Cee v. Murphy

2025 Ohio 3045

• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals
• Decided: August 19, 2025
• Docket: 23CA28
• Status: Published

Opinion

[Cite as Cee v. Murphy, 2025-Ohio-3045.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT ROSS COUNTY

JILLIAN M. CEE, : : Case No. 23CA28 Plaintiff-Appellee, : : v. : DECISION AND JUDGMENT : ENTRY JASON M. MURPHY, : : RELEASED: 08/19/2025 Defendant-Appellant. :

APPEARANCES:

Jason M. Murphy, Wellston, Ohio, for appellant, pro se.

Stephen K. Sesser, Benson & Sesser, LLC, Chillicothe, Ohio, for appellee.

Wilkin, J.

{¶1} James M. Murphy appeals the trial court’s decision of the Ross

County Court of Common Pleas in which the trial court granted both Murphy and

Cee a divorce. Murphy presents ten assignments of error challenging the trial

court’s allocation of property. We find no abuse of discretion by the trial court’s

equitable division of Murphy and Cee’s properties. The division is supported by

competent, credible evidence. Accordingly, we overrule Murphy’s assignments

of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

{¶2} In 2015, Murphy and Cee began dating. At the time, each owned

their own house. Cee’s home was purchased in 2013 and was located on

Kentucky Circle in Marysville, Ohio. Murphy’s home was purchased in 2004 and

was located on Big Plain in London, Ohio. Ross App. No. 23CA28 2

{¶3} In 2016, Cee discovered she was pregnant. Cee and Murphy

decided in December 2016 to move in together prior to getting married, which

occurred on February 20, 2018. In December 2016, Cee’s mother was residing

with her and so were Cee’s other children. Thus, Murphy moved out of his home

located on Big Plain in London, Ohio, and moved in with Cee and her children at

her Marysville home. At the time, Murphy was remodeling his London house,

which he continued to do and then began renting it out.

{¶4} Prior to moving in together, Cee and Murphy jointly signed a real

estate purchase contract of two adjoining lots on Loop Road: 0 Loop Road and

1036 Loop Road, in Wellston, Ohio. The total purchase price was $112,500.

Cee and Murphy’s names were on the Loop Road property deeds which they

both signed in December 2016. At the time of closing, Murphy contributed

$55,760.70 of his own funds, and Cee contributed $1,171.21 of her own funds.

The money was used to pay off the full cost of 0 Loop Road and partial cost of

1036 Loop Road. The remainder of the balance of the 1036 Loop Road was

funded through a mortgage. Murphy was the sole borrower of the mortgage.

{¶5} Cee and Murphy’s child was born in July 2017, while they still resided

at the Marysville home. In May 2020, the parties agreed to jointly purchase 5632

Higby Road, which is located in Chillicothe, Ohio. It was also agreed that Cee’s

mother, who has resided with Cee for many years, was not going to move in with

them at the Higby Road location. Thus, Cee’s mother purchased a different

home, 188 Plyleys Lane, which is also located in Chillicothe. With the purchase

of the new house at Higby Road, Cee sold her home in Marysville and netted Ross App. No. 23CA28 3

$105,798.82. The closings of the Marysville house and Plyleys Lane house were

held at the same time. Cee co-signed for the mortgage loan with her mother for

the Plyleys Lane property, but Cee was not added to the deed. In addition to co-

signing, Cee contributed $10,172.42, toward the Plyleys Lane down

payment/closing costs. The proceeds were directly transferred from the net sale

of the Marysville property to the Plyleys Lane purchase fund.

{¶6} In October 2021, Cee filed a complaint for divorce and moved out of

the Higby residence and moved in with her mother at the Plyleys Lane house.

Murphy answered and filed a counterclaim for divorce. While the divorce was

pending, in February 2022, Cee’s mother sold the Plyleys Lane home and Cee in

March 2022, through a trust, purchased a home on Applewood Drive, also

located in Chillicothe.1 Cee’s mother received $26,467.41 from the sale of the

Plyleys Lane house, which she gave to Cee as contribution for the down

payment of the Applewood house. Cee’s mother after selling her home in

Plyleys Lane moved in with Cee and her children at the Applewood house.

{¶7} Cee and Murphy were able to agree with regard to their child’s

visitation and allocation of parental rights, but not to the distribution of property.

Further, the parties were unable to agree on the distribution of retirement

accounts. Accordingly, a two-day hearing was held. At the conclusion of the

hearings, and after Murphy’s objection to the magistrate’s decision, the trial court

made the following relevant findings with regard to the distribution of property

and debts:

1 Cee’s purchase of the Applewood house was in violation of a mutual restraining order which prohibited both from selling or purchasing any property while the divorce was pending. Ross App. No. 23CA28 4

• Any reduction in the amount of mortgage paid for by marital funds is marital property.

• For the Kentucky Circle property – the trial court determined it to be Cee’s separate property and any traceable proceeds from the sale, are hers alone. But with the reduction in mortgage from when they began living together to the sale in May 2020, the trial court determined that Murphy is entitled to half of that reduction amount.

• Higby Road property – the sale proceeds will be equally divided between the parties.

• Loop Road properties are determined to be marital. The court explained that although they did not live there together, Cee and Murphy jointly owned them. As Murphy currently resides at the 1036 Loop Road cabin, the trial court allocated the property to Murphy but ordered him to pay Cee $47,494.28. This amount was calculated from the property’s stipulated value and then subtracting the down payments and mortgage balance, dividing the result by two, and adding Cee’s down payment back.

• Plyleys Lane property was determined to be Cee’s mother’s but because Cee paid the mortgage on the property until it sold, the trial court granted Murphy half of the mortgage reduction during the time Cee’s mother owned it. However, the trial court determined that the proceeds given to Cee from her mother of $26,467.41 to be a gift and not marital property.

• Applewood Drive property was determined to be Cee’s own property and determined that the down payment was traceable to Cee’s separate funds. And since the purchase was recent, the property had no equity to divide.

• Big Plain property – The trial court determined it to be Murphy’s separate property but granted Cee one-half of the mortgage reduction amount from the time they moved together in December 2016 to when it was paid off in April 2021.

