Celina Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner

47 B.T.A. 967
CourtUnited States Board of Tax Appeals
DecidedOctober 30, 1942
DocketDocket No. 109281
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 47 B.T.A. 967 (Celina Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Board of Tax Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Celina Manufacturing Co. v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 967 (bta 1942).

Opinion

[969]*969OPINION.

Hill :

The sole issue of this proceeding is whether or not petitioner is to be allowed a deduction for salaries accrued but not paid in cash within the taxable year or 2½ months thereafter.

[970]*970Respondent disallowed for each taxable year that part of the salaries which petitioner did not so pay in cash. The disallowance was made under the provisions of section 24 (c) of the Revenue Act of 1936 as amended by section 301 of the Revenue Act of 1937, the Revenue Act of 1938, and the Internal Revenue Code.1 He contends that the notes were not payment but merely represented a change in the name of the liability accounts.

The petitioner contends that, since the officers accepted the notes in full payment of the accrued but unpaid salaries, petitioner paid within 2½ months after the close of the taxable years all salaries due.

Petitioner rests its case solely on the contention that section 24 (c) (1) does not apply to the facts here. It makes no claim that 24 (c) (2) or (3) does not apply. From this we may reasonably assume that petitioner acknowledges that section 24 (c) (2) and (3) are applicable. Unquestionably subdivision (3) of such section so applies. The record is silent as to whether the officers of petitioner are on an accrual or cash basis of accounting. We, therefore, resolve the question of whether subdivision (2) of such section is applicable to the facts here against the petitioner and hold that it is so applicable.

We have then for determination only the question whether the issuance and acceptance of the notes here involved constitute payment within the meaning of section 24 (c) (1). On the authority of the principle announced in Helvering v. Price, 309 U. S. 409, and Eckert v. Burnet, 283 U. S. 140, we hold that the issuance and acceptance of the notes here involved do not constitute payment within the meaning of such statute. We hold, further, that subdivisions (1), (2), and (3) of section 24 (c) coexist under the facts of this proceeding and that, therefore, the determination of the respondent herein should in all respects be sustained.

Decision will be entered for the respondent.

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Related

Nock Fire Brick Co. v. Commissioner
4 T.C.M. 432 (U.S. Tax Court, 1945)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
47 B.T.A. 967, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/celina-manufacturing-co-v-commissioner-bta-1942.