MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL J. KELLY, Circuit Judge,
Sitting by Designation.
THIS MATTER comes on for consideration of Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed April 23, 2001 (Doc. 8), and Defendant Secretary Gale A. Norton’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Remedy, filed June 4, 2001 (Doc. 16), and the court, being advised fully in the premises, finds that the plaintiffs motion is well taken and should be granted. The defendant’s motion is denied.
I.
Background
The Center for Biological Diversity (the “Center”) is a non-profit corporation that “is actively involved in species and habitat protection issues throughout North America.” Doc. 1, at 2 (complaint). Some members of the Center live in “the area in New Mexico which serves as habitat for the Sacramento. Mountains checkerspot butterfly.”
Id.
On January 28, 1999, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) received a petition from the Center to list the Sacramento Mountains checkerspot butterfly (Euphydryas anicia [=chalcedona] cloudcrofti) as endangered with critical habitat. 64 Fed.Reg. 72,300, 72,301 (Dec. 27, 1999). On December 27, 1999, the Service concluded that the petition “presented] substantial information that listing ... may be warranted.”
Id.
at 72,302. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B), the Service was required to make a finding whether listing was warranted by January 28, 2000.
Although the Service has prepared a draft, the Service has not yet published a twelve-month finding.
Doc. 17, att. 1, at ¶35. After notifying the Secretary of its intent to sue, Doc. 1, at ¶ 14, the Center filed suit in this
court against Defendant Secretary Norton (the “Secretary”) for declaratory and in-junctive relief.
The Center now moves for summary judgment. The Center argues that the Secretary has violated § 1538(b)(3)(B) and that she should be ordered to issue a twelve-month finding within 30 days. Doc. 8, at 3-4. In her opposition to the Center’s motion, the Secretary argues that the Center has failed to satisfy its burden of establishing standing. Doc. 17, at 9-10. In the alternative, the Secretary concedes that she has violated § 1533(b)(3)(B), but, in a cross motion for partial summary judgment as to remedy, argues that she should have until January 15, 2002 to complete the twelve-month finding.
Id.
at 20-25.
II.
Discussion
A.
Standing
The Secretary asserts that the Center “has not supplied any affidavits or other supporting evidence necessary to meet them burden at the summary judgment stage of establishing standing.”
Id.
at 10. The Center, however, was under no such obligation because the Secretary did not move for summary judgment on the issue of the Center’s standing.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Center bears the burden of proving standing only “[i]n
response
to a summary judgment motion ....”
Id.
(emphasis added). There is no cross motion for summary judgment on standing pending.
B.
Remedy
The Secretary concedes that she has failed to comply with the mandate of § 1533(b)(3)(B). Doc. 17, at 10. Accordingly, the Center is entitled to summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The remaining issue is how soon the Secretary should be required to issue the twelvemonth finding. The Center requests that the Secretary be required to act within 30 days of this court’s order; Doc. 8, at 4; the Secretary requests that she have until January 15, 2002. Doc. 17, at 21.
In
Forest Guardians,
the Tenth Circuit held that it was required to compel then Secretary Babbitt to designate critical habitat for the Rio Grande silvery minnow. 174 F.3d 1178, 1184, 1187 (10th Cir.1999). The court remanded the case to the district court “to order the Secretary to [act]
as soon as possible
....”
Id.
at 1193 (emphasis in original). No consideration was to be given to “the Secretary’s other priorities under the ESA.”
Id.
Accordingly, under
Forest Guardians,
the Secretary must complete the twelve-month finding as soon as possible.
In setting a deadline,
Forest Guardians
forbids our consideration of the Secretary’s budgetary crisis caused by judicially-imposed deadlines in other cases.
174
F.3d at 1193. The Secretary argues that consideration of these deadlines is appropriate in imposing a deadline in this case because, unlike then Secretary Babbitt’s decision not to designate critical habitat in
Forest Guardians,
the Secretary lacks discretion to comply or not comply with the judicially-imposed deadlines. Doc. 17, at 20-21. The court disagrees. The judicially-imposed deadlines in other cases flow from the inadequacy of ESA or NEPA-mandated action or the Secretary’s decision not to take action at all. Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton,
No. CIV 00-1537 (D.N.M. filed April 24, 2001)
; Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District v. Babbitt,
No. CIV 99-870, 872, 1445 (D.N.M. filed Nov. 21, 2000); Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
No. CIV 99-D-1118 (D.Colo. filed April 14, 2000); Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 4
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
108 F.Supp.2d 1209 (D.N.M.2000); Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior,
No. CIV 99-519 (D.N.M. filed March 13, 2000); Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
No. CIV C99-3202-SC (N.D.Cal. filed Feb. 16, 2000); Order,
Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt,
No. CIV 96-2695, 97-777 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 8, 2000). Though one step removed, the deadlines are a product of the Secretary’s discretionary actions.