• As for vehicles, the trial court determined that each will be awarded their own vehicles and solely responsible for any remaining debt. The trial court additionally awarded Cee the trailer.

• As for retirement accounts, the trial court found that Cee’s retirement account with Lazarus to be her own personal fund, and also found Murphy’s retirement account with Capital Group to be his separate account. However, with regard to Murphy’s retirement account with Ross App. No. 23CA28 5

NiSource, which was his employer at the time the parties were together, the trial court awarded equal distribution from the date of their marriage, February 2018 to their separation date of October 2021.

• As for the bank accounts, the trial court determined that Cee’s checking and savings accounts to be her separate property. However, for Murphy, the trial court ordered the total in his checking and savings accounts of $11,794.85 to be divided equally.

• With regard to credit card debt, the trial court determined that the Home Depot card balance to be divided equally.

• Finally, the trial court found Cee in contempt and ordered her to pay Murphy $250.

{¶8} It is from this judgment of decree that Murphy appeals.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion in decreeing December 2016 as “during the marriage” in determining “marital property” division. The couples actual February 20, 2018, date of marriage, provides for a more “fair and equitable” distribution.

II. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion when it determined as marital assets those assets which can specifically be traced to Jason before the marriage, specifically the real estate at 1036 Loop [R]d and 0 Loop Rd.

III. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of and abused its discretion in determining that “premarital property” division, of Jason’s London home and Jillian’s Kentucky Circle home, be determined using only a 50/50 paydown formula for each individual property.

IV. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion in decreeing Jillian pay Husband $2,787.00 from the proceeds of the Sale of 188 Plyleys Ln, Chillicothe, OH, hereinafter termed Plyley’s Ln.

V. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion when it failed to consider a retirement benefit offset based on the Jillian’s testimony that real estate interests were in lieu of her enrollment of an employer sponsored retirement benefit.

VI. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion in decreeing that Jillian be awarded one half of Jason’s JP Ross App. No. 23CA28 6

Morgan Chase account and Jillian’s JP Morgan accounts were ruled “separate property.”

VII. The trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion when it did not grant a compensatory distribution to Jason for the 7 months of payments made by Jason on the Higby Rd marital property.

VIII. Trial court erred as a matter of law to the prejudice of Husband and abused its discretion when it decreed that Jason pay half the debt on Jillian’s Home Depot card.

IX. The trial court erred as a of law to the prejudice of Jason and abused its discretion when it did not consider a distribution for refunded money, from the refinance of the Higby Rd property.

X. The trial court erred as a matter of law and abused its discretion when it determined as marital assets those assets which can specifically be traced to Jason before the marriage, specifically Jason’s Utility Trailer.

APPLICABLE LAW

{¶9} Murphy’s ten assignments of error challenge the trial court’s

discretion in allocating property after the parties elect to separate and file for

divorce. As the law to the ten assignments of error is similar, we will begin by

outlining the applicable law before addressing each assignment of error.

{¶10} “ ‘When a trial court grants a divorce, the court must determine what

constitutes the parties’ marital property and what constitutes their separate

property.’ ” Thompson v. Thompson, 2024-Ohio-2147, ¶ 33 (4th Dist.), quoting

Evans v. Evans, 2014-Ohio-4450, ¶ 26 (4th Dist.), citing Barkley v. Barkley, 119

Ohio App.3d 155 (4th Dist. 1997); R.C. 3105.171(B). And because “the trial

court’s characterization of the parties’ property involves a factual inquiry[,]” we

“review such determinations under the standard of manifest weight of the

evidence.” Id. at ¶ 31, citing Barkley at 159; Wylie v. Wylie, 1996 WL 292044

(4th Dist. May 30, 1996). Ross App. No. 23CA28 7

{¶11} The civil manifest weight standard of review is the same standard

that is applied in criminal cases. See Eastley v. Volkman, 2012-Ohio-2179, ¶ 17.

Thus, we must review the entire record, weigh the evidence and all reasonable

inferences, consider the credibility of witnesses and determine whether in

resolving conflicts in the evidence, the trier of fact clearly lost its way and created

such a manifest miscarriage of justice warranting reversal. Douglas v. Boughton,

2014-Ohio-808, ¶ 19 (4th Dist.). “Judgments supported by some competent,

credible evidence going to all the essential elements of the case will not be

reversed by a reviewing court as being against the manifest weight of the

evidence.” C.E. Morris Co. v. Foley Const. Co., 54 Ohio St.2d 279 (1978),

syllabus. “This standard of review is highly deferential and even “some”

evidence is sufficient to sustain the judgment and to prevent a reversal.” Smith v.

Smith, 2019-Ohio-899, ¶ 44 (4th Dist.), citing Barkley at 159.

{¶12} We are also mindful that

“Trial courts enjoy broad discretion when dividing marital property in a divorce proceeding.” Jenkins v. Jenkins, 4th Dist. Highland No. 19CA19, 2021-Ohio-153, ¶ 32, citing Holcomb v. Holcomb, 44 Ohio St.3d 128, 131, 541 N.E.2d 597 (1989). Therefore, “an appellate court will not reverse a trial court’s decision regarding the allocation of marital property absent an abuse of that discretion.” Id., citing Elliott v. Elliott, 4th Dist. Ross No. 05CA2823, 2005-Ohio- 5405, ¶ 17.

Thompson at ¶ 62.

{¶13} An abuse of discretion “is more than a mere error of law or

judgment; it implies that a trial court’s decision was unreasonable, arbitrary or

unconscionable.” State v. Martin, 2017-Ohio-7556, ¶ 27, citing Blakemore v.

Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219 (1983). Ross App. No. 23CA28 8

{¶14} Domestic relations courts’ determination of whether an asset is

marital or separate property are governed by R.C. 3105.171. The provision

provides that the trial court shall determine “what constitutes marital property and

what constitutes separate property. In either case, upon making such a

determination, the court shall divide the marital and separate property equitably

between the spouses, in accordance with this section.” R.C. 3105.171(B). In

conducting an equitable division, the provision provides that

the division of marital property shall be equal. If an equal division of marital property would be inequitable, the court shall not divide the marital property equally but instead shall divide it between the spouses in the manner the court determines equitable. In making a division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant factors, including those set forth in division (F) of this section. (2) Each spouse shall be considered to have contributed equally to the production and acquisition of marital property.

