE represented that the same

81 Assistant Director was the sole officer or employee “personally and directly engaged in” the

relevant criminal matter for both the second and third request. Compare id. at TD_84 (naming the

Assistant Director for the second request) with Defs.’ Resp. to Order, Dkt. No. 40 at 1–2 (naming

the Assistant Director for the third request).

This recent history of ICE’s requests for taxpayer information provides further evidence in

support of Plaintiffs’ claim that there is an imminent risk that their members’ confidential address

information will be impermissibly used by ICE for civil immigration enforcement. To start, the

administrative record suggests that the IRS denied ICE’s first request for taxpayer information

because it understood that ICE wanted to use the information for civil removal proceedings. See

Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_4 (IRS Chief Counsel concluding that ICE’s request was unlawful

“because removal proceedings are generally civil in nature”). Perhaps sensing that ICE needed

clarification on the protections afforded to taxpayer information, the IRS entered into an April

2025 MOU with ICE that provided ICE with clear guidelines for submitting future requests under

Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). MOU, Dkt. No. 31-1. But ICE’s early-June 2025

request for the taxpayer information of over 7 million individuals—which ICE said represented

“the full alien population”—failed to fulfill most of the MOU’s requirements, suggesting that ICE

was wholly uninterested in abiding by the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code at the time

of its second request for taxpayer information. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_83–93. There is

reason to believe that ICE held the same indifference toward the requirements of Section 6103(i)(2)

when it made the June 27 request for address information at issue in this case. In its June 27

request for the last known address of 1.2 million individuals, ICE represented that each individual

was under criminal investigation for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1253(a)(1) (remaining 90 days past

an order of removal) and that Assistant Director “J.W.” was the lone officer or employee

82 “personally and directly engaged in” each of the 1.2 million investigations. Defs.’ Resp. to Order,

Dkt. No. 40 at 1–2. Compare this to ICE’s early-June request for the last known address of 7.6

million individuals, where ICE represented that each individual was under criminal investigation

for a violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325 (improper entry into U.S.) and that Assistant Director “J.W.”

was the lone officer or employee “personally and directly engaged in” each of the 7.6 million

investigations. Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48 at TD_84. It is unreasonable to think that, in one month,

the same Assistant Director could be “personally and directly engaged” in 7.6 million criminal

matters under one statute and 1.2 million criminal matters under another. Accordingly, this raises

an inference that ICE’s representation that it is conducting criminal investigations under 8 U.S.C.

§ 1253(a)(1) was pretext.

Plaintiffs finally argue that “the White House’s recent conduct” and statements attributable

to the current White House show that there is an imminent risk their members’ data will be

impermissibly used for civil immigration enforcement. Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 41. For

instance, Plaintiffs allege that in February 2025 the White House pressured the IRS to give DOGE

Affiliates broad access to the IRS’s tax systems and datasets. Am. Compl., Dkt. No. 20 ¶ 146.

Plaintiffs also cite public reporting suggesting that multiple members of IRS leadership were

excluded from the Section 6103(i)(2) review process between February and August 2025 because

they pushed back on ICE’s requests for taxpayer information. See, e.g., Pls. Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1

at 42–3 (regarding the “ouster” of the IRS’s then-Commissioner and then-Chief Counsel). As the

Court detailed above, the administrative record supports this claim. In addition, Plaintiffs

emphasize that, when asked about the IRS’s information sharing with ICE, White House

spokesperson Abigail Jackson said that the information sharing was “part of President Trump’s

promise to carry out the mass deportation of criminal illegal aliens—the promise that the American

83 people elected him on and he is committed to fulfilling.” Pls.’ Mem. Ex. 3, Dkt. No. 30-5 at 4.

Defendants do not contest the underlying facts of these claims. Viewed in conjunction with the

rest of the record, Plaintiffs’ factually uncontested allegations regarding the White House’s

engagement with the IRS and its stated reasons for that engagement further support Plaintiffs’

claim that there is an imminent risk their members’ address information will be impermissibly

used for civil immigration enforcement.

To summarize, the Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown “a ‘clear and present’ need for

equitable relief to prevent” the imminent risk that their members’ address information will be

impermissibly used for civil immigration enforcement. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454

F.3d at 297 (citing Wisconsin Gas Co., 758 F.2d at 674). The Court makes this determination

despite the protections contained in the Internal Revenue Code and the MOU because of the IRS’s

violations of the confidentiality protections contained in Section 6103(i)(2); the focus on civil

immigration enforcement referenced in the MOU and elaborated on in EO 14161; the history of

ICE requesting taxpayer information from the IRS for civil enforcement and ICE’s subsequent

indifference toward the requirements of Section 6103(i)(2); and Plaintiffs’ factually uncontested

allegations regarding the White House’s engagement with the IRS and its stated reasons for that

engagement.