See e.g.
Order,
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District,
No. CIV 99-870, 872, 1445 at 3 (D.N.M. filed April 25, 2001) (“I see the difficulties which the United States Fish and Wildlife Service now encounters as those of its own making.”).
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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
PAUL J. KELLY, Circuit Judge,
Sitting by Designation.
THIS MATTER comes on for consideration of Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity’s Motion for Summary Judgment filed April 23, 2001 (Doc. 8), and Defendant Secretary Gale A. Norton’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Remedy, filed June 4, 2001 (Doc. 16), and the court, being advised fully in the premises, finds that the plaintiffs motion is well taken and should be granted. The defendant’s motion is denied.
I.
Background
The Center for Biological Diversity (the “Center”) is a non-profit corporation that “is actively involved in species and habitat protection issues throughout North America.” Doc. 1, at 2 (complaint). Some members of the Center live in “the area in New Mexico which serves as habitat for the Sacramento. Mountains checkerspot butterfly.”
Id.
On January 28, 1999, the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (the “Service”) received a petition from the Center to list the Sacramento Mountains checkerspot butterfly (Euphydryas anicia [=chalcedona] cloudcrofti) as endangered with critical habitat. 64 Fed.Reg. 72,300, 72,301 (Dec. 27, 1999). On December 27, 1999, the Service concluded that the petition “presented] substantial information that listing ... may be warranted.”
Id.
at 72,302. Pursuant to 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(B), the Service was required to make a finding whether listing was warranted by January 28, 2000.
Although the Service has prepared a draft, the Service has not yet published a twelve-month finding.
Doc. 17, att. 1, at ¶35. After notifying the Secretary of its intent to sue, Doc. 1, at ¶ 14, the Center filed suit in this
court against Defendant Secretary Norton (the “Secretary”) for declaratory and in-junctive relief.
The Center now moves for summary judgment. The Center argues that the Secretary has violated § 1538(b)(3)(B) and that she should be ordered to issue a twelve-month finding within 30 days. Doc. 8, at 3-4. In her opposition to the Center’s motion, the Secretary argues that the Center has failed to satisfy its burden of establishing standing. Doc. 17, at 9-10. In the alternative, the Secretary concedes that she has violated § 1533(b)(3)(B), but, in a cross motion for partial summary judgment as to remedy, argues that she should have until January 15, 2002 to complete the twelve-month finding.
Id.
at 20-25.
II.
Discussion
A.
Standing
The Secretary asserts that the Center “has not supplied any affidavits or other supporting evidence necessary to meet them burden at the summary judgment stage of establishing standing.”
Id.
at 10. The Center, however, was under no such obligation because the Secretary did not move for summary judgment on the issue of the Center’s standing.
See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992). The Center bears the burden of proving standing only “[i]n
response
to a summary judgment motion ....”
Id.
(emphasis added). There is no cross motion for summary judgment on standing pending.
B.
Remedy
The Secretary concedes that she has failed to comply with the mandate of § 1533(b)(3)(B). Doc. 17, at 10. Accordingly, the Center is entitled to summary judgment. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The remaining issue is how soon the Secretary should be required to issue the twelvemonth finding. The Center requests that the Secretary be required to act within 30 days of this court’s order; Doc. 8, at 4; the Secretary requests that she have until January 15, 2002. Doc. 17, at 21.
In
Forest Guardians,
the Tenth Circuit held that it was required to compel then Secretary Babbitt to designate critical habitat for the Rio Grande silvery minnow. 174 F.3d 1178, 1184, 1187 (10th Cir.1999). The court remanded the case to the district court “to order the Secretary to [act]
as soon as possible
....”
Id.
at 1193 (emphasis in original). No consideration was to be given to “the Secretary’s other priorities under the ESA.”
Id.
Accordingly, under
Forest Guardians,
the Secretary must complete the twelve-month finding as soon as possible.
In setting a deadline,
Forest Guardians
forbids our consideration of the Secretary’s budgetary crisis caused by judicially-imposed deadlines in other cases.
