Celluloid Corp. v. Libbey Owens Ford Glass Co.

40 F. Supp. 840, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2787
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Ohio
DecidedAugust 28, 1941
DocketNo. 1442
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 40 F. Supp. 840 (Celluloid Corp. v. Libbey Owens Ford Glass Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Ohio primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Celluloid Corp. v. Libbey Owens Ford Glass Co., 40 F. Supp. 840, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2787 (N.D. Ohio 1941).

Opinion

DARR, District Judge.

1. This is a suit under Sections 4919 and 4921 of the Revised Statutes, 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 67, 70, wherein the plaintiff, Celluloid Corporation, a New Jersey corporation, charges infringement of claims 1 and 3 to 7 of United States Letters Patent No. 1,936,-044 granted November 21, 1933 to James F. Walsh, assignor to said Celluloid Corporation (R. 24, plaintiff’s Exhibit 1).

2. Defendant, Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Company, is a corporation under the laws of the State of Ohio, with an office and place of business at Toledo, Ohio within the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division (R. 24).

3. The Walsh patent in suit relates to laminated glass, commonly referred to as safety glass, and more particularly it relates to a product forming the inner or connecting layer between sheets of laminated glass.

4. Prior to Walsh it had generally been the practice to interpose between two glass sheets or plates a hardened sheet of preferably cellulose nitrate with volatile plastifier such as camphor. This hard layer was caused to adhere to the sheets or plates of glass by a gelatin binder. An objection to such laminated glass was due to the hardness of the sheet or layer. The binder was not always able to cause it to adhere uniformly throughout where irregularities existed. Other objections were that changes of temperature and stresses would cause the hard layers to separate from the glass sheets so that upon impact and breakage the glass would splinter and fly.

5. Walsh proposed to overcome these objections and defects in the prior art by providing an inner layer of soft, yieldable, plastic material which would more nearly conform to the irregularities of the adjacent sheets or plates of glass and would thus provide greater and more permanent and complete adhesion than in the case of a hard inner layer. This would prevent the glass from flying when struck by impact, and would absorb part of the impact and distribute it.

6. Patentee accomplishes this by using a large amount of non-volatile plastifier which at ordinary temperatures is a liquid. This does not reduce the flexibility of the layer whereby stresses and changes in temperature of the glass do not result in separation of the layer therefrom, but are compensated for by the yieldability of such inner layer.

[842]*8427. Walsh in making this layer contemplated the use of a cellulose derivative such as cellulose acetate or cellulose nitrate. The plastifier employed is of non-volatile character such as dibutyl phthalate, dimethyl phthalate, dibutyl tartrate, triacetin and phthalic acid esters. However, Walsh expressly recognizes that any appropriate plastifier which is a relatively non-volatile solvent may be employed.

8. Defendant admits that its products exhibits B to G contain a certain cellulose derivative, cellulose acetate, expressly recited in the claims, and that it uses a large proportion of a non-volatile plastifier, but asserts that the plastifier used is dimethyl phthalate. That since this plastifier is not expressly set out in the claims, infringement is avoided. But, if the plastifier used by defendant is the equivalent of those recited in the claims, then infringement is not avoided, within the range specified, by the simple expedient of merely substituting one old and well known plastifier for another. For one thing to be the equivalent of another it must produce the same function in substantially the same way. Again the range of equivalents is determined by the character of advance of the invention in the art, pioneer inventions receiving a much wider range of equivalents than mere improvements. However, every invention has some range of equivalents. Even improvement patents have a range of equivalents, and while the present invention cannot be said to be of the pioneer class in the sense that the one involved in the case of Morley Sewing Machine Co. v. Lancaster, 129 U.S. 263, 9 S.Ct. 299, 32 L.Ed. 715 was, it does represent an important step forward in the art and is entitled to a reasonable range of equivalents.

9. The record shows that dimethyl phthalate and the plastifiers enumerated by Walsh are not identical in characteristics, but indeed few chemicals are. However, that is not the proper test. The rule to be followed is whether it performs the same function in substantially the same way in this particular combination, composition, or process. Dimethyl phthalate was a well known non-volatile plastifier. See publication “Moiters Plastiques Artificielles” by Clemit & Riviers, Exhibit R. When substituted for those plastifiers enumerated in Walsh it gave the product the same advantages and acted in'substantially the same way as those plastifiers in producing a soft inner layer which absorbed and distributed shock, and produced good adhesion. This court is convinced that the substitution by defendant of dimethyl phthalate for the plastifiers enumerated in the claims was nothing more than a mere substitution of- equivalents. That it did not enter into the combination in such a manner as to change the effect or result thereof.

10. Concluding that the plastifier employed by defendant is the full equivalent of that set forth in the claims it next becomes necessary to examine into and determine the effect of the limitation, 50% to 75% of plastifier.

11. Defendant’s products in question are Exhibits B to C, and it .appears that Exhibit B employs 68.4% of dimethyl phthalate which clearly falls within the range of 50% to 75% plastifier set forth in the claims, and being otherwise covered by them is, therefore, clearly an infringement.

12. It is contended, however, that the other Exhibits C to G, inclusive, containing slightly greater amounts of plastifier than that set out in the claims, avoid infringement, and patentee having consented to limit the claims in the prosecution of the application before the Patent Office, is now estopped to contend for a broader construction of them. The rule appears to be that having inserted limitations in a claim to secure its allowance over the prior art, relied upon by the Examiner in the rejection of the claim, the patent holder is estopped to later contend for such a broad construction of the claim as would have the effect of disregarding such limitations and giving it the same scope as the rejected claim.

13. However, a careful examination of the file wrapper of the Walsh patent reveals that after applicant had limited his claims to a plastifier content of at least 50% they were finally rejected by the Examiner. The ground being that applicant was attempting to introduce, new matter in the claims and that they were thus made unpatentable over the prior art. Then pursuant to an interview with the Examiner, an amendment was filed wherein it was pointed out that no new matter had actually been introduced and that the references did not anticipate the claims. In response to an objection regarding the breadth of the claims, applicant amended them to set the upper limit of the plastifier at 75%. It does not appear that the fixing of the upper limit at 75% was nec[843]*843cessitated by the prior art. Nor does it appear that to construe the claims sufficiently broad so as to cover such colorable evasions as Exhibits C to G, inclusive, would have the effect of broadening the claims to their original scope such as is prohibited by the doctrine of estoppel.

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Bluebook (online)
40 F. Supp. 840, 50 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 504, 1941 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2787, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/celluloid-corp-v-libbey-owens-ford-glass-co-ohnd-1941.