Plaintiffs have also shown that this imminent risk of impermissible use presents injuries

that are “beyond remediation” absent a stay. Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches, 454 F.3d at

297. As Plaintiffs argue, their members and their members’ families face an “imminent risk of the

kinds of immigration detention-and-removal-related harm that other courts have found warranted

preliminary injunctions to prevent.” Id. (citing Doe v. Noem, No. 3:25-cv-00023, 2025 WL

1399216, at *11 (W.D. Va. May 14, 2025) (risk of removal to a third country); D.B.U. v. Trump,

84 No. 1:25-cv-01163-CNS, 2025 WL 1304288, at *9 (D. Colo. May 6, 2025) (risk of summary

removal without due process); Noem v. Abrego Garcia, No. 24A949, 2025 WL 1077101 (April

10, 2025) (actual summary removal without due process)). Furthermore, Plaintiffs have

introduced evidence showing that the risk of immigration detention-and-removal-related harm is

heightened by the additional threat of misidentification. See Phetteplace Decl., Dkt. No. 30-9 ¶ 15

(MSA members fear “mistaken immigration enforcement actions based on misidentification”

because many “live in communities with immigrants, and some of them have similar or identical

names to other people who live near them”); Piacsek Decl., Dkt. No. 30-11 ¶ 9 (same for NFFE

members); Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 75 (“From my time as Taxpayer Advocate, . . . I know

that government databases often fail to properly or consistently record the names of individuals

whose names do not follow Anglo naming conventions.”); Hr’g Tr., Dkt. No. 38 at 42:16–23 (“. .

. many times immigrant families not only have . . . certain conventions in their naming systems

that would lead to misidentification, but in addition, the families often live together. If a family

lived together and a father and a son had identical names and then that son moved and that son is

a U.S. citizen and his name was matched, that’s a significant risk of misidentification.”). Finally,

Plaintiffs have shown that the imminent risk that their members’ address information will be

misused “impedes [their members’] ability to safely participate in the tax system,” which will

cause their members to miss filing deadlines and “forfeit rights or money to which they would

otherwise have been entitled.” Pls.’ Mem., Dkt. No. 30-1 at 43 (citing Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-

8 ¶ 81-89).

* * * *

In sum, Plaintiffs have established that their members face irreparable injury due to the

imminent risk that their confidential address information will be impermissibly used by ICE for

85 civil immigration enforcement. While the Internal Revenue Code and MOU prohibit ICE from

using Plaintiffs’ members’ confidential address information for civil enforcement, Plaintiffs have

introduced evidence that establishes a significant and imminent risk that ICE may not comply with

those prohibitions. If this risk were to materialize, then Plaintiffs’ members would face injuries,

including deportation from the United States, that would be beyond remediation at a later date.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs have shown that their members face irreparable harm.

D. The balance of the equities and the public interest favor granting a stay of the agency action.

Finally, to obtain preliminary relief, Plaintiffs must show that “the balance of equities tips

in [their] favor” and that “an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 20. Because

the Government is the opposing party in this case, these two factors “merge” together. Nken, 556

U.S. at 435. In analyzing these factors, the Court “must carefully balance the equities by weighing

the harm to the moving party and the public if there is no injunction against the harm to the

government and the public if there is.” Hanson v. D.C., 120 F.4th 223, 246 (D.C. Cir. 2024), cert.

denied, 145 S. Ct. 2778 (2025). The Court finds that the balance of equities and the public interest

weigh in favor of granting preliminary relief.

1. Harm to Plaintiffs and the public if a preliminary injunction does not issue.

To start, Plaintiffs’ “extremely high likelihood of success on the merits is a strong indicator

that a preliminary injunction would serve the public interest.” Newby, 838 F.3d at 12. “There is

generally no public interest in the perpetuation of unlawful agency action.” Id. “To the contrary,

there is a substantial public interest ‘in having governmental agencies abide by the federal laws

that govern their existence and operations.’” Id. (quoting Washington v. Reno, 35 F.3d 1093, 1103

(6th Cir. 1994)). Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s August 7 disclosure of confidential taxpayer

information to ICE violated Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). Furthermore, Plaintiffs

86 have shown that the IRS’s implementation of the Address-Sharing Policy was arbitrary and

capricious. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of granting preliminary relief.

