Celestine v. People of the Virgin Islands

2024 V.I. 29

• Court: Supreme Court of The Virgin Islands
• Decided: September 16, 2024
• Docket: SCT-Crim-2024-0015
• Status: Published

Opinion

For Publication

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS C QUANJ CELESTINE ) S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Appellant/Defendant ) Re Super (t Crim No S1 2016 CR ) 00195 (STT) v ) ) PEOPLE OF THE VIRGIN ISLANDS ; Appellee/Plaintiff ) )

On Appeal from the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands Division of St Thomas & St John

Considered July 16 2024 Filed September I6 2024

Cite as 2024 V] 29

BEFORE RHYS S HODGE Chief Justice IVE ARLINGTON SWAN Associate Justice, and, HAROLD W L WILLOCKS, Associate Justice

APPEARANCES

David J Cattie, Esq The Cattie Law Firm, P C St Thomas U S V I Attorneyfor Appellant

Sean P Bailey, Esq Assistant Attorney General St Croix U S V I Attorneyfor Appellee

OPINION OF THE COURT

WILLOCKS, Associate Justice

1]] Appellant C’Quan J Celestine (“Celestine”) appeals the Superior Court’s March 14,

2024 Judgment and Commitment, for failing to conduct a full re sentencing hearing upon Celestmet People 2024 V l 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion 01 the Court Page 2 of 12

remand, in violation of this Court’s Opinion and Judgment ' For the reasons that follow we

affirm

I BACKGROUND

112 Afler a trial by jury in May 2017, Celestine was convicted of seven counts, including

attempted murder in the second degree, assault in the first and third degree and unauthorized

possession ofa firearm during the commission ofeach of those crimes Thereafter, the Superior

Court sentenced him to 40 years imprisonment “0n the Habitual Offender Information ”

Judgment and Commitment (People v Celestine ST 2016 CR 00195, Docket No 84), entered

August 17, 2017 2 at 3 The trial court stayed the sentences on the individual charges, but

explained what those sentences would be if imposed Celestine timely appealed both his

convictions and sentence to this Court

113 In the previous appeal (referred to herein as Celestine I), Celestine claimed (1) that his

due process rights were violated during trial and thus that his convictions should be

overturned; (2) that the Superior Court erred in applying the habitual offender sentencing

enhancement, and (3) that based upon this Court’s holding in Titre v People, 70 V I 797 (V 1

2019), his convictions on the “lesser” counts should be vacated

{[4 Upon consideration, this Court affirmed the Superior Court’s sentencing order, but

ordered the case be REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING in accordance with this Court 5

Titre decision ” Judgment (Celestine v People, S Ct Crim No 2017 0066, Docket No 51),

entered June 17, 2020, at 2 (emphasis in original) 3

‘ Celestine v People 73 V 1 500 (V 1 2020)( Celestmc 1’ ) 2 In what appears to be a typographical error this Court 5 opinion and order in Celestine 1 refer to the Superior Court’s “August 9, 2017 judgment and commitment However that original Judgment and Commitment is dated August 17, 2017 3 9 This Court 3 written opmlon In the previous appeal IS recorded at Celestine v People 73 V I 500 (V I 2020), however, the accompanying Judgment was not included Celestine v People 2024 V I 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion 01‘ the Court Page 3 of 12

1[5 The Superior Court convened for such resentencing on March 7, 2024, but it did not

conduct a full sentencing hearing The Superior Court simply vacated Celestine’s convictions

on Counts Three through Seven of the information, inclusive, and imposed sentence on Counts

One and Two as outlined by the trial court, clarified the enhancement of the sentence under

the Habitual Offender statute, and reiterated the other provisions contained in the August 17,

2017, Judgment and Commitment 4

4 The original judgment sentenced Celestine “to a term of imprisonment in the Bureau of Corrections for forty (40) years on the Habitual Offender information,” with the trial judge noting that

with regard to Count One of the June 21 2016 Information Attempted Murder in the Second Degree the imposition of sentence is stayed but were the Court to impose a separate sentence thereon the Court would sentence Defendant to a term of imprisonment in the Bureau of Corrections for twenty five (25) years and with regard to Count Two Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm during the Commission or Attempted Commission of a Crime of Violence Attempted Murder in the Second Degree the imposition of sentence is stayed but were the Court to impose a separate sentence thereon the Court would sentence Defendant to fifieen (15) years with said sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count One and a fine ofTwenty five thousand dollars ($25 000 00)