R.C. 3105.171(C)(1) and (2).

{¶15} To assist the trial court, the provision provides several definitions

and factors for the trial court to consider. This includes, as pertinent to the case

at bar, the definition of “during the marriage” as

whichever of the following is applicable: (a) Except as provided in division (A)(2)(b) of this section, the period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of the final hearing in an action for divorce or in an action for legal separation; (b) If the court determines that the use of either or both of the dates specified in division (A)(2)(a) of this section would be inequitable, the court may select dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property. If the court selects dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property, "during the marriage" means the period of time between those dates selected and specified by the court.

R.C. 3105.171(A)(2). Ross App. No. 23CA28 9

{¶16} The definition of “marital property” as pertinent here is defined as

follows:

(3)(a) “Marital property” means, subject to division (A)(3)(b) of this section, all of the following: (i) All real and personal property that currently is owned by either or both of the spouses, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage; (ii) All interest that either or both of the spouses currently has in any real or personal property, including, but not limited to, the retirement benefits of the spouses, and that was acquired by either or both of the spouses during the marriage; (iii) Except as otherwise provided in this section, all income and appreciation on separate property, due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during the marriage; ... (b) “Marital property” does not include any separate property.

R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(i), (ii) and (iii); and R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(b).

{¶17} The provision continues with defining “separate property” and as

relevant here includes:

(6)(a) . . . all real and personal property and any interest in real or personal property that is found by the court to be any of the following:

(ii) Any real or personal property or interest in real or personal property that was acquired by one spouse prior to the date of the marriage; (iii) Passive income and appreciation acquired from separate property by one spouse during the marriage; ... (vii) Any gift of any real or personal property or of an interest in real or personal property that is made after the date of the marriage and that is proven by clear and convincing evidence to have been given to only one spouse. (b) The commingling of separate property with other property of any type does not destroy the identity of the separate property as separate property, except when the separate property is not traceable.

R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(ii), (iii), and (vii); and R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b). Ross App. No. 23CA28 10

{¶18} The provision mandates that the “court shall disburse a spouse’s

separate property to that spouse. If a court does not disburse a spouse’s

separate property to that spouse, the court shall make written findings of fact that

explain the factors that it considered in making its determination that the

spouse’s separate property should not be disbursed to that spouse.” R.C.

3105.171(D). One of the exceptions in disbursing a spouse their separate

property is “[i]f a spouse has engaged in financial misconduct, including, but not

limited to, the dissipation, destruction, concealment, nondisclosure, or fraudulent

disposition of assets, the court may compensate the offended spouse with a

distributive award or with a greater award of marital property.” R.C.

3105.171(E)(4).

{¶19} Moreover, the provision states that “the holding of title to property by

one spouse individually or by both spouses in a form of co-ownership does not

determine whether the property is marital property or separate property.” R.C.

3105.171(G). Finally, the statutory provision provides the trial court with factors

to consider “in determining whether to make and the amount of any distributive

award under this section” including:

(1) The duration of the marriage; (2) The assets and liabilities of the spouses; (3) The desirability of awarding the family home, or the right to reside in the family home for reasonable periods of time, to the spouse with custody of the children of the marriage; (4) The liquidity of the property to be distributed; (5) The economic desirability of retaining intact an asset or an interest in an asset; (6) The tax consequences of the property division upon the respective awards to be made to each spouse; (7) The costs of sale, if it is necessary that an asset be sold to effectuate an equitable distribution of property; Ross App. No. 23CA28 11

(8) Any division or disbursement of property made in a separation agreement that was voluntarily entered into by the spouses; (9) Any retirement benefits of the spouses, excluding the social security benefits of a spouse except as may be relevant for purposes of dividing a public pension; (10) Any other factor that the court expressly finds to be relevant and equitable.

R.C. 3105.171(F).

{¶20} To aid the trial court, caselaw provides that “a party claiming a

separate interest in property must establish that interest by a preponderance of

the evidence.” Kochaliyev v. Kochaliyeva, 2025-Ohio-1140, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.),

citing Todor v. Ballesteros-Cuberos, 2024-Ohio-4525, ¶ 9 (12th Dist.).

“This standard requires the claiming party to demonstrate that it is more likely than not that the asset in question is indeed separate property, rather than marital property subject to division in the divorce proceedings.” Id. Separate interests in property “may be commingled with marital property without losing its distinct status, provided ... it remains traceable.” Id. at ¶ 22, citing R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(b).

Id.

{¶21} Additionally, “there are two separate inquiries with respect to

dividing property, especially where real property is concerned: (1) is the property

itself separate, and if so, (2) is the appreciation of that property considered

separate property that is independently traceable.” Beyer v. Beyer, 2024-Ohio-

1278, ¶ 8 (8th Dist.). And

if one spouse traces the property to a premarital purchase with separate funds, that real property acquired before marriage is deemed separate property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(ii) and (A)(6)(b). After that, the inquiry shifts to the appreciation or passive income derived from that separate property, which also remains separate property under a different provision of the statute, R.C. 3105.171(A)(6)(a)(iii), if the passive income or appreciation is traceable. Appreciation and income derived from separate property Ross App. No. 23CA28 12

is a separate consideration under the statute, which is addressed only if the property is deemed separate property. (Emphasis added).

Id. at ¶ 9.

{¶22} The Eighth District Court of Appeals in Beyer continued to explain

that

not all appreciation or income from property is considered separate property. If the income or appreciation of separate property is “due to the labor, monetary, or in-kind contribution of either or both of the spouses that occurred during the marriage” that appreciation or income is deemed marital property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii). Thus, in order to demonstrate that the appreciation and income derived from the separate property should remain separate property, the proponent must demonstrate that the appreciation of the asset or the income derived therefrom is traceable as separate property. See, e.g., Ockunzzi at ¶ 23. But if the appreciation or income was due to marital labor or funds, the appreciation or income is considered marital property. Even if the appreciation or income was due to marital labor or funds, however, that does not convert the separate property into marital property. Only the appreciation or income on or from the separate property is deemed marital property. R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii).