In addition, Plaintiffs and their members would likely face substantial, irreparable harm

absent preliminary relief. For example, Plaintiffs have introduced evidence showing that the

Center’s pro bono representation clinic is losing clients because the IRS’s alleged Data Policy,

including the Address-Sharing Policy and information sharing with ICE, has caused “trust in the

tax system [to] plummet.” Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 53. Plaintiffs have also established a

sufficiently likely risk that their members’ confidential address information will be impermissibly

used for civil immigration enforcement. See supra Section III.C.2. If this risk were to materialize,

then Plaintiffs’ members would be subject to grave harm, including, but not limited to, illegal

removal from the United States. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have shown that the risk of this harm has

led many of Plaintiffs’ members to forgo filing for tax benefits to which they are entitled. These

harms weigh in favor of preliminary relief.

The public is harmed as well by the Defendants’ likely unlawful conduct. As the D.C.

Circuit has explained, “[t]he assurance of privacy secured by § 6103 is fundamental to a tax system

that relies upon self-reporting.” Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Fed. Lab. Rels. Auth., 791 F.2d

183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1986). Self-reporting is based on voluntary compliance, and it is “an axiom

of tax administration that taxpayer trust in the system is critical to maintaining and increasing

voluntary compliance.” Olson Decl., Dkt. No. 30-8 ¶ 53. Plaintiffs’ evidence regarding the drop

off in participation among immigrant taxpayers due to the IRS’s new Data Policy shows this

principle in action. But it also reveals a way in which the IRS’s new Data Policy could harm the

American public. Plaintiffs have introduced evidence showing that “undocumented immigrants

contribute significant revenue to the federal tax system—$59.4 billion in 2022 alone.” Pls.’ Mem.,

87 Dkt. No. 30-1 at 31. However, due to a drop-off in compliance stemming from the Data Policy,

the IRS “is expected to lose $12 billion in revenue this year, and more than $313 billion over the

next decade.” Id. at 31–2. This is a significant loss of revenue. Accordingly, while Plaintiffs and

their members face particular immediate harm from the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy, the

American public in general faces long-term harm from their government losing a substantial

amount of revenue.

2. Harm to Defendants and the public if a preliminary injunction does issue.

Defendants argue that the Court should not issue preliminary relief because it would disrupt

the status quo. Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 36. While courts “must be ‘institutionally wary of

granting relief that disrupts, rather than preserves, the status quo,’” the IRS’s recent policy and

practice of sharing taxpayer information with ICE is not the status quo. Hanson, 120 F.4th at 247

(quoting Singh v. Berger, 56 F.4th 88, 95 (D.C. Cir. 2022)). The status quo is “the last uncontested

status which preceded the pending controversy.” Huisha-Huisha v. Mayorkas, 27 F.4th 718, 733

(D.C. Cir. 2022) (quoting District 50, United Mine Workers of America v. International Union,

United Mine Workers of America, 412 F.2d 165, 168 (D.C. Cir. 1969)) (emphasis in original).

“The traditional goal of a preliminary injunction is to preserve that status quo.” Id. (emphasis in

original). Accordingly, this factor does not weigh in favor of the Defendants.

Defendants also argue that a preliminary injunction would harm its interest in effectuating

the law because it would prohibit information sharing “that is required by [Internal Revenue Code]

Section 6103(i)(2).” Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31 at 36–7 (emphasis in original) (adding that harm

is “particularly acute” because Section 6103(i)(2) aids law enforcement). But the IRS is only

required to share information under Section 6103(i)(2) when an agency’s request “meets the

requirements” of the statute. 26 U.S.C. § 6103(i)(2)(A). Plaintiffs have shown that ICE’s request

to the IRS failed to meet those requirements. See supra Section III.B.2. This would be the third 88 known request submitted by ICE in approximately eight months that failed to meet the

requirements of Section 6103(i)(2). See Admin. R., Dkt. No. 48. A temporary prohibition on

information sharing between the IRS and DHS and its component agencies would not only be

warranted given the circumstances, but it would not interfere with the lawful use of Section

6103(i)(2) between the IRS and other agencies.

