Center for Biological Diversity v. Deb Haaland, et al.

District Court, D. Arizona·Decided March 27, 2026·No. 4:23-cv-00391·Unknown

Opinion

WO

Center for Biological Diversity, No. CV-23-00391-TUC-RCC

Plaintiff, ORDER

v.

Deb Haaland, et al.,

Defendants. In 2013, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) created a Proposed Rule designating 421,423 acres of critical habitat for the northern Mexican gartersnake (“MGS”) and 210,189 acres for the narrow-headed gartersnake (“NHGS”). FWS01911, FWS01913. In 2020, FWS issued a Revised Proposed Rule decreasing the proposed critical habitat acreage for both species. FWS01664, FWS01667. The 2021 Final Rule designated a mere 20,326 acres of critical habitat for the MGS and 23,785 for the NHGS. FWS02336; FWS12644. Plaintiff Center for Biological Diversity’s (“CBD”) Complaint asserts that the final critical habitat designation was arbitrary and capricious in violation of the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”) and Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”). (Doc. 1 at 1–3.)1 The parties bring dueling motions for summary judgment. (Docs. 18, 22.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court denies CBD’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 18) and grants

1 Document citations refer to the documents and page numbers generated by the Court’s Case Management/Electronic Case Filing system. FWS citations refer to the page number from the FWS administrative record. Defendants Deb Haaland (Secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior) and Martha Williams’s (Director of FWS) Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 22). 1.) Summary Judgment “Summary judgment is a particularly appropriate tool for resolving claims challenging agency action.” Defenders of Wildlife v. Salazar, 729 F. Supp. 2d 1207, 1215 (D. Mont. 2010). When the facts are undisputed, upon summary judgment, a court must “determine whether or not as a matter of law the evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Occidental Eng’g Co. v. INS, 753 F.2d 766, 769 (9th Cir. 1985). The Court finds the administrative record establishes the facts necessary for judicial review, and it may render an opinion as a matter of law. Review of agency decisions “is not a determination of whether there is any genuine issue as to any material fact . . . , but rather whether the agency action was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, not in accordance with law, or unsupported by substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole.” Good Samaritan Hosp., Corvallis v. Mathews, 609 F.2d 949, 951 (9th Cir. 1979) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)). Moreover, “[r]eview under the arbitrary and capricious standard is deferential.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 658 (2007). The reviewing court’s “role is simply to ensure that the [agency] made no ‘clear error of judgment’ that would render its action ‘arbitrary and capricious.’” Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 993 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled on other grounds by Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008). A decision is not arbitrary when “‘a rational connection [exists] between facts found and conclusions made’ by the defendant agencies.” Conservation Cong. v. Finley, 774 F.3d 611, 617 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting League of Wilderness Defs./Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Connaughton, 752 F.3d 755, 760 (9th Cir. 2014)). Accordingly, a reviewing court should “not vacate an agency’s decision unless” the agency “has relied on factors which Congress had not intended it to consider,” ignored “an important aspect of the problem,” explained its decision with no support from the evidence available, or the decision “is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.” Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders, 551 U.S. at 658 (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983)). Where the agency has relied on “relevant evidence [such that] a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,” its decision is supported by “substantial evidence.” Bear Lake Watch, Inc. v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 324 F.3d 1071, 1076 (9th Cir. 2003). However, an agency cannot simply “ignore available studies, even if it disagrees with or discredits them.” San Luis & Delta-Mendota Water Auth. v. Locke, 776 F.3d 971, 995 (9th Cir. 2014). 2.) Endangered Species Act and Administrative Procedure Act The ESA, 16 U.S.C. § 1531, et seq., “is a comprehensive scheme with the broad purpose of protecting endangered and threatened species.” Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 698 F.3d 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012); see also 16 U.S.C. § 1531. When enacting the ESA, Congress was primarily concerned with “halt[ing] and revers[ing] the trend toward species extinction, whatever the cost.” Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180 (1978). Yet, the ESA was intended not only “to forestall the extinction of species (i.e., promote a species survival), but to allow a species to recover to the point where it may be delisted.” Gifford Pinchot Task Force v. U.S. Fish & Wildlife Serv., 378 F.3d 1059, 1070 (9th Cir. 2004). To address these concerns, the ESA requires federal agencies to adhere to certain procedural and substantive requirements. Forest Guardians v. Johanns, 450 F.3d 455, 457 (9th Cir. 2006). One duty under the ESA requires that FWS determine a species’ critical habitat concomitant to listing the species as threatened. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(A)(i). Critical habitat is defined as occupied areas where physical or biological features are discovered that are “[e]ssential to the conservation of the species” and that “may require special management considerations or protection;” and may include unoccupied areas if FWS makes “a determination [] that such areas are essential for the conservation of the species.” 16 U.S.C. § 1532(5)(A). The ESA’s citizen suit provision empowers “any person” to “commence a civil suit on his own behalf” against “the Secretary where there is alleged a failure of the Secretary to perform any act or duty under section 1533 . . . .” 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(C). The duties of the Secretary are delegated to FWS under 50 C.F.R. § 402.01(b). Like the EPA, under the APA, a party may challenge FWS’s

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Center for Biological Diversity v. Deb Haaland, et al., (D. Ariz. 2026).

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