Id. at ¶ 10.

{¶23} Additionally, we have held that “ ‘property acquired during the

marriage is presumed to be marital in nature unless it can be shown to be

separate.’ ” Thompson, 2024-Ohio-2147, ¶ 33 (4th Dist.), quoting Barkley, 119

Ohio App.3d 155, 160 (4th Dist. 1997). And “[t]he general rule in Ohio is that

income earned by labor performed during the marriage is marital property

whether received during or after the marriage.” Vanderink v. Vanderink, 2018-

Ohio-3328, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.), citing Schweinfurth v. Meza, 2002-Ohio-6316, ¶ 19

(8th Dist.); R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii). Ross App. No. 23CA28 13

{¶24} With the above law in mind, we now address Murphy’s ten

assignments of error.

ANALYSIS

I. First assignment of error

{¶25} Murphy maintains that the trial court’s decision in determining that

the “during the marriage” date was December 2016, was arbitrary and

unreasonable. Murphy asserts that the evidence demonstrated that although in

December 2016, he and Cee began living together, they maintained separate

finances and Murphy continued to have his own home.

{¶26} Cee disagrees and states that the trial court is not constrained to the

exact ceremonial date of the marriage, and in this case, properly determined the

“during the marriage” date began in December 2016. This is because the parties

in December began living together and Cee was pregnant with their child during

this period. Further, during that time, the parties were sharing financial

responsibilities, such as paying down mortgages on their respective properties.

Therefore, Cee concludes that there is competent, credible evidence supporting

the trial court’s decision to use December 2016 as the beginning of “during the

marriage” date.

{¶27} We agree with Cee and find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in finding that December 2016 was the beginning date of “during the

marriage.”

{¶28} “ ‘Prior to dividing a couples’ property and debts, the trial court must

determine the duration of the marriage by pinpointing the time period that will be Ross App. No. 23CA28 14

considered “during the marriage.” ’ ” Owens v. Owens, 2022-Ohio-3450, ¶ 18

(1st Dist.), quoting Elliot-Thomas v. Lewis, 2019-Ohio-3870, ¶ 5 (9th Dist.), citing

Tustin v. Tustin, 2015-Ohio-3454, ¶ 17 (9th Dist.). The First District Court of

Appeals in Owens elaborated

“ ‘As a general matter, a trial court should consistently apply the same set of dates when evaluating marital property that is subject to division and distribution in a divorce proceeding.’ ” Kachmar v. Kachmar, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 08 MA 90, 2010-Ohio-1311, ¶ 47, citing Angles v. Angles, 5th Dist. Fairfield No. 00CA1, 2000 WL 1369958, * , 2000 Ohio App. LEXIS 4281, *12 (Sept. 15, 2000). “If the circumstances of a given case so require, the trial court may choose different dates for valuation purposes so long as the court adequately explains its reasons, and its decision does not constitute an abuse of discretion.” Id., citing Angles. ... “Nevertheless, the Ohio Supreme Court has stated that equity may occasionally require the trial court to choose a de facto termination of marriage date.” Id., citing Barish v. Barish, 69 Ohio St.2d 318, 319, 432 N.E.2d 183 (1982); see R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b). “Generally, trial courts use a de facto termination of marriage date when the parties separate, make no attempt at reconciliation, continually maintain separate residences, separate business activities and/or separate bank accounts.” Id. at ¶ 11, citing Gullia v. Gullia, 93 Ohio App.3d 653, 666, 639 N.E.2d 822 (8th Dist.1994).

Id. at ¶ 19.

{¶29} R.C. 3105.171(A)(2) defines "[d]uring the marriage" as:

whichever of the following is applicable: (a) Except as provided in division (A)(2)(b) of this section, the period of time from the date of the marriage through the date of the final hearing in an action for divorce or in an action for legal separation; (b) If the court determines that the use of either or both of the dates specified in division (A)(2)(a) of this section would be inequitable, the court may select dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property. If the court selects dates that it considers equitable in determining marital property, "during the marriage" means the period of time between those dates selected and specified by the court. Ross App. No. 23CA28 15

{¶30} In the matter at bar, the trial court determined the beginning date to

be December 2016. We find no abuse of discretion as that date corresponds to

when Cee and Murphy began living together as a family. Murphy stipulated that

in December 2016, he moved into Cee’s Marysville house after discovering Cee

was pregnant. After he moved in, they set up the nursery room for their daughter

at the Marysville house. Additionally, Murphy testified that during that time he

considered the Marysville house as their marital home. What is more, he

admitted that during that time, he and Cee were discussing marriage but it kept

getting shelved until February 20, 2018, when they got married in Las Vegas.

And after they were married, Cee and Murphy continued to live at the Marysville

home until the filing of the first divorce in July 2019, but they reconciled in

September 2019. And the first divorce filing was dismissed in December 2019.

{¶31} Moreover, while they resided in the Marysville house, Cee was

making the full mortgage payment and Murphy was paying the mortgage to both

his London house and the Loop Road property. This was their agreement in

order to tackle paying down the mortgages on all properties.

{¶32} As the above demonstrates, the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in selecting December 2016 as the equitable date in determining

marital property. Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s first assignment of error.

II. Second assignment of error

{¶33} Murphy argues that the trial court erred in determining that the two

properties at Loop Road, which were simultaneously purchased on December 6,

2016, are marital property. The evidence according to Murphy demonstrated that Ross App. No. 23CA28 16

he used premarital funds to purchase the property at 0 Loop Road, and paid the

down payment for the property at 1036 Loop Road from premarital funds.

Moreover, the remaining balance for the 1036 Loop Road was mortgaged solely

in Murphy’s name. Additionally, Murphy paid the mortgage, taxes, and insurance

for the 1036 Loop Road property. Murphy acknowledges that Cee was added to

the deed of the Loop Road properties, but maintains that it was not intended as a

gift. And contends that Cee was added because she promised to add Murphy on

the deed of her property in Marysville, but she reneged on her promise.

