Cellco Partnership v. United States

54 Fed. Cl. 260, 2002 U.S. Claims LEXIS 275, 2002 WL 31414700
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedOctober 22, 2002
DocketNo. 02-280C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 54 Fed. Cl. 260 (Cellco Partnership v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cellco Partnership v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 260, 2002 U.S. Claims LEXIS 275, 2002 WL 31414700 (uscfc 2002).

Opinion

OPINION

WILSON, Judge.

This ease is before the Court on defendant’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings on the ground that related cases are pending before the U.S. Supreme Court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. Plaintiff alleges that a contract was created by the FCC’s acceptance of plaintiffs high bid for spectrum licenses and that the FCC materially breached the contract by failing to deliver the licenses in a timely manner. Based on the Court’s “paramount obligation to exercise jurisdiction timely in cases before it,” [261]*261Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States, 124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed.Cir.1997), and because the economic harm to the plaintiff in staying the proceedings outweighs the harm to the defendant if the case progresses, the Court denied the Motion to Stay Proceedings following oral argument and issued an order establishing deadlines for further filings related to plaintiffs pending Motion for Summary Judgment.1 This Memorandum Opinion discusses in more detail the reasons articulated from the bench for denying the Defendant’s Motion for a Stay.

BACKGROUND

In January 2001, plaintiff Célico Partnership, d/b/a Verizon Wireless (Verizon) successfully bid $8.69 billion for reauctioned wireless spectrum licenses and paid the required deposit of approximately $1.7 billion to the FCC. The licenses were originally awarded in 1997 to NextWave Personal Communications Inc. (NextWave) and Urban Communicators PCS Limited Partnership (UrbanCom),2 pursuant to a competitive bidding procedure authorized by 47 U.S.C. § 309(j). Both carriers had difficulty raising the necessary capital to make license installment payments. The FCC gave the carriers a deadline of July 1998 to restructure the payments. NextWave opted not to restructure the payments and declared bankruptcy in June 1998. After extensive litigation in bankruptcy court and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, the FCC determined in January 2000 that NextWave and UrbanCom’s licenses had automatically can-celled as a result of their failure to meet their payment obligations, and initiated reauction proceedings (Auction No. 35).

The FCC’s decision to cancel and subsequently reauction the contested licenses gave rise to two lawsuits relevant to defendant’s Motion to Stay the Proceedings in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. First, NextWave filed a petition for review of the FCC decision to cancel and reauction the licenses in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. The D.C. Circuit reversed the FCC decision to cancel NextWave’s licenses and the FCC returned the licenses to NextWave. The FCC filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in the Supreme Court, which was granted. NextWave Personal Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 254 F.3d 130 (D.C.Cir.2001), cert. granted, 122 S.Ct. 1202 (U.S. Mar. 4, 2002) (No. 01-653). Oral argument took place on October 8, 2002.

The second related matter is plaintiffs appeal of the FCC’s March 27, 2002 Partial Refund Order pending in the D.C. Circuit. Cellco Partnership d/b/a Verizon Wireless v. FCC, D.C.Cir. No. 02-1110 (filed Apr. 8, 2002). Pursuant to the Partial Refund Order, the FCC agreed to refund all but three percent of the net winning bids for the contested licenses, including a refund of $1.4 billion to Verizon. (Order, In the Matter of Requests for Refunds of Down Payments Made in Auction No. 35, 17 FCC Red 6283, 2002 WL 464682 (2002)). However, the FCC declined to reheve Verizon of the “obligation to pay their full bid amounts for licenses won in Auction No. 35.” Id. The FCC’s Partial Refund Order responded to a request filed on January 4, 2002, by plaintiff and others seeking a return of the down payments, and a March 5, 2002 notice of rescission informing the FCC that “to the extent the contract is not already void or voided, and to the extent [plaintiffs] have the right to void the auction contract as to the NextWave licenses, [plaintiffs] elect to void the contract.” (Pl. Opp’n to Def. Mot. to Stay, App. at 089 (Tuller letter)). Oral argument before the D.C. Circuit is scheduled for April 15, 2003.

On September 12, 2002, the FCC filed a Public Notice soliciting public comment on the disposition of the licenses reauctioned [262]*262during Auction No. 35. (Public Notice, Commission Seeks Comment on Disposition of Down Payments and Pending Applications for Licenses Won During Auction No. 85 and Spectrum Formerly Licensed to NextWave Personal Communications Inc., NextWave Power Partners, Inc. and Urban Comm — North Carolina, Inc., WT Dkt. No. 02-276, FCC 02-248, 2002 WL 31039895 (Sept. 12, 2002)). The FCC seeks public comment on two possible options: 1) a full refund with an option to dismiss all pending applications, or 2) a selective opt-out provision for pending applications. Under the first option, the bidder would also be required to release any other claims against the United States and the FCC arising out of Auction No. 35. Id. The FCC also seeks comment on whether bidders who choose to dismiss pending applications should be “barred from participating in the reauetion of the license or otherwise obtaining such licenses for a period of time.” Id. Initial comments were due on October 11, 2002 and reply comments are due on October 21, 2002.

ANALYSIS

The power of this Court to stay proceedings is “incidental to the power inherent in every court to control the disposition of the causes on its docket with economy of time and effort for itself, for counsel, and for litigants.” Landis v. North Am. Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254, 57 S.Ct. 163, 81 L.Ed. 153 (1936). “When and how to stay proceedings is within the sound discretion” of this Court. Cherokee Nation of Okla., 124 F.3d at 1416. Suspension of judicial proceedings may be appropriate to serve the “interest of judicial economy and to avoid duplication of effort and the possibility of inconsistent results.” Cooley v. United States, 219 Ct.Cl. 587, 1979 WL 10170 (1979).

The Court employs a three part test in deciding whether to stay a case. First, a trial court must identify a pressing need for the stay. Second, “[t]he court must balance the interests favoring a stay against interests frustrated by the action.” “Overarching this balancing is the court’s paramount obligation to exercise jurisdiction timely in cases properly before it.” Cherokee Nation of Okla., 124 F.3d at 1416. When a related ease is pending before another court, a trial court may also consider: “(i) principles of comity, with the normal rules favoring the court in which a case is first filed, (ii) judicial economy, focusing, inter alia, on whether a stay is necessary to avoid duplicative litigation, and (iii) the motives of the party seeking the stay, with courts disfavoring stays where the movant is seeking to avoid adverse precedent.” Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 46 Fed.Cl. 29 (2000).

Defendant’s primary argument in support of a stay is the risk of inconsistent • rulings on plaintiffs breach of contract claim.

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54 Fed. Cl. 260, 2002 U.S. Claims LEXIS 275, 2002 WL 31414700, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cellco-partnership-v-united-states-uscfc-2002.