Celestin v. Shawy

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Celestin v. Shawy

126 A.D.3d 661, 2 N.Y.S.3d 372

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedMarch 4, 2015

Docket2014-06808

StatusPublished

This text of 126 A.D.3d 661 (Celestin v. Shawy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Celestin v. Shawy, 126 A.D.3d 661, 2 N.Y.S.3d 372 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2015).

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Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), entered June 4, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the *662 plaintiffs spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.R, Hall, Roman, Cohen and Barros, JJ., concur.

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In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Nassau County (Feinman, J.), entered June 4, 2014, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident.

Ordered that the order is reversed, on the law, with costs, and the motion is denied.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) as a result of the subject accident (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345 [2002]; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957 [1992]). The defendants submitted competent medical evidence establishing, prima facie, that the alleged injury to the lumbar region of the *662 plaintiffs spine did not constitute a serious injury under either the permanent consequential limitation of use or significant limitation of use categories of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see Staff v Yshua, 59 AD3d 614 [2009]).

In opposition, however, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to whether he sustained a serious injury to the lumbar region of his spine (see Perl v Meher, 18 NY3d 208, 218-219 [2011]). Therefore, the Supreme Court should have denied the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Rivera, J.R, Hall, Roman, Cohen and Barros, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

126 A.D.3d 661, 2 N.Y.S.3d 372, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/celestin-v-shawy-nyappdiv-2015.

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