{¶34} Murphy also disputes Cee’s testimony that the $1,171.32 check

dated April 2016, and payable to Elite Land Title, went toward the closing of the

Loop Road properties that were bought in December 2016 with the assistance of

Lanco Title agency. Murphy concludes his argument reiterating that he used his

premarital funds to purchase the 0 Loop Road property and used his premarital

funds for the down payment of the 1036 Loop Road property. The remainder of

the 1036 Loop Road property balance was mortgaged in his name as the sole

borrower. And at the time of separation, there was a balance remaining on the

mortgage. Murphy asserts that the only arguable marital money would be the

difference in the mortgage balance between the marriage date of February 2018,

and time of separation, a paydown amount of $20,483.

{¶35} Cee disagrees and contends that the Loop Road properties were

purchased jointly with both she and Murphy jointly agreeing to the purchase

contract back in May 2016. And the properties are jointly deeded to Cee and

Murphy. What is more, there was a stipulation that Murphy used premarital Ross App. No. 23CA28 17

funds of $55,760.76 and that Cee paid $1,171.21 of her premarital funds toward

the closing. Finally, Cee asserts that there was no supporting evidence to

Murphy’s claim that there was an agreement to add his name to Cee’s premarital

home in Marysville.

{¶36} We agree with Cee. First, during his testimony, Murphy agreed with

the stipulation that Cee paid $1,171.21 toward the purchase of the two adjacent

lots on Loop Road.2 Second, Murphy also confirmed that back in April 2016, both

he and Cee signed the contract to purchase the properties, and both attended

the closing of the properties on December 6, 2016. Further, both he and Cee

were added to the deed of the properties. Additionally, Murphy confirmed that

Cee purchased appliances and flooring for the cabin on one of the Loop Road

lots and she testified that she was going there with her daughter.

{¶37} Moreover, Murphy testified that Cee had discussed with him how

she always wanted to own a cabin. This was one of her dreams. And that they

discussed building a house on the property, but that after researching the issue,

it was not financially feasible as the properties have a steep terrain.

{¶38} Based on the evidence submitted, we find the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that Cee and Murphy jointly purchased the

Loop Road properties, and its determination is supported by competent credible

evidence. It is true that Murphy paid the mortgage payments, but that was an

agreement the parties had made. Cee was paying the more expensive mortgage

payment on the Kentucky Circle house while Murphy made the lower mortgage

2 The two lots are connected and one lot has a cabin and 30 acres, and the other lot has 26 acres. The total purchase price for the two lots was $112,500. Ross App. No. 23CA28 18

payments on his London property and Loop Road properties. By his own

testimony, Murphy stated that the Marysville mortgage was more than the

London and Loop property mortgages combined.

{¶39} Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s second assignment of error.

III. Third assignment of error

{¶40} Murphy argues that the trial court’s division of his pre-marital owned

property in London and Cee’s pre-marital Marysville property was arbitrary and

unreasonable. Murphy again challenges the trial court’s utilization of December

2016 as the beginning date for “during the marriage” and not the actual marriage

date. Murphy also asserts that the trial court failed to consider the appropriate

factors, and instead, utilized the 50/50 mortgage paydown formula. And based

on the trial court’s unreasonable division, he was ordered to pay $23,746.05 to

Cee as her equity from the London property, and she was ordered to pay Murphy

only $8,202.21 from the $105,798.82 she received after selling her Marysville

residence. According to Murphy, this is inequitable and unreasonable.

{¶41} Cee in response contends that it was not an abuse of discretion for

the trial court to award each party the mortgage paydown from the London and

Marysville property from the date of December 2016 until October 2021, the

stipulated date of separation. Further, it was not an abuse of discretion when the

trial court determined that the proceeds from the sale of the Marysville property

were not marital. Cee concludes that she presented evidence to support that the

proceeds were left untouched in her savings bank account. Ross App. No. 23CA28 19

{¶42} The evidence supports the trial court’s division of the pre-marital

Marysville and London properties. Cee purchased her Marysville house back in

2013, and Murphy purchased his house in London back in 2004. The parties

began residing at the Marysville house in 2016, and during that time, there was a

mortgage balance remaining on both properties. The parties agreed that Cee

would continue to pay the full mortgage payment on the Marysville property and

Murphy would pay the mortgage payment on the London property. And as

previously stated, the Marysville mortgage payment was greater than the London

property. During that time, Murphy was able to update the London property and

began renting it out within months of moving into the Marysville house, and was

receiving rent payments of $900 a month.

{¶43} Murphy is correct that there is a monetary difference between the

amount of mortgage paydowns between the properties, but this numerical

difference is due to the values of the properties. In December 2016, the

Marysville property had a mortgage balance of $231,251.20 and when it was sold

in May 2020, the remaining mortgage balance was $214,810.77. The London

property had a mortgage balance of $47,492.10 and was paid off in April 2021.

The trial court applied the same equitable calculation to both.

{¶44} Moreover, the trial court granted Murphy the London property as his,

and per the evidence, it was valued at $130,000. And the trial court determined

the same for the Maryville property and determined the sale proceeds were the

sole property of Cee. This finding is supported by Cee’s evidence in which she Ross App. No. 23CA28 20

met her burden of demonstrating that she did not mingle the proceeds with

marital assets; that is, she established the traceability of the money.

{¶45} Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s third assignment of error.

IV. Fourth assignment of error

{¶46} Murphy argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it

solely awarded Murphy the paydown amount of $2,787.00 from the sale of the

property on Plyleys Lane. The property was purchased during the marriage, and

even though Cee was simply a cosigner on the mortgage of the property that was

titled to her mother, Cee paid the down payment and the mortgage. And when

the property was sold, the proceeds of $26,467.41 went to Cee, which she used

as down payment to purchase property on Applewood Drive. Murphy maintains

the proceeds should have been divided equally with him, and the trial court

arbitrarily determined the proceeds were a gift to Cee from her mother.

{¶47} Cee disagrees and contends that the evidence demonstrated that

the Plyleys Lane property was purchased by her mother and her mother was the

sole person on the deed of the property. Cee was simply a loan cosigner.

Further, the down payment Cee gifted to her mother came from the sale

proceeds of the Marysville property, which are Cee’s sole assets. And then

when her mother sold Plyleys Lane, her mother gifted her $26,467.41 toward the

down payment to the Applewood Drive house.