Judgment and Commitment (People v Celestine ST 2016 CR 00195 Docket No 84), entered August 17, 2017, at 3 The judgment also deemed Counts Three through Seven merged with Count Two and stayed the sentences for those counts In addition, the trial court gave Celestine credit for time served and imposed restitution and court costs

At resentencing, the Superior Court ordered

[t]hat with regard to Count One of the June 21 2016, Information Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, Defendant is sentenced to a term of imprisonment for twenty five (25) years, and with regard to Count Two, Unauthorized Possession of a Firearm during the Commission or Attempted Commission of a Crime of Violence, Attempted Murder in the Second Degree, Defendant is sentenced to fifieen (15) years imprisonment, with said sentence to run consecutive to the sentence imposed on Count One and Defendant shall pay a fine of Twenty five thousand dollars ($25 000 00)

Judgment and Commitment (People v Celestine ST 2016 CR 00195 Docket No 105) entered March 14 2024 at4 Celestine v People 2024 V I 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion of the Court Page 4 of 12

116 Celestine filed his notice of appeal on March 15, 2024, which was amended on March

18, 2024 He seeks to vacate the Superior Court’s Judgment and Commitment and have the

matter “remanded for a full rehearing ” (App’ant Br at I4 ) 5

II JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

117 Title 4, section 32(a) of the Virgin Islands Code vests this Court with “jurisdiction over

all appeals arising from final judgments, final decrees or final orders of the Superior Court or

as otherwise provided by law 4 V I C § 32(a) Because the Superior Court’s March I4, 2024,

order sentencing Celestine disposed of the matters submitted to it upon remand, the order

constitutes a final judgment within the meaning of 4 V l C § 32

118 We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and exercise plenary review

over its legal determinations Thomas v People 63 V I 595 602 03 (V l 20l5) (citing

Simmonds v People 53 V l 549, 555 (V I 2010)) “However, in ruling on the correctness of

discretionary rulings, such as those granting or denying motions to suppress evidence or for

severance, we review only for abuse of discretion ” Ponce v People, 72 V l 828, 833 (V I

2020) (citations omitted)

III DISCUSSION

119 In Celestine I, we found that our holding in Titre v People 70 V I 797 (V I

20l9), applied to ( elestine ° and agreed that the secondary convictions should be vacated ’

it further ordered that “Defendant is sentenced as a Habitual Offender pursuant to 14 VIC § 61, therefore, he shall serve not less than ten (I0) years and his sentence shall not be suspended, nor shall probation be granted neither shall parole or any other form of release be granted for the minimum period of incarceration”, it vacated Counts Three, Four, Five, Six and Seven; and, it gave Celestine the same credit for time served and imposed the same restitution and court costs as the trial judge in the original judgment Id at 4 5 (footnote omitted) l Initially, Celestine contended that the Superior Court’s order also violated [4 V l C § [04 However, he withdrew this portion of this appeal in his reply brief Thus, we do not address that issue herein 6 There, we declared Celestine v People 2024 V I 29 S Ct Crim No 20240015 Opinion of the Court Page 5 of 12

Celestine 73 V | at 51 1 Ourjudgment in ( elestme I ordered the case to be “REMANDED

FOR RESENTENCING in accordance with this Court 5 Titre decision ’ Judgment (Celestine

v People S Ct Crim No 2017 0066 Docket No 51) entered June 17 2020 at 2 (emphasis

in original) Celestine avers that this order required the Superior Court to conduct a hearing as

set forth in V 1 R CRIM P 32 and that the Superior Court erred in failing to do so 7 However,

In Titre v Pe0ple 2019 V1 3 70 V I 797 (V I 2019) this Court examined title 14, section 104 of the Virgin Islands Code, which provides that [a]n acquittal 0r conviction and sentence under any [provision of Virgin Islands law] bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other ” 14 V 1 C § 104 We had previously held that the appropriate remedy under this provision was the “merger and stay” remedy, under which convictions under multiple statutes are ‘merged” and any lesser sentences stayed Williams v People, 56 V 1 821, 834 n 9 (V 1 2012) However, in Tztre we determined that the “merger and stay” remedy “on1y creates confusion and the possibility of more errors at the trial court level which then need to be corrected by this Court,” and that vacatur of any lesser convictions was a more appropriate remedy

