Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Captain Jane Doe and Officers Jane/John Does 1-7

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedFebruary 20, 2026
Docket2:25-cv-01332
StatusUnknown

This text of Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Captain Jane Doe and Officers Jane/John Does 1-7 (Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Captain Jane Doe and Officers Jane/John Does 1-7) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Captain Jane Doe and Officers Jane/John Does 1-7, (E.D. Wis. 2026).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ CEDRIC SANDERS, JR.,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 25-cv-1332-pp

CAPTAIN JANE DOE and OFFICERS JANE/JOHN DOES 1-7,

Defendants. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2) AND SCREENING COMPLAINT UNDER 28 U.S.C. §1915A ______________________________________________________________________________

Plaintiff Cedric Sanders, Jr., who is incarcerated at Oshkosh Correctional Institution and is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights while confined at the Jefferson County Jail. This decision resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, and screens his complaint, dkt. no. 1. I. Motion for Leave to Proceed without Prepaying the Filing Fee (Dkt. No. 2)

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. §1915(h). The PLRA lets the court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the plaintiff must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b)(1). He then must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On November 26, 2025, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $16.12. Dkt. No. 9. The court received that fee on December

15, 2025. The court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee and will require him to pay remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the Complaint A. Federal Screening Standard Under the PLRA, the court must screen complaints brought by incarcerated persons seeking relief from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must

dismiss a complaint if the incarcerated plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d

714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States, and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan–Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The court construes liberally complaints filed by

plaintiffs who are representing themselves and holds such complaints to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)). B. The Plaintiff’s Allegations The plaintiff alleges that in January 2025, while confined as a pretrial detainee at the Jefferson County Jail, he violated rules and was sent to the disciplinary unit. Dkt. No. 1 at 4. The plaintiff states that he was “top locked,”

which means that he was in a cell for twenty-three hours a day. Id. He says that defendants Captain Jane Doe and Officers John and Jane Does 1-7 removed his mattress and blankets every day from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. Id. They allegedly referred to it as “concrete punishment.” Id. at 5. The plaintiff states that he was in the disciplinary unit for six days, from January 22 through January 27, 2025. Id. at 4-5. The plaintiff claims that the removal of his bedding from 6:00 a.m. to 10:00 p.m. while in the disciplinary unit violated his constitutional rights. Id.

at 5. He says that he could not sleep comfortably on concrete, which resulted in “major pain”. Id. Officers John and Jane Does allegedly ignored the plaintiff's complaints and continued to remove his mattress and bedding until he left the disciplinary unit on January 28, 2025. Id. For relief, the plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages, and for the defendants to be retrained. Id. at 6. C. Analysis The court assesses conditions-of-confinement claims brought by pretrial

detainees under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island Cnty., 850 F.3d 849, 856 (7th Cir. 2017). “Pre-trial detainees may assert a conditions-of-confinement claim under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.” Hardeman v. Curran, 933 F.3d 816, 821–22 (7th Cir. 2019). The court analyzes such claims under an objective reasonableness standard. Id. at 822–23. To state a claim, the plaintiff first must allege that the conditions of confinement were “objectively serious enough to amount to a constitutional

deprivation.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 309 (7th Cir. 2015).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Rhodes v. Chapman
452 U.S. 337 (Supreme Court, 1981)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Booker-El v. Superintendent, Indiana State Prison
668 F.3d 896 (Seventh Circuit, 2012)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Kingsley v. Hendrickson
576 U.S. 389 (Supreme Court, 2015)
Miguel Perez v. James Fenoglio
792 F.3d 768 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
D. S. v. East Porter County School Corp
799 F.3d 793 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Stephens, James R. v. Mase, Mr.
145 F. App'x 179 (Seventh Circuit, 2005)
Alfredo Miranda v. County of Lake
900 F.3d 335 (Seventh Circuit, 2018)
Tapanga Hardeman v. David Wathen
933 F.3d 816 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Smith v. Dart
803 F.3d 304 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Mulvania v. Sheriff of Rock Island County
850 F.3d 849 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Cedric Sanders, Jr. v. Captain Jane Doe and Officers Jane/John Does 1-7, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/cedric-sanders-jr-v-captain-jane-doe-and-officers-janejohn-does-1-7-wied-2026.