{¶48} We find that the trial court’s decision to only grant Murphy half of the

mortgage reduction of the Plyleys Lane property as equitable and supported by

the evidence. The evidence established that Plyleys Lane was deeded solely in Ross App. No. 23CA28 21

Cee’s mother’s name. Cee was solely a cosigner to the mortgage. Cee did not

hold any ownership to the house, and Murphy was not part of the negotiation or

purchase of the house.

{¶49} Further, Cee’s closing of the Marysville house occurred just minutes

prior to her mother’s purchase of the Plyleys Lane house. Cee submitted

evidence demonstrating that the title company at the May 2020 closing,

transferred $10,172.42 directly from the Marysville sale proceeds to the down

payment of the Plyleys Lane house. This transfer occurred because Cee was

gifting her mother the money.

{¶50} The evidence also demonstrated that from May 2020 to October

2021, date of separation, Cee was paying the mortgage on Plyleys Lane

property. Because Cee was using her income while married to pay her mother’s

mortgage, the trial court determined that any mortgage reduction during that

period of time is marital property and should be divided equally between the

parties. We find no error in that determination. We reiterate that “[t]he general

rule in Ohio is that income earned by labor performed during the marriage is

marital property whether received during or after the marriage.” Vanderink,

2018-Ohio-3328, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.), citing Meza, 2002-Ohio-6316, ¶ 19 (8th Dist.);

R.C. 3105.171(A)(3)(a)(iii).

{¶51} Similarly, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that the

$26,467.41 that Cee’s mother gave to Cee in February 2022 after selling the

Plyleys Lane house, was a gift and not a marital asset. Ross App. No. 23CA28 22

{¶52} Cee’s mother resided with Cee for years prior to Cee and Murphy’s

marriage. And when Cee and Murphy began residing together in December

2016, Cee’s mother continued to reside with them. This was until July 2019

when the first divorce was filed and Murphy moved out of the Marysville house.

Murphy did not get along with Cee’s mother, and so, when the parties reconciled

in September 2019 and began looking for a place, it was decided that Cee’s

mother was not going to move in with them. Accordingly, Cee’s mother began

looking for a house and purchased the house on Plyleys Lane with Cee’s

financial assistance. But then when Cee and Murphy separated in October 2021,

Cee and her daughter moved in with her mother at Plyleys Lane. The house was

not ideal for them, so in March 2022, Cee purchased the house on Applewood

Drive. This time Cee’s mother assisted Cee and gave her the full sale proceeds

from Plyleys Lane as part of the down payment on the Applewood house. Cee’s

mother then moved in with Cee at the Applewood house.

{¶53} We conclude that based on the evidence presented, the trial court

equitably determined that the house on Plyleys Lane was not marital property but

that the mortgage reduction was and should be equally divided. Therefore, we

overrule Murphy’s fourth assignment of error.

V. Fifth assignment of error

{¶54} Murphy argues that the trial court’s division of Murphy’s retirement

account at NiSource was inequitable when the trial court failed to also grant

Murphy a portion of Cee’s JP Morgan Chase savings account. According to

Murphy, he had no idea that Cee was planning on using the sale proceeds of her Ross App. No. 23CA28 23

Marysville property as her retirement plan, and, because she was, he should

have been entitled to half the proceeds. Murphy maintains that it was

unreasonable and arbitrary for the trial court to grant Cee half of Murphy’s

retirement account but he got no portion of her retirement. The inequity is

prejudicial to Murphy as his income is lacking after he was terminated from his

job; thus, he is no longer part of an employer retirement account. Murphy

moreover asserts that during their marriage, Cee was making much more money

than he was.

{¶55} Cee contends that many of Murphy’s factual assertions are not

supported by the record of the case. And that the evidence demonstrated that

Cee did not have a retirement account during the marriage, thus, there was

nothing to divide. Further, the proceeds from the sale of the Marysville house

were solely her property. Cee met her burden in establishing that she did not

mingle the funds with marital assets. Thus, Cee maintains that the trial court did

not abuse its discretion in giving Cee half of Murphy’s retirement contributions

made from the date of their marriage to the date of their separation.

{¶56} We agree with Cee and find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion. The evidence demonstrated that Cee’s only retirement account was

with Lazarus and none of the contributions occurred while the parties were

together. As previously outlined, Cee purchased the Marysville property in 2013,

which was prior to the parties being together. And when Cee sold the property in

May 2020, she received approximately $105,000. Of that money, she used

approximately $10,000 as a gift to her mother to purchase the house on Plyleys Ross App. No. 23CA28 24

Lane. And then $88,000 was transferred from her checking to her savings

account. Thus, at the time the parties separated in October 2021, the savings

account funds were determined to be her sole property. We find no error in that

determination.

{¶57} Murphy, on the other hand, was contributing to his retirement fund

at NiSource while the parties were married. Thus, the contributions were

considered marital. The trial court determined that the equitable dates would be

from the date of marriage (February 20, 2018) to their date of separation

(October 1, 2021). We find no error in that determination.

{¶58} Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s fifth assignment of error.

VI. Sixth assignment of error

{¶59} Murphy argues that the division of his bank accounts with Cee but

not dividing the funds in her bank accounts was inequitable and burdensome to

him. Murphy asserts that the trial court’s decision not to give him any portion of

the funds in Cee’s bank accounts was an abuse of discretion. According to

Murphy, Cee was commingling funds from her checking and savings account

throughout the marriage, Cee had payroll deposits of over $312,000 and had

other deposits of over $263,000, and her savings account did not drop below

$80,000. Thus, Murphy asserts it was erroneous for the trial court not to award

him any of the money in Cee’s bank accounts, since it is unreasonable to believe

that the money left in her savings account was just the proceeds from the sale of

the Marysville property. Ross App. No. 23CA28 25

{¶60} Cee disagrees and maintains that she met her burden in

establishing that since May 2020, the sale of Marysville property, the funds in her

savings account did not drop below $80,000. Thus, demonstrating that her

savings account was her separate property. Cee also contends that Murphy’s

argument is based on facts outside the record and there is no evidence she

committed financial misconduct.

