Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Jane Doe, et al.

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided July 7, 2026·No. 2:25-cv-01332·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ CEDRIC SANDERS, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-1332-pp

JANE DOE, et al.,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 11) ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Cedric Sanders, Jr., who is confined at Oshkosh Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed this case alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The court screened his complaint and determined that it did not state a claim. Dkt. No. 10 at 8. The court gave the plaintiff an opportunity to file an amended complaint; he did so, dkt. no. 11, and this order screens the amended complaint. I. Screening the Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 11) A. Federal Screening Standard Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison,

668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter C’nty Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. C’nty of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by

plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. Amended Complaint’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that from January 22 through 27, 2025, while he was confined at the Jefferson County Jail, defendants Officer Jane Doe and Officer John Doe removed the mattress from his cell for sixteen hours a day,

from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m.. Dkt. No. 11 at 2. The plaintiff states that “with no sheets or blankets with negative degree wind chills outside[,] [t]he cell was cold and laying on the concrete all day and well into the night caused pain in [his] lower back.” Id. He says that he was “top locked”, which is the “hole” in the Jefferson County Jail, as a form of “concrete punishment.” Id. The plaintiff alleges that his water didn’t run the entire first day in lock up. Id. at 2-3. He states that “with the conditions outside and going an entire day without water [he] believe[s] [his] basic needs were not met[.]” Id. at 3.

For relief, the plaintiff seeks $250,000. Id. at 4. He states that he also wants an outside source to rewrite the rules that the Jefferson County Jail uses to punish incarcerated individuals and restrict the jail from concrete punishment in the future. Id. C. Analysis The court assesses conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island

Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2017). “Pre-trial detainees may assert a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019). The court analyzes such claims under an objective reasonableness standard. Id. at 822-23. To state a claim, the plaintiff must first allege that the conditions of confinement were “objectively serious enough to amount to a constitutional deprivation.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015). An objectively serious condition of confinement must result in the denial of “the minimal

civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 820 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). Second, the plaintiff must allege that “the defendant’s response was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances, and that the defendant acted purposely, knowingly, or recklessly with respect to the consequences of his actions.” Mays v. Emanuele, 853 F. App’x 25, 27 (7th Cir. 2021) (cleaned up) (citing Hardeman, 933 F.3d at 823, 827; Miranda v. County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 353–54 (7th Cir. 2018)). The defendant’s response is objectively unreasonable if it is “not rationally

related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental purpose” or is “excessive in relation to that purpose.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 398 (2015). Life’s necessities include shelter and heat, and confinement without adequate bedding can amount to objectively serious deprivation. See Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 493 (7th Cir. 2006). The plaintiff does not allege that he did not have bedding the entire time he was on the disciplinary unit. He states that he spent six days on a disciplinary unit where the defendants

removed his mattress and blankets for sixteen hours a day, from 6:00 a.m.

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Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Jane Doe, et al., (E.D. Wis. 2026).

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