Ceesay v. Gotham Bronx, LLC

Opinion

Ceesay v Gotham Bronx, LLC

2026 NY Slip Op 04739

July 29, 2026

Appellate Division, Second Department

Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.

This decision is uncorrected and subject to revision before publication in the Official Reports.

Malleh Ceesay, et al., appellants,

v

Gotham Bronx, LLC, et al., respondents.

Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, Second Judicial Department

Decided on July 29, 2026

2024-09192, 2024-09195, 2024-13402, (Index No. 56731/23)

Colleen D. Duffy, J.P.

Linda Christopher

Barry E. Warhit

Elena Goldberg Velazquez, JJ.

Lawrence James, New York, NY, for appellants.

Morris Duffy Alonso Faley & Pitcoff, New York, NY (Iryna S. Krauchanka and Andrea M. Alonso of counsel), for respondents.

[*1]

DECISION & ORDER

In an action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the plaintiffs appeal from (1) two orders of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Robert S. Ondrovic, J.), both dated August 8, 2024, and (2) an order of the same court dated August 28, 2024. The first order dated August 8, 2024, insofar as appealed from, granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries. The second order dated August 8, 2024, denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. The order dated August 28, 2024, insofar as appealed from, upon reargument, adhered to so much of the first order dated August 8, 2024, as granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries.

ORDERED that the appeal from the first order dated August 8, 2024, is dismissed, as the portion of that order appealed from was superseded by the order dated August 28, 2024, made upon reargument; and it is further,

ORDERED that the appeal from the second order dated August 8, 2024, is dismissed as abandoned; and it is further,

ORDERED that the order dated August 28, 2024, is affirmed insofar as appealed from; and it is further,

ORDERED that one bill of costs is awarded to the defendants.

The plaintiffs commenced this action, inter alia, to recover damages for personal injuries that they alleged they sustained when a truck operated by the defendant Omar A. Cordoba and owned by the defendants Gotham Bronx, LLC, and Gotham Ready Mix, LLC, crashed into the plaintiffs' residence. The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries on the ground that none of the plaintiffs sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the crash. The plaintiffs [*2]opposed the motion. In an order dated August 8, 2024, the Supreme Court, among other things, granted the motion. Thereafter, in an order dated August 28, 2024, upon reargument, the court, inter alia, adhered to so much of its original determination as granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries. The plaintiffs appeal.

The defendants met their prima facie burden of showing that none of the plaintiffs sustained a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the crash (see Toure v Avis Rent A Car Sys., 98 NY2d 345; Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). In support of their motion, the defendants submitted, among other things, records of the plaintiffs' treating therapist, which demonstrated, prima facie, that none of the plaintiffs sustained a psychological injury that constituted a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102(d) as a result of the crash (see Perez v Dixon, 166 AD3d 913, 914; see also McGovern v Walls, 201 AD2d 628). In opposition, the plaintiffs failed to raise a triable issue of fact (see Perez v Dixon, 166 AD3d at 914).

Contrary to the plaintiffs' contention, the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries was not premature. "While a party is entitled to a reasonable opportunity to conduct discovery in advance of a summary judgment determination, a party contending that a summary judgment motion is premature must demonstrate that discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that the facts essential to justify opposition to the motion were exclusively within the knowledge and control of the movant" (Quintanilla v Mark, 210 AD3d 713, 714 [alterations and internal quotation marks omitted]; see CPLR 3212[f]). "The mere hope or speculation that evidence sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment may be uncovered during the discovery process is insufficient to deny the motion" (Lopez v WS Distrib., Inc., 34 AD3d 759, 760; see White v U-Haul Co. of Ariz., 226 AD3d 851, 853). Here, the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that additional discovery might lead to relevant evidence or that facts essential to oppose the motion were exclusively within the defendants' knowledge and control (see Ocasio v Metro Myrtle Ave., LLC, 242 AD3d 1103, 1105).

The plaintiffs' remaining contentions are without merit.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment dismissing the causes of action to recover damages for personal injuries.

DUFFY, J.P., CHRISTOPHER, WARHIT and GOLDBERG VELAZQUEZ, JJ., concur.

ENTER:

Darrell M. Joseph

Clerk of the Court