Cedric Taylor, Jr v. State of Arkansas

2025 Ark. App. 388

• Court: Court of Appeals of Arkansas
• Decided: June 4, 2025
• Status: Published

Opinion

Cite as 2025 Ark. App. 388 ARKANSAS COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION I No. CR-24-480

Opinion Delivered June 4, 2025 CEDRIC TAYLOR, JR APPELLANT APPEAL FROM THE DESHA COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 21ACR-23-52]

STATE OF ARKANSAS HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON III, JUDGE APPELLEE AFFIRMED

MIKE MURPHY, Judge

A Desha County jury convicted appellant Cedric Taylor of being a felon in possession

of a firearm and sentenced him to six years’ incarceration. On appeal, Taylor argues that the

State presented insufficient evidence to show constructive possession and that the

Confrontation Clause was violated.1 We affirm.

The evidence at trial established that, on March 17, 2023, Officer Nathan Donaldson

with the Dumas Police Department pulled over the car Taylor was driving for failure to use

1 Taylor was charged with possession of marijuana with the purpose to deliver, a Class D felony; simultaneous possession of drugs and firearm, a Class Y felony; and being a felon in possession of a firearm, a Class B felony. The information was amended, adding a habitual-offender enhancement to each count. Following a motion to sever the felon-in- possession-of-firearm offense, an order for nolle prosequi was entered, allowing for the severance and dismissing the remaining two charges without prejudice. a turn signal. Taylor was the car’s sole occupant. Taylor did not produce a driver’s license

and told Donaldson that his name was Brennan Taylor. Dispatch subsequently informed

Donaldson that there was no record with that name.

Donaldson and another officer who had arrived on the scene, Investigator Eric

Armstrong, asked Taylor to get out of the car and decided to search it because they smelled

marijuana when they approached. During the search, the officers opened the hood and

found an operable Glock 19 pistol and an extended magazine with thirty rounds in it. As

they were searching under the hood, Taylor, who was handcuffed, started running. The

parties stipulated that Taylor had a previous felony conviction. Police learned Taylor’s real

identity once he was in jail.

Two witnesses testified at trial: Officer Donaldson and Drug Task Force Officer James

Slaughter. Donaldson’s body-camera footage was introduced into evidence without

objection, and the video was played for the jury. The footage revealed the officers finding

the gun and Taylor running away. After Donaldson testified, the prosecution stated its intent

not to call Investigator Armstrong as a witness and to release him from his subpoena because

his pregnant wife was in the hospital. Taylor objected, asserting that releasing Armstrong

would violate the Confrontation Clause because Armstrong “was over the entirety of his

prosecution” since he arrested Taylor and was part of the gun’s chain of custody. The court

overruled the objection, concluding that the prosecution was the master of its case and could

decide what witnesses to present.

2 Taylor moved for a directed verdict at the close of the State’s case, which also was at

the close of all the evidence, on the ground that his right to confront witnesses had been

violated mainly due to the prosecution’s failure to call Armstrong as a witness. The trial court

denied the motion, and the jury found Taylor guilty of being a felon in possession of a

firearm. This appeal followed.

Taylor first argues that the State did not present sufficient evidence to prove that he

was in constructive possession of the firearm found under the hood of the vehicle. This

argument is not preserved.

A person commits the offense of possession of a firearm by certain persons if the

person has been convicted of a felony and possesses or owns a firearm. Steadmon v. State,

2024 Ark. App. 586, at 8–9, 701 S.W.3d 69, 74. Possession of a firearm by certain persons

requires a showing that the defendant “possessed” the firearm. Id. A showing of constructive

possession, which is the control of, or right to control, the contraband, is sufficient to prove

possession of a firearm. Id. Constructive possession may be inferred when the firearm is

found in a place immediately and exclusively accessible to the accused and subject to his or

her control. Id.

The method to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence at a criminal jury trial is by a

motion for directed verdict. See Bennett v. State, 308 Ark. 393, 825 S.W.2d 560 (1992).

According to Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.1, if a motion for directed verdict is

to be made in a jury trial, it must be made at the close of the State’s evidence and at the close

of all the evidence. Rule 33.1(a) requires that a motion for directed verdict “state the specific

3 grounds therefor.” Failure to comply with the time and manner requirements of Rule 33.1(a)

will constitute a waiver of any question pertaining to the sufficiency of the evidence to

support the verdict. Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1(c). Rule 33.1(c) recites that a directed-verdict

motion that merely states that the evidence is insufficient does not preserve the issue for

appellate review. Breeden v. State, 2013 Ark. 145, 427 S.W.3d 5. The rationale behind this

rule is that when specific grounds are stated and the absent proof is pinpointed, the circuit

court can either grant the motion or, if justice requires, allow the State to reopen its case and

supply the missing proof. Pinell v. State, 364 Ark. 353, 219 S.W.3d 168 (2005). Without a

trial court ruling on a specific motion, there is nothing for this court to review. Maxwell v.

State, 373 Ark. 553, 285 S.W.3d 195 (2008). Our supreme court has held that Rule 33.1 is

to be strictly construed. Stone v. State, 2015 Ark. App. 133.

Here, Taylor’s motion for directed verdict was focused on the confrontation of

Investigator Armstrong. Taylor did not pinpoint what element of the offense the State failed

to prove nor did he challenge the State’s evidence to support “constructive possession.”

Accordingly, this sufficiency argument is not preserved for appellate review.

Next, Taylor argues he had the right to confront Investigator Armstrong at trial. He

contends that because Armstrong was the primary investigator involved in the search and

seizure of evidence, and the officer who transported the gun to the police station, Taylor was

entitled to cross-examine him.

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article 2, section 10 of

the Arkansas Constitution provide that the accused in a criminal prosecution has the right

4 “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” One’s right to confront the witnesses

against him, however, applies only to witnesses who testify or to those persons whose out-of-

court testimonial statements are offered in evidence for the truth of the matter asserted.

Caldwell v. State, 2018 Ark. App. 588, at 8, 565 S.W.3d 539, 544. The right generally does

not compel the State to produce every possible witness. Id.

Here, the case against Taylor was made by Officer Donaldson and Officer Slaughter.

Specifically, Officer Donaldson’s body-camera footage showed him retrieving the firearm

from under the hood of the car, and Donaldson identified the firearm as the one he

recovered. Officer Slaughter confirmed that he retrieved the firearm from the Dumas Police

Department and that the gun operated properly. No hearsay evidence was offered tying

Armstrong to the case. Because Taylor was allowed to confront and cross-examine all the

witnesses who provided evidence against him, there was no violation of his right to

confrontation.

Affirmed.

VIRDEN and BARRETT, JJ., agree.

Dusti Standridge, for appellant.

Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Sr. Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.