{¶61} We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to divide

Murphy’s bank account funds equally between them, but not to divide any of

Cee’s bank accounts with him.

{¶62} The burden to demonstrate separate property is on the party

asserting it. See Kochaliyev v. Kochaliyeva, 2025-Ohio-1140, ¶ 23 (12th Dist.).

Cee asserted that the proceeds from the sale of the Marysville house was her

separate property. In order to meet her burden of proof, she testified that after

the sale, she transferred $88,000 from her checking account to the savings

account. After the transfer, the savings account did not drop below $80,000.

Cee also submitted her bank statement as an exhibit demonstrating the deposit

of the money from the sale of Marysville house into her checking account and

then the transfer of the $88,000 to the savings account. And in October 2021,

the savings account had a balance of $81,013.32, and her checking had a

balance of $996.16.

{¶63} Murphy did not present any evidence to contradict the traceability of

Cee’s sale proceeds from the Marysville house. Thus, based on the evidence

before the trial court, there is competent credible evidence that Cee was entitled Ross App. No. 23CA28 26

to $88,000 as her separate property. And since, as of October 2021, her bank

accounts were $81,013.32 and $996.16, which is slightly below the $88,000, the

trial court determined no division was required. We find no abuse of discretion in

that determination.

{¶64} Murphy on the other hand, failed to demonstrate that any of the

money in his bank accounts as of September 2021, the date the trial court

determined to be equitable, were from separate funds other than from

employment while married. Thus, the trial court ordered Murphy’s bank accounts

totaling $11,794.85 to be divided equally between the parties. We find no abuse

of discretion in that determination.

{¶65} Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s sixth assignment of error.

VII. Seventh assignment of error

{¶66} Murphy argues that the trial court erred in not granting him half of

the mortgage payments he made at the Higby Road property after Cee ceased to

contribute and he made the full payments. Murphy maintains that Cee

abandoned the property in October 2021, moved in with her mother, and then

she purchased another house in March 2022. Murphy maintains that he should

have been granted half of the mortgage payments and utilities he made after Cee

abandoned the property, and also, for his work in maintaining the property in

preparation for its sale. Further, Murphy contends that the trial court erred in not

finding that Cee committed financial misconduct. Ross App. No. 23CA28 27

{¶67} Cee in response asserts that Murphy is alleging facts that are not

part of the record of the case. Cee then contends that she stopped paying the

mortgage at Higby Road after Murphy was granted exclusive use of the house.

{¶68} We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering the

equal distribution of the Higby Road sale proceeds. Additionally, we find the trial

court did not abuse its discretion when it did not find that Cee committed any

financial misconduct.

{¶69} The “financial misconduct statute should apply only if the spouse

engaged in some type of ‘wrongdoing.’ ” Tittel v. Tittel, 2021-Ohio-1571, ¶ 30

(4th Dist.), quoting Jacobs v. Jacobs, 2003-Ohio-3466, ¶ 23 (4th Dist.). Further,

[t]he party complaining of the misconduct has the burden of proof. Vulgamore v. Vulgamore, 4th Dist. Pike No. 16CA876, 2017- Ohio-4114, ¶ 30, citing Jacobs Scioto No. 02CA2846 at ¶ 25. “ ‘There must be a clear showing that the offending spouse either profited from the alleged misconduct or intentionally defeated the other spouse’s distribution of assets.’ ” Martindale, 4th Dist. Athens No. 2019-Ohio-3028 at ¶ 82, quoting Jacobs at ¶ 23.

Id. at ¶ 31.

{¶70} In January 2020, Murphy and Cee purchased the house on Higby

Road. They did not, however, move in until May 2020. The evidence submitted

established that from January 2020, Cee was paying at least half of the mortgage

until May 2020, and then beginning in May 2020 until February 2022, she was

paying the full mortgage amount. Cee and Murphy both testified that in October

2021, Cee moved out of the house and began living with her mother. And that in

April 2022, Murphy was granted exclusive use of the Higby Road house. It is not

reasonable to expect Cee to pay for the mortgage when she is not residing at the Ross App. No. 23CA28 28

house and there was no court order for her do so. Thus, we find Murphy failed to

meet his burden in demonstrating Cee committed any financial wrongdoing.

{¶71} In September 2022 when the Higby Road house was sold, the sale

proceeds were placed in Cee’s attorney’s trust account, and the parties

stipulated that the proceeds would be divided equally between them. Murphy

failed to present any testimony or evidence on the work he completed that

assisted in the sale of the Higby Road property. Thus, there can be no abuse of

discretion on an issue that was not presented to the trial court.

{¶72} Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s seventh assignment of error.

VIII. Eighth assignment of error

{¶73} Murphy argues that the trial court erred in finding that he and Cee

are equally responsible for the payment of the remaining balance of the Home

Depot card. This is because part of the balance of the Home Depot bill is the

Samsung Washer and Dryer which Cee removed and is currently in possession

of. Murphy maintains that because of Cee’s violation of the mutual restraining

order in which she removed the washer and dryer from the Higby Road marital

home while the divorce was pending, she caused Murphy to have to spend over

$785 to replace the washer and dryer. The newly purchased set by Murphy was

left with the marital home as part of the sale agreement. Murphy maintains that

Cee alone should be responsible for the payment of the Home Depot card

balance.

{¶74} Cee maintains that there was no evidence presented that Murphy

purchased another set of washer and dryer. Additionally, she contends that Ross App. No. 23CA28 29

there was no evidence that she committed financial misconduct or violated any

restraining order by removing the washer and dryer. Finally, the remaining

balance on the Home Depot card was marital purchases that should be divided

equally.

{¶75} We find no abuse of discretion of the trial court’s decision to order

the parties to equally pay the $3,774.81 balance on the Home Depot card. Cee

testified that the Home Depot card was used to purchase the refrigerator, the

microwave, dishwasher, and the washer and dryer set for the Higby Road house

back in 2020. When the house was sold, the refrigerator, microwave and

dishwasher remained in the house and were part of the sale. Cee took the

washer and dryer set. There was no evidence on the monetary cost of each

appliance and the monetary value of the items at the time of division. What was

submitted was the amount of the remaining balance on the Home Deport card as

of October 2021. Thus, the court based on the evidence presented did not

abuse its discretion in ordering them to equally pay the remaining balance on the

card.