174
F.3d at 1193. The Secretary argues that consideration of these deadlines is appropriate in imposing a deadline in this case because, unlike then Secretary Babbitt’s decision not to designate critical habitat in
Forest Guardians,
the Secretary lacks discretion to comply or not comply with the judicially-imposed deadlines. Doc. 17, at 20-21. The court disagrees. The judicially-imposed deadlines in other cases flow from the inadequacy of ESA or NEPA-mandated action or the Secretary’s decision not to take action at all. Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton,
No. CIV 00-1537 (D.N.M. filed April 24, 2001)
; Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District v. Babbitt,
No. CIV 99-870, 872, 1445 (D.N.M. filed Nov. 21, 2000); Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
No. CIV 99-D-1118 (D.Colo. filed April 14, 2000); Memorandum Opinion and Order, at 4
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
108 F.Supp.2d 1209 (D.N.M.2000); Memorandum Opinion and Order,
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. Dep’t of Interior,
No. CIV 99-519 (D.N.M. filed March 13, 2000); Stipulated Settlement Agreement,
Center for Biological Diversity v. Babbitt,
No. CIV C99-3202-SC (N.D.Cal. filed Feb. 16, 2000); Order,
Defenders of Wildlife v. Babbitt,
No. CIV 96-2695, 97-777 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 8, 2000). Though one step removed, the deadlines are a product of the Secretary’s discretionary actions.
See e.g.
Order,
Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District,
No. CIV 99-870, 872, 1445 at 3 (D.N.M. filed April 25, 2001) (“I see the difficulties which the United States Fish and Wildlife Service now encounters as those of its own making.”). It also bears noting that the Secretary’s financial predicament may be, in part, the product of its own making. In the Effect Statement to the Conference Managers regarding the Fiscal Year 2001 Interior Appropriations Bill, the Department of Interior admitted that “the listing program is not proposed at a level that would allow the Service to meet all of the Act’s requirements and deadlines.” Doc. 17, att. 1, ex. 1, at 2.
The Secretary asserts that it will take approximately three-and-a-half months to complete the twelve-month finding. This estimate is based upon the time necessary for: (1) the Field Office’s completion of a proposed listing rule and critical habitat description; Doc. 17, att. 1, ¶47, (2) the Field Office’s “review [of] the most recent survey information and any new information about the threats faced by the species;”
id.
at ¶ 36, (3) the Regional Office
and Washington Office’s review of the Field Office’s work,
id.,
and (4) an economic analysis for the proposed critical habitat designation. Doc. 17, at 23.
A proposed twelve-month finding was drafted by the Field Office some time in 2000.
Id.,
att. 1, at ¶35. Furthermore, economic analysis for proposed critical habitat is to occur
after
critical habitat designation is proposed. 50 C.F.R. § 424.19 (2001);
see also
Doc. 17, att. 1, at ¶ 81. Therefore, the court finds that time is required only to (1) supplement the already-drafted proposed twelve-month finding with new information on the butterfly and its habitat, and (2) have the twelvemonth finding reviewed. Thirty days is sufficient to accomplish these two tasks. Because a proposed finding has already been drafted, this deadline will not, as the Secretary contends, sacrifice the substance of the twelve-month finding.
The court recognizes that the Secretary is caught in a quandary. Without sufficient funding or a change in the mandatory tasks required by Congress, the Service cannot fulfill the myriad of mandatory listing duties.
Id.,
att. 1, at ¶¶ 6-13. As a result, the Service has violated the ESA on numerous occasions. Lawsuits follow, requiring the Service to spend a greater portion of its already insufficient budget on litigation support,
id.
at ¶¶ 15-17, including the plaintiffs’ attorneys fees and costs in many instances. In fact, the Secretary has allocated all of the fiscal year 2001 fisting budget for Region 2 to compliance with existing court orders and settlement agreements.
Id.
at ¶ 15. More lawsuits will inevitably follow unless Congress recognizes the problem it has created and acts to solve the problem, either by appropriating additional funds, amending the time limits or by giving the Secretary the discretion to prioritize her workload. Until Congress does, tax dollars will be spent not on protecting species, but on fighting losing battle after losing battle in court. The solution to this problem lies not in the courts, but with Congress.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Plaintiff Center’s Motion for Summary Judgment, filed April 23, 2001 (Doc. 8), is granted;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Secretary’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Remedy, filed June 4, 2001 (Doc. 16), is denied;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Secretary shall complete and submit for publication to the Federal Register a twelvemonth finding for the Sacramento Mountains checkerspot butterfly within thirty days of the date of entry of the Judgment for Injunctive Relief and Costs filed contemporaneously with this memorandum opinion and order.