Celestine 73 V I at 511 7 Rule 32 0f the Virgin Islands Rules of Criminal Procedure provides, in relevant part

(i) Sentencing

(1) In General At sentencing, the court (A) must verify that the defendant and the defendant's attorney have read and discussed the presentence report and any addendum to the report;

(B) must allow the parties' attorneys to comment on the probation officer's determinations and other matters relating to an appropriate sentence, and

(C) may, for good cause, allow a party to make a new objection at any time before sentence is imposed

(2) Introducing Evidence, Producing a Statement The court may permit the parties to introduce evidence If a witness testifies at sentencing, Rule 26 2 (a) (d) and (0 applies If a party fails to comply with a Rule 26 2 order to produce a witness's statement, the court must not consider that witness's testimony Celestme v People 2024 V I 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion of the Court Page 6 of 12

a review of subparagraph (i) of the rule does not indicate whether the provision applies equally

to resentencing

(3) Court Determinations At sentencing, the court

(A) may accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact,

(B) must for any disputed portion of the presentence report or other controverted matter rule on the dispute or determine that a ruling is unnecessary either because the matter will not affect sentencing or because the court will not consider the matter in sentencing and

(C) must append a copy of the court's determinations under this rule to any copy of the presentence report made available to the Bureau of Corrections

(4) Opportunity to Speak

(A) By a Party Before imposing sentence the court must

(i) provide the defendant's attorney an opportunity to speak on the defendant's behalf, (ii) address the defendant personally in order to permit the defendant to speak or present any information to mitigate the sentence, and

(iii) provide an attorney for the government an opportunity to speak equivalent to that of the defendant's attorney

(B) By a Victim Before imposing sentence, the court must address any victim of the crime who is present at sentencing and must permit the victim to speak or submit any information about the sentence

(C)In Camera Proceedings Upon a party 5 motion and for good cause, the court may hear in camera any statement made under Rule 32(i)(4)

V I R CRIM P 32(i) Celestine v People 2024 V I 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion of the Court Page 7 of 12

1110 Subparagraph (b) of Rule 32 is the only provision which contains the term resentencmg,

however, nothing in this portion of the rule indicates that subparagraph (i) applies to

resentencing It only requires that a resentencing be held “forthwith,” providing “Where a

sentence has been opened and vacated, the defendant shall be re sentenced forthwith except

wherea new trial is granted V] R CRIM P 32(b)(1)

1|] l Celestine argues that the Superior Court violated this Court 5 order requiring

resentencing because it merely vacated the lesser convictions without conducting a full

sentencing hearing as outlined in Rule 320) Celestine maintains that the term resentencmg is

a ‘term of art’ and, by ordering a resentencing, the Court intended the Superior Court ‘to

conductafull sentencing hearing,” as outlined inV I R CRIM P 32 (App ant Br at7 (quoting

J A 68) (internal quotation marks omitted» He further posits that, if vacatur of the lesser

offenses was the sole objective, the Court simply could have ordered the Superior Court to

vacate those convictions like the instructions given in Titre Thus he concludes that by

employing the word resentencmg we meant that the Superior Court hold a comprehensive

sentencing hearing

1|12 In support of his position Celestine relies primarily upon State v Stezmle, 2002 Ohio

2238 2002 WL 973076 (Ohio Ct App 2002) However that case is not analogous to the matter

at bar, and Celestine s reliance thereon is misplaced In Stezmle, the Ohio Court of Appeals

decision is based upon a particular Ohio statute requiring a “sentencing hearing before

resentencing an offender who was convicted of a felony and whose case was remanded

” Ohio Rev Code Ann § 2929 I9 (West) The Virgin Islands has no corresponding statute

Celestine also cites State v Smegal, 444 So 2d “84 (La 1984) But that case is

inapposite as well because the court in Smegal gave specific instructions that the resentencing

be “alter a full hearing and affording defendant opportunity to contravene allegations in [a Celestine v People 2024 V I 29 S Ct Crim No 20240015 Opinion of the Court Page 8 of 12

pretrial services] report ’ 1d at 1184 Likewise, United States v Collem 984 F 2d 1339 (3d