Finally, Defendants argue that “principles of comity and judicial efficiency weigh against

the exercise of equitable relief” because “the D.C. Circuit will soon decide the same issue” in

Centro de Trabajadores Unidos v. Bessent, No. 25-cv-0677, 2025 WL 1380420 (D.D.C. May 12,

2025) (DLF), appeal docketed, No. 25-5851 (D.C. Cir. May 21, 2025). Defs.’ Opp’n, Dkt. No. 31

at 37. But there are fundamental differences between the issues presented in this case and the

findings made in Centro.

In Centro, the district court found that the text of the MOU between the IRS and ICE was

unlikely to constitute a facial violation of Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). Centro, 2025

WL 1380420 at *5–8. Here, however, the Court has determined that the IRS’s actual information

sharing with ICE on August 7—which occurred approximately three months after the Centro

opinion was issued—was likely unlawful under Section 6103(i)(2). In other words, the court in

Centro analyzed the MOU on its face, while this Court has analyzed the MOU as it was applied.

The court in Centro also found that the MOU on its own did not “constitute[] a reviewable change

in agency action under the APA,” and therefore the plaintiffs could “not show[] a substantial

likelihood of success on their claim that the IRS acted arbitrarily and capriciously by reaching an

agreement with DHS.” Centro, 2025 WL 1380420 at *8. Here, on the other hand, the Court has

determined that the IRS’s broader Address-Sharing Policy—of which the MOU is just a part—

along with the IRS’s completed information sharing with ICE, constitute final agency action that

89 was arbitrary and capricious. In other words, the court in Centro analyzed agency action by

referencing the MOU alone, while the Court here analyzed agency action by referring to a sequence

of conduct engaged in by the IRS, including the final transfer of taxpayer information. Ultimately,

the record in this case—which, unlike Centro, includes the benefit of the administrative record—

presents materially different issues from the “limited record” in Centro. Centro, 2025 WL

1380420 at *2; see also id. at *8 (“At its core, this case presents a narrow legal issue: Does the

Memorandum of Understanding between the IRS and DHS violate the Internal Revenue Code?”).

Accordingly, the ongoing appeal in Centro does not warrant a refusal to provide relief to Plaintiffs.

* * * *

In sum, the Court finds that the balance of equities and the public interest weigh in favor

of issuing preliminary relief. Preliminary relief will vindicate the public interest because Plaintiffs

have shown that the IRS’s Address-Sharing Policy and information sharing with ICE is unlawful.

Furthermore, Plaintiffs, their members, and the American public would face significant harm if

preliminary relief was not granted. Finally, preliminary relief will not unduly burden Defendants’

countervailing interest in vigorous enforcement of criminal statutes because Defendants will retain

the ability to request information from the IRS in strict compliance with the requirements of

Section 6103(i)(2).

E. The appropriate equitable remedy is a stay that enjoins further unlawful data transfers, accompanied by requirements to notify the Court of planned future transfers and to notify ICE of the Court’s holdings.

The Court determines that Plaintiffs are entitled to preliminary relief from the IRS’s

Address-Sharing Policy. Crafting the appropriate preliminary relief from this Policy “is an

exercise of discretion and judgment, often dependent as much on the equities of a given case as

the substance of the legal issues it presents.” Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 582 U.S.

571, 579 (2017). The purpose of preliminary relief “is not to conclusively determine the rights of 90 the parties, but to balance the equities as the litigation moves forward.” Id. (citing University of

Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981)). Therefore, courts must limit preliminary relief to

the wrongful conduct causing the movant’s harm and ensure that such relief is no more

burdensome to the non-moving party than necessary to provide complete redress. Gill v. Whitford,

585 U.S. 48, 68 (2018); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979). Furthermore, complete

relief “is not a guarantee” but rather “the maximum a court can provide.” Trump v. CASA, Inc.,

606 U.S. 831, 854 (2025). A court “need not grant the total relief sought by the applicant but may

mold its decree to meet the exigencies of the particular case.” Int’l Refugee Assistance Project.,

582 U.S. at 579 (quoting 11A C. Wright, A. Miller, & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure

§ 2947 (3d ed. 2013)).