{¶76} Therefore, we overrule Murphy’s eighth assignment of error.

IX. Ninth assignment of error

{¶77} Murphy argues that the trial court erred in not finding Cee financially

irresponsible for depositing two refund checks into her personal account and not

adding them to the Higby Road mortgage. Murphy maintains that the refund

checks that totaled $4,859.62 were refunded to them after they refinanced their

marital home. Cee used the money on a Disney vacation instead of rolling it over Ross App. No. 23CA28 30

to the mortgage. Thus, according to Murphy, Cee’s conduct increased the

balance of the mortgage due.

{¶78} Cee responds by asserting that the checks were used on a family

vacation and the refinance transaction occurred months before the parties

separated in October 2021. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

{¶79} We agree with Cee and find that the trial court did not abuse its

discretion in not addressing the refinance refund money. Cee and Murphy both

testified that they refinanced the Higby Road house to eliminate the mortgage

insurance payment since they failed to put down enough money on the property.

After they refinanced, they received two checks totaling approximately $4,700.

The checks were deposited in Cee’s checking account. She testified that the

money was spent on a Disney vacation which included airplane tickets, overnight

accommodations, and park tickets. Murphy did not dispute that Cee and his

daughter went on a Disney vacation, but testified that Cee’s other children and

brother and his girlfriend went as well. But Murphy did not present any evidence

on what amounts were spent on Cee and their daughter and what was not.

Moreover, he failed to present any evidence that any of the refund money was

still outstanding and still in Cee’s checking account.

{¶80} Therefore, based on the evidence presented, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion in determining that the refund money was spent and not part

of what was required to be divided as marital property. Murphy’s ninth

assignment of error is overruled.

X. Tenth assignment of error Ross App. No. 23CA28 31

{¶81} Murphy argues that the trial court erred in granting the utility trailer

as separate property to Cee. Murphy asserts that the trailer was included in his

property and debt affidavit and it was not discussed at trial. Yet, the trial court

granted Cee the trailer as separate property. Murphy maintains that the trailer

was solely used by him and the funds to purchase it were from the sale of the

previous trailer he owned before marrying Cee. The previous trailer was sold for

$950, and those funds were used to purchase this $1,600 trailer. Thus, the trial

court abused its discretion in awarding Cee the trailer.

{¶82} Cee maintains that Murphy’s factual assertions are not supported by

the record of the case and that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.

{¶83} At trial, both Cee and Murphy testified but neither addressed the

trailer. The only reference to a trailer in the record of the case is in Murphy’s

affidavit filed with his counterclaim for divorce. In the affidavit, which was

admitted as an exhibit at trial, Murphy lists properties and identifies which ones

he believes are marital and which are separate. As part of his list, Murphy

included a 12x6 PJ Trailer that he asserted was worth $1,500, as his separate

asset.

{¶84} Even though there was no other evidence presented as to the

trailer, we cannot conclude that the trial court’s decision was an abuse of

discretion and unsupported by competent evidence when it awarded the trailer to

Cee. “Self-serving affidavits, without corroboration, generally will not be sufficient

to demonstrate material issues of fact.” Bangor v. Amato, 2014-Ohio-5503, ¶ 32

(7th Dist.). And as stated previously, Murphy has the burden to demonstrate that Ross App. No. 23CA28 32

the trailer was his separate property. In this case, we find he failed to meet his

burden. Therefore, the trial court considered the trailer as marital property and

had the duty to equitably divide the trailer along with the other marital property.

{¶85} We find no abuse of discretion here and overrule Murphy’s tenth

assignment of error.

CONCLUSION

{¶86} As a reviewing court, we are

required to examine the overall equity of the division of marital assets and not to conduct a line-by-line analysis of every item of marital property: “[I]t is not this court’s role to conduct an item by item review of the marital assets and liabilities. Our review is limited to the equity, i.e., fairness * * *.” Fergus v. Fergus (1997), 117 Ohio App.3d 432, 438, 690 N.E.2d 949.

Waller v. Waller, 163 Ohio App.3d 303, 310, ¶ 7 (7th Dist. 2005).

{¶87} But we feel the need to point out here some line-by-line assets that

were granted to Murphy to demonstrate the trial court’s equitable division. The

trial court granted Murphy the London house and both Loop Road properties,

valued at $130,000 and $183,000, respectively. And at the time of the parties’

separation in October 2021, the London house was paid for, and the Loop Road

properties had a mortgage balance of $33,420. Murphy was also granted his

truck and according to Murphy, it was valued at $34,000 and was paid for.

Murphy was also granted half of the mortgage paydown of the Marysville house

and the Plyleys Lane house totaling approximately $11,000. Thus, if we add the

amounts based on the value of the real estate property, the truck, and mortgage

reduction allocation, Murphy was granted approximately $358,000 of assets. Ross App. No. 23CA28 33

{¶88} Cee, on the other hand, was granted the proceeds of $105,798 from

the sale of her Marysville house, and the mortgage reduction from the London

house and Loop Road properties of approximately $71,000. Cee was granted

the Buick vehicle and the trailer which had monetary values attached to them of

approximately $12,000 and $1,500, respectively. The other monetary assets she

was granted was approximately $5,897 from Murphy’s bank accounts and half of

distribution of his retirement contributions from February 2018 to October 2021—

no amount was provided. The other properties that Cee was granted had no

monetary value, including her Jeep that, according to her, she owed more than

its value and the Applewood Drive house which had no equity. Thus, if we add

the assets that were allocated to Cee, the total is approximately $196,195.

{¶89} In essence, we find that the trial court effectively allocated the

assets between Cee and Murphy, ensuring the distribution was equitable and

that neither party was prejudiced in the process. Accordingly, we overrule all ten

of Murphy’s assignments of error and affirm the trial court’s judgment entry.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED. Ross App. No. 23CA28 34

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the JUDGMENT IS AFFIRMED and appellant shall pay the costs.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the Ross County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Smith, P.J. and Abele, J.: Concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

BY: ____________________________ Kristy S. Wilkin, Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the date of filing with the clerk.