Cir 1992) does not support Celestine’s position In Collem, the United States Court ofAppeals

for the Third Circuit specifically ordered that the “new sentencing hearing be conducted

in full compliance with Rule 32(c)(3)(a), and that the appellant be afforded an adequate

opportunity to present, by appropriate means all pertinent information 1d at 1350 In the

matter at bar, the language that was included in both of those cases is absent from our remand

order

1113 The People counter that Celestine ‘focuses too narrowly on the single use of the word

‘resentencing’ in the Court’s Order while wholly ignoring the context in which that word

is used Indeed, this Court did not merely remand this matter ‘for resentencing’ generally

but specifically for ‘resentencing in accordance wzth Titre App ee Br at 3 (emphasis in

original) We agree The Court’s qualifying phrase “in accordance with this Court 3 Titre

decision ” supports the Superior Court 3 interpretation of the remand order In Titre we

specifically held that “vacatur shall be the remedy in cases in which section 104 is implicated

Titre 70 V I at 809

114 In Celestine I, we explained that in Titre we determined that the ‘merger and stay’

remedy ‘only creates confusion and the possibility of more errors at the trial court level which

then need to be corrected by this Court,’ and that vacatur of any lesser convictions was a more

appropriate remedy ” Celestine, 73 V l at 51 1 We then concluded that in Celestine’s case,

‘Ture applies, and Celestine's lesser convictions should be vacated ’ 1d Thus, the mandate of

our remand order was that Celestine be resentenced by having his lesser convictions vacated 8

3 Since our holding in Titre, we have remanded numerous cases with instructions to vacate convictions of lesser included offenses in accordance therewith See e g Williams v People, S Ct Crim No 2019 0068 2024 V l 27 (V 1 August 16 2024) (remanding with instructions to vacate convictions and sentences pursuant to Titre) Thomas v Gov (ofthe Virgin Islands, Celestine v People 2024 V l 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion of the Court Page 9 of 12

1|15 Moreover, in his prior appeal, Celestine did not take issue with the length or propriety

of the sentences imposed as to Counts 1 and II or the other provisions of the judgment and

commitment nor did this Court’s remand order address those matters 9 In fact the remand

order affirmed the August 17, 2017, judgment and commitment entered by the Superior Court

1H6 In Rawlms v People ofthe Virgin Islands 59 V I 1069 1073 (V I 2013) we adopted

the “rule that ‘[a] defendant does not receive a second chance to support an argument he failed

to support in a first appeal simply because he is resentenced ’ (quoting Untied States v

Stuckey 255 F 3d 528 531 (8th Cir 2001)) As support for that principle we cited United

States v Marmolejo, 139 F 3d 528, 531 (5th Cir 1998), where the court stated ‘This case was

remanded for resentencing The fact that the appellate court did not expressly limit the scope

of the remand order did not imply that a full blown sentencing hearing was permissible for a

second time, allowing evidence on all issues that would affect the sentencing guidelines ” Here,

the Court did limit the scope of the remand order in Celestine 1 nothing in the remand order

implied that a full blown sentencing hearing was permissible for a second time

1|l7 In United States v Stanley, 54 F 3d 103 (2d Cir 1995) another case we relied upon in

Rawlms the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit states “Our decision

in Stanley] did not call for de novo resentencing Instead we identified a narrow issue for

remand ” Stanley, 54 F 3d at 108 Like the Stanley court, this Court’s remand order in

77 V l 503 (V l 2022) (where the matter was remanded with instructions to vacate consistent with Titre v People 2019 V I 3) Roberts v People 76 V l 555 (V l 2022) (where this Court remanded with instructions to vacate to comport with our decision in Titre); Cascen v Gov I ofthe Virgin Islands 74 V l 512 (V I 2021) (matter remanded and the Superior Court directed to apply the ruling in Titre) Flores v People 70 V l 958 962 n 3 (V l 2019) (where the Court notes that “[i]n light of TIIre , the proper procedure where 14 V l C § 104 is implicated would be to vacate the conviction of the lesser included offense”) At this stage, the application of Tllre is clear 9 Celestine did object to the application of the habitual offender enhancement, and the Court found that the Superior Court 5 sentencing was proper Celestine, 73 V l at 510 ( eleslme v People 2024 V l 29 s Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion of the Court Page 10 of 12

