Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service

408 F. App'x 64
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 7, 2011
Docket09-17521
StatusUnpublished

This text of 408 F. App'x 64 (Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Center for Biological Diversity v. United States Forest Service, 408 F. App'x 64 (9th Cir. 2011).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM *

The Center for Biological Diversity (“the Center”) appeals the district court’s decision granting the U.S. Forest Service (“Forest Service”) and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s (“FWS”) cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court found that FWS’ “letter of concurrence” regarding the impacts of the Warm Fire Recovery Project on the Mexican spotted owl (“MSO”) and its critical habitat did not violate the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”). The district court also found that the Forest Service did not violate the National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) or the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) in determining that the Warm Fire Recovery Project is not likely to affect the population trend of the sensitive Allen’s lappet-browed bat. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm the district court’s order granting defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.

This Court reviews the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Bader v. N. Line Layers, Inc., 503 F.3d 813, 816 (9th Cir.2007). Judicial review of agency action is governed by the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), and we must set aside an agency’s decision if it is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” Northwest Coalition for Alternatives to Pesticides v. EPA, 544 F.3d 1043, 1047 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)). The arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential, and courts will “uphold a decision of less than ideal clarity if the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. of United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (quoting Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc. 419 U.S. 281, 286, 95 S.Ct. 438, 42 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)).

I. ESA Claim

Section 7 of the ESA requires federal agencies to ensure, through consultation *66 with expert wildlife agencies, that their actions are “not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any endangered species ... or result in the destruction or adverse modification of [critical] habitat of such species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2). If the action agency determines that a proposed project is “not likely to affect” any listed species or critical habitat, and the expert agency issues a written concurrence, so-called “informal” consultation can be terminated. As long as an agency follows proper procedures, it is fully entitled to change its mind during the consultation process, and “federal courts ordinarily are empowered to review only an agency’s final action.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 659, 127 S.Ct. 2518, 168 L.Ed.2d 467 (2007) (emphasis in original).

In this case, a thorough review of the administrative record reveals that FWS satisfied the requirements of ESA. The path to FWS’ final decision can be discerned from the beginning of the consultation process to its letter of concurrence. In the scoping comments that FWS issued on February 7, 2007, it wrote that “[b]ased upon the description of the project area, the threatened Mexican spotted owl ... may occur in the area.” As the consultation continued, however, the Forest Service presented evidence that allowed FWS to “conclude that there is not a resident population” of MSO in the project area. In other words, FWS “ ‘considered the relevant factors and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choices made,’ ” Arrington v. Daniels, 516 F.3d 1106, 1112 (9th Cir.2008) (quoting Ranchers Cattlemen Action Legal Fund v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 415 F.3d 1078, 1093 (9th Cir.2005)). The same is true of FWS’ consideration of the MSO’s critical habitat.

FWS’ concurrence also relied, in part, on the fact that the Forest Service had incorporated design features that “include[d] active management to enhance recovery of MSO habitat.” Between the time of the scoping comments and the letter, the Forest Service had incorporated many of FWS’ suggestions, including design features to protect soils, an increase in the number of large snags that would be retained, and revisions to its final Biological Assessment to address the effects on primary constituent elements. FWS’ letter reflects a holistic assessment of all the recommendations it had made and the extent to which they had been incorporated into the Forest Service’s Biological Assessment.

For all of these reasons, FWS’ decision to concur in the Warm Fire Recovery Project complied with the requirements of ESA.

II. NFMA and NEPA Claims

The NFMA requires that site-specific projects be consistent with the applicable forest plan. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(i). Under the Kaibab Forest Plan, this requires the Forest Service to “document the effect of the selected action on the viability of the population of ... sensitive species,” including the Allen’s lappetbrowed bat. A “viable population” is defined, in turn, “as one that has the estimated numbers and distribution of reproductive individuals to insure [sic] its continued existence and is well distributed in the planning area.”

As the district court emphasized, the Ninth Circuit has held that the Forest Service may rely solely on habitat information in analyzing whether a project maintains species viability. Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 996 (9th Cir.2008), ovenmled, on other grounds by Am. Trucking Ass’ns Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 559 *67 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir.2009). The Forest Service must also “describe the quantity and quality of habitat that is necessary to sustain the viability of the species in question and explain its methodology for measuring this habitat.” Id. at 998 (citations omitted). This approach provides that a showing of sustained habitat operates as a “proxy for the viability of that species.” Id. This Court “will defer to [the] decision to use habitat as a proxy unless the Forest Service makes a ‘clear error of judgment’ that renders its decision arbitrary and capricious.” Id. at 998 (citations omitted).

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408 F. App'x 64, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/center-for-biological-diversity-v-united-states-forest-service-ca9-2011.