In this case, Plaintiffs have requested that the Court stay the implementation of the IRS’s

alleged new Data Policy. See Pls.’ Proposed Order, Dkt. No. 30-2. For the reasons the Court has

already explained, the Court shall grant this relief in part, staying the aspects of the alleged Data

Policy that the Court has described as the IRS’s “Address-Sharing Policy.” Plaintiffs have also

requested that the Court not only order the IRS to halt all sharing of taxpayer address information

with DHS and its component agencies pursuant to Section 6103(i)(2), but also “inform ICE” that

it “must destroy, or seek and facilitate the destruction of” the information that the IRS has already

shared with it under that provision. Id. The Court shall not grant this relief in full, but instead

shall substitute similar remedies that are better tailored to addressing the precise illegalities and

irreparable injuries that Plaintiffs have established. See CASA, 606 U.S. at 854 (directing lower

courts to “determine whether a narrower injunction” than the injunction a party sought would be

“appropriate” under the circumstances).

91 At the threshold, the Court notes that it cannot order ICE or DHS to take any particular

action with respect to the information received from the IRS on August 7, 2025, because neither

ICE nor DHS is a party to this case. “[T]he Court is ‘powerless to issue an injunction against’

non-parties.” Hamilton v. Transportation Sec. Admin., 240 F. Supp. 3d 203, 205 (D.D.C. 2016)

(EGS) (quoting Citizens Alert Regarding the Env’t v. E.P.A., 259 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2003)

(ESH), aff’d, 102 F. App’x 167 (D.C. Cir. 2004)). Accordingly, the Court focuses its consideration

on the remedies available among the parties to this case.

Upon careful consideration of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludes that the best

way to “balance the equities as the litigation moves forward” is not to enjoin all data transfers from

the IRS to DHS under Section 6103(i)(2), but rather to enjoin only unlawful transfers and require

advance notification to the Court and the Plaintiffs of any transfers that the IRS believes are lawful

and consistent with the relevant statute. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project., 582 U.S. at 579.

Similarly, the Court concludes that the “exigencies of the particular case” do not demand

an order directing the IRS to seek destruction of all copies of information that it transferred to ICE

more than three months ago. See Int’l Refugee Assistance Project., 582 U.S. at 579 (quoting

Wright, Miller, & Kane, supra § 2947). However, the circumstances do warrant an order directing

the Secretary of the Treasury or his designee to convey to ICE the Secretary’s own expectation

that ICE will handle that information consistent with the Court’s holdings and the safeguards that

Congress established in the Internal Revenue Code. See 26 U.S.C. § 6103(p)(4).

* * * *

92 IV. CONCLUSION

The Court determines that Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the IRS has taken final

agency action by changing its policy of strictly protecting confidential taxpayer information and,

in its place, implementing a new Data Policy that prioritizes large-scale inter-agency sharing of

confidential taxpayer information. Plaintiffs have also shown a substantial likelihood that at least

one specific aspect of the Data Policy—the Address-Sharing Policy—is final agency action.

Pursuant to the Data Policy, including the Address-Sharing Policy, the IRS entered into an

agreement with ICE to share confidential taxpayer address information and, on August 7, 2025,

disclosed address information for approximately 47,000 taxpayers to ICE.

Plaintiffs have shown a substantial likelihood that both the IRS’s implementation of the

Address-Sharing Policy and its subsequent sharing of taxpayer information with ICE were

unlawful under the APA. Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s implementation of the Address-

Sharing Policy was arbitrary and capricious because the IRS failed to recognize that it was

departing from its prior policy of strict confidentiality, failed to consider the reliance interests that

were engendered by its prior policy of strict confidentiality, and failed to provide a reasoned

explanation for the new Policy. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have shown that the IRS’s disclosure of

confidential taxpayer address information to ICE was contrary to law because it violated several

provisions of Internal Revenue Code Section 6103(i)(2). For similar reasons, Plaintiffs have

plausibly alleged that the IRS’s broader Data Policy is unlawful under the APA.

The IRS’s unlawful conduct has created a substantial likelihood that Plaintiffs and their

members will suffer irreparable harm. The Center for Taxpayer Rights is experiencing a

significant decline in interest and engagement with its core activities of providing pro bono

services to low-income taxpayers, including immigrant taxpayers—potentially jeopardizing its

federal funding—which it has attempted to mitigate by diverting resources to education and 93 outreach. Plaintiffs' members, meanwhile, face an imminent risk that their confidential address

information will be impermissibly used by ICE for civil immigration enforcement.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court shall GRANT IN PART and DENY IN PART

Defendants' [26] Motion to Dismiss and GRANT Plaintiffs' [30] Motion for Stay or, in the'

Alternative, for a Preliminary Injunction. An appropriate Order accompanies this Memorandum

Opinion.

Dated: November 21, 2025

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTEL y United States District Judge