Celestine 1 identifies a narrow issue for remand, namely, that resentencing be “in accordance

with this Court’s Titre decision ” Judgment (( elestme v People, S Ct Crim No 2017 0066,

Docket No 5|), entered June 17, 2020, at 2 Given our accompanying opinion, where we

declared that, under Titre, “vacatur of any lesser convictions was [the] appropriate remedy”

and that “Titre applies, and Celestine s lesser convictions should be vacated,” Celestine, 73

V l at 511, the order is abundantly clear and capable of only one interpretation the lesser

convictions should be vacated Thus, the Superior Court’s understanding of the order was

correct

‘118 The Superior Court further noted that in Celestine 1 neither Celestine nor this Court

suggested that the sentence of 40 years incarceration was excessive

I do not find that they that this the Court 5 decision was intended to have an entire new hearing with I think the Court to me the Court is clear, the Court decision at least its clear on that part that the purpose is to have the Court vacate the lesser convictions That is my understanding of the Court's decision, and those and those lesser convictions and enter and to ensure that the sentence, not the not to do this all over again and decide on a new period of incarceration It was to ensure that the sentence as it is handed down that whatever needs to be corrected is corrected so that it conforms with Titre That's my understanding of the Court 5 order of the Supreme Court's order I don't see the Supreme Court order as asking the Court this Court to go back and revisit all the testimony and or considerations that the Court took into account when it sentenced Mr Celestine My job is to just ensure that the order, whatever errors were in this order in terms of the formulation of it, is corrected to make it consistent with Titre That's my understanding of this order It's a resentence to ensure that the and to vacate the lesser convictions And the lesser convictions in this case are Counts Four, Five, Six, and Seven So the Court is just going to at this point the Court is just going to impose the sentence consistent with what its understanding is of the Supreme Court 5 order Because there was no during this appeal there was no claim that the at least there is nothing in the Supreme Court's order that suggest that the sentence of 40 years incarceration is excessive There is nothing in the Court's order, the Supreme Court's decision to suggest that, otherwise this Court would look at that, but there is nothing that would do that

J A 73 74 Celestine v People 2024 V l 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion 0! the Court Page I l of 12

1H9 This Court, in Irons v People 57 V I 473 (V I 20l2) held that where a resentencing

results in a reduction of sentence, the absence of the defendant does not violate his or her

constitutional rights We noted that a “defendant only has a constitutional right to be present at

stages of the trial where his absence might frustrate the fairness of the proceedings ”’ 1d at

479 (quoting Faretta v California 422 U S 806 819 n [5 (1975) (internal citation omitted»

The defendant in Irons had been present at the original sentencing hearing and

was given the opportunity to challenge the accuracy and reliability of the information the trial court used, to argue the weight the information should be given and to present mitigating circumstances The subsequent proceeding was conducted for the limited purpose of correcting lronss sentence so that it comported with the plea agreement It was not a ‘ critical stage of sentencing as the sentence had already been imposed, nor did her ‘ absence frustrate the fairness of the proceedings ” Thus, her absence from the subsequent hearing did not affect the fairness of the procedure and was not unconstitutional

Irons, at 57 V] 479 80 In the present case, Celestine was present and was given the

opportunity to participate fully in the initial sentencing hearing His resentencing for the

purpose of vacating the convictions of the lesser included offenses to compon with this

Court’s holding in Titre technically a reduction of sentence was not a critical stage of the

proceedings against” him 1d at 479 (quoting United States v Parrish 427 F 3d 1345 1347

(I Ith Cir 2005) (internal citation omitted)) Therefore, and particularly since Celestine was

present, a lack of a full hearing did not “frustrate the fairness of the proceedings ” Faretta, 422

U S at 8l9 n 15 (citing Snyder v Massachusetts 29l U S 97 (1934))

IV CONCLUSION

1120 To conclude, we affirm the March I4, 2024, J udgment and Commitment ofthe Superior

Court Celestine v People 2024 V l 29 S Ct Crim No 2024 0015 Opinion of the Court Page 12 of 12

Dated this 16th day of September, 2024

BY THE COURT

HAROé W L WILLOCKS 3 Associate Justice

ATTEST VERONICA J HANDY ESQ Clerk of the Court

By M“— Deputy Clerk I

Dated q I [a O? 0 (7? 6L