Center for Food Safety v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers

District Court, W.D. Washington·Decided June 11, 2020·No. 2:17-cv-01209·Unknown

Opinion

WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON SOUND HABITAT, Case No. C16-0950RSL Plaintiff, v. U.S. ARMY CORPS. OF ENGINEERS, et al., Defendants, and TAYLOR SHELLFISH COMPANY, INC., Intervenor - Defendant. _____________________________________ Case No. 17-1209RSL Plaintiff, v. ORDER VACATING NWP 48 IN THE STATE OF WASHINGTON U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, et al., Defendants, and ASSOCIATION, Intervenor - Defendant. On October 10, 2019, the Court, after considering the cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the parties and intervenors in the above-captioned matters as well as the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community’s submission in a related case, C18-0598RSL (Dkt. # 28), found (a) that there is insufficient evidence in the administrative record to support the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ conclusion that the 2017 reissuance of Nationwide Permit (“NWP”) 48 would have minimal individual and cumulative impacts on the aquatic environment for purposes of the Clean Water Act (“CWA”) and (b) that the Corps’ environmental assessment related to NWP 48 did not satisfy the requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”). In issuing NWP 48, the Corps opted to interpret the “similar in nature” requirement of 33 U.S.C. § 1344(e)(1) broadly, with the result that it was virtually impossible to evaluate the impacts of “commercial shellfish aquaculture activities” in a way that captured all of the varying operations in the varying ecosystems throughout the nation. The Court found that the Corps’ promise that its District Engineers would consider the impacts of the permitted activities did not satisfy the agency’s obligation “to thoroughly examine the environmental impacts of permitted activities” before issuing a nationwide permit. Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal. v. Hurst, 604 F. Supp.2d 860, 901- 02 (S.D. W.Va. 2009). The Corps’ issuance of a nationwide permit, at least with respect to activities in the waters of the State of Washington, was found to be arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with NEPA or the CWA. Despite the statutory direction to “set aside agency action” that is found to be “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,” the Court has discretion to leave the unlawful agency action in place while the agency corrects the identified errors or deficiencies. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). The circumstances in which a remand without vacatur is appropriate are “rare,” Humane Soc’y v. Locke, 626 F.3d 1040, 1053 n.7 (9th Cir. 2010), or “limited,” Cal. Communities Against Toxics, v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 688 F.3d 989, 992 (9th ORDER VACATING NWP 48 Cir. 2012). Because the APA creates a “presumption of vacatur” if an agency acts unlawfully, the presumption must be overcome by the party seeking remand without vacatur. Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. U.S. Forest Serv., 907 F.3d 1105, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2018). See also Nw. Envt’l Advocates v. U.S. Envt’l Protection Agency, 2018 WL 6524161, at *3 (D. Ore. Dec. 12, 2018) (“Because vacatur . . . is the ordinary remedy, the Court concludes [that the party opposing vacatur] bears the burden of demonstrating vacatur is inappropriate.”).1 When determining whether to vacate an agency action, the courts in the Ninth Circuit consider (1) the seriousness of an agency’s errors and (2) the “disruptive consequences of an interim change that may itself be changed.” Cal. Communities, 688 F.3d at 992 (quoting Allied- Signal, Inc. v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Comm’n, 988 F.2d 146, 150-51 (D.C. Cir. 1993)). Put differently, courts may decline to vacate agency decisions when vacatur would cause serious and irremediable harms that significantly outweigh the magnitude of the agency’s error. . . . Courts have considered remand without vacatur to be appropriate where serious irreparable environmental injury would result from vacatur. . . . In addition to environmental harm, it is appropriate to consider other practical concerns when weighing the consequences of vacatur. Cal Communities, 688 F.3d at 993-94 (considering delay to “much needed power plant,” possibly resulting in blackouts, to be a “severe” consequence of vacatur that may be considered in balance). AquAlliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 312 F. Supp. 3d 878, 881 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). In the context of environmental regulation, the Ninth 1 At oral argument, the Army Corps of Engineers argued that vacatur was inappropriate because plaintiffs had not established that each and every commercial shellfish operation authorized by NWP 48 caused them injury. Because the agency’s action was unlawful, vacatur is the “ordinary result.” Empire Health Found. v. Azar, __ F.3d __, 2020 WL 2123363, *10 (9th Cir. May 5, 2020). “Other courts routinely have vacated invalid agency actions of broad applicability without requiring plaintiffs to show harms stemming from each unlawful application.” N. Plains Res. Council v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, No. 4:19-cv-0044-GF-BMM (D. Mont. May 11, 2020). The Corps’ argument is rejected. ORDER VACATING NWP 48 Circuit considers (a) whether vacating the invalid rule would risk environmental harm and (b) whether the agency could legitimately adopt the same rule on remand (or whether the flaws were so fundamental that it is unlikely the same rule would result after further analysis). Pollinator Stewardship Council v. U.S. E.P.A., 806 F.3d 520, 532 (9th Cir. 2015). Courts “leave an invalid rule in place only when equity demands that we do so.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also All. for the Wild Rockies v. United States Forest Serv., 907 F.3d 1105, 1121 (9th Cir. 2018). Having considered the submissions of the parties, amici, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, and Nisbet Oyster Co., Inc., regarding the appropriate remedy for the agency’s unlawful actions and having heard the arguments of counsel, the Court finds as follows: 1. Seriousness of the Agency’s Errors The Corps argues that, although the Court found that it violated the CWA and NEPA by failing to take a hard look at the anticipated environmental impacts of NWP 48, the consequences of its unlawful actions are not serious enough to justify vacatur because no environmental harm will, in fact, occur if activities authorized under 2017 NWP 48 are allowed to continue.2 The Corps maintains that, even if it cannot devolve its obligations under the CWA and NEPA to the District Engineer, the project-by-project verification process that is required in 2 The Corps stopped processing NWP 48 applications in Washington State following entry of the Court’s October 10, 2019, order. All pending and new shellfish aquaculture permit applications are being processed as individual permits. Case No. C16-0950RSL, Dkt. # 63-2 at ¶ 5. Until oral argument, the Corps agreed that “[r]emand with instructions to process new permit applications and modification requests through the individual permit process” was a viable option. Dkt. # 63-1 at 5. ORDER VACATING NWP 48 the State of Washington3 effectively ensures that the aquaculture operations authorized by NWP 48 have minimal environmental impacts. As of October 10, 20

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Center for Food Safety v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, (W.D. Wash. 2020).

Center for Food Safety v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Center for Food Safety v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Humane Society of the United States v. Locke
626 F.3d 1040 (Ninth Circuit, 2010)
Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Hurst
604 F. Supp. 2d 860 (S.D. West Virginia, 2009)
United States v. Douglas
907 F.3d 1 (First Circuit, 2018)
Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Usfs
907 F.3d 1105 (Ninth Circuit, 2018)
Aqualliance v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
312 F. Supp. 3d 878 (E.D. California, 2018)
United States v. Washington
898 F. Supp. 1453 (W.D. Washington, 1995)
United States v. Washington
909 F. Supp. 787 (W.D